Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 2011 > April 2011 Decisions > [G.R. No. 190660, April 11 : 2011] LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND ELIZABETH DIAZ, REPRESENTED BY FRANCISCA P. DE GUZMAN AS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, RESPONDENTS. :

Private respondent Elizabeth P. Diaz (Elizabeth) was the registered owner of a parcel of agricultural land measuring approximately 15 hectares, situated in San Ricardo, Talavera, Nueva Ecija and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 197132. Ten hectares of the land were expropriated by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) under Presidential Decree No. 27 and Executive Order No. 228.

The DAR valued the expropriated land (the land) at P54,880.59 plus increment of P143,041.59 or a total of P197,922.18. Not satisfied with the valuation, Elizabeth, through her attorney-in-fact Francisca P. De Guzman (Francisca), filed a complaint^[1] on November 28, 2001 against the Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank) and the DAR before the Regional Trial Court of Guimba, Nueva Ecija, Branch 33, acting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC).  The complaint, docketed as Special Agrarian Case No. 1194-G, prayed that just compensation be fixed at P350,000 per hectare or a total of P5,250.000.

Upon Elizabeth's motion, three Commissioners were appointed to determine the just compensation for the land.

By Decision of June 21, 2006,^[2] the SAC, adopted the DAR's valuation on the basis of average gross production and fixed the just compensation plus increment at P19,107.235 per hectare or a total of P197,922.29.  It held that given  the formula used in Gabatin v. LBP,^[3] the Commissioner's Report and the fair market or assessed value of the land can not be considered in the valuation.

Elizabeth's motion for reconsideration was denied by Order dated August 31, 2006,^[4] hence, she elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.^[5]

Land Bank and the DAR failed to file their appellees' brief.  During the pendency of the appeal, Land Bank filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Defendant-Appellee['s] Motion to Dismiss Appeal,^[6] maintaining that the appeal should be dismissed because an ordinary appeal is the wrong remedy, the proper mode being by way of a petition for review, citing Section 60 of Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Hence, Land Bank concluded that the appellate court had no jurisdiction over the case, the SAC decision having attained finality following Land Bank of the Philippines v. De Leon^[7] which held that failure of a party to file the proper remedy within fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice of the assailed decision renders it final.

By Resolution^[8] of June 2, 2009, the appellate court denied Land Bank's motion to dismiss.  It faulted Land Bank for not filing an appellee's brief as directed, and for filing the motion to dismiss the appeal after the lapse of 157 days from the last day for filing the brief.

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari,^[9] Land Bank maintaining that the SAC Decision had become final and executory and, therefore, the appellate court never acquired jurisdiction over the appeal filed by Elizabeth, a wrong mode of appeal.

Additionally, Land Bank ascribes bad faith on the part of Elizabeth for, instead of sending a copy of her motion for reconsideration before the SAC and her subsequent Notice of Appeal to Land Bank's counsel of record Atty. Graciela L. Gutierrez at her address at the Land Bank Field Office in Cabanatuan City, Elizabeth sent them to the Land Bank's main office in Malate, Manila where, it points out, the lawyers neither have control nor possession of the records of the case.

In view of the filing of the present petition, action on Elizabeth's appeal was held in abeyance by the appellate court per Resolution dated June 7, 2010.^[10]

The petition is meritorious.

Indeed, following Land Bank of the Philippines v. De Leon,^[11] the proper mode of appeal from decisions of Regional Trial Courts sitting as SACs is by petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court and not through an ordinary appeal under Rule 41. The Court, in the immediately cited case of Land Bank, observing that "before the instant case reached us, Land Bank of the Philippines had no authoritative guideline on how to appeal decisions of SACs considering the seemingly conflicting provisions of Sections 60 and 61 of RA 6657," held that "Sec. 60 of RA 6657^[12] clearly and categorically states that the said mode of appeal (petition for review) should be adopted."

First, there is no conflict between Section[s] 60 and 61 of RA 6657 inasmuch as the Rules of Court do not at all prescribe the procedure for ordinary appeals as the proper mode of appeal for decisions of Special Agrarian Courts.  Section 61 in fact makes no more than a general reference to the Rules of Court and does not even mention the procedure for ordinary appeals in Section 2, Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure as the appropriate method of elevating to the Court of Appeals decisions of Special method of elevating to the Court of Appeals decisions of Special Agrarian Courts in eminent domain cases.

Second, the failure to mention Special Agrarian Courts in Section 1 of Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure cannot be construed to mean that a petition for review is not permissible for decisions of the said special courts.  In fact, the said Rule is not relevant to determine whether a petition for review is the proper mode of appeal from decisions of Regional Trial Courts in agrarian cases, that is, why they act as Special Agrarian Courts. Section 1 of Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure merely mentions the Court of Tax Appeals and the other different quasi-judicial agencies without exclusivity in its phraseology.  Such omission cannot be construed to justify the contention that a petition for review is prohibited for decisions on special agrarian cases inasmuch as the category is for quasi-judicial agencies and tax courts to which the Regional Trial Courts do not properly belong.  Although Supreme Court of Circular No. 1-91 (precursor to Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure) included the decisions of Special Agrarian Courts in the enumeration requiring petition for review, its non-inclusion later on in Rule 43 merely signifies that it was inappropriately classified as a quasi-judicial agencies.

What is indisputable is that Section 60 expressly regards a petition for review as the proper way of appealing decisions of agrarian courts.  So far, there is no rule prescribed by this Court expressly disallowing the said procedure.

Third, far from being in conflict, Section 61 of RA 6657 can easily be harmonized with Section 60.  The reference to the Rules of Court means that the specific rules for petitions for review in the Rules of Court and other relevant procedures in appeals filed before the Court of Appeals shall be followed in appealed decisions of Special Agrarian Courts.  Considering that RA 6657 cannot and does not provide the details on how the petition for review shall be conducted, a suppletory application of the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court is necessary.  In fact, Section 61 uses the word "review" to designate the mode by which the appeal is to be effected.  The reference therefore by Section 61 to the Rules of Court only means that the procedure under Rule 42 for petitions for review is to be followed for appeals in agrarian cases.^[13] (italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The adoption of a petition for review as the mode of appeal is justified in order to "hasten" the resolution of cases involving issues on just compensation of expropriated lands under RA 6657.  Thus the Court, still in the immediately cited Land Bank case, pronounced:

The reason why it is permissible to adopt a petition for review when appealing cases decided by the Special Agrarian Courts in eminent domain case is the need for absolute dispatch in the determination of just compensation.  Just compensation means not only paying the correct amount but also paying for the land within a reasonable time from its acquisition. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" for the property owner is made to suffer the consequences of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss.  Such objective is more in keeping with the nature of a petition for review.

Unlike an ordinary appeal, a petition for review dispenses with the filing of a notice of appeal or completion of records as requisites before any pleading is submitted.  A petition for review hastens the award of fair recompense to deprived landowners for the government-acquired property, an end not foreseeable in an ordinary appeal. . . .^[14]  (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Following then the same Land Bank case, resort by Elizabeth to a wrong mode of appeal was fatal to her cause as it resulted in rendering the decision appealed from final and executory.  Her notice of appeal did not, it bears emphasis, stop the running of the reglementary period to file a petition for review.

Although appeal is an essential part of our judicial process, it has been held, time and again, that the right thereto is not a natural right or a part of due process but is merely a statutory privilege. Thus, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional and failure of a party to conform to the rules regarding appeal will render the judgment final and executory. Once a decision attains finality, it becomes the law of the case irrespective of whether the decision is erroneous or not and no court - not even the Supreme Court - has the power to revise, review, change or alter the same. The basic rule of finality of judgment is grounded on the fundamental principle of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional error, the judgment of courts and the award of quasi-judicial agencies must become final at some definite date fixed by law.^[15] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.  The Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated June 2, 2009 is SET ASIDE.

The Decision dated June 21, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Guimba, Nueva Ecija, Branch 33 sitting as a Special Agrarian Court in Agr. Case No. 1194-G is deemed  final and executory.

SO ORDERED.

Brion, Bersamin, Villarama, Jr., and Sereno, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

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^[1] Records, pp. 1-11.

^[2] Id. at 240-244. Penned by Judge Ismael P. Casabar.

^[3] G.R. No. 148223, November 25, 2004.

^[4] Records, pp. 257-258.

^[5]  Id. at 260-262.

^[6]  Rollo, pp. 131-135

^[7] G.R. No. 143275, September 10, 2002, 388 SCRA 537.

^[8] CA rollo, pp.  178-181.

^[9]  Id. at 3-46.

^[10] Id. at  363.

^[11] Supra note 7.

^[12]  "An Act Instituting A Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program To Promote Social Justice And Industrialization Providing The Mechanism For Its Implementation, And For Other Purposes."

^[13] 388 SCRA 537, 544-545.

^[14] Id. at 546.

^[15] Zamboanga Forest Managers Corp. v. New Pacific Timber and Supply Co., et al., G.R. No. 143275, 399 SCRA 376, 385.