October 2009 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence
G.R. No. 174451 - Veronica Cabacungan Alcazar v. Rey C. Alcazar
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 174451 : October 13, 2009]
VERONICA CABACUNGAN ALCAZAR, Petitioner, v. REY C. ALCAZAR, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse the Decision1 dated 24 May 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84471, affirming the Decision dated 9 June 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos City, Branch 85, in Civil Case No. 664-M-2002, which dismissed petitioner Veronica Cabacungan Alcazar's Complaint for the annulment of her marriage to respondent Rey C. Alcazar.
The Complaint,2 docketed as Civil Case No. 664-M-2002, was filed by petitioner before the RTC on 22 August 2002. Petitioner alleged in her Complaint that she was married to respondent on 11 October 2000 by Rev. Augusto G. Pabustan (Pabustan), at the latter's residence. After their wedding, petitioner and respondent lived for five days in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, the hometown of respondent's parents. Thereafter, the newlyweds went back to Manila, but respondent did not live with petitioner at the latter's abode at 2601-C Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila. On 23 October 2000, respondent left for Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, where he worked as an upholsterer in a furniture shop. While working in Riyadh, respondent did not communicate with petitioner by phone or by letter. Petitioner tried to call respondent for five times but respondent never answered. About a year and a half after respondent left for Riyadh, a co-teacher informed petitioner that respondent was about to come home to the Philippines. Petitioner was surprised why she was not advised by respondent of his arrival.
Petitioner further averred in her Complaint that when respondent arrived in the Philippines, the latter did not go home to petitioner at 2601-C Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila. Instead, respondent proceeded to his parents' house in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. Upon learning that respondent was in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, petitioner went to see her brother-in-law in Velasquez St., Tondo, Manila, who claimed that he was not aware of respondent's whereabouts. Petitioner traveled to San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, where she was informed that respondent had been living with his parents since his arrival in March 2002.
Petitioner asserted that from the time respondent arrived in the Philippines, he never contacted her. Thus, petitioner concluded that respondent was physically incapable of consummating his marriage with her, providing sufficient cause for annulment of their marriage pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code). There was also no more possibility of reconciliation between petitioner and respondent.
Per the Sheriff's Return3 dated 3 October 2002, a summons, together with a copy of petitioner's Complaint, was served upon respondent on 30 September 2002.4
On 18 November 2002, petitioner, through counsel, filed a Motion5 to direct the public prosecutor to conduct an investigation of the case pursuant to Article 48 of the Family Code.
As respondent did not file an Answer, the RTC issued on 27 November 2002 an Order6 directing the public prosecutor to conduct an investigation to ensure that no collusion existed between the parties; to submit a report thereon; and to appear in all stages of the proceedings to see to it that evidence was not fabricated or suppressed.
On 4 March 2003, Public Prosecutrix Veronica A.V. de Guzman (De Guzman) submitted her Report manifesting that she had conducted an investigation of the case of petitioner and respondent in January 2003, but respondent never participated therein. Public Prosecutrix De Guzman also noted that no collusion took place between the parties, and measures were taken to prevent suppression of evidence between them. She then recommended that a full-blown trial be conducted to determine whether petitioner's Complaint was meritorious or not.
Pre-trial was held and terminated on 20 May 2003.
On 21 May 2003, the RTC received the Notice of Appearance of the Solicitor General.
Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.
During trial, petitioner presented herself, her mother Lolita Cabacungan (Cabacungan), and clinical psychologist Nedy L. Tayag (Tayag) as witnesses.
Petitioner first took the witness stand and elaborated on the allegations in her Complaint. Cabacungan corroborated petitioner's testimony.
Petitioner's third witness, Tayag, presented the following psychological evaluation of petitioner and respondent:
After meticulous scrutiny and careful analysis of the collected data, petitioner is found to be free from any underlying personality aberration neither (sic) of any serious psychopathological traits, which may possibly impede her normal functioning (sic) of marriage. On the other hand, the undersigned arrived to (sic) a firm opinion that the sudden breakdown of marital life between petitioner and respondent was clearly due to the diagnosed personality disorder that the respondent is harboring, making him psychologically incapacitated to properly assume and comply [with] essential roles (sic) of obligations as a married man.
The pattern of behaviors displayed by the respondent satisfies the diagnostic criteria of a disorder clinically classified as Narcissistic Personality Disorder, a condition deemed to be grave, severe, long lasting in proportion and incurable by any treatment.
People suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder are known to have a pervasive pattern of grandiosity (in fantasy or behavior), need for admiration, and lack of empathy, beginning by early adulthood and present in a variety of contexts, as indicated by five (or more) of the following:
1. has a grandiose of self-importance (e.g. exaggerates achievements and talents, expect to be recognized as superior without commensurate achievements)
2. is preoccupied with fantasies of unlimited success, power, brilliance, beauty or ideal love
3. believes that he or she is "special" and unique and can only be understood by, or should associate with, other special or high status people (institutions)
4. requires excessive admiration
5. has sense of entitlement, i.e., unreasonable expectations of especially favorable treatment or automatic compliance with his or her expectations
6. is interpersonally exploitative, i.e., takes advantage of others to achieve his or her own ends
7. lacks empathy: is unwilling to recognize or identify with the feelings and needs of others
8. is often envious of others or believes that others are envious of him or her
9. shows arrogant, haughty behavior or attitudes.
The root cause of respondent's personality disorder can be attributed to his early childhood years with predisposing psychosocial factors that influence[d] his development. It was recounted that respondent is the first child of his mother's second family. Obviously, unhealthy familial constellation composed his immediate environment in his growing up years. Respondent had undergone a severe longing for attention from his father who had been unfaithful to them and had died early in life, that he was left alone to fend for the family needs. More so that they were coping against poverty, his caregivers failed to validate his needs, wishes or responses and overlooked the love and attention he yearned which led to develop a pathological need for self-object to help him maintain a cohesive sense of self-such so great that everything other people offer is "consumed." Hence, he is unable to develop relationship with other (sic) beyond this need. There is no capacity for empathy sharing, or loving others.
The psychological incapacity of the respondent is characterized by juridical antecedence as it already existed long before he entered into marriage. Since it already started early in life, it is deeply engrained within his system and becomes a[n] integral part of his personality structure, thereby rendering such to be permanent and incurable.7
Tayag concluded in the end that:
As such, their marriage is already beyond repair, considering the fact that it has long been (sic) ceased to exist and have their different life priorities. Reconciliation between them is regarded to be (sic). The essential obligations of love, trust, respect, fidelity, authentic cohabitation as husband and wife, mutual help and support, and commitment, did not and will no lon[g]er exist between them. With due consideration of the above-mentioned findings, the undersigned recommends, the declaration of nullity of marriage between petitioner and respondent.8
On 18 February 2004, petitioner filed her Formal Offer of Evidence. Public Prosecutrix Myrna S. Lagrosa (Lagrosa), who replaced Public Prosecutrix De Guzman, interposed no objection to the admission of petitioner's evidence and manifested that she would no longer present evidence for the State.
On 9 June 2004, the RTC rendered its Decision denying petitioner's Complaint for annulment of her marriage to respondent, holding in substance that:
In the case at bar, the Court finds that the acts of the respondent in not communicating with petitioner and not living with the latter the moment he returned home from Saudi Arabia despite their marriage do (sic) not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at the inception of their marriage or that these are incurable.
That being the case, the Court resolves to deny the instant petition.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Annulment of Marriage is hereby DENIED.9
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration10 but it was denied by the RTC in an Order11 dated 19 August 2004.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 84471. In a Decision12 dated 24 May 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision dated 9 June 2004. The Court of Appeals ruled that the RTC did not err in finding that petitioner failed to prove respondent's psychological incapacity. Other than petitioner's bare allegations, no other evidence was presented to prove respondent's personality disorder that made him completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state. Citing Republic v. Court of Appeals,13 the appellate court ruled that the evidence should be able to establish that at least one of the spouses was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that said person could not have known the marital obligations to be assumed; or knowing the marital obligations, could not have validly assumed the same. At most, respondent's abandonment of petitioner could be a ground for legal separation under Article 5 of the Family Code.???�r?bl?�