February 2012 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence
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[G.R. No. 151258 : February 01, 2012] ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT. [G.R. NO. 154954] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ANTONIO MARIANO ALMEDA, DALMACIO LIM, JR., JUNEL ANTHONY AMA, ERNESTO JOSE MONTECILLO, VINCENT TECSON, ANTONIO GENERAL, SANTIAGO RANADA III, NELSON VICTORINO, JAIME MARIA FLORES II, ZOSIMO MENDOZA, MICHAEL MUSNGI, VICENTE VERDADERO, ETIENNE GUERRERO, JUDE FERNANDEZ, AMANTE PURISIMA II, EULOGIO SABBAN, PERCIVAL BRIGOLA, PAUL ANGELO SANTOS, JONAS KARL B. PEREZ, RENATO BANTUG, JR., ADEL ABAS, JOSEPH LLEDO, AND RONAN DE GUZMAN, RESPONDENTS. [G.R. NO. 155101] FIDELITO DIZON, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT. [G.R. NOS. 178057 & 178080] GERARDA H. VILLA, PETITIONER, VS. MANUEL LORENZO ESCALONA II, MARCUS JOEL CAPELLAN RAMOS, CRISANTO CRUZ SARUCA, JR., AND ANSELMO ADRIANO, RESPONDENTS. :
[G.R. No. 151258 : February 01, 2012]
ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
[G.R. NO. 154954]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ANTONIO MARIANO ALMEDA, DALMACIO LIM, JR., JUNEL ANTHONY AMA, ERNESTO JOSE MONTECILLO, VINCENT TECSON, ANTONIO GENERAL, SANTIAGO RANADA III, NELSON VICTORINO, JAIME MARIA FLORES II, ZOSIMO MENDOZA, MICHAEL MUSNGI, VICENTE VERDADERO, ETIENNE GUERRERO, JUDE FERNANDEZ, AMANTE PURISIMA II, EULOGIO SABBAN, PERCIVAL BRIGOLA, PAUL ANGELO SANTOS, JONAS KARL B. PEREZ, RENATO BANTUG, JR., ADEL ABAS, JOSEPH LLEDO, AND RONAN DE GUZMAN, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. NO. 155101]
FIDELITO DIZON, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
[G.R. NOS. 178057 & 178080]
GERARDA H. VILLA, PETITIONER, VS. MANUEL LORENZO ESCALONA II, MARCUS JOEL CAPELLAN RAMOS, CRISANTO CRUZ SARUCA, JR., AND ANSELMO ADRIANO, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
SERENO, J.:
The public outrage over the death of Leonardo "Lenny" Villa - the victim in this case - on 10 February 1991 led to a very strong clamor to put an end to hazing.[1] Due in large part to the brave efforts of his mother, petitioner Gerarda Villa, groups were organized, condemning his senseless and tragic death. This widespread condemnation prompted Congress to enact a special law, which became effective in 1995, that would criminalize hazing.[2] The intent of the law was to discourage members from making hazing a requirement for joining their sorority, fraternity, organization, or association.[3] Moreover, the law was meant to counteract the exculpatory implications of "consent" and "initial innocent act" in the conduct of initiation rites by making the mere act of hazing punishable or mala prohibita.[4]
Sadly, the Lenny Villa tragedy did not discourage hazing activities in the country.[5] Within a year of his death, six more cases of hazing-related deaths emerged - those of Frederick Cahiyang of the University of Visayas in Cebu; Raul Camaligan of San Beda College; Felipe Narne of Pamantasan ng Araullo in Cabanatuan City; Dennis Cenedoza of the Cavite Naval Training Center; Joselito Mangga of the Philippine Merchant Marine Institute; and Joselito Hernandez of the University of the Philippines in Baguio City.[6]
Although courts must not remain indifferent to public sentiments, in this case the general condemnation of a hazing-related death, they are still bound to observe a fundamental principle in our criminal justice system - "[N]o act constitutes a crime... unless it is made so by law."[7] Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege. Even if an act is viewed by a large section of the populace as immoral or injurious, it cannot be considered a crime, absent any law prohibiting its commission. As interpreters of the law, judges are called upon to set aside emotion, to resist being swayed by strong public sentiments, and to rule strictly based on the elements of the offense and the facts allowed in evidence.
Before the Court are the consolidated cases docketed as G.R. No. 151258 (Villareal v. People), G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals), G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People), and G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona).
Facts
The pertinent facts, as determined by the Court of Appeals (CA)[8] and the trial court,[9] are as follows:
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). They were Caesar "Bogs" Asuncion, Samuel "Sam" Belleza, Bienvenido "Bien" Marquez III, Roberto Francis "Bert" Navera, Geronimo "Randy" Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and Leonardo "Lenny" Villa (neophytes).
On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some members of the Aquila Fraternity (Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They all proceeded to Rufo's Restaurant to have dinner. Afterwards, they went to the house of Michael Musngi, also an Aquilan, who briefed the neophytes on what to expect during the initiation rites. The latter were informed that there would be physical beatings, and that they could quit at any time. Their initiation rites were scheduled to last for three days. After their "briefing," they were brought to the Almeda Compound in Caloocan City for the commencement of their initiation.
Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had already received threats and insults from the Aquilans. As soon as the neophytes alighted from the van and walked towards the pelota court of the Almeda compound, some of the Aquilans delivered physical blows to them. The neophytes were then subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan "initiation rites." These rites included the "Indian Run," which required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows of Aquilans, each row delivering blows to the neophytes; the "Bicol Express," which obliged the neophytes to sit on the floor with their backs against the wall and their legs outstretched while the Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran over their legs; the "Rounds," in which the neophytes were held at the back of their pants by the "auxiliaries" (the Aquilans charged with the duty of lending assistance to neophytes during initiation rites), while the latter were being hit with fist blows on their arms or with knee blows on their thighs by two Aquilans; and the "Auxies' Privilege Round," in which the auxiliaries were given the opportunity to inflict physical pain on the neophytes. During this time, the neophytes were also indoctrinated with the fraternity principles. They survived their first day of initiation.
On the morning of their second day - 9 February 1991 - the neophytes were made to present comic plays and to play rough basketball. They were also required to memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternity's principles. Whenever they would give a wrong answer, they would be hit on their arms or legs. Late in the afternoon, the Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper and proceeded to torment them physically and psychologically. The neophytes were subjected to the same manner of hazing that they endured on the first day of initiation. After a few hours, the initiation for the day officially ended.
After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members[10] Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity members, including Dizon and Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to "paddling" and to additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny received several paddle blows, one of which was so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. The neophytes heard him complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After their last session of physical beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. He had to be carried by the auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the initiation for the day was officially ended, and the neophytes started eating dinner. They then slept at the carport.
After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lenny's shivering and incoherent mumblings. Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they thought he was just overacting. When they realized, though, that Lenny was really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans started helping him. They removed his clothes and helped him through a sleeping bag to keep him warm. When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival.
Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the following 35 Aquilans:
On 8 November 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91), holding the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, penalized with reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.[13] A few weeks after the trial court rendered its judgment, or on 29 November 1993, Criminal Case No. C-38340 against the remaining nine accused commenced anew.[14]
On 10 January 2002, the CA in (CA-G.R. No. 15520)[15] set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) and modified the criminal liability of each of the accused according to individual participation. Accused De Leon had by then passed away, so the following Decision applied only to the remaining 25 accused, viz:
On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 38340 dismissed the charge against accused Concepcion on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial.[16] Meanwhile, on different dates between the years 2003 and 2005, the trial court denied the respective Motions to Dismiss of accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.[17] On 25 October 2006, the CA in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 89060 & 90153[18] reversed the trial court's Orders and dismissed the criminal case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of violation of their right to speedy trial.[19]
From the aforementioned Decisions, the five (5) consolidated Petitions were individually brought before this Court.
G.R. No. 151258 - Villareal v. People
The instant case refers to accused Villareal's Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. The Petition raises two reversible errors allegedly committed by the CA in its Decision dated 10 January 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520 - first, denial of due process; and, second, conviction absent proof beyond reasonable doubt.[20]
While the Petition was pending before this Court, counsel for petitioner Villareal filed a Notice of Death of Party on 10 August 2011. According to the Notice, petitioner Villareal died on 13 March 2011. Counsel thus asserts that the subject matter of the Petition previously filed by petitioner does not survive the death of the accused.
G.R. No. 155101 - Dizon v. People
Accused Dizon filed a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari, questioning the CA's Decision dated 10 January 2002 and Resolution dated 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520.[21] Petitioner sets forth two main issues - first, that he was denied due process when the CA sustained the trial court's forfeiture of his right to present evidence; and, second, that he was deprived of due process when the CA did not apply to him the same "ratio decidendi that served as basis of acquittal of the other accused."[22]
As regards the first issue, the trial court made a ruling, which forfeited Dizon's right to present evidence during trial. The trial court expected Dizon to present evidence on an earlier date since a co-accused, Antonio General, no longer presented separate evidence during trial. According to Dizon, his right should not have been considered as waived because he was justified in asking for a postponement. He argues that he did not ask for a resetting of any of the hearing dates and in fact insisted that he was ready to present evidence on the original pre-assigned schedule, and not on an earlier hearing date.
Regarding the second issue, petitioner contends that he should have likewise been acquitted, like the other accused, since his acts were also part of the traditional initiation rites and were not tainted by evil motives.[23] He claims that the additional paddling session was part of the official activity of the fraternity. He also points out that one of the neophytes admitted that the chairperson of the initiation rites "decided that [Lenny] was fit enough to undergo the initiation so Mr. Villareal proceeded to do the paddling...."[24] Further, petitioner echoes the argument of the Solicitor General that "the individual blows inflicted by Dizon and Villareal could not have resulted in Lenny's death."[25] The Solicitor General purportedly averred that, "on the contrary, Dr. Arizala testified that the injuries suffered by Lenny could not be considered fatal if taken individually, but if taken collectively, the result is the violent death of the victim."[26]
Petitioner then counters the finding of the CA that he was motivated by ill will. He claims that Lenny's father could not have stolen the parking space of Dizon's father, since the latter did not have a car, and their fathers did not work in the same place or office. Revenge for the loss of the parking space was the alleged ill motive of Dizon. According to petitioner, his utterances regarding a stolen parking space were only part of the "psychological initiation." He then cites the testimony of Lenny's co-neophyte - witness Marquez - who admitted knowing "it was not true and that he was just making it up...."[27]
Further, petitioner argues that his alleged motivation of ill will was negated by his show of concern for Villa after the initiation rites. Dizon alludes to the testimony of one of the neophytes, who mentioned that the former had kicked the leg of the neophyte and told him to switch places with Lenny to prevent the latter's chills. When the chills did not stop, Dizon, together with Victorino, helped Lenny through a sleeping bag and made him sit on a chair. According to petitioner, his alleged ill motivation is contradicted by his manifestation of compassion and concern for the victim's well-being.
G.R. No. 154954 - People v. Court of Appeals
This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 seeks the reversal of the CA's Decision dated 10 January 2002 and Resolution dated 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520, insofar as it acquitted 19 (Victorino et al.) and convicted 4 (Tecson et al.) of the accused Aquilans of the lesser crime of slight physical injuries.[28] According to the Solicitor General, the CA erred in holding that there could have been no conspiracy to commit hazing, as hazing or fraternity initiation had not yet been criminalized at the time Lenny died.
In the alternative, petitioner claims that the ruling of the trial court should have been upheld, inasmuch as it found that there was conspiracy to inflict physical injuries on Lenny. Since the injuries led to the victim's death, petitioner posits that the accused Aquilans are criminally liable for the resulting crime of homicide, pursuant to Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code.[29] The said article provides: "Criminal liability shall be incurred... [b]y any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended."
Petitioner also argues that the rule on double jeopardy is inapplicable. According to the Solicitor General, the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in setting aside the trial court's finding of conspiracy and in ruling that the criminal liability of
all the accused must be based on their individual participation in the commission of the crime.
G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 - Villa v. Escalona
Petitioner Villa filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari, praying for the reversal of the CA's Decision dated 25 October 2006 and Resolution dated 17 May 2007 in CA-G.R. S.P. Nos. 89060 and 90153.[30] The Petition involves the dismissal of the criminal charge filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.
Due to "several pending incidents," the trial court ordered a separate trial for accused Escalona, Saruca, Adriano, Ramos, Ampil, Concepcion, De Vera, S. Fernandez, and Cabangon (Criminal Case No. C-38340) to commence after proceedings against the 26 other accused in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) shall have terminated. On 8 November 1993, the trial court found the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. As a result, the proceedings in Criminal Case No. C-38340 involving the nine other co-accused recommenced on 29 November 1993. For "various reasons," the initial trial of the case did not commence until 28 March 2005, or almost 12 years after the arraignment of the nine accused.
Petitioner Villa assails the CA's dismissal of the criminal case involving 4 of the 9 accused, namely, Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano. She argues that the accused failed to assert their right to speedy trial within a reasonable period of time. She also points out that the prosecution cannot be faulted for the delay, as the original records and the required evidence were not at its disposal, but were still in the appellate court.
We resolve herein the various issues that we group into five.
ISSUES
DISCUSSION
Resolution on Preliminary Matters
G.R. No. 151258 - Villareal v. People
In a Notice dated 26 September 2011 and while the Petition was pending resolution, this Court took note of counsel for petitioner's Notice of Death of Party.
According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability for personal penalties is totally extinguished by the death of the convict. In contrast, criminal liability for pecuniary penalties is extinguished if the offender dies prior to final judgment. The term "personal penalties" refers to the service of personal or imprisonment penalties,[31] while the term "pecuniary penalties" (las pecuniarias) refers to fines and costs,[32] including civil liability predicated on the criminal offense complained of (i.e., civil liability ex delicto).[33] However, civil liability based on a source of obligation other than the delict survives the death of the accused and is recoverable through a separate civil action.[34]
Thus, we hold that the death of petitioner Villareal extinguished his criminal liability for both personal and pecuniary penalties, including his civil liability directly arising from the delict complained of. Consequently, his Petition is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case against him deemed closed and terminated.
G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People)
In an Order dated 28 July 1993, the trial court set the dates for the reception of evidence for accused-petitioner Dizon on the 8th, 15th, and 22nd of September; and the 5th and 12 of October 1993.[35] The Order likewise stated that "it will not entertain any postponement and that all the accused who have not yet presented their respective evidence should be ready at all times down the line, with their evidence on all said dates. Failure on their part to present evidence when required shall therefore be construed as waiver to present evidence."[36]
However, on 19 August 1993, counsel for another accused manifested in open court that his client - Antonio General - would no longer present separate evidence. Instead, the counsel would adopt the testimonial evidence of the other accused who had already testified.[37] Because of this development and pursuant to the trial court's Order that the parties "should be ready at all times down the line," the trial court expected Dizon to present evidence on the next trial date - 25 August 1993 - instead of his originally assigned dates. The original dates were supposed to start two weeks later, or on 8 September 1993.[38] Counsel for accused Dizon was not able to present evidence on the accelerated date. To address the situation, counsel filed a Constancia on 25 August 1993, alleging that he had to appear in a previously scheduled case, and that he would be ready to present evidence on the dates originally assigned to his clients.[39] The trial court denied the Manifestation on the same date and treated the Constancia as a motion for postponement, in violation of the three-day-notice rule under the Rules of Court.[40] Consequently, the trial court ruled that the failure of Dizon to present evidence amounted to a waiver of that right.[41]
Accused-petitioner Dizon thus argues that he was deprived of due process of law when the trial court forfeited his right to present evidence. According to him, the postponement of the 25 August 1993 hearing should have been considered justified, since his original pre-assigned trial dates were not supposed to start until 8 September 1993, when he was scheduled to present evidence. He posits that he was ready to present evidence on the dates assigned to him. He also points out that he did not ask for a resetting of any of the said hearing dates; that he in fact insisted on being allowed to present evidence on the dates fixed by the trial court. Thus, he contends that the trial court erred in accelerating the schedule of presentation of evidence, thereby invalidating the finding of his guilt.
The right of the accused to present evidence is guaranteed by no less than the Constitution itself.[42] Article III, Section 14(2) thereof, provides that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused ... shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel..." This constitutional right includes the right to present evidence in one's defense,[43] as well as the right to be present and defend oneself in person at every stage of the proceedings.[44]
In Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan,[45] the Sandiganbayan set the hearing of the defense's presentation of evidence for 21, 22 and 23 June 1995. The 21 June 1995 hearing was cancelled due to "lack of quorum in the regular membership" of the Sandiganbayan's Second Division and upon the agreement of the parties. The hearing was reset for the next day, 22 June 1995, but Crisostomo and his counsel failed to attend. The Sandiganbayan, on the very same day, issued an Order directing the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Crisostomo and the confiscation of his surety bond. The Order further declared that he had waived his right to present evidence because of his nonappearance at "yesterday's and today's scheduled hearings." In ruling against the Order, we held thus:
The trial court should not have deemed the failure of petitioner to present evidence on 25 August 1993 as a waiver of his right to present evidence. On the contrary, it should have considered the excuse of counsel justified, especially since counsel for another accused - General - had made a last-minute adoption of testimonial evidence that freed up the succeeding trial dates; and since Dizon was not scheduled to testify until two weeks later. At any rate, the trial court pre-assigned five hearing dates for the reception of evidence. If it really wanted to impose its Order strictly, the most it could have done was to forfeit one out of the five days set for Dizon's testimonial evidence. Stripping the accused of all his pre-assigned trial dates constitutes a patent denial of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due process.
Nevertheless, as in the case of an improvident guilty plea, an invalid waiver of the right to present evidence and be heard does not per se work to vacate a finding of guilt in the criminal case or to enforce an automatic remand of the case to the trial court.[47] In People v. Bodoso, we ruled that where facts have adequately been represented in a criminal case, and no procedural unfairness or irregularity has prejudiced either the prosecution or the defense as a result of the invalid waiver, the rule is that a guilty verdict may nevertheless be upheld if the judgment is supported beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence on record.[48]
We do not see any material inadequacy in the relevant facts on record to resolve the case at bar. Neither can we see any "procedural unfairness or irregularity" that would substantially prejudice either the prosecution or the defense as a result of the invalid waiver. In fact, the arguments set forth by accused Dizon in his Petition corroborate the material facts relevant to decide the matter. Instead, what he is really contesting in his Petition is the application of the law to the facts by the trial court and the CA. Petitioner Dizon admits direct participation in the hazing of Lenny Villa by alleging in his Petition that "all actions of the petitioner were part of the traditional rites," and that "the alleged extension of the initiation rites was not outside the official activity of the fraternity."[49] He even argues that "Dizon did not request for the extension and he participated only after the activity was sanctioned."[50]
For one reason or another, the case has been passed or turned over from one judge or justice to another - at the trial court, at the CA, and even at the Supreme Court. Remanding the case for the reception of the evidence of petitioner Dizon would only inflict further injustice on the parties. This case has been going on for almost two decades. Its resolution is long overdue. Since the key facts necessary to decide the case have already been determined, we shall proceed to decide it.
G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona)
Petitioner Villa argues that the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano should not have been dismissed, since they failed to assert their right to speedy trial within a reasonable period of time. She points out that the accused failed to raise a protest during the dormancy of the criminal case against them, and that they asserted their right only after the trial court had dismissed the case against their co-accused Concepcion. Petitioner also emphasizes that the trial court denied the respective Motions to Dismiss filed by Saruca, Escalona, Ramos, and Adriano, because it found that "the prosecution could not be faulted for the delay in the movement of this case when the original records and the evidence it may require were not at its disposal as these were in the Court of Appeals."[51]
The right of the accused to a speedy trial has been enshrined in Sections 14(2) and 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.[52] This right requires that there be a trial free from vexatious, capricious or oppressive delays.[53] The right is deemed violated when the proceeding is attended with unjustified postponements of trial, or when a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the case being tried and for no cause or justifiable motive.[54] In determining the right of the accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case.[55] The conduct of both the prosecution and the defense must be weighed.[56] Also to be considered are factors such as the length of delay, the assertion or non-assertion of the right, and the prejudice wrought upon the defendant.[57]
We have consistently ruled in a long line of cases that a dismissal of the case pursuant to the right of the accused to speedy trial is tantamount to acquittal.[58] As a consequence, an appeal or a reconsideration of the dismissal would amount to a violation of the principle of double jeopardy.[59] As we have previously discussed, however, where the dismissal of the case is capricious, certiorari lies.[60] The rule on double jeopardy is not triggered when a petition challenges the validity of the order of dismissal instead of the correctness thereof.[61] Rather, grave abuse of discretion amounts to lack of jurisdiction, and lack of jurisdiction prevents double jeopardy from attaching.[62]
We do not see grave abuse of discretion in the CA's dismissal of the case against accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of the violation of their right to speedy trial. The court held thus:
This Court points out that on 10 January 1992, the final amended Information was filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, Ampil, S. Fernandez, Adriano, Cabangon, Concepcion, and De Vera.[64] On 29 November 1993, they were all arraigned.[65] Unfortunately, the initial trial of the case did not commence until 28 March 2005 or almost 12 years after arraignment.[66]
As illustrated in our ruling in Abardo v. Sandiganbayan, the unexplained interval or inactivity of the Sandiganbayan for close to five years since the arraignment of the accused amounts to an unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases - a clear violation of the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of cases.[67] Thus, we held:
From the foregoing principles, we affirm the ruling of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 89060 that accused Escalona et al.'s right to speedy trial was violated. Since there is nothing in the records that would show that the subject of this Petition includes accused Ampil, S. Fernandez, Cabangon, and De Vera, the effects of this ruling shall be limited to accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.
G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals)
The rule on double jeopardy is one of the pillars of our criminal justice system. It dictates that when a person is charged with an offense, and the case is terminated - either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the accused - the accused cannot again be charged with the same or an identical offense.[69] This principle is founded upon the law of reason, justice and conscience.[70] It is embodied in the civil law maxim non bis in idem found in the common law of England and undoubtedly in every system of jurisprudence.[71] It found expression in the Spanish Law, in the Constitution of the United States, and in our own Constitution as one of the fundamental rights of the citizen,[72] viz:
Rule 117, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, which implements this particular constitutional right, provides as follows:[73]
The rule on double jeopardy thus prohibits the state from appealing the judgment in order to reverse the acquittal or to increase the penalty imposed either through a regular appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court or through an appeal by certiorari on pure questions of law under Rule 45 of the same Rules.[74] The requisites for invoking double jeopardy are the following: (a) there is a valid complaint or information; (b) it is filed before a competent court; (c) the defendant pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case against him or her was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the defendant's express consent.[75]
As we have reiterated in People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, "[a] verdict of acquittal is immediately final and a reexamination of the merits of such acquittal, even in the appellate courts, will put the accused in jeopardy for the same offense. The finality-of-acquittal doctrine has several avowed purposes. Primarily, it prevents the State from using its criminal processes as an instrument of harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude of cases with accumulated trials. It also serves the additional purpose of precluding the State, following an acquittal, from successively retrying the defendant in the hope of securing a conviction. And finally, it prevents the State, following conviction, from retrying the defendant again in the hope of securing a greater penalty."[76] We further stressed that "an acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal."[77]
This prohibition, however, is not absolute. The state may challenge the lower court's acquittal of the accused or the imposition of a lower penalty on the latter in the following recognized exceptions: (1) where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, tantamount to a deprivation of due process;[78] (2) where there is a finding of mistrial;[79] or (3) where there has been a grave abuse of discretion.[80]
The third instance refers to this Court's judicial power under Rule 65 to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.[81] Here, the party asking for the review must show the presence of a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; a patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or to act in contemplation of law; an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility;[82] or a blatant abuse of authority to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive the court of its very power to dispense justice.[83] In such an event, the accused cannot be considered to be at risk of double jeopardy.[84]
The Solicitor General filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari, which seeks the reversal of (1) the acquittal of Victorino et al. and (2) the conviction of Tecson et al. for the lesser crime of slight physical injuries, both on the basis of a misappreciation of facts and evidence. According to the Petition, "the decision of the Court of Appeals is not in accordance with law because private complainant and petitioner were denied due process of law when the public respondent completely ignored the a) Position Paper x x x b) the Motion for Partial Reconsideration x x x and c) the petitioner's Comment x x x."[85] Allegedly, the CA ignored evidence when it adopted the theory of individual responsibility; set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court; and failed to apply Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code.[86] The Solicitor General also assails the finding that the physical blows were inflicted only by Dizon and Villareal, as well as the appreciation of Lenny Villa's consent to hazing.[87]
In our view, what the Petition seeks is that we reexamine, reassess, and reweigh the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties.[88] In People v. Maquiling, we held that grave abuse of discretion cannot be attributed to a court simply because it allegedly misappreciated the facts and the evidence.[89] Mere errors of judgment are correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, and not by an application for a writ of certiorari.[90] Therefore, pursuant to the rule on double jeopardy, we are constrained to deny the Petition contra Victorino et al. - the 19 acquitted fraternity members.
We, however, modify the assailed judgment as regards Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug - the four fraternity members convicted of slight physical injuries.
Indeed, we have ruled in a line of cases that the rule on double jeopardy similarly applies when the state seeks the imposition of a higher penalty against the accused.[91] We have also recognized, however, that certiorari may be used to correct an abusive judgment upon a clear demonstration that the lower court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.[92] The present case is one of those instances of grave abuse of discretion.
In imposing the penalty of slight physical injuries on Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug, the CA reasoned thus:
The appellate court relied on our ruling in People v. Penesa[94] in finding that the four accused should be held guilty only of slight physical injuries. According to the CA, because of "the death of the victim, there can be no precise means to determine the duration of the incapacity or medical attendance required."[95] The reliance on Penesa was utterly misplaced. A review of that case would reveal that the accused therein was guilty merely of slight physical injuries, because the victim's injuries neither caused incapacity for labor nor required medical attendance.[96] Furthermore, he did not die.[97] His injuries were not even serious.[98] Since Penesa involved a case in which the victim allegedly suffered physical injuries and not death, the ruling cited by the CA was patently inapplicable.
On the contrary, the CA's ultimate conclusion that Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug were liable merely for slight physical injuries grossly contradicts its own findings of fact. According to the court, the four accused "were found to have inflicted more than the usual punishment undertaken during such initiation rites on the person of Villa."[99] It then adopted the NBI medico-legal officer's findings that the antecedent cause of Lenny Villa's death was the "multiple traumatic injuries" he suffered from the initiation rites.[100] Considering that the CA found that the "physical punishment heaped on [Lenny Villa was] serious in nature,"[101] it was patently erroneous for the court to limit the criminal liability to slight physical injuries, which is a light felony.
Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code dictates that the perpetrator shall be liable for the consequences of an act, even if its result is different from that intended. Thus, once a person is found to have committed an initial felonious act, such as the unlawful infliction of physical injuries that results in the death of the victim, courts are required to automatically apply the legal framework governing the destruction of life. This rule is mandatory, and not subject to discretion.
The CA's application of the legal framework governing physical injuries - punished under Articles 262 to 266 for intentional felonies and Article 365 for culpable felonies - is therefore tantamount to a whimsical, capricious, and abusive exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction. According to the Revised Penal Code, the mandatory and legally imposable penalty in case the victim dies should be based on the framework governing the destruction of the life of a person, punished under Articles 246 to 261 for intentional felonies and Article 365 for culpable felonies, and not under the aforementioned provisions. We emphasize that these two types of felonies are distinct from and legally inconsistent with each other, in that the accused cannot be held criminally liable for physical injuries when actual death occurs.[102]
Attributing criminal liability solely to Villareal and Dizon - as if only their acts, in and of themselves, caused the death of Lenny Villa - is contrary to the CA's own findings. From proof that the death of the victim was the cumulative effect of the multiple injuries he suffered,[103] the only logical conclusion is that criminal responsibility should redound to all those who have been proven to have directly participated in the infliction of physical injuries on Lenny. The accumulation of bruising on his body caused him to suffer cardiac arrest. Accordingly, we find that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug criminally liable for slight physical injuries. As an allowable exception to the rule on double jeopardy, we therefore give due course to the Petition in G.R. No. 154954.
Resolution on Ultimate Findings
According to the trial court, although hazing was not (at the time) punishable as a crime, the intentional infliction of physical injuries on Villa was nonetheless a felonious act under Articles 263 to 266 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, in ruling against the accused, the court a quo found that pursuant to Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the accused fraternity members were guilty of homicide, as it was the direct, natural and logical consequence of the physical injuries they had intentionally inflicted.[104]
The CA modified the trial court's finding of criminal liability. It ruled that there could have been no conspiracy since the neophytes, including Lenny Villa, had knowingly consented to the conduct of hazing during their initiation rites. The accused fraternity members, therefore, were liable only for the consequences of their individual acts. Accordingly, 19 of the accused - Victorino et al. - were acquitted; 4 of them - Tecson et al. - were found guilty of slight physical injuries; and the remaining 2 - Dizon and Villareal - were found guilty of homicide.
The issue at hand does not concern a typical criminal case wherein the perpetrator clearly commits a felony in order to take revenge upon, to gain advantage over, to harm maliciously, or to get even with, the victim. Rather, the case involves an ex ante situation in which a man - driven by his own desire to join a society of men - pledged to go through physically and psychologically strenuous admission rituals, just so he could enter the fraternity. Thus, in order to understand how our criminal laws apply to such situation absent the Anti-Hazing Law, we deem it necessary to make a brief exposition on the underlying concepts shaping intentional felonies, as well as on the nature of physical and psychological initiations widely known as hazing.
Intentional Felony and Conspiracy
Our Revised Penal Code belongs to the classical school of thought.[105] The classical theory posits that a human person is essentially a moral creature with an absolute free will to choose between good and evil.[106] It asserts that one should only be adjudged or held accountable for wrongful acts so long as free will appears unimpaired.[107] The basic postulate of the classical penal system is that humans are rational and calculating beings who guide their actions with reference to the principles of pleasure and pain.[108] They refrain from criminal acts if threatened with punishment sufficient to cancel the hope of possible gain or advantage in committing the crime.[109] Here, criminal liability is thus based on the free will and moral blame of the actor.[110] The identity of mens rea - defined as a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent - is the predominant consideration.[111] Thus, it is not enough to do what the law prohibits.[112] In order for an intentional felony to exist, it is necessary that the act be committed by means of dolo or "malice."[113]
The term "dolo" or "malice" is a complex idea involving the elements of freedom, intelligence, and intent.[114] The first element, freedom, refers to an act done with deliberation and with power to choose between two things.[115] The second element, intelligence, concerns the ability to determine the morality of human acts, as well as the capacity to distinguish between a licit and an illicit act.[116] The last element, intent, involves an aim or a determination to do a certain act.[117]
The element of intent - on which this Court shall focus - is described as the state of mind accompanying an act, especially a forbidden act.[118] It refers to the purpose of the mind and the resolve with which a person proceeds.[119] It does not refer to mere will, for the latter pertains to the act, while intent concerns the result of the act.[120] While motive is the "moving power" that impels one to action for a definite result, intent is the "purpose" of using a particular means to produce the result.[121] On the other hand, the term "felonious" means, inter alia, malicious, villainous, and/or proceeding from an evil heart or purpose.[122] With these elements taken together, the requirement of intent in intentional felony must refer to malicious intent, which is a vicious and malevolent state of mind accompanying a forbidden act. Stated otherwise, intentional felony requires the existence of dolus malus - that the act or omission be done "willfully," "maliciously," "with deliberate evil intent," and "with malice aforethought."[123] The maxim is actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea - a crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of is innocent.[124] As is required of the other elements of a felony, the existence of malicious intent must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.[125]
In turn, the existence of malicious intent is necessary in order for conspiracy to attach. Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code - which provides that "conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it" - is to be interpreted to refer only to felonies committed by means of dolo or malice. The phrase "coming to an agreement" connotes the existence of a prefaced "intent" to cause injury to another, an element present only in intentional felonies. In culpable felonies or criminal negligence, the injury inflicted on another is unintentional, the wrong done being simply the result of an act performed without malice or criminal design.[126] Here, a person performs an initial lawful deed; however, due to negligence, imprudence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill, the deed results in a wrongful act.[127] Verily, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act, which is a requisite in conspiracy, is inconsistent with the idea of a felony committed by means of culpa.[128]
The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is thus a vital ingredient in establishing the commission of the intentional felony of homicide.[129] Being mala in se, the felony of homicide requires the existence of malice or dolo[130] immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of injuries.[131] Intent to kill - or animus interficendi - cannot and should not be inferred, unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such intent.[132] Furthermore, the victim's death must not have been the product of accident, natural cause, or suicide.[133] If death resulted from an act executed without malice or criminal intent - but with lack of foresight, carelessness, or negligence - the act must be qualified as reckless or simple negligence or imprudence resulting in homicide.[134]
Hazing and other forms of initiation rites
The notion of hazing is not a recent development in our society.[135] It is said that, throughout history, hazing in some form or another has been associated with organizations ranging from military groups to indigenous tribes.[136] Some say that elements of hazing can be traced back to the Middle Ages, during which new students who enrolled in European universities worked as servants for upperclassmen.[137] It is believed that the concept of hazing is rooted in ancient Greece,[138] where young men recruited into the military were tested with pain or challenged to demonstrate the limits of their loyalty and to prepare the recruits for battle.[139] Modern fraternities and sororities espouse some connection to these values of ancient Greek civilization.[140] According to a scholar, this concept lends historical legitimacy to a "tradition" or "ritual" whereby prospective members are asked to prove their worthiness and loyalty to the organization in which they seek to attain membership through hazing.[141]
Thus, it is said that in the Greek fraternity system, custom requires a student wishing to join an organization to receive an invitation in order to be a neophyte for a particular chapter.[142] The neophyte period is usually one to two semesters long.[143] During the "program," neophytes are required to interview and to get to know the active members of the chapter; to learn chapter history; to understand the principles of the organization; to maintain a specified grade point average; to participate in the organization's activities; and to show dignity and respect for their fellow neophytes, the organization, and its active and alumni members.[144] Some chapters require the initiation activities for a recruit to involve hazing acts during the entire neophyte stage.[145]
Hazing, as commonly understood, involves an initiation rite or ritual that serves as prerequisite for admission to an organization.[146] In hazing, the "recruit," "pledge," "neophyte," "initiate," "applicant" - or any other term by which the organization may refer to such a person - is generally placed in embarrassing or humiliating situations, like being forced to do menial, silly, foolish, or other similar tasks or activities.[147] It encompasses different forms of conduct that humiliate, degrade, abuse, or physically endanger those who desire membership in the organization.[148] These acts usually involve physical or psychological suffering or injury.[149]
The concept of initiation rites in the country is nothing new. In fact, more than a century ago, our national hero - Andres Bonifacio - organized a secret society named Kataastaasan Kagalanggalangang Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan (The Highest and Most Venerable Association of the Sons and Daughters of the Nation).[150] The Katipunan, or KKK, started as a small confraternity believed to be inspired by European Freemasonry, as well as by confraternities or sodalities approved by the Catholic Church.[151] The Katipunan's ideology was brought home to each member through the society's initiation ritual.[152] It is said that initiates were brought to a dark room, lit by a single point of illumination, and were asked a series of
questions to determine their fitness, loyalty, courage, and resolve. [153] They were made to go through vigorous trials such as "pagsuot sa isang lungga" or "[pagtalon] sa balon." [154] It would seem that they were also made to withstand the blow of "pangherong bakal sa pisngi" and to endure a "matalas na punyal." [155] As a final step in the ritual, the neophyte Katipunero was made to sign membership papers with the his own blood. [156]
It is believed that the Greek fraternity system was transported by the Americans to the Philippines in the late 19th century. As can be seen in the following instances, the manner of hazing in the United States was jarringly similar to that inflicted by the Aquila Fraternity on Lenny Villa.
Early in 1865, upperclassmen at West Point Academy forced the fourth classmen to do exhausting physical exercises that sometimes resulted in permanent physical damage; to eat or drink unpalatable foods; and in various ways to humiliate themselves.[157] In 1901, General Douglas MacArthur got involved in a congressional investigation of hazing at the academy during his second year at West Point.[158]
In Easler v. Hejaz Temple of Greenville, decided in 1985, the candidate-victim was injured during the shriner's hazing event, which was part of the initiation ceremonies for Hejaz membership.[159] The ritual involved what was known as the "mattress-rotating barrel trick."[160] It required each candidate to slide down an eight to nine-foot-high metal board onto connected mattresses leading to a barrel, over which the candidate was required to climb.[161] Members of Hejaz would stand on each side of the mattresses and barrel and fun-paddle candidates en route to the barrel.[162]
In a video footage taken in 1991, U.S. Marine paratroopers in Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, were seen performing a ceremony in which they pinned paratrooper jump wings directly onto the neophyte paratroopers' chests.[163] The victims were shown writhing and crying out in pain as others pounded the spiked medals through the shirts and into the chests of the victims.[164]
In State v. Allen, decided in 1995, the Southeast Missouri State University chapter of Kappa Alpha Psi invited male students to enter into a pledgeship program.[165] The fraternity members subjected the pledges to repeated physical abuse including repeated, open-hand strikes at the nape, the chest, and the back; caning of the bare soles of the feet and buttocks; blows to the back with the use of a heavy book and a cookie sheet while the pledges were on their hands and knees; various kicks and punches to the body; and "body slamming," an activity in which active members of the fraternity lifted pledges up in the air and dropped them to the ground.[166] The fraternity members then put the pledges through a seven-station circle of physical abuse.[167]
In Ex Parte Barran, decided in 1998, the pledge-victim went through hazing by fraternity members of the Kappa Alpha Order at the Auburn University in Alabama.[168] The hazing included the following: (1) having to dig a ditch and jump into it after it had been filled with water, urine, feces, dinner leftovers, and vomit; (2) receiving paddlings on the buttocks; (3) being pushed and kicked, often onto walls or into pits and trash cans; (4) eating foods like peppers, hot sauce, butter, and "yerks" (a mixture of hot sauce, mayonnaise, butter, beans, and other items); (5) doing chores for the fraternity and its members, such as cleaning the fraternity house and yard, being designated as driver, and running errands; (6) appearing regularly at 2 a.m. "meetings," during which the pledges would be hazed for a couple of hours; and (7) "running the gauntlet," during which the pledges were pushed, kicked, and hit as they ran down a hallway and descended down a flight of stairs.[169]
In Lloyd v. Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity, decided in 1999, the victim - Sylvester Lloyd - was accepted to pledge at the Cornell University chapter of the Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity.[170] He participated in initiation activities, which included various forms of physical beatings and torture, psychological coercion and embarrassment.[171]
In Kenner v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, decided in 2002, the initiate-victim suffered injuries from hazing activities during the fraternity's initiation rites.[172] Kenner and the other initiates went through psychological and physical hazing, including being paddled on the buttocks for more than 200 times.[173]
In Morton v. State, Marcus Jones - a university student in Florida - sought initiation into the campus chapter of the Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity during the 2005-06 academic year.[174] The pledge's efforts to join the fraternity culminated in a series of initiation rituals conducted in four nights. Jones, together with other candidates, was blindfolded, verbally harassed, and caned on his face and buttocks.[175] In these rituals described as "preliminaries," which lasted for two evenings, he received approximately 60 canings on his buttocks.[176] During the last two days of the hazing, the rituals intensified.[177] The pledges sustained roughly 210 cane strikes during the four-night initiation.[178] Jones and several other candidates passed out.[179]
The purported raison d'�tre behind hazing practices is the proverbial "birth by fire," through which the pledge who has successfully withstood the hazing proves his or her worth.[180] Some organizations even believe that hazing is the path to enlightenment. It is said that this process enables the organization to establish unity among the pledges and, hence, reinforces and ensures the future of the organization.[181] Alleged benefits of joining include leadership opportunities; improved academic performance; higher self-esteem; professional networking opportunities; and the esprit d'corp associated with close, almost filial, friendship and common cause.[182]
Anti-Hazing laws in the U.S.
The first hazing statute in the U.S. appeared in 1874 in response to hazing in the military.[183] The hazing of recruits and plebes in the armed services was so prevalent that Congress prohibited all forms of military hazing, harmful or not.[184] It was not until 1901 that Illinois passed the first state anti-hazing law, criminalizing conduct "whereby any one sustains an injury to his [or her] person therefrom."[185]
However, it was not until the 1980s and 1990s, due in large part to the efforts of the Committee to Halt Useless College Killings and other similar organizations, that states increasingly began to enact legislation prohibiting and/or criminalizing hazing.[186] As of 2008, all but six states had enacted criminal or civil statutes proscribing hazing.[187] Most anti-hazing laws in the U.S. treat hazing as a misdemeanor and carry relatively light consequences for even the most severe situations.[188] Only a few states with anti-hazing laws consider hazing as a felony in case death or great bodily harm occurs.[189]
Under the laws of Illinois, hazing is a Class A misdemeanor, except hazing that results in death or great bodily harm, which is a Class 4 felony.[190] In a Class 4 felony, a sentence of imprisonment shall be for a term of not less than one year and not more than three years.[191] Indiana criminal law provides that a person who recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally
performs hazing that results in serious bodily injury to a person commits criminal recklessness, a Class D felony.[192]
The offense becomes a Class C felony if committed by means of a deadly weapon.[193] As an element of a Class C felony - criminal recklessness - resulting in serious bodily injury, death falls under the category of "serious bodily injury."[194] A person who commits a Class C felony is imprisoned for a fixed term of between two (2) and eight (8) years, with the advisory sentence being four (4) years.[195] Pursuant to Missouri law, hazing is a Class A misdemeanor, unless the act creates a substantial risk to the life of the student or prospective member, in which case it becomes a Class C felony.[196] A Class C felony provides for an imprisonment term not to exceed seven years.[197]
In Texas, hazing that causes the death of another is a state jail felony.[198] An individual adjudged guilty of a state jail felony is punished by confinement in a state jail for any term of not more than two years or not less than 180 days.[199] Under Utah law, if hazing results in serious bodily injury, the hazer is guilty of a third-degree felony.[200] A person who has been convicted of a third-degree felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for a term not to exceed five years.[201] West Virginia law provides that if the act of hazing would otherwise be deemed a felony, the hazer may be found guilty thereof and subject to penalties provided therefor.[202] In Wisconsin, a person is guilty of a Class G felony if hazing results in the death of another.[203] A
Class G felony carries a fine not to exceed $25,000 or imprisonment not to exceed 10 years, or both.[204]
In certain states in the U.S., victims of hazing were left with limited remedies, as there was no hazing statute.[205] This situation was exemplified in Ballou v. Sigma Nu General Fraternity, wherein Barry Ballou's family resorted to a civil action for wrongful death, since there was no anti-hazing statute in South Carolina until 1994.[206]
The existence of animus interficendi or intent
to kill not proven beyond reasonable doubt
The presence of an ex ante situation - in this case, fraternity initiation rites - does not automatically amount to the absence of malicious intent or dolus malus. If it is proven beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrators were equipped with a guilty mind - whether or not there is a contextual background or factual premise - they are still criminally liable for intentional felony.
The trial court, the CA, and the Solicitor General are all in agreement that - with the exception of Villareal and Dizon - accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug did not have the animus interficendi or intent to kill Lenny Villa or the other neophytes. We shall no longer disturb this finding.
As regards Villareal and Dizon, the CA modified the Decision of the trial court and found that the two accused had the animus interficendi or intent to kill Lenny Villa, not merely to inflict physical injuries on him. It justified its finding of homicide against Dizon by holding that he had apparently been motivated by ill will while beating up Villa. Dizon kept repeating that his father's parking space had been stolen by the victim's father.[207] As to Villareal, the court said that the accused suspected the family of Bienvenido Marquez, one of the neophytes, to have had a hand in the death of Villareal's brother.[208] The CA then ruled as follows:
We cannot subscribe to this conclusion.
The appellate court relied mainly on the testimony of Bienvenido Marquez to determine the existence of animus interficendi. For a full appreciation of the context in which the supposed utterances were made, the Court deems it necessary to reproduce the relevant portions of witness Marquez's testimony:
On cross-examination, witness Bienvenido Marquez testified thus:
According to the Solicitor General himself, the ill motives attributed by the CA to Dizon and Villareal were "baseless,"[213] since the statements of the accused were "just part of the psychological initiation calculated to instill fear on the part of the neophytes"; that "[t]here is no element of truth in it as testified by Bienvenido Marquez"; and that the "harsh words uttered by Petitioner and Villareal are part of `tradition' concurred and accepted by all the fraternity members during their initiation rites."[214]
We agree with the Solicitor General.
The foregoing testimony of witness Marquez reveals a glaring mistake of substantial proportion on the part of the CA - it mistook the utterances of Dizon for those of Villareal. Such inaccuracy cannot be tolerated, especially because it was the CA's primary basis for finding that Villarreal had the intent to kill Lenny Villa, thereby making Villareal guilty of the intentional felony of homicide. To repeat, according to Bienvenido Marquez's testimony, as reproduced above, it was Dizon who uttered both "accusations" against Villa and Marquez; Villareal had no participation whatsoever in the specific threats referred to by the CA. It was "Boyet Dizon [who] stepped on [Marquez's] thigh"; and who told witness Marquez, "[I]to, yung pamilya nito ay pinapatay yung kapatid ko." It was also Dizon who jumped on Villa's thighs while saying, "[T]his guy, his father stole the parking space of my father." With the testimony clarified, we find that the CA had no basis for concluding the existence of intent to kill based solely thereon.
As to the existence of animus interficendi on the part of Dizon, we refer to the entire factual milieu and contextual premise of the incident to fully appreciate and understand the testimony of witness Marquez. At the outset, the neophytes were briefed that they would be subjected to psychological pressure in order to scare them. They knew that they would be mocked, ridiculed, and intimidated. They heard fraternity members shout, "Patay ka, Recinto," "Yari ka, Recinto," "Villa, akin ka," "Asuncion, gulpi ka," "Putang ina mo, Asuncion," "Putang ina nyo, patay kayo sa amin," or some other words to that effect.[215] While beating the neophytes, Dizon accused Marquez of the death of the former's purported NPA brother, and then blamed Lenny Villa's father for stealing the parking space of Dizon's father. According to the Solicitor General, these statements, including those of the accused Dizon, were all part of the psychological initiation employed by the Aquila Fraternity.[216]
Thus, to our understanding, accused Dizon's way of inflicting psychological pressure was through hurling make-believe accusations at the initiates. He concocted the fictitious stories, so that he could "justify" giving the neophytes harder blows, all in the context of fraternity initiation and role playing. Even one of the neophytes admitted that the accusations were untrue and made-up.
The infliction of psychological pressure is not unusual in the conduct of hazing. In fact, during the Senate deliberations on the then proposed Anti-Hazing Law, former Senator Lina spoke as follows:
Thus, without proof beyond reasonable doubt, Dizon's behavior must not be automatically viewed as evidence of a genuine, evil motivation to kill Lenny Villa. Rather, it must be taken within the context of the fraternity's psychological initiation. This Court points out that it was not even established whether the fathers of Dizon and Villa really had any familiarity with each other as would lend credence to the veracity of Dizon's threats. The testimony of Lenny's co-neophyte, Marquez, only confirmed this view. According to Marquez, he "knew it was not true and that [Dizon] was just making it up...."[218] Even the trial court did not give weight to the utterances of Dizon as constituting intent to kill: "[T]he cumulative acts of all the accused were not directed toward killing Villa, but merely to inflict physical harm as part of the fraternity initiation rites x x x."[219] The Solicitor General shares the same view.
Verily, we cannot sustain the CA in finding the accused Dizon guilty of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code on the basis of the existence of intent to kill. Animus interficendi cannot and should not be inferred unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such intent.[220] Instead, we adopt and reinstate the finding of the trial court in part, insofar as it ruled that none of the fraternity members had the specific intent to kill Lenny Villa.[221]
The existence of animus iniuriandi or malicious intent
to injure not proven beyond reasonable doubt
The Solicitor General argues, instead, that there was an intent to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa. Echoing the Decision of the trial court, the Solicitor General then posits that since all of the accused fraternity members conspired to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa and death ensued, all of them should be liable for the crime of homicide pursuant to Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code.
In order to be found guilty of any of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266 of the Revised Penal Code,[222] the employment of physical injuries must be coupled with dolus malus. As an act that is mala in se, the existence of malicious intent is fundamental, since injury arises from the mental state of the wrongdoer - iniuria ex affectu facientis consistat. If there is no criminal intent, the accused cannot be found guilty of an intentional felony. Thus, in case of physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code, there must be a specific animus iniuriandi or malicious intention to do wrong against the physical integrity or well-being of a person, so as to incapacitate and deprive the victim of certain bodily functions. Without proof beyond reasonable doubt of the required animus iniuriandi, the overt act of inflicting physical injuries per se merely satisfies the elements of freedom and intelligence in an intentional felony. The commission of the act does not, in itself, make a man guilty unless his intentions are.[223]
Thus, we have ruled in a number of instances[224] that the mere infliction of physical injuries, absent malicious intent, does not make a person automatically liable for an intentional felony. In Bagajo v. People,[225] the accused teacher, using a bamboo stick, whipped one of her students behind her legs and thighs as a form of discipline. The student suffered lesions and bruises from the corporal punishment. In reversing the trial court's finding of criminal liability for slight physical injuries, this Court stated thus: "Independently of any civil or administrative responsibility ... [w]e are persuaded that she did not do what she had done with criminal intent ... the means she actually used was moderate and that she was not motivated by ill-will, hatred or any malevolent intent." Considering the applicable laws, we then ruled that "as a matter of law, petitioner did not incur any criminal liability for her act of whipping her pupil." In People v. Carmen,[226] the accused members of the religious group known as the Missionaries of Our Lady of Fatima - under the guise of a "ritual or treatment" - plunged the head of the victim into a barrel of water, banged his head against a bench, pounded his chest with fists, and stabbed him on the side with a kitchen knife, in order to cure him of "nervous breakdown" by expelling through those means the bad spirits possessing him. The collective acts of the group caused the death of the victim. Since malicious intent was not proven, we reversed the trial court's finding of liability for murder under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code and instead ruled that the accused should be held criminally liable for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide under Article 365 thereof.
Indeed, the threshold question is whether the accused's initial acts of inflicting physical pain on the neophytes were attended by animus iniuriandi amounting to a felonious act punishable under the Revised Penal Code, thereby making it subject to Article 4(1) thereof. In People v. Regato, we ruled that malicious intent must be judged by the action, conduct, and external acts of the accused.[227] What persons do is the best index of their intention.[228] We have also ruled that the method employed, the kind of weapon used, and the parts of the body on which the injury was inflicted may be determinative of the intent of the perpetrator.[229] The Court shall thus examine the whole contextual background surrounding the death of Lenny Villa.
Lenny died during Aquila's fraternity initiation rites. The night before the commencement of the rites, they were briefed on what to expect. They were told that there would be physical beatings, that the whole event would last for three days, and that they could quit anytime. On their first night, they were subjected to "traditional" initiation rites, including the "Indian Run," "Bicol Express," "Rounds," and the "Auxies' Privilege Round." The beatings were predominantly directed at the neophytes' arms and legs.
In the morning of their second day of initiation, they were made to present comic plays and to play rough basketball. They were also required to memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternity's principles. Late in the afternoon, they were once again subjected to "traditional" initiation rituals. When the rituals were officially reopened on the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, the neophytes were subjected to another "traditional" ritual - paddling by the fraternity.
During the whole initiation rites, auxiliaries were assigned to the neophytes. The auxiliaries protected the neophytes by functioning as human barriers and shielding them from those who were designated to inflict physical and psychological pain on the initiates.[230] It was their regular duty to stop foul or excessive physical blows; to help the neophytes to "pump" their legs in order that their blood would circulate; to facilitate a rest interval after every physical activity or "round"; to serve food and water; to tell jokes; to coach the initiates; and to give them whatever they needed.
These rituals were performed with Lenny's consent.[231] A few days before the "rites," he asked both his parents for permission to join the Aquila Fraternity.[232] His father knew that Lenny would go through an initiation process and would be gone for three days.[233] The CA found as follows:
Even after going through Aquila's grueling traditional rituals during the first day, Lenny continued his participation and finished the second day of initiation.
Based on the foregoing contextual background, and absent further proof showing clear malicious intent, we are constrained to rule that the specific animus iniuriandi was not present in this case. Even if the specific acts of punching, kicking, paddling, and other modes of inflicting physical pain were done voluntarily, freely, and with intelligence, thereby satisfying the elements of freedom and intelligence in the felony of physical injuries, the fundamental ingredient of criminal intent was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. On the contrary, all that was proven was that the acts were done pursuant to tradition. Although the additional "rounds" on the second night were held upon the insistence of Villareal and Dizon, the initiations were officially reopened with the consent of the head of the initiation rites; and the accused fraternity members still participated in the rituals, including the paddling, which were performed pursuant to tradition. Other than the paddle, no other "weapon" was used to inflict injuries on Lenny. The targeted body parts were predominantly the legs and the arms. The designation of roles, including the role of auxiliaries, which were assigned for the specific purpose of lending assistance to and taking care of the neophytes during the initiation rites, further belied the presence of malicious intent. All those who wished to join the fraternity went through the same process of "traditional" initiation; there is no proof that Lenny Villa was specifically targeted or given a different treatment. We stress that Congress itself recognized that hazing is uniquely different from common crimes.[235] The totality of the circumstances must therefore be taken into consideration.
The underlying context and motive in which the infliction of physical injuries was rooted may also be determined by Lenny's continued participation in the initiation and consent to the method used even after the first day. The following discussion of the framers of the 1995 Anti-Hazing Law is enlightening:
During a discussion between Senator Biazon and Senator Lina on the issue of whether to include sodomy as a punishable act under the Anti-Hazing Law, Senator Lina further clarified thus:
Realizing the implication of removing the state's burden to prove intent, Senator Lina, the principal author of the Senate Bill, said:
Thus, having in mind the potential conflict between the proposed law and the core principle of mala in se adhered to under the Revised Penal Code, Congress did not simply enact an amendment thereto. Instead, it created a special law on hazing, founded upon the principle of mala prohibita. This dilemma faced by Congress is further proof of how the nature of hazing - unique as against typical crimes - cast a cloud of doubt on whether society considered the act as an inherently wrong conduct or mala in se at the time. It is safe to presume that Lenny's parents would not have consented[239] to his participation in Aquila Fraternity's initiation rites if the practice of hazing were considered by them as mala in se.
Furthermore, in Veda�a v. Valencia (1998), we noted through Associate Justice (now retired Chief Justice) Hilario Davide that "in our nation's very recent history, the people have spoken, through Congress, to deem conduct constitutive of ... hazing, [an] act[] previously considered harmless by custom, as criminal."[240] Although it may be regarded as a simple obiter dictum, the statement nonetheless shows recognition that hazing - or the conduct of initiation rites through physical and/or psychological suffering - has not been traditionally criminalized. Prior to the 1995 Anti-Hazing Law, there was to some extent a lacuna in the law; hazing was not clearly considered an intentional felony. And when there is doubt on the interpretation of criminal laws, all must be resolved in favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo.
For the foregoing reasons, and as a matter of law, the Court is constrained to rule against the trial court's finding of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa, there being no proof beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries or animus iniuriandi as required in mala in se cases, considering the contextual background of his death, the unique nature of hazing, and absent a law prohibiting hazing.
The accused fraternity members guilty of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however, that the accused fraternity members are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The Revised Penal Code also punishes felonies that are committed by means of fault (culpa). According to Article 3 thereof, there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act done without malice, from which an immediate personal harm, injury or material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution or advertence on the part of the person committing it.[241] In this case, the danger is visible and consciously appreciated by the actor.[242] In contrast, simple imprudence or negligence comprises an act done without grave fault, from which an injury or material damage ensues by reason of a mere lack of foresight or skill.[243] Here, the threatened harm is not immediate, and the danger is not openly visible. [244]
The test[245] for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act is as follows: Would a prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes on the doer the duty to take precaution against the mischievous results of the act. Failure to do so constitutes negligence.[246]
As we held in Gaid v. People, for a person to avoid being charged with recklessness, the degree of precaution and diligence required varies with the degree of the danger involved.[247] If, on account of a certain line of conduct, the danger of causing harm to another person is great, the individual who chooses to follow that particular course of conduct is bound to be very careful, in order to prevent or avoid damage or injury.[248] In contrast, if the danger is minor, not much care is required.[249] It is thus possible that there are countless degrees of precaution or diligence that may be required of an individual, "from a transitory glance of care to the most vigilant effort."[250] The duty of the person to employ more or less degree of care will depend upon the circumstances of each particular case.[251]
There was patent recklessness in the hazing of Lenny Villa.
According to the NBI medico-legal officer, Lenny died of cardiac failure secondary to multiple traumatic injuries.[252] The officer explained that cardiac failure refers to the failure of the heart to work as a pump and as part of the circulatory system due to the lack of blood.[253] In the present case, the victim's heart could no longer work as a pumping organ, because it was deprived of its requisite blood and oxygen.[254] The deprivation was due to the "channeling" of the blood supply from the entire circulatory system - including the heart, arteries, veins, venules, and capillaries - to the thigh, leg, and arm areas of Lenny, thus causing the formation of multiple hematomas or blood clots.[255] The multiple hematomas were wide, thick, and deep,[256] indicating that these could have resulted mainly from injuries sustained by the victim from fist blows, knee blows, paddles, or the like.[257] Repeated blows to those areas caused the blood to gradually ooze out of the capillaries until the circulating blood became so markedly diminished as to produce death. [258] The officer also found that the brain, liver, kidney, pancreas, intestines, and all other organs seen in the abdominals, as well as the thoracic organ in the lungs, were pale due to the lack of blood, which was redirected to the thighs and forearms.[259] It was concluded that there was nothing in the heart that would indicate that the victim suffered from a previous cardiac arrest or disease.[260]
The multiple hematomas or bruises found in Lenny Villa's arms and thighs, resulting from repeated blows to those areas, caused the loss of blood from his vital organs and led to his eventual death. These hematomas must be taken in the light of the hazing activities performed on him by the Aquila Fraternity. According to the testimonies of the co-neophytes of Lenny, they were punched, kicked, elbowed, kneed, stamped on; and hit with different objects on their arms, legs, and thighs.[261] They were also "paddled" at the back of their thighs or legs;[262] and slapped on their faces.[263] They were made to play rough basketball.[264] Witness Marquez testified on Lenny, saying: "[T]inamaan daw sya sa spine."[265] The NBI medico-legal officer explained that the death of the victim was the cumulative effect of the multiple injuries suffered by the latter.[266] The relevant portion of the testimony is as follows:
There is also evidence to show that some of the accused fraternity members were drinking during the initiation rites.[268]
Consequently, the collective acts of the fraternity members were tantamount to recklessness, which made the resulting death of Lenny a culpable felony. It must be remembered that organizations owe to their initiates a duty of care not to cause them injury in the process.[269] With the foregoing facts, we rule that the accused are guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Since the NBI medico-legal officer found that the victim's death was the cumulative effect of the injuries suffered, criminal responsibility redounds to all those who directly participated in and contributed to the infliction of physical injuries.
It appears from the aforementioned facts that the incident may have been prevented, or at least mitigated, had the alumni of Aquila Fraternity - accused Dizon and Villareal - restrained themselves from insisting on reopening the initiation rites. Although this point did not matter in the end, as records would show that the other fraternity members participated in the reopened initiation rites - having in mind the concept of "seniority" in fraternities - the implication of the presence of alumni should be seen as a point of review in future legislation. We further note that some of the fraternity members were intoxicated during Lenny's initiation rites. In this light, the Court submits to Congress, for legislative consideration, the amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the fact of intoxication and the presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members during hazing as aggravating circumstances that would increase the applicable penalties.
It is truly astonishing how men would wittingly - or unwittingly -impose the misery of hazing and employ appalling rituals in the name of brotherhood. There must be a better way to establish "kinship." A neophyte admitted that he joined the fraternity to have more friends and to avail himself of the benefits it offered, such as tips during bar examinations.[270] Another initiate did not give up, because he feared being looked down upon as a quitter, and because he felt he did not have a choice.[271] Thus, for Lenny Villa and the other neophytes, joining the Aquila Fraternity entailed a leap in the dark. By giving consent under the circumstances, they left their fates in the hands of the fraternity members. Unfortunately, the hands to which lives were entrusted were barbaric as they were reckless.
Our finding of criminal liability for the felony of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide shall cover only accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, Bantug, and Dizon. Had the Anti-Hazing Law been in effect then, these five accused fraternity members would have all been convicted of the crime of hazing punishable by reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment).[272] Since there was no law prohibiting the act of hazing when Lenny died, we are constrained to rule according to existing laws at the time of his death. The CA found that the prosecution failed to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, Victorino et al.'s individual participation in the infliction of physical injuries upon Lenny Villa.[273] As to accused Villareal, his criminal liability was totally extinguished by the fact of his death, pursuant to Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code.
Furthermore, our ruling herein shall be interpreted without prejudice to the applicability of the Anti-Hazing Law to subsequent cases. Furthermore, the modification of criminal liability from slight physical injuries to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide shall apply only with respect to accused Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson.
The accused liable to pay damages
The CA awarded damages in favor of the heirs of Lenny Villa in the amounts of P50,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto and P1,000,000 as moral damages, to be jointly and severally paid by accused Dizon and Villareal. It also awarded the amount of P30,000 as indemnity to be jointly and severally paid by accused Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson.
Civil indemnity ex delicto is automatically awarded for the sole fact of death of the victim.[274] In accordance with prevailing jurisprudence,[275] we sustain the CA's award of indemnity in the amount of P50,000.
The heirs of the victim are entitled to actual or compensatory damages, including expenses incurred in connection with the death of the victim, so long as the claim is supported by tangible documents.[276] Though we are prepared to award actual damages, the Court is prevented from granting them, since the records are bereft of any evidence to show that actual expenses were incurred or proven during trial. Furthermore, in the appeal, the Solicitor General does not interpose any claim for actual damages.[277]
The heirs of the deceased may recover moral damages for the grief suffered on account of the victim's death.[278] This penalty is pursuant to Article 2206(3) of the Civil Code, which provides that the "spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and the ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased."[279] Thus, we hereby we affirm the CA's award of moral damages in the amount of ?1,000,000.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 155101 finding petitioner Fidelito Dizon guilty of homicide is hereby MODIFIED and set aside IN PART. The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954 - finding Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries - is also MODIFIED and set aside in part. Instead, Fidelito Dizon, Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide defined and penalized under Article 365 in relation to Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. They are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. In addition, accused are ORDERED jointly and severally to pay the heirs of Lenny Villa civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of ?50,000, and moral damages in the amount of ?1,000,000, plus legal interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 12% from the date of the finality of this Decision until satisfaction.[280] Costs de oficio.
The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954, acquitting Victorino et al., is hereby affirmed. The appealed Judgments in G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080, dismissing the criminal case filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano, are likewise affirmed. Finally, pursuant to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the Petition in G.R. No. 151258 is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case against Artemio Villareal deemed closed and TERMINATED.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives for possible consideration of the amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the fact of intoxication and the presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members during hazing as aggravating circumstances that would increase the applicable penalties.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Perez, and Reyes, JJ., concur.
[1] Sponsorship Speech of former Senator Joey Lina, Senate Transcript of Session Proceedings No. 34 (08 October 1992) 9th Congress, 1st Regular Sess. at 21-22 [hereinafter Senate TSP No. 34].
[2] Id.
[3] Senate Transcript of Session Proceedings No. 47 (10 November 1992) 9th Congress, 1st Regular Sess. at 20-21, 24-27 [hereinafter Senate TSP No. 47].
[4] Id.; Senate Transcript of Session Proceedings No. 62 (14 December 1992) 9th Congress, 1st Regular Sess. at 15 [hereinafter Senate TSP No. 62].
[5] Senate TSP No. 34, supra note 1.
[6] Id.
[7] U.S. v. Taylor, 28 Phil 599 (1914). The Court declared, "In the Philippine Islands there exist no crimes such as are known in the United States and England as common law crimes;" id. at 604.
[8] CA Decision (People v. Dizon, CA-G.R. CR No. 15520), pp. 1-5; rollo (G.R. No. 151258), pp. 62-66.
[9] RTC Decision [People v. Dizon, Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)], pp. 1-57; rollo (G.R. No. 151258), pp. 109-167.
[10] As explained in the Petition for Review of Villareal, "resident brods" are those fraternity members who are currently students of the Ateneo Law School, while "alumni brods" are those fraternity members who are graduates or former students of the law school; see Villareal's Petition for Review (Villareal v. People, G.R. No. 151258), pp. 5-7; rollo (G.R. No. 151258), pp. 17-19.
[11] RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 2, supra note 9; rollo, p. 110.
[12] Id.
[13] Id. at 66-67; rollo, pp. 175-176.
[14] CA Decision (Escalona v. RTC, CA-G.R. SP No. 89060), p. 4; rollo (G.R. No. 178057), p. 131.
[15] Penned by Associate Justice Eubulo G. Verzola and concurred in by Associate Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Eliezer R. de los Santos (with Concurring Opinion).
[16] RTC Decision (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. 38340), p. 21; rollo (G.R. No. 178057), p. 1114.
[17] CA Decision (Escalona v. RTC), pp. 12-14, supra note 14; rollo, pp. 139-141.
[18] Penned by Associate Justice Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo and concurred in by Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Hakim S. Abdulwahid.
[19] CA Decision (Escalona v. RTC), pp. 37-39, supra note 14; rollo, pp. 166-168.
[20] Villareal's Petition for Review (Villareal v. People, G.R. No. 151258), p. 13; rollo, p. 25.
[21] Dizon's Petition for Review (Dizon v. People, G.R. No. 155101), p. 1; rollo, p. 3.
[22] Id. at 17; rollo, p. 19.
[23] Id. at 10; rollo, p. 12.
[24] Id. at 22; rollo, p. 24.
[25] Id. at 23; rollo, p. 25.
[26] Id. at 23-24; rollo/i>, pp. 25-26.
[27] Id. at 26; rollo, p. 28.
[28] People's Petition for Certiorari (People v. CA, G.R. No. 154954), p. 2; rollo, p. 13.
[29] Id. at 167; rollo, p. 118.
[30] Villa's Petition for Review on Certiorari (Villa v. Escalona, G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080), p. 1; rollo, p. 84.
[31] Petralba v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 81337, 16 August 1991, 200 SCRA 644.
[32] People v. Badeo, G.R. No. 72990, 21 November 1991, 204 SCRA 122, citing J. Aquino's Concurring Opinion in People v. Satorre, G.R. No. L-26282, August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 439.
[33] People v. Bayotas, G.R. No. 102007, 2 September 1994, 236 SCRA 239; People v. Bunay, G.R. No. 171268, 14 September 2010, 630 SCRA 445.
[34] People v. Bunay, supra, citing People v. Bayotas, supra.
[35] CA Decision (People v. Dizon), p. 7, supra note 8; rollo, p. 68.
[36] Id.
[37] Id.
[38] Id.
[39] Id. at 7-8; rollo, pp. 68-69.
[40] Id. at 8; rollo, p. 69.
[41] Id.
[42] People v. Banihit, 393 Phil. 465 (2000); People v. Hernandez, 328 Phil. 1123 (1996), citing People v. Dichoso, 96 SCRA 957 (1980); and People v. Angco, 103 Phil. 33 (1958).
[43] People v. Hapa, 413 Phil. 679 (2001), citing People v. Diaz, 311 SCRA 585 (1999).
[44] People v. Hapa, supra, citing Parada v. Veneracion, 336 Phil. 354, 360 (1997).
[45] Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan, 495 Phil. 718 (2005).
[46] Id.
[47] People v. Bodoso, 446 Phil. 838 (2003).
[48] Id.
[49] Dizon's Petition for Review, supra note 21 at 20; rollo, p. 22.
[50] Id. at 23; rollo, p. 25.
[51] Villa's Petition for Review on Certiorari, supra note 30 at 19; rollo, p. 102.
[52] People v. Hernandez, G.R. Nos. 154218 & 154372, 28 August 2006, 499 SCRA 688.
[53] People v. Tampal, 314 Phil. 35 (1995), citing Gonzales v. Sandiganbayan, 199 SCRA 298 (1991); Acebedo v. Sarmiento, 146 Phil. 820 (1970).
[54] People v. Tampal, supra; Acebedo v. Sarmiento, supra.
[55] People v. Tampal, supra.
[56] Id.
[57] Id.
[58] People v. Hernandez, supra note 52, citing People v. Tampal, supra; Philippine Savings Bank v. Spouses Bermoy, 471 SCRA 94, 107 (2005); People v. Bans, 239 SCRA 48 (1994); People v. Declaro, 170 SCRA 142 (1989); and People v. Quizada, 160 SCRA 516 (1988).
[59] See People v. Hernandez, supra note 52.
[60] Id.
[61] Id.
[62] Id.
[63] CA Decision (Escalona v. RTC), pp. 24-30, supra note 14; rollo, pp. 151-157.
[64] Id. at 4; rollo, p. 131.
[65] Id.
[66] Id.
[67] Abardo v. Sandiganbayan, 407 Phil. 985 (2001).
[68] Id.
[69] Melo v. People, 85 Phil. 766 (1950).
[70] Id.
[71] Id.
[72] Id.
[73] People v. Nazareno, G.R. No. 168982, 5 August 2009, 595 SCRA 438.
[74] Id.; People v. Maquiling, 368 Phil. 169 (1999).
[75] People v. Velasco, 394 Phil. 517 (2000), citing Rules on Criminal Procedure, Rule 117, Sec 7; Paulin v. Gimenez, G. R. No. 103323, 21 January 1993, 217 SCRA 386; Comelec v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 108120, 26 January 1994, 229 SCRA 501; People v. Maquiling, supra note 74.
[76] People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, G.R. No. 159261, 21 February 2007, 516 SCRA 383, 397, citing People v. Serrano, 315 SCRA 686, 689 (1999).
[77] People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, supra, citing People v. Velasco, 340 SCRA 207, 240 (2000).
[78] Galman v. Sandiganbayan, 228 Phil. 42 (1986), citing People v. Bocar, 138 SCRA 166 (1985); Combate v. San Jose, 135 SCRA 693 (1985); People v. Catolico, 38 SCRA 389 (1971); and People v. Navarro, 63 SCRA 264 (1975).
[79] People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, supra note 76 [citing People v. Tria-Tirona, 463 SCRA 462, 469-470 (2005); and People v. Velasco, 340 SCRA 207 (2000)]; People v. Court of Appeals and Francisco, 468 Phil. 1 (2004); Galman v. Sandiganbayan, supra, citing People v. Bocar, supra.
[80] People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, supra note 76, citing People v. Serrano, supra note 76 at 690; People v. De Grano, G.R. No. 167710, 5 June 2009, 588 SCRA 550.
[81] People v. Nazareno, supra note 73; De Vera v. De Vera, G.R. No. 172832, 7 April 2009, 584 SCRA 506.
[82] People v. Nazareno, supra note 73; De Vera v. De Vera, supra.
[83] People v. De Grano, supra note 80, citing People v. Maquiling, supra note 74 at 704.
[84] Id.
[85] People's Petition for Certiorari, p. 8, supra note 28; rollo, p. 19.
[86] Id. at 80-81; rollo, pp. 91-92.
[87] Id. at 82-86; rollo, pp. 93-97.
[88] See Francisco v. Desierto, G.R. No. 154117, 2 October 2009, 602 SCRA 50, citing First Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 171989, 4 July 2007, 526 SCRA 564, 578.
[89] People v. Maquiling, supra note 74, citing Teknika Skills and Trade Services v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, 273 SCRA 10 (1997).
[90] People v. Maquiling, supra note 74, citing Medina v. City Sheriff of Manila, 276 SCRA 133, (1997); Jamer v. National Labor Relations Commission, 278 SCRA 632 (1997); and Azores v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 252 SCRA 387 (1996).
[91] De Vera v. De Vera, supra note 81; People v. Dela Torre, 430 Phil. 420 (2002); People v. Leones, 418 Phil. 804 (2001); People v. Ruiz, 171 Phil. 400 (1978); People v. Pomeroy, 97 Phil. 927 (1955), citing People v. Ang Cho Kio, 95 Phil. 475 (1954).
[92] See generally People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, supra note 76; and People v. Court of Appeals and Francisco, supra note 79.
[93] CA Decision (People v. Dizon), pp. 21-22, supra note 8; rollo, pp. 82-83.
[94] People v. Penesa, 81 Phil. 398 (1948).
[95] CA Decision (People v. Dizon), pp. 21-22, supra note 8; rollo, pp. 82-83.
[96] People v. Penesa, supra note 94.
[97] Id.
[98] Id.
[99] CA Decision (People v. Dizon), p. 16, supra note 8; rollo, p. 77.
[100] Id. at 21; rollo, p. 82.
[101] Id.
[102] See footnote 1 of Corpus v. Paje, 139 Phil. 429 (1969).
[103] RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 61, supra note 9; rollo, p. 170.
[104] Id. at 58; rollo, p. 167.
[105] Ramon C. Aquino, The Revised Penal Code - Volume One 3 (1961); see People v. Estrada, 389 Phil. 216 (2000); People v. Sandiganbayan, 341 Phil. 503 (1997).
[106] Vicente J. Francisco, The Revised Penal Code: Annotated and Commented - Book One 4 (3rd ed. 1958); see People v. Estrada, supra.
[107] Francisco, supra at 4; People v. Estrada, supra.
[108] Aquino, supra note 105 at 3.
[109] Id.
[110] Guillermo B. Guevara, Penal Sciences and Philippine Criminal Law 6 (1974).
[111] People v. Sandiganbayan, 341 Phil. 503 (1997).
[112] Francisco, supra note 106 at 33.
[113] Id. at 33-34.
[114] Mariano A. Albert, The Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815) 21-24 (1946).
[115] Id. at 21.
[116] Id. at 21.
[117] Guevarra v. Almodovar, 251 Phil. 427 (1989), citing 46 CJS Intent 1103.
[118] Black's Law Dictionary 670 (8th abr. ed. 2005); see People v. Regato, 212 Phil. 268 (1984).
[119] Guevarra v. Almodovar, supra note 117.
[120] Albert, supra note 114 at 23.
[121] People v. Ballesteros, 349 Phil. 366 (1998); Bagajo v. Marave, 176 Phil. 20 (1978), citing People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 297; 61 N.E. 286, 296; 62 L.R.A. 193.
[122] Black's Law Dictionary, supra note 118 at 520.
[123] See Francisco, supra note 106 at 34; Albert, supra note 114 at 23-25.
[124] U.S. v. Catolico, 18 Phil. 504 (1911); U.S. v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil. 488 (1910).
[125] U.S. v. Barnes, 8 Phil. 59 (1907); Dado v. People, 440 Phil. 521 (2002), citing Mondragon v. People, 17 SCRA 476, 481 (1966); People v. Villanueva, 51 Phil. 488 (1928); U.S. v. Reyes, 30 Phil. 551 (1915); U.S. v. Mendoza, 38 Phil. 691 (1918); People v. Montes, 53 Phil. 323 (1929); People v. Pacusbas, 64 Phil. 614 (1937); and People v. Penesa, supra note 94.
[126] People v. Fallorina, 468 Phil. 816 (2004), citing People v. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257 (1943); Francisco, supra note 106 at 51-52, citing People v. Sara, 55 Phil. 939 (1931).
[127] See generally Francisco, supra note 106 at 51.
[128] Id. at 52; People v. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257 (1943), citing People v. Nanquil, 43 Phil. 232 (1922); People v. Bindoy, 56 Phil. 15 (1931).
[129] Mahawan v. People, G.R. No. 176609, 18 December 2008, 574 SCRA 737, citing Rivera v. People, G.R. No. 166326, 25 January 2006, 480 SCRA 188, 196-197.
[130] People v. Quijada, 328 Phil. 505 (1996).
[131] Mahawan v. People, supra note 129, citing Rivera v. People, supra note 129.
[132] Dado v. People, supra note 125.
[133] People v. Delim, 444 Phil. 430, 450 (2003), citing Wharton, Criminal Law - Vol. 1, 473-474 (12th ed., 1932).
[134] See People v. Garcia, 467 Phil. 1102 (2004), citing People v. Carmen, G.R. No. 137268, 26 March 2001, 355 SCRA 267; U.S. v. Tayongtong, 21 Phil. 476 (1912); see generally U.S. v. Maleza, 14 Phil. 468 (1909).
[135] A. Catherine Kendrick, Ex Parte Barran: In Search of Standard Legislation for Fraternity Hazing Liability, 24 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 407 (2000)
[136] Id.
[137] In re Khalil H., No. 08110, 2010 WL 4540458 (N.Y. App. Div. Nov. 9, 2010) (U.S.) [citing Kuzmich, Comment, In Vino Mortuus: Fraternal Hazing and Alcohol-Related Deaths, 31 McGeorge L Rev. 1087, 1088-1089 (2000); and Symposium, The Works of Plato (The Modern Library 1956)]; Gregory E. Rutledge, Hell Night Hath No Fury Like a Pledge Scorned ... and Injured: Hazing Litigation in U.S. Colleges and Universities, 25 J.C. & U.L. 361, 368-9 (1998); Kendrick, 24 Am. J. Trial Advoc.
[138] In re Khalil H., supra; Rutledge, supra.
[139] Jamie Ball, This Will Go Down on Your Permanent Record (But We'll Never Tell): How the Federal Educational Rights and Privacy Act May Help Colleges and Universities Keep Hazing a Secret, 33 Sw. U. L. Rev. 477, 480 (2004), citing Rutledge, supra.
[140] Id.
[141] Id.
[142] Kendrick, supra note 135, citing Scott Patrick McBride, Comment, Freedom of Association in the Public University Setting: How Broad is the Right to Freely Participate in Greek Life?, 23 U. Dayton L. Rev. 133, 147-8 (1997).
[143] Id.
[144] Id.
[145] Id., citing Ex parte Barran, 730 So.2d 203 (Ala. 1998) (U.S.).
[146] See generally Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 8049 (1995), otherwise known as the Anti-Hazing Law.
[147] Id.
[148] In re Khalil H., supra note 137, citing Webster's Third International Dictionary, 1041 (1986); and People v. Lenti, 44 Misc.2d 118, 253 N.Y.S.2d 9 (N.Y. Nassau County Ct. 1964) (U.S.).
[149] See generally Republic Act No. 8049 (1995), Sec. 1, otherwise known as the Anti-Hazing Law; Susan Lipkins, Hazing: Defining and Understanding Psychological Damages, 2 Ann.2007 AAJ-CLE 2481 (2007).
[150] Reynaldo C. Ileto, The Diorama Experience: A Visual History of the Philippines 84 (2004).
[151] Id.
[152] Id.
[153] Id.; see Philippine Insurrection Records, Reel 31, Folder 514/10 - Cartilla del Katipunan, quoted in Luis Camara Dery, Alay sa Inang Bayan: Panibagong Pagbibigay Kahulugan sa Kasaysayan ng Himagsikan ng 1896, 16-24 (1999).
[154] Philippine Insurrection Records, supra, quoted in Dery, supra at 17.
[155] Philippine Insurrection Records, supra, quoted in Dery, supra at 18.
[156] Ileto, supra note 150.
[157] Stephen E. Ambrose, Duty, Honor, Country: A History of West Point 222 (1999).br>
[158] Id.
[159] Easler v. Hejaz Temple of Greenville, 285 S.C. 348, 329 S.E.2d 753 (S.C. 1985) (U.S.). (The South Carolina Supreme Court held, inter alia, that (1) evidence supported the jury finding that the manner in which the association carried out "mattress-rotating barrel trick," a hazing event, was hazardous and constituted actionable negligence; and (2) the candidate was not barred from recovery by the doctrine of assumption of risk. Id.)
[160] Id.
[161] Id.
[162] Id.
[163] CNN U.S., Pentagon Brass Disgusted by Marine Hazing Ceremony, January 31, 1997, available at (visited 3 December 2010); see also Gregory E. Rutledge, Hell Night Hath No Fury Like a Pledge Scorned ... and Injured: Hazing Litigation in U.S. Colleges and Universities, 25 J.C. & U.L. 361, 364 (1998).
[164] CNN U.S., supra; see also Rutledge, supra.
[165] State v. Allen, 905 S.W.2d 874, 875 (Mo. 1995) (U.S.). (One of the pledges - Michael Davis - blacked out and never regained consciousness. He died the following afternoon. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the trial court's conviction of hazing. Id.)
[166] Id.
[167] Id.
[168] Ex parte Barran, 730 So.2d 203 (Ala. 1998) (U.S.). (The Alabama Supreme Court ruled that the (1) pledge knew and appreciated the risks inherent in hazing; and (2) pledge voluntarily exposed himself to hazing, supporting the fraternity's assumption of the risk defense. Consequently, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and reinstated the ruling of the trial court, which entered the summary judgment in favor of the defendants with respect to the victim's negligence claims. The case was remanded as to the other matters. Id.)
[169] Id.
[170] Lloyd v. Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity, No. 96-CV-348, 97-CV-565, 1999 WL 47153 (Dist. Ct., N.D. N.Y., 1999) (U.S.). (The plaintiff filed a law suit against Cornell University for the latter's liability resulting from the injuries the former sustained during the alleged hazing by the fraternity. The New York district court granted defendant Cornell's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint. Id.)
[171] Id.
[172] Kenner v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, Inc., 808 A.2d 178 (Pa. Super.Ct. 2002). (The Pennsylvania Superior Court held that: (1) the fraternity owed the duty to protect the initiate from harm; (2) breach of duty by fraternity was not established; (3) individual fraternity members owed the duty to protect the initiate from harm; and (4) the evidence raised the genuine issue of material fact as to whether the fraternity's chapter advisor breached the duty of care to initiate. Id.)
[173] Id.
[174] Morton v. State, 988 So.2d 698 (Flo. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (U.S.). (The District Court of Appeal of Florida reversed the conviction for felony hazing and remanded the case for a new trial because of erroneous jury instruction. Id.)
[175] Id.
[176] Id.
[177] Id.
[178] Id.
[179] Id.
[180] Rutledge, supra note 137.
[181] Rutledge, supra note 137, citing Fraternity Hazing: Is that Anyway to Treat a Brother?, TRIAL, September 1991, at 63.
[182] Rutledge, supra note 137, [citing Robert D. Bickel & Peter F. Lake, Reconceptualizing the University's Duty to Provide A Safe Learning Environment: A Criticism of the Doctrine of In Loco Parentis and the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 20 J.C. & U.L. 261 (1994); Jennifer L. Spaziano, It's All Fun and Games Until Someone Loses an Eye: An Analysis of University Liability for Actions of Student Organizations, 22 Pepp. L. Rev. 213 (1994); Fraternity Hazing: Is that Anyway to Treat a Brother?, TRIAL, Sept. 1991, at 63; and Byron L. Leflore, Jr., Alcohol and Hazing Risks in College Fraternities: Re-evaluating Vicarious and Custodial Liability of National Fraternities, 7 Rev. Litig. 191, 210 (1988)].
[183] Darryll M. Halcomb Lewis, The Criminalization of Fraternity, Non-Fraternity and Non-Collegiate Hazing, 61 Miss. L.J. 111, 117 (1991), citing Benjamin, The Trouble at the Naval Academy, 60 The Independent 154, 155 (1906). According to Lewis, the 1874 statute outlawing hazing was directed specifically at the United States Naval Academy.
[184] Gregory L. Acquaviva, Protecting Students from the Wrongs of Hazing Rites: A Proposal for Strengthening New Jersey's Anti-Hazing Act, 26 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 305, 311 (2008), citing Lewis, supra note 183 at 118.
[185] Acquaviva, supra, citing Lewis, supra note 183 at 118-119.
[186] Acquaviva, supra, citing Lewis, supra note 183 at 119.
[187] Acquaviva, supra at 313.
[188] Amie Pelletier, Note, Regulation of Rites: The Effect and Enforcement of Current Anti-Hazing Statutes, 28 New Eng. J. on Crim. & Civ. Confinement 377, 377 (2002).
[189] Id.
[190] Id., citing 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 120/10 (1992) (U.S.).
[191] 730 ILCS 5/5-8-2 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 96-1482 of the 2010 Sess.) (U.S.).
[192] Pelletier, supra note 188, citing Ind. Code Ann. � 35-42-2-2 (U.S.).
[193] Pelletier, supra note 188, citing Ind. Code Ann. � 35-42-2-2 (U.S.).
[194] Ind. Code Ann. � 35-42-2-2 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Sess.) (U.S.) citing State v. Lewis, 883 N.E.2d 847 (Ind. App. 2008) (U.S.).
[195] Ind. Code Ann. � 35-50-2-6 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Sess.) (U.S.).
[196] Pelletier, supra note 188, citing Mo. Rev. Stat. � 578.365 (2001) (U.S.).
[197] Mo. Stat. Ann. � 558.011 (West, Westlaw through 2010 First Extraordinary Gen. Ass. Sess.).
[198] Pelletier, supra note 188, citing Tex. Educ. Code Ann. � 37.152 (Vernon 1996) (U.S.).
[199] Tex. Stat. Code Ann., Penal Code � 12.35 (Vernon, Westlaw through 2009 Legis. Sess.) (U.S.).
[200] Pelletier, supra note 188, citing Utah Code Ann. � 76-5-107.5 (1999) (U.S.).
[201] Utah Code Ann. 1953 � 76-3-203 (Westlaw through 2010 Gen. Sess.) (U.S.).
[202] Pelletier, supra note 188, citing W. Va. Code � 18-16-3 (1999) (U.S.).
[203] See Pelletier, supra note 188, citing Wis. Stat. � 948.51 (1996) (U.S.).
[204] Wis. Stat. Ann. � 939.50 (Westlaw through 2009 Act 406) (U.S.).
[205] Pelletier, supra note 188 at 381.
[206] Id.
[207] CA Decision (People v. Dizon), p. 15, supra note 8; rollo, p. 76.
[208] Id.
[209] Id.
[210] TSN, 21 April 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), pp. 68-72, 90-91, 100-102, 108-109, 127-134.
[211] TSN, 26 May 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), pp. 29-32, 43.
[212] TSN, 3 June 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No.C-38340), pp. 24-28.
[213] People's Comment (Dizon v. People, G.R. No. 155101), p. 131; rollo, p. 626; People's Comment (Villareal v. People, G.R. No. 151258), p. 120-3; rollo, pp. 727-730.
[214] People's Comment (Dizon v. People, G.R. No. 155101), pp. 130-131; rollo, pp. 625-626; People's Comment (Villareal v. People, G.R. No. 151258), pp. 120-123; rollo, pp. 727-730.
[215] RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], pp. 18-35, supra note 9; rollo, pp. 127-144.
[216] People's Comment (Dizon v. People, G.R. No. 155101), pp. 130-131; rollo, pp. 625-626; People's Comment (Villareal v. People, G.R. No. 151258), pp. 120-123; rollo, pp. 727-730.
[217] Senate TSP No. 51 (17 November 1992) 9th Congress, 1st Regular Sess., pp. 12-13.
[218] TSN, 21 April 1992(People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), pp. 68-72, 90-91, 100-102, 108-109, 127-134; see TSN, 26 May 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No.C-38340), pp. 29-32, 43; and TSN, 3 June 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No.C-38340), pp. 24-28.
[219] RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 58, supra note 9; rollo, p. 167.
[220] Dado v. People, supra note 125.
[221] RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 58, supra note 9; rollo, p. 167.
[222] The aforementioned articles refer to the Revised Penal Code provisions on Physical Injuries. These are the following: (a) Art. 262 - Mutilation; (b) Art. 263 - Serious Physical Injuries; (c) Art. 264 - Administering Injurious Substances or Beverages; (d) Art. 265 - Less Serious Physical Injuries; and, (e) Art. 266 - Slight Physical Injuries and Maltreatment.
[223] Cf. United States v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil. 488 (1910); and Calimutan v. People, 517 Phil. 272 (2006).
[224] Cf. Calimutan v. People, supra, citing People v. Carmen, 407 Phil. 564 (2001); People v. Nocum, 77 Phil. 1018 (1947); People v. Sara, 55 Phil 939 (1931); and People v. Ramirez, 48 Phil 204 (1925).
[225] 176 Phil. 20 (1978).
[226] People v. Carmen, supra note 224.
[227] People v. Regato, supra note 118.
[228] Id.
[229] Cf. People v. Penesa, supra note 94.
[230] RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], pp. 38-44, supra note 9; rollo, pp. 147-153.
[231] RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], pp. 18-35, supra note 9; rollo, pp. 127-144.
[232] RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 38, supra note 9; rollo, p. 147; TSN, 16 July 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), p. 108.
[233] RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 38, supra note 9; rollo, p. 147; TSN, 16 July 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), p. 109.
[234] CA Decision (People v. Dizon), pp. 13-14, supra note 8; rollo, pp. 74-75.
[235] Senate TSP No. 47, supra note 3.
[236] Senate TSP No. 47, supra note 3.
[237] Senate TSP No. 62, supra note 4 at 13-15.
[238] Senate TSP No. 47, supra note 3.
[239] RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 38, supra note 9; rollo, p. 147; TSN, 16 July 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), pp. 108-109.
[240] Veda�a v. Valencia, 356 Phil. 317, 332 (1998).
[241] Caminos v. People, 587 SCRA 348 (2009) citing Luis B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code: Criminal Law - Book One 995 (15th ed. 2001); People v. Vistan, 42 Phil 107 (1921), citing U.S. vs. Gomez, G.R. No. 14068, 17 January 1919 (unreported); U.S. v. Manabat, 28 Phil. 560 (1914).
[242] People v. Vistan, supra, citing U.S. vs. Gomez, supra.
[243] Id.
[244] Id.
[245] Gaid v. People, G.R. No. 171636, 7 April 2009, 584 SCRA 489; Gan v. Court of Appeals, 247-A Phil. 460 (1988).
[246] Gaid v. People, supra; Gan v. Court of Appeals, supra.
[247] Gaid v. People, supra; People v. Vistan, supra note 241, citing U.S. vs. Gomez, supra note 241.
[248] Id.
[249] Id.
[250] See Gaid v. People, supra note 245, at 503 (Velasco, J., dissenting).
[251] Id.
[252] RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 37, supra note 9; rollo, p. 146.
[253] Id.
[254] Id. at 36; rollo, p. 145.
[255] Id.; TSN, 24 June 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), pp. 52-67.
[256] RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 37, supra note 9; rollo, p. 146.
[257] Id.; TSN, 24 June 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), pp. 68-69.
[258] RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 37, supra note 9; rollo, p. 146; TSN, 24 June 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), pp. 70-71.
[259] RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 37, supra note 9; rollo, p. 146.
[260] TSN, 24 June 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No.C-38340), p. 50.
[261] RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 18-21, supra note 9; rollo, p. 127-130.
[262] Id. at 23; rollo, p. 132.
[263] Id. at 25; rollo, p. 134.
[264] Id. at 26; rollo, p. 135.
[265] TSN, 21 April 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No.C-38340), pp. 175-176.
[266] RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 61, supra note 9; rollo, p. 170.
[267] TSN, 16 July 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No.C-38340), pp. 92-93.
[268] TSN, 21 April 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No.C-38340), pp. 110-111.
[269] Ballou v. Sigma Nu General Fraternity, 291 S.C. 140, 352 S.E.2d 488 (S.C. App. 1986) (U.S.) citing Easler v. Hejaz Temple of Greenville, 285 S.C. 348, 329 S.E.2d 753 (S.C. 1985) (U.S.).
[270] RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 34, supra note 9; rollo, p. 143.
[271] Id. at 27; rollo, p. 136.
[272] Republic Act No. 8049 (1995), Sec. 4(1), otherwise known as the Anti-Hazing Law.
[273] CA Decision (People v. Dizon), p. 22, supra note 8; rollo, p. 83.
[274] Bri�as v. People, 211 Phil. 37 (1983); see also People v. Yanson, G.R. No. 179195, 3 October 2011, citing People v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 189580, 9 February 2011.
[275] People v. Mercado, G.R. No. 189847, 30 May 2011 [citing People v. Flores, G.R. No. 188315, 25 August 2010; People v. Lindo, G.R. No. 189818, 9 August 2010; People v. Ogan, G.R. No. 186461, 5 July 2010; and People v. Cadap, G.R. No. 190633, 5 July 2010].
[276] Seguritan v. People, G.R. No. 172896, 19 April 2010, 618 SCRA 406.
[277] People's Consolidated Memoranda (Dizon v. People, G.R. No. 155101), p. 144; rollo, p. 1709.
[278] Heirs of Ochoa v. G & S Transport Corporation, G.R. No. 170071, 9 March 2011, citing Victory Liner Inc. v. Gammad, 486 Phil. 574, 592-593 (2004).
[279] Id.
[280] Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97412, 17 July 1994, 234 SCRA 78.
Sadly, the Lenny Villa tragedy did not discourage hazing activities in the country.[5] Within a year of his death, six more cases of hazing-related deaths emerged - those of Frederick Cahiyang of the University of Visayas in Cebu; Raul Camaligan of San Beda College; Felipe Narne of Pamantasan ng Araullo in Cabanatuan City; Dennis Cenedoza of the Cavite Naval Training Center; Joselito Mangga of the Philippine Merchant Marine Institute; and Joselito Hernandez of the University of the Philippines in Baguio City.[6]
Although courts must not remain indifferent to public sentiments, in this case the general condemnation of a hazing-related death, they are still bound to observe a fundamental principle in our criminal justice system - "[N]o act constitutes a crime... unless it is made so by law."[7] Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege. Even if an act is viewed by a large section of the populace as immoral or injurious, it cannot be considered a crime, absent any law prohibiting its commission. As interpreters of the law, judges are called upon to set aside emotion, to resist being swayed by strong public sentiments, and to rule strictly based on the elements of the offense and the facts allowed in evidence.
Before the Court are the consolidated cases docketed as G.R. No. 151258 (Villareal v. People), G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals), G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People), and G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona).
The pertinent facts, as determined by the Court of Appeals (CA)[8] and the trial court,[9] are as follows:
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). They were Caesar "Bogs" Asuncion, Samuel "Sam" Belleza, Bienvenido "Bien" Marquez III, Roberto Francis "Bert" Navera, Geronimo "Randy" Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and Leonardo "Lenny" Villa (neophytes).
On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some members of the Aquila Fraternity (Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They all proceeded to Rufo's Restaurant to have dinner. Afterwards, they went to the house of Michael Musngi, also an Aquilan, who briefed the neophytes on what to expect during the initiation rites. The latter were informed that there would be physical beatings, and that they could quit at any time. Their initiation rites were scheduled to last for three days. After their "briefing," they were brought to the Almeda Compound in Caloocan City for the commencement of their initiation.
Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had already received threats and insults from the Aquilans. As soon as the neophytes alighted from the van and walked towards the pelota court of the Almeda compound, some of the Aquilans delivered physical blows to them. The neophytes were then subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan "initiation rites." These rites included the "Indian Run," which required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows of Aquilans, each row delivering blows to the neophytes; the "Bicol Express," which obliged the neophytes to sit on the floor with their backs against the wall and their legs outstretched while the Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran over their legs; the "Rounds," in which the neophytes were held at the back of their pants by the "auxiliaries" (the Aquilans charged with the duty of lending assistance to neophytes during initiation rites), while the latter were being hit with fist blows on their arms or with knee blows on their thighs by two Aquilans; and the "Auxies' Privilege Round," in which the auxiliaries were given the opportunity to inflict physical pain on the neophytes. During this time, the neophytes were also indoctrinated with the fraternity principles. They survived their first day of initiation.
On the morning of their second day - 9 February 1991 - the neophytes were made to present comic plays and to play rough basketball. They were also required to memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternity's principles. Whenever they would give a wrong answer, they would be hit on their arms or legs. Late in the afternoon, the Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper and proceeded to torment them physically and psychologically. The neophytes were subjected to the same manner of hazing that they endured on the first day of initiation. After a few hours, the initiation for the day officially ended.
After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members[10] Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity members, including Dizon and Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to "paddling" and to additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny received several paddle blows, one of which was so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. The neophytes heard him complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After their last session of physical beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. He had to be carried by the auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the initiation for the day was officially ended, and the neophytes started eating dinner. They then slept at the carport.
After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lenny's shivering and incoherent mumblings. Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they thought he was just overacting. When they realized, though, that Lenny was really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans started helping him. They removed his clothes and helped him through a sleeping bag to keep him warm. When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival.
Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the following 35 Aquilans:
In Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) were jointly tried.[11] On the other hand, the trial against the remaining nine accused in Criminal Case No. C-38340 was held in abeyance due to certain matters that had to be resolved first.[12]
- Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)
- Artemio Villareal (Villareal)
- Efren de Leon (De Leon)
- Vincent Tecson (Tecson)
- Junel Anthony Ama (Ama)
- Antonio Mariano Almeda (Almeda)
- Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug)
- Nelson Victorino (Victorino)
- Eulogio Sabban (Sabban)
- Joseph Lledo (Lledo)
- Etienne Guerrero (Guerrero)
- Michael Musngi (Musngi)
- Jonas Karl Perez (Perez)
- Paul Angelo Santos (Santos)
- Ronan de Guzman (De Guzman)
- Antonio General (General)
- Jaime Maria Flores II (Flores)
- Dalmacio Lim, Jr. (Lim)
- Ernesto Jose Montecillo (Montecillo)
- Santiago Ranada III (Ranada)
- Zosimo Mendoza (Mendoza)
- Vicente Verdadero (Verdadero)
- Amante Purisima II (Purisima)
- Jude Fernandez (J. Fernandez)
- Adel Abas (Abas)
- Percival Brigola (Brigola)
In Criminal Case No. C-38340
- Manuel Escalona II (Escalona)
- Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca)
- Anselmo Adriano (Adriano)
- Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos)
- Reynaldo Concepcion (Concepcion)
- Florentino Ampil (Ampil)
- Enrico de Vera III (De Vera)
- Stanley Fernandez (S. Fernandez)
- Noel Cabangon (Cabangon)
On 8 November 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91), holding the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, penalized with reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.[13] A few weeks after the trial court rendered its judgment, or on 29 November 1993, Criminal Case No. C-38340 against the remaining nine accused commenced anew.[14]
On 10 January 2002, the CA in (CA-G.R. No. 15520)[15] set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) and modified the criminal liability of each of the accused according to individual participation. Accused De Leon had by then passed away, so the following Decision applied only to the remaining 25 accused, viz:
- Nineteen of the accused-appellants - Victorino, Sabban, Lledo, Guerrero, Musngi, Perez, De Guzman, Santos, General, Flores, Lim, Montecillo, Ranada, Mendoza, Verdadero, Purisima, Fernandez, Abas, and Brigola (Victorino et al.) - were acquitted, as their individual guilt was not established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
- Four of the accused-appellants - Vincent Tecson, Junel Anthony Ama, Antonio Mariano Almeda, and Renato Bantug, Jr. (Tecson et al.) - were found guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries and sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor. They were also ordered to jointly pay the heirs of the victim the sum of ?30,000 as indemnity.
- Two of the accused-appellants - Fidelito Dizon and Artemio Villareal - were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. Having found no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the CA sentenced them to an indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor to 17 years of reclusion temporal. They were also ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Lenny Villa in the sum of P50,000 and to pay the additional amount of P1,000,000 by way of moral damages.
On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 38340 dismissed the charge against accused Concepcion on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial.[16] Meanwhile, on different dates between the years 2003 and 2005, the trial court denied the respective Motions to Dismiss of accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.[17] On 25 October 2006, the CA in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 89060 & 90153[18] reversed the trial court's Orders and dismissed the criminal case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of violation of their right to speedy trial.[19]
From the aforementioned Decisions, the five (5) consolidated Petitions were individually brought before this Court.
G.R. No. 151258 - Villareal v. People
The instant case refers to accused Villareal's Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. The Petition raises two reversible errors allegedly committed by the CA in its Decision dated 10 January 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520 - first, denial of due process; and, second, conviction absent proof beyond reasonable doubt.[20]
While the Petition was pending before this Court, counsel for petitioner Villareal filed a Notice of Death of Party on 10 August 2011. According to the Notice, petitioner Villareal died on 13 March 2011. Counsel thus asserts that the subject matter of the Petition previously filed by petitioner does not survive the death of the accused.
G.R. No. 155101 - Dizon v. People
Accused Dizon filed a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari, questioning the CA's Decision dated 10 January 2002 and Resolution dated 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520.[21] Petitioner sets forth two main issues - first, that he was denied due process when the CA sustained the trial court's forfeiture of his right to present evidence; and, second, that he was deprived of due process when the CA did not apply to him the same "ratio decidendi that served as basis of acquittal of the other accused."[22]
As regards the first issue, the trial court made a ruling, which forfeited Dizon's right to present evidence during trial. The trial court expected Dizon to present evidence on an earlier date since a co-accused, Antonio General, no longer presented separate evidence during trial. According to Dizon, his right should not have been considered as waived because he was justified in asking for a postponement. He argues that he did not ask for a resetting of any of the hearing dates and in fact insisted that he was ready to present evidence on the original pre-assigned schedule, and not on an earlier hearing date.
Regarding the second issue, petitioner contends that he should have likewise been acquitted, like the other accused, since his acts were also part of the traditional initiation rites and were not tainted by evil motives.[23] He claims that the additional paddling session was part of the official activity of the fraternity. He also points out that one of the neophytes admitted that the chairperson of the initiation rites "decided that [Lenny] was fit enough to undergo the initiation so Mr. Villareal proceeded to do the paddling...."[24] Further, petitioner echoes the argument of the Solicitor General that "the individual blows inflicted by Dizon and Villareal could not have resulted in Lenny's death."[25] The Solicitor General purportedly averred that, "on the contrary, Dr. Arizala testified that the injuries suffered by Lenny could not be considered fatal if taken individually, but if taken collectively, the result is the violent death of the victim."[26]
Petitioner then counters the finding of the CA that he was motivated by ill will. He claims that Lenny's father could not have stolen the parking space of Dizon's father, since the latter did not have a car, and their fathers did not work in the same place or office. Revenge for the loss of the parking space was the alleged ill motive of Dizon. According to petitioner, his utterances regarding a stolen parking space were only part of the "psychological initiation." He then cites the testimony of Lenny's co-neophyte - witness Marquez - who admitted knowing "it was not true and that he was just making it up...."[27]
Further, petitioner argues that his alleged motivation of ill will was negated by his show of concern for Villa after the initiation rites. Dizon alludes to the testimony of one of the neophytes, who mentioned that the former had kicked the leg of the neophyte and told him to switch places with Lenny to prevent the latter's chills. When the chills did not stop, Dizon, together with Victorino, helped Lenny through a sleeping bag and made him sit on a chair. According to petitioner, his alleged ill motivation is contradicted by his manifestation of compassion and concern for the victim's well-being.
G.R. No. 154954 - People v. Court of Appeals
This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 seeks the reversal of the CA's Decision dated 10 January 2002 and Resolution dated 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520, insofar as it acquitted 19 (Victorino et al.) and convicted 4 (Tecson et al.) of the accused Aquilans of the lesser crime of slight physical injuries.[28] According to the Solicitor General, the CA erred in holding that there could have been no conspiracy to commit hazing, as hazing or fraternity initiation had not yet been criminalized at the time Lenny died.
In the alternative, petitioner claims that the ruling of the trial court should have been upheld, inasmuch as it found that there was conspiracy to inflict physical injuries on Lenny. Since the injuries led to the victim's death, petitioner posits that the accused Aquilans are criminally liable for the resulting crime of homicide, pursuant to Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code.[29] The said article provides: "Criminal liability shall be incurred... [b]y any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended."
Petitioner also argues that the rule on double jeopardy is inapplicable. According to the Solicitor General, the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in setting aside the trial court's finding of conspiracy and in ruling that the criminal liability of
all the accused must be based on their individual participation in the commission of the crime.
G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 - Villa v. Escalona
Petitioner Villa filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari, praying for the reversal of the CA's Decision dated 25 October 2006 and Resolution dated 17 May 2007 in CA-G.R. S.P. Nos. 89060 and 90153.[30] The Petition involves the dismissal of the criminal charge filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.
Due to "several pending incidents," the trial court ordered a separate trial for accused Escalona, Saruca, Adriano, Ramos, Ampil, Concepcion, De Vera, S. Fernandez, and Cabangon (Criminal Case No. C-38340) to commence after proceedings against the 26 other accused in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) shall have terminated. On 8 November 1993, the trial court found the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. As a result, the proceedings in Criminal Case No. C-38340 involving the nine other co-accused recommenced on 29 November 1993. For "various reasons," the initial trial of the case did not commence until 28 March 2005, or almost 12 years after the arraignment of the nine accused.
Petitioner Villa assails the CA's dismissal of the criminal case involving 4 of the 9 accused, namely, Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano. She argues that the accused failed to assert their right to speedy trial within a reasonable period of time. She also points out that the prosecution cannot be faulted for the delay, as the original records and the required evidence were not at its disposal, but were still in the appellate court.
We resolve herein the various issues that we group into five.
- Whether the forfeiture of petitioner Dizon's right to present evidence constitutes denial of due process;
- Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano for violation of the right of the accused to speedy trial;
- Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, when it set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court and adjudicated the liability of each accused according to individual participation;
- Whether accused Dizon is guilty of homicide; and
- Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it pronounced Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug guilty only of slight physical injuries.
G.R. No. 151258 - Villareal v. People
In a Notice dated 26 September 2011 and while the Petition was pending resolution, this Court took note of counsel for petitioner's Notice of Death of Party.
According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability for personal penalties is totally extinguished by the death of the convict. In contrast, criminal liability for pecuniary penalties is extinguished if the offender dies prior to final judgment. The term "personal penalties" refers to the service of personal or imprisonment penalties,[31] while the term "pecuniary penalties" (las pecuniarias) refers to fines and costs,[32] including civil liability predicated on the criminal offense complained of (i.e., civil liability ex delicto).[33] However, civil liability based on a source of obligation other than the delict survives the death of the accused and is recoverable through a separate civil action.[34]
Thus, we hold that the death of petitioner Villareal extinguished his criminal liability for both personal and pecuniary penalties, including his civil liability directly arising from the delict complained of. Consequently, his Petition is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case against him deemed closed and terminated.
G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People)
In an Order dated 28 July 1993, the trial court set the dates for the reception of evidence for accused-petitioner Dizon on the 8th, 15th, and 22nd of September; and the 5th and 12 of October 1993.[35] The Order likewise stated that "it will not entertain any postponement and that all the accused who have not yet presented their respective evidence should be ready at all times down the line, with their evidence on all said dates. Failure on their part to present evidence when required shall therefore be construed as waiver to present evidence."[36]
However, on 19 August 1993, counsel for another accused manifested in open court that his client - Antonio General - would no longer present separate evidence. Instead, the counsel would adopt the testimonial evidence of the other accused who had already testified.[37] Because of this development and pursuant to the trial court's Order that the parties "should be ready at all times down the line," the trial court expected Dizon to present evidence on the next trial date - 25 August 1993 - instead of his originally assigned dates. The original dates were supposed to start two weeks later, or on 8 September 1993.[38] Counsel for accused Dizon was not able to present evidence on the accelerated date. To address the situation, counsel filed a Constancia on 25 August 1993, alleging that he had to appear in a previously scheduled case, and that he would be ready to present evidence on the dates originally assigned to his clients.[39] The trial court denied the Manifestation on the same date and treated the Constancia as a motion for postponement, in violation of the three-day-notice rule under the Rules of Court.[40] Consequently, the trial court ruled that the failure of Dizon to present evidence amounted to a waiver of that right.[41]
Accused-petitioner Dizon thus argues that he was deprived of due process of law when the trial court forfeited his right to present evidence. According to him, the postponement of the 25 August 1993 hearing should have been considered justified, since his original pre-assigned trial dates were not supposed to start until 8 September 1993, when he was scheduled to present evidence. He posits that he was ready to present evidence on the dates assigned to him. He also points out that he did not ask for a resetting of any of the said hearing dates; that he in fact insisted on being allowed to present evidence on the dates fixed by the trial court. Thus, he contends that the trial court erred in accelerating the schedule of presentation of evidence, thereby invalidating the finding of his guilt.
The right of the accused to present evidence is guaranteed by no less than the Constitution itself.[42] Article III, Section 14(2) thereof, provides that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused ... shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel..." This constitutional right includes the right to present evidence in one's defense,[43] as well as the right to be present and defend oneself in person at every stage of the proceedings.[44]
In Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan,[45] the Sandiganbayan set the hearing of the defense's presentation of evidence for 21, 22 and 23 June 1995. The 21 June 1995 hearing was cancelled due to "lack of quorum in the regular membership" of the Sandiganbayan's Second Division and upon the agreement of the parties. The hearing was reset for the next day, 22 June 1995, but Crisostomo and his counsel failed to attend. The Sandiganbayan, on the very same day, issued an Order directing the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Crisostomo and the confiscation of his surety bond. The Order further declared that he had waived his right to present evidence because of his nonappearance at "yesterday's and today's scheduled hearings." In ruling against the Order, we held thus:
Under Section 2(c), Rule 114 and Section 1(c), Rule 115 of the Rules of Court, Crisostomo's non-appearance during the 22 June 1995 trial was merely a waiver of his right to be present for trial on such date only and not for the succeeding trial dates...x x x x x x x x x
Moreover, Crisostomo's absence on the 22 June 1995 hearing should not have been deemed as a waiver of his right to present evidence. While constitutional rights may be waived, such waiver must be clear and must be coupled with an actual intention to relinquish the right. Crisostomo did not voluntarily waive in person or even through his counsel the right to present evidence. The Sandiganbayan imposed the waiver due to the agreement of the prosecution, Calingayan, and Calingayan's counsel.
In criminal cases where the imposable penalty may be death, as in the present case, the court is called upon to see to it that the accused is personally made aware of the consequences of a waiver of the right to present evidence. In fact, it is not enough that the accused is simply warned of the consequences of another failure to attend the succeeding hearings. The court must first explain to the accused personally in clear terms the exact nature and consequences of a waiver. Crisostomo was not even forewarned. The Sandiganbayan simply went ahead to deprive Crisostomo of his right to present evidence without even allowing Crisostomo to explain his absence on the 22 June 1995 hearing.
Clearly, the waiver of the right to present evidence in a criminal case involving a grave penalty is not assumed and taken lightly. The presence of the accused and his counsel is indispensable so that the court could personally conduct a searching inquiry into the waiver x x x.[46] (Emphasis supplied)
The trial court should not have deemed the failure of petitioner to present evidence on 25 August 1993 as a waiver of his right to present evidence. On the contrary, it should have considered the excuse of counsel justified, especially since counsel for another accused - General - had made a last-minute adoption of testimonial evidence that freed up the succeeding trial dates; and since Dizon was not scheduled to testify until two weeks later. At any rate, the trial court pre-assigned five hearing dates for the reception of evidence. If it really wanted to impose its Order strictly, the most it could have done was to forfeit one out of the five days set for Dizon's testimonial evidence. Stripping the accused of all his pre-assigned trial dates constitutes a patent denial of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due process.
Nevertheless, as in the case of an improvident guilty plea, an invalid waiver of the right to present evidence and be heard does not per se work to vacate a finding of guilt in the criminal case or to enforce an automatic remand of the case to the trial court.[47] In People v. Bodoso, we ruled that where facts have adequately been represented in a criminal case, and no procedural unfairness or irregularity has prejudiced either the prosecution or the defense as a result of the invalid waiver, the rule is that a guilty verdict may nevertheless be upheld if the judgment is supported beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence on record.[48]
We do not see any material inadequacy in the relevant facts on record to resolve the case at bar. Neither can we see any "procedural unfairness or irregularity" that would substantially prejudice either the prosecution or the defense as a result of the invalid waiver. In fact, the arguments set forth by accused Dizon in his Petition corroborate the material facts relevant to decide the matter. Instead, what he is really contesting in his Petition is the application of the law to the facts by the trial court and the CA. Petitioner Dizon admits direct participation in the hazing of Lenny Villa by alleging in his Petition that "all actions of the petitioner were part of the traditional rites," and that "the alleged extension of the initiation rites was not outside the official activity of the fraternity."[49] He even argues that "Dizon did not request for the extension and he participated only after the activity was sanctioned."[50]
For one reason or another, the case has been passed or turned over from one judge or justice to another - at the trial court, at the CA, and even at the Supreme Court. Remanding the case for the reception of the evidence of petitioner Dizon would only inflict further injustice on the parties. This case has been going on for almost two decades. Its resolution is long overdue. Since the key facts necessary to decide the case have already been determined, we shall proceed to decide it.
G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona)
Petitioner Villa argues that the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano should not have been dismissed, since they failed to assert their right to speedy trial within a reasonable period of time. She points out that the accused failed to raise a protest during the dormancy of the criminal case against them, and that they asserted their right only after the trial court had dismissed the case against their co-accused Concepcion. Petitioner also emphasizes that the trial court denied the respective Motions to Dismiss filed by Saruca, Escalona, Ramos, and Adriano, because it found that "the prosecution could not be faulted for the delay in the movement of this case when the original records and the evidence it may require were not at its disposal as these were in the Court of Appeals."[51]
The right of the accused to a speedy trial has been enshrined in Sections 14(2) and 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.[52] This right requires that there be a trial free from vexatious, capricious or oppressive delays.[53] The right is deemed violated when the proceeding is attended with unjustified postponements of trial, or when a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the case being tried and for no cause or justifiable motive.[54] In determining the right of the accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case.[55] The conduct of both the prosecution and the defense must be weighed.[56] Also to be considered are factors such as the length of delay, the assertion or non-assertion of the right, and the prejudice wrought upon the defendant.[57]
We have consistently ruled in a long line of cases that a dismissal of the case pursuant to the right of the accused to speedy trial is tantamount to acquittal.[58] As a consequence, an appeal or a reconsideration of the dismissal would amount to a violation of the principle of double jeopardy.[59] As we have previously discussed, however, where the dismissal of the case is capricious, certiorari lies.[60] The rule on double jeopardy is not triggered when a petition challenges the validity of the order of dismissal instead of the correctness thereof.[61] Rather, grave abuse of discretion amounts to lack of jurisdiction, and lack of jurisdiction prevents double jeopardy from attaching.[62]
We do not see grave abuse of discretion in the CA's dismissal of the case against accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of the violation of their right to speedy trial. The court held thus:
An examination of the procedural history of this case would reveal that the following factors contributed to the slow progress of the proceedings in the case below:x x x x x x x x x 5) The fact that the records of the case were elevated to the Court of Appeals and the prosecution's failure to comply with the order of the court a quo requiring them to secure certified true copies of the same.x x x x x x x x x
While we are prepared to concede that some of the foregoing factors that contributed to the delay of the trial of the petitioners are justifiable, We nonetheless hold that their right to speedy trial has been utterly violated in this case x x x.x x x x x x x x x
[T]he absence of the records in the trial court [was] due to the fact that the records of the case were elevated to the Court of Appeals, and the prosecution's failure to comply with the order of the court a quo requiring it to secure certified true copies of the same. What is glaring from the records is the fact that as early as September 21, 1995, the court a quo already issued an Order requiring the prosecution, through the Department of Justice, to secure the complete records of the case from the Court of Appeals. The prosecution did not comply with the said Order as in fact, the same directive was repeated by the court a quo in an Order dated December 27, 1995. Still, there was no compliance on the part of the prosecution. It is not stated when such order was complied with. It appears, however, that even until August 5, 2002, the said records were still not at the disposal of the trial court because the lack of it was made the basis of the said court in granting the motion to dismiss filed by co-accused Concepcion x x x.x x x x x x x x x
It is likewise noticeable that from December 27, 1995, until August 5, 2002, or for a period of almost seven years, there was no action at all on the part of the court a quo. Except for the pleadings filed by both the prosecution and the petitioners, the latest of which was on January 29, 1996, followed by petitioner Saruca's motion to set case for trial on August 17, 1998 which the court did not act upon, the case remained dormant for a considerable length of time. This prolonged inactivity whatsoever is precisely the kind of delay that the constitution frowns upon x x x.[63] (Emphasis supplied)
This Court points out that on 10 January 1992, the final amended Information was filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, Ampil, S. Fernandez, Adriano, Cabangon, Concepcion, and De Vera.[64] On 29 November 1993, they were all arraigned.[65] Unfortunately, the initial trial of the case did not commence until 28 March 2005 or almost 12 years after arraignment.[66]
As illustrated in our ruling in Abardo v. Sandiganbayan, the unexplained interval or inactivity of the Sandiganbayan for close to five years since the arraignment of the accused amounts to an unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases - a clear violation of the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of cases.[67] Thus, we held:
The delay in this case measures up to the unreasonableness of the delay in the disposition of cases in Angchangco, Jr. vs. Ombudsman, where the Court found the delay of six years by the Ombudsman in resolving the criminal complaints to be violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy disposition of cases; similarly, in Roque vs. Office of the Ombudsman, where the Court held that the delay of almost six years disregarded the Ombudsman's duty to act promptly on complaints before him; and in Cervantes vs. Sandiganbayan, where the Court held that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in not quashing the information which was filed six years after the initiatory complaint was filed and thereby depriving petitioner of his right to a speedy disposition of the case. So it must be in the instant case, where the reinvestigation by the Ombudsman has dragged on for a decade already.[68] (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing principles, we affirm the ruling of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 89060 that accused Escalona et al.'s right to speedy trial was violated. Since there is nothing in the records that would show that the subject of this Petition includes accused Ampil, S. Fernandez, Cabangon, and De Vera, the effects of this ruling shall be limited to accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.
G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals)
The rule on double jeopardy is one of the pillars of our criminal justice system. It dictates that when a person is charged with an offense, and the case is terminated - either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the accused - the accused cannot again be charged with the same or an identical offense.[69] This principle is founded upon the law of reason, justice and conscience.[70] It is embodied in the civil law maxim non bis in idem found in the common law of England and undoubtedly in every system of jurisprudence.[71] It found expression in the Spanish Law, in the Constitution of the United States, and in our own Constitution as one of the fundamental rights of the citizen,[72] viz:
Article III - Bill of Rights
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
Rule 117, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, which implements this particular constitutional right, provides as follows:[73]
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. -- When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
The rule on double jeopardy thus prohibits the state from appealing the judgment in order to reverse the acquittal or to increase the penalty imposed either through a regular appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court or through an appeal by certiorari on pure questions of law under Rule 45 of the same Rules.[74] The requisites for invoking double jeopardy are the following: (a) there is a valid complaint or information; (b) it is filed before a competent court; (c) the defendant pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case against him or her was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the defendant's express consent.[75]
As we have reiterated in People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, "[a] verdict of acquittal is immediately final and a reexamination of the merits of such acquittal, even in the appellate courts, will put the accused in jeopardy for the same offense. The finality-of-acquittal doctrine has several avowed purposes. Primarily, it prevents the State from using its criminal processes as an instrument of harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude of cases with accumulated trials. It also serves the additional purpose of precluding the State, following an acquittal, from successively retrying the defendant in the hope of securing a conviction. And finally, it prevents the State, following conviction, from retrying the defendant again in the hope of securing a greater penalty."[76] We further stressed that "an acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal."[77]
This prohibition, however, is not absolute. The state may challenge the lower court's acquittal of the accused or the imposition of a lower penalty on the latter in the following recognized exceptions: (1) where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, tantamount to a deprivation of due process;[78] (2) where there is a finding of mistrial;[79] or (3) where there has been a grave abuse of discretion.[80]
The third instance refers to this Court's judicial power under Rule 65 to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.[81] Here, the party asking for the review must show the presence of a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; a patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or to act in contemplation of law; an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility;[82] or a blatant abuse of authority to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive the court of its very power to dispense justice.[83] In such an event, the accused cannot be considered to be at risk of double jeopardy.[84]
The Solicitor General filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari, which seeks the reversal of (1) the acquittal of Victorino et al. and (2) the conviction of Tecson et al. for the lesser crime of slight physical injuries, both on the basis of a misappreciation of facts and evidence. According to the Petition, "the decision of the Court of Appeals is not in accordance with law because private complainant and petitioner were denied due process of law when the public respondent completely ignored the a) Position Paper x x x b) the Motion for Partial Reconsideration x x x and c) the petitioner's Comment x x x."[85] Allegedly, the CA ignored evidence when it adopted the theory of individual responsibility; set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court; and failed to apply Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code.[86] The Solicitor General also assails the finding that the physical blows were inflicted only by Dizon and Villareal, as well as the appreciation of Lenny Villa's consent to hazing.[87]
In our view, what the Petition seeks is that we reexamine, reassess, and reweigh the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties.[88] In People v. Maquiling, we held that grave abuse of discretion cannot be attributed to a court simply because it allegedly misappreciated the facts and the evidence.[89] Mere errors of judgment are correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, and not by an application for a writ of certiorari.[90] Therefore, pursuant to the rule on double jeopardy, we are constrained to deny the Petition contra Victorino et al. - the 19 acquitted fraternity members.
We, however, modify the assailed judgment as regards Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug - the four fraternity members convicted of slight physical injuries.
Indeed, we have ruled in a line of cases that the rule on double jeopardy similarly applies when the state seeks the imposition of a higher penalty against the accused.[91] We have also recognized, however, that certiorari may be used to correct an abusive judgment upon a clear demonstration that the lower court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.[92] The present case is one of those instances of grave abuse of discretion.
In imposing the penalty of slight physical injuries on Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug, the CA reasoned thus:
Based on the medical findings, it would appear that with the exclusion of the fatal wounds inflicted by the accused Dizon and Villareal, the injuries sustained by the victim as a result of the physical punishment heaped on him were serious in nature. However, by reason of the death of the victim, there can be no precise means to determine the duration of the incapacity or the medical attendance required. To do so, at this stage would be merely speculative. In a prosecution for this crime where the category of the offense and the severity of the penalty depend on the period of illness or incapacity for labor, the length of this period must likewise be proved beyond reasonable doubt in much the same manner as the same act charged [People v. Codilla, CA-G.R. No. 4079-R, June 26, 1950]. And when proof of the said period is absent, the crime committed should be deemed only as slight physical injuries [People v. De los Santos, CA, 59 O.G. 4393, citing People v. Penesa, 81 Phil. 398]. As such, this Court is constrained to rule that the injuries inflicted by the appellants, Tecson, Ama, Almeda and Bantug, Jr., are only slight and not serious, in nature.[93] (Emphasis supplied and citations included)
The appellate court relied on our ruling in People v. Penesa[94] in finding that the four accused should be held guilty only of slight physical injuries. According to the CA, because of "the death of the victim, there can be no precise means to determine the duration of the incapacity or medical attendance required."[95] The reliance on Penesa was utterly misplaced. A review of that case would reveal that the accused therein was guilty merely of slight physical injuries, because the victim's injuries neither caused incapacity for labor nor required medical attendance.[96] Furthermore, he did not die.[97] His injuries were not even serious.[98] Since Penesa involved a case in which the victim allegedly suffered physical injuries and not death, the ruling cited by the CA was patently inapplicable.
On the contrary, the CA's ultimate conclusion that Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug were liable merely for slight physical injuries grossly contradicts its own findings of fact. According to the court, the four accused "were found to have inflicted more than the usual punishment undertaken during such initiation rites on the person of Villa."[99] It then adopted the NBI medico-legal officer's findings that the antecedent cause of Lenny Villa's death was the "multiple traumatic injuries" he suffered from the initiation rites.[100] Considering that the CA found that the "physical punishment heaped on [Lenny Villa was] serious in nature,"[101] it was patently erroneous for the court to limit the criminal liability to slight physical injuries, which is a light felony.
Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code dictates that the perpetrator shall be liable for the consequences of an act, even if its result is different from that intended. Thus, once a person is found to have committed an initial felonious act, such as the unlawful infliction of physical injuries that results in the death of the victim, courts are required to automatically apply the legal framework governing the destruction of life. This rule is mandatory, and not subject to discretion.
The CA's application of the legal framework governing physical injuries - punished under Articles 262 to 266 for intentional felonies and Article 365 for culpable felonies - is therefore tantamount to a whimsical, capricious, and abusive exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction. According to the Revised Penal Code, the mandatory and legally imposable penalty in case the victim dies should be based on the framework governing the destruction of the life of a person, punished under Articles 246 to 261 for intentional felonies and Article 365 for culpable felonies, and not under the aforementioned provisions. We emphasize that these two types of felonies are distinct from and legally inconsistent with each other, in that the accused cannot be held criminally liable for physical injuries when actual death occurs.[102]
Attributing criminal liability solely to Villareal and Dizon - as if only their acts, in and of themselves, caused the death of Lenny Villa - is contrary to the CA's own findings. From proof that the death of the victim was the cumulative effect of the multiple injuries he suffered,[103] the only logical conclusion is that criminal responsibility should redound to all those who have been proven to have directly participated in the infliction of physical injuries on Lenny. The accumulation of bruising on his body caused him to suffer cardiac arrest. Accordingly, we find that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug criminally liable for slight physical injuries. As an allowable exception to the rule on double jeopardy, we therefore give due course to the Petition in G.R. No. 154954.
According to the trial court, although hazing was not (at the time) punishable as a crime, the intentional infliction of physical injuries on Villa was nonetheless a felonious act under Articles 263 to 266 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, in ruling against the accused, the court a quo found that pursuant to Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the accused fraternity members were guilty of homicide, as it was the direct, natural and logical consequence of the physical injuries they had intentionally inflicted.[104]
The CA modified the trial court's finding of criminal liability. It ruled that there could have been no conspiracy since the neophytes, including Lenny Villa, had knowingly consented to the conduct of hazing during their initiation rites. The accused fraternity members, therefore, were liable only for the consequences of their individual acts. Accordingly, 19 of the accused - Victorino et al. - were acquitted; 4 of them - Tecson et al. - were found guilty of slight physical injuries; and the remaining 2 - Dizon and Villareal - were found guilty of homicide.
The issue at hand does not concern a typical criminal case wherein the perpetrator clearly commits a felony in order to take revenge upon, to gain advantage over, to harm maliciously, or to get even with, the victim. Rather, the case involves an ex ante situation in which a man - driven by his own desire to join a society of men - pledged to go through physically and psychologically strenuous admission rituals, just so he could enter the fraternity. Thus, in order to understand how our criminal laws apply to such situation absent the Anti-Hazing Law, we deem it necessary to make a brief exposition on the underlying concepts shaping intentional felonies, as well as on the nature of physical and psychological initiations widely known as hazing.
Intentional Felony and Conspiracy
Our Revised Penal Code belongs to the classical school of thought.[105] The classical theory posits that a human person is essentially a moral creature with an absolute free will to choose between good and evil.[106] It asserts that one should only be adjudged or held accountable for wrongful acts so long as free will appears unimpaired.[107] The basic postulate of the classical penal system is that humans are rational and calculating beings who guide their actions with reference to the principles of pleasure and pain.[108] They refrain from criminal acts if threatened with punishment sufficient to cancel the hope of possible gain or advantage in committing the crime.[109] Here, criminal liability is thus based on the free will and moral blame of the actor.[110] The identity of mens rea - defined as a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent - is the predominant consideration.[111] Thus, it is not enough to do what the law prohibits.[112] In order for an intentional felony to exist, it is necessary that the act be committed by means of dolo or "malice."[113]
The term "dolo" or "malice" is a complex idea involving the elements of freedom, intelligence, and intent.[114] The first element, freedom, refers to an act done with deliberation and with power to choose between two things.[115] The second element, intelligence, concerns the ability to determine the morality of human acts, as well as the capacity to distinguish between a licit and an illicit act.[116] The last element, intent, involves an aim or a determination to do a certain act.[117]
The element of intent - on which this Court shall focus - is described as the state of mind accompanying an act, especially a forbidden act.[118] It refers to the purpose of the mind and the resolve with which a person proceeds.[119] It does not refer to mere will, for the latter pertains to the act, while intent concerns the result of the act.[120] While motive is the "moving power" that impels one to action for a definite result, intent is the "purpose" of using a particular means to produce the result.[121] On the other hand, the term "felonious" means, inter alia, malicious, villainous, and/or proceeding from an evil heart or purpose.[122] With these elements taken together, the requirement of intent in intentional felony must refer to malicious intent, which is a vicious and malevolent state of mind accompanying a forbidden act. Stated otherwise, intentional felony requires the existence of dolus malus - that the act or omission be done "willfully," "maliciously," "with deliberate evil intent," and "with malice aforethought."[123] The maxim is actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea - a crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of is innocent.[124] As is required of the other elements of a felony, the existence of malicious intent must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.[125]
In turn, the existence of malicious intent is necessary in order for conspiracy to attach. Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code - which provides that "conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it" - is to be interpreted to refer only to felonies committed by means of dolo or malice. The phrase "coming to an agreement" connotes the existence of a prefaced "intent" to cause injury to another, an element present only in intentional felonies. In culpable felonies or criminal negligence, the injury inflicted on another is unintentional, the wrong done being simply the result of an act performed without malice or criminal design.[126] Here, a person performs an initial lawful deed; however, due to negligence, imprudence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill, the deed results in a wrongful act.[127] Verily, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act, which is a requisite in conspiracy, is inconsistent with the idea of a felony committed by means of culpa.[128]
The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is thus a vital ingredient in establishing the commission of the intentional felony of homicide.[129] Being mala in se, the felony of homicide requires the existence of malice or dolo[130] immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of injuries.[131] Intent to kill - or animus interficendi - cannot and should not be inferred, unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such intent.[132] Furthermore, the victim's death must not have been the product of accident, natural cause, or suicide.[133] If death resulted from an act executed without malice or criminal intent - but with lack of foresight, carelessness, or negligence - the act must be qualified as reckless or simple negligence or imprudence resulting in homicide.[134]
Hazing and other forms of initiation rites
The notion of hazing is not a recent development in our society.[135] It is said that, throughout history, hazing in some form or another has been associated with organizations ranging from military groups to indigenous tribes.[136] Some say that elements of hazing can be traced back to the Middle Ages, during which new students who enrolled in European universities worked as servants for upperclassmen.[137] It is believed that the concept of hazing is rooted in ancient Greece,[138] where young men recruited into the military were tested with pain or challenged to demonstrate the limits of their loyalty and to prepare the recruits for battle.[139] Modern fraternities and sororities espouse some connection to these values of ancient Greek civilization.[140] According to a scholar, this concept lends historical legitimacy to a "tradition" or "ritual" whereby prospective members are asked to prove their worthiness and loyalty to the organization in which they seek to attain membership through hazing.[141]
Thus, it is said that in the Greek fraternity system, custom requires a student wishing to join an organization to receive an invitation in order to be a neophyte for a particular chapter.[142] The neophyte period is usually one to two semesters long.[143] During the "program," neophytes are required to interview and to get to know the active members of the chapter; to learn chapter history; to understand the principles of the organization; to maintain a specified grade point average; to participate in the organization's activities; and to show dignity and respect for their fellow neophytes, the organization, and its active and alumni members.[144] Some chapters require the initiation activities for a recruit to involve hazing acts during the entire neophyte stage.[145]
Hazing, as commonly understood, involves an initiation rite or ritual that serves as prerequisite for admission to an organization.[146] In hazing, the "recruit," "pledge," "neophyte," "initiate," "applicant" - or any other term by which the organization may refer to such a person - is generally placed in embarrassing or humiliating situations, like being forced to do menial, silly, foolish, or other similar tasks or activities.[147] It encompasses different forms of conduct that humiliate, degrade, abuse, or physically endanger those who desire membership in the organization.[148] These acts usually involve physical or psychological suffering or injury.[149]
The concept of initiation rites in the country is nothing new. In fact, more than a century ago, our national hero - Andres Bonifacio - organized a secret society named Kataastaasan Kagalanggalangang Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan (The Highest and Most Venerable Association of the Sons and Daughters of the Nation).[150] The Katipunan, or KKK, started as a small confraternity believed to be inspired by European Freemasonry, as well as by confraternities or sodalities approved by the Catholic Church.[151] The Katipunan's ideology was brought home to each member through the society's initiation ritual.[152] It is said that initiates were brought to a dark room, lit by a single point of illumination, and were asked a series of
questions to determine their fitness, loyalty, courage, and resolve. [153] They were made to go through vigorous trials such as "pagsuot sa isang lungga" or "[pagtalon] sa balon." [154] It would seem that they were also made to withstand the blow of "pangherong bakal sa pisngi" and to endure a "matalas na punyal." [155] As a final step in the ritual, the neophyte Katipunero was made to sign membership papers with the his own blood. [156]
It is believed that the Greek fraternity system was transported by the Americans to the Philippines in the late 19th century. As can be seen in the following instances, the manner of hazing in the United States was jarringly similar to that inflicted by the Aquila Fraternity on Lenny Villa.
Early in 1865, upperclassmen at West Point Academy forced the fourth classmen to do exhausting physical exercises that sometimes resulted in permanent physical damage; to eat or drink unpalatable foods; and in various ways to humiliate themselves.[157] In 1901, General Douglas MacArthur got involved in a congressional investigation of hazing at the academy during his second year at West Point.[158]
In Easler v. Hejaz Temple of Greenville, decided in 1985, the candidate-victim was injured during the shriner's hazing event, which was part of the initiation ceremonies for Hejaz membership.[159] The ritual involved what was known as the "mattress-rotating barrel trick."[160] It required each candidate to slide down an eight to nine-foot-high metal board onto connected mattresses leading to a barrel, over which the candidate was required to climb.[161] Members of Hejaz would stand on each side of the mattresses and barrel and fun-paddle candidates en route to the barrel.[162]
In a video footage taken in 1991, U.S. Marine paratroopers in Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, were seen performing a ceremony in which they pinned paratrooper jump wings directly onto the neophyte paratroopers' chests.[163] The victims were shown writhing and crying out in pain as others pounded the spiked medals through the shirts and into the chests of the victims.[164]
In State v. Allen, decided in 1995, the Southeast Missouri State University chapter of Kappa Alpha Psi invited male students to enter into a pledgeship program.[165] The fraternity members subjected the pledges to repeated physical abuse including repeated, open-hand strikes at the nape, the chest, and the back; caning of the bare soles of the feet and buttocks; blows to the back with the use of a heavy book and a cookie sheet while the pledges were on their hands and knees; various kicks and punches to the body; and "body slamming," an activity in which active members of the fraternity lifted pledges up in the air and dropped them to the ground.[166] The fraternity members then put the pledges through a seven-station circle of physical abuse.[167]
In Ex Parte Barran, decided in 1998, the pledge-victim went through hazing by fraternity members of the Kappa Alpha Order at the Auburn University in Alabama.[168] The hazing included the following: (1) having to dig a ditch and jump into it after it had been filled with water, urine, feces, dinner leftovers, and vomit; (2) receiving paddlings on the buttocks; (3) being pushed and kicked, often onto walls or into pits and trash cans; (4) eating foods like peppers, hot sauce, butter, and "yerks" (a mixture of hot sauce, mayonnaise, butter, beans, and other items); (5) doing chores for the fraternity and its members, such as cleaning the fraternity house and yard, being designated as driver, and running errands; (6) appearing regularly at 2 a.m. "meetings," during which the pledges would be hazed for a couple of hours; and (7) "running the gauntlet," during which the pledges were pushed, kicked, and hit as they ran down a hallway and descended down a flight of stairs.[169]
In Lloyd v. Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity, decided in 1999, the victim - Sylvester Lloyd - was accepted to pledge at the Cornell University chapter of the Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity.[170] He participated in initiation activities, which included various forms of physical beatings and torture, psychological coercion and embarrassment.[171]
In Kenner v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, decided in 2002, the initiate-victim suffered injuries from hazing activities during the fraternity's initiation rites.[172] Kenner and the other initiates went through psychological and physical hazing, including being paddled on the buttocks for more than 200 times.[173]
In Morton v. State, Marcus Jones - a university student in Florida - sought initiation into the campus chapter of the Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity during the 2005-06 academic year.[174] The pledge's efforts to join the fraternity culminated in a series of initiation rituals conducted in four nights. Jones, together with other candidates, was blindfolded, verbally harassed, and caned on his face and buttocks.[175] In these rituals described as "preliminaries," which lasted for two evenings, he received approximately 60 canings on his buttocks.[176] During the last two days of the hazing, the rituals intensified.[177] The pledges sustained roughly 210 cane strikes during the four-night initiation.[178] Jones and several other candidates passed out.[179]
The purported raison d'�tre behind hazing practices is the proverbial "birth by fire," through which the pledge who has successfully withstood the hazing proves his or her worth.[180] Some organizations even believe that hazing is the path to enlightenment. It is said that this process enables the organization to establish unity among the pledges and, hence, reinforces and ensures the future of the organization.[181] Alleged benefits of joining include leadership opportunities; improved academic performance; higher self-esteem; professional networking opportunities; and the esprit d'corp associated with close, almost filial, friendship and common cause.[182]
Anti-Hazing laws in the U.S.
The first hazing statute in the U.S. appeared in 1874 in response to hazing in the military.[183] The hazing of recruits and plebes in the armed services was so prevalent that Congress prohibited all forms of military hazing, harmful or not.[184] It was not until 1901 that Illinois passed the first state anti-hazing law, criminalizing conduct "whereby any one sustains an injury to his [or her] person therefrom."[185]
However, it was not until the 1980s and 1990s, due in large part to the efforts of the Committee to Halt Useless College Killings and other similar organizations, that states increasingly began to enact legislation prohibiting and/or criminalizing hazing.[186] As of 2008, all but six states had enacted criminal or civil statutes proscribing hazing.[187] Most anti-hazing laws in the U.S. treat hazing as a misdemeanor and carry relatively light consequences for even the most severe situations.[188] Only a few states with anti-hazing laws consider hazing as a felony in case death or great bodily harm occurs.[189]
Under the laws of Illinois, hazing is a Class A misdemeanor, except hazing that results in death or great bodily harm, which is a Class 4 felony.[190] In a Class 4 felony, a sentence of imprisonment shall be for a term of not less than one year and not more than three years.[191] Indiana criminal law provides that a person who recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally
performs hazing that results in serious bodily injury to a person commits criminal recklessness, a Class D felony.[192]
The offense becomes a Class C felony if committed by means of a deadly weapon.[193] As an element of a Class C felony - criminal recklessness - resulting in serious bodily injury, death falls under the category of "serious bodily injury."[194] A person who commits a Class C felony is imprisoned for a fixed term of between two (2) and eight (8) years, with the advisory sentence being four (4) years.[195] Pursuant to Missouri law, hazing is a Class A misdemeanor, unless the act creates a substantial risk to the life of the student or prospective member, in which case it becomes a Class C felony.[196] A Class C felony provides for an imprisonment term not to exceed seven years.[197]
In Texas, hazing that causes the death of another is a state jail felony.[198] An individual adjudged guilty of a state jail felony is punished by confinement in a state jail for any term of not more than two years or not less than 180 days.[199] Under Utah law, if hazing results in serious bodily injury, the hazer is guilty of a third-degree felony.[200] A person who has been convicted of a third-degree felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for a term not to exceed five years.[201] West Virginia law provides that if the act of hazing would otherwise be deemed a felony, the hazer may be found guilty thereof and subject to penalties provided therefor.[202] In Wisconsin, a person is guilty of a Class G felony if hazing results in the death of another.[203] A
Class G felony carries a fine not to exceed $25,000 or imprisonment not to exceed 10 years, or both.[204]
In certain states in the U.S., victims of hazing were left with limited remedies, as there was no hazing statute.[205] This situation was exemplified in Ballou v. Sigma Nu General Fraternity, wherein Barry Ballou's family resorted to a civil action for wrongful death, since there was no anti-hazing statute in South Carolina until 1994.[206]
The existence of animus interficendi or intent
to kill not proven beyond reasonable doubt
The presence of an ex ante situation - in this case, fraternity initiation rites - does not automatically amount to the absence of malicious intent or dolus malus. If it is proven beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrators were equipped with a guilty mind - whether or not there is a contextual background or factual premise - they are still criminally liable for intentional felony.
The trial court, the CA, and the Solicitor General are all in agreement that - with the exception of Villareal and Dizon - accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug did not have the animus interficendi or intent to kill Lenny Villa or the other neophytes. We shall no longer disturb this finding.
As regards Villareal and Dizon, the CA modified the Decision of the trial court and found that the two accused had the animus interficendi or intent to kill Lenny Villa, not merely to inflict physical injuries on him. It justified its finding of homicide against Dizon by holding that he had apparently been motivated by ill will while beating up Villa. Dizon kept repeating that his father's parking space had been stolen by the victim's father.[207] As to Villareal, the court said that the accused suspected the family of Bienvenido Marquez, one of the neophytes, to have had a hand in the death of Villareal's brother.[208] The CA then ruled as follows:
The two had their own axes to grind against Villa and Marquez. It was very clear that they acted with evil and criminal intent. The evidence on this matter is unrebutted and so for the death of Villa, appellants Dizon and Villareal must and should face the consequence of their acts, that is, to be held liable for the crime of homicide.[209] (Emphasis supplied)
We cannot subscribe to this conclusion.
The appellate court relied mainly on the testimony of Bienvenido Marquez to determine the existence of animus interficendi. For a full appreciation of the context in which the supposed utterances were made, the Court deems it necessary to reproduce the relevant portions of witness Marquez's testimony:
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
On cross-examination, witness Bienvenido Marquez testified thus:
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x tr valign="TOP">
According to the Solicitor General himself, the ill motives attributed by the CA to Dizon and Villareal were "baseless,"[213] since the statements of the accused were "just part of the psychological initiation calculated to instill fear on the part of the neophytes"; that "[t]here is no element of truth in it as testified by Bienvenido Marquez"; and that the "harsh words uttered by Petitioner and Villareal are part of `tradition' concurred and accepted by all the fraternity members during their initiation rites."[214]
We agree with the Solicitor General.
The foregoing testimony of witness Marquez reveals a glaring mistake of substantial proportion on the part of the CA - it mistook the utterances of Dizon for those of Villareal. Such inaccuracy cannot be tolerated, especially because it was the CA's primary basis for finding that Villarreal had the intent to kill Lenny Villa, thereby making Villareal guilty of the intentional felony of homicide. To repeat, according to Bienvenido Marquez's testimony, as reproduced above, it was Dizon who uttered both "accusations" against Villa and Marquez; Villareal had no participation whatsoever in the specific threats referred to by the CA. It was "Boyet Dizon [who] stepped on [Marquez's] thigh"; and who told witness Marquez, "[I]to, yung pamilya nito ay pinapatay yung kapatid ko." It was also Dizon who jumped on Villa's thighs while saying, "[T]his guy, his father stole the parking space of my father." With the testimony clarified, we find that the CA had no basis for concluding the existence of intent to kill based solely thereon.
As to the existence of animus interficendi on the part of Dizon, we refer to the entire factual milieu and contextual premise of the incident to fully appreciate and understand the testimony of witness Marquez. At the outset, the neophytes were briefed that they would be subjected to psychological pressure in order to scare them. They knew that they would be mocked, ridiculed, and intimidated. They heard fraternity members shout, "Patay ka, Recinto," "Yari ka, Recinto," "Villa, akin ka," "Asuncion, gulpi ka," "Putang ina mo, Asuncion," "Putang ina nyo, patay kayo sa amin," or some other words to that effect.[215] While beating the neophytes, Dizon accused Marquez of the death of the former's purported NPA brother, and then blamed Lenny Villa's father for stealing the parking space of Dizon's father. According to the Solicitor General, these statements, including those of the accused Dizon, were all part of the psychological initiation employed by the Aquila Fraternity.[216]
Thus, to our understanding, accused Dizon's way of inflicting psychological pressure was through hurling make-believe accusations at the initiates. He concocted the fictitious stories, so that he could "justify" giving the neophytes harder blows, all in the context of fraternity initiation and role playing. Even one of the neophytes admitted that the accusations were untrue and made-up.
The infliction of psychological pressure is not unusual in the conduct of hazing. In fact, during the Senate deliberations on the then proposed Anti-Hazing Law, former Senator Lina spoke as follows:
Senator Lina. -- so as to capture the intent that we conveyed during the period of interpellations on why we included the phrase "or psychological pain and suffering."x x x x x x x x x
So that if no direct physical harm is inflicted upon the neophyte or the recruit but the recruit or neophyte is made to undergo certain acts which I already described yesterday, like playing the Russian roulette extensively to test the readiness and the willingness of the neophyte or recruit to continue his desire to be a member of the fraternity, sorority or similar organization or playing and putting a noose on the neck of the neophyte or recruit, making the recruit or neophyte stand on the ledge of the fourth floor of the building facing outside, asking him to jump outside after making him turn around several times but the reality is that he will be made to jump towards the inside portion of the building - these are the mental or psychological tests that are resorted to by these organizations, sororities or fraternities. The doctors who appeared during the public hearing testified that such acts can result in some mental aberration, that they can even lead to psychosis, neurosis or insanity. This is what we want to prevent.[217] (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, without proof beyond reasonable doubt, Dizon's behavior must not be automatically viewed as evidence of a genuine, evil motivation to kill Lenny Villa. Rather, it must be taken within the context of the fraternity's psychological initiation. This Court points out that it was not even established whether the fathers of Dizon and Villa really had any familiarity with each other as would lend credence to the veracity of Dizon's threats. The testimony of Lenny's co-neophyte, Marquez, only confirmed this view. According to Marquez, he "knew it was not true and that [Dizon] was just making it up...."[218] Even the trial court did not give weight to the utterances of Dizon as constituting intent to kill: "[T]he cumulative acts of all the accused were not directed toward killing Villa, but merely to inflict physical harm as part of the fraternity initiation rites x x x."[219] The Solicitor General shares the same view.
Verily, we cannot sustain the CA in finding the accused Dizon guilty of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code on the basis of the existence of intent to kill. Animus interficendi cannot and should not be inferred unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such intent.[220] Instead, we adopt and reinstate the finding of the trial court in part, insofar as it ruled that none of the fraternity members had the specific intent to kill Lenny Villa.[221]
The existence of animus iniuriandi or malicious intent
to injure not proven beyond reasonable doubt
The Solicitor General argues, instead, that there was an intent to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa. Echoing the Decision of the trial court, the Solicitor General then posits that since all of the accused fraternity members conspired to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa and death ensued, all of them should be liable for the crime of homicide pursuant to Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code.
In order to be found guilty of any of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266 of the Revised Penal Code,[222] the employment of physical injuries must be coupled with dolus malus. As an act that is mala in se, the existence of malicious intent is fundamental, since injury arises from the mental state of the wrongdoer - iniuria ex affectu facientis consistat. If there is no criminal intent, the accused cannot be found guilty of an intentional felony. Thus, in case of physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code, there must be a specific animus iniuriandi or malicious intention to do wrong against the physical integrity or well-being of a person, so as to incapacitate and deprive the victim of certain bodily functions. Without proof beyond reasonable doubt of the required animus iniuriandi, the overt act of inflicting physical injuries per se merely satisfies the elements of freedom and intelligence in an intentional felony. The commission of the act does not, in itself, make a man guilty unless his intentions are.[223]
Thus, we have ruled in a number of instances[224] that the mere infliction of physical injuries, absent malicious intent, does not make a person automatically liable for an intentional felony. In Bagajo v. People,[225] the accused teacher, using a bamboo stick, whipped one of her students behind her legs and thighs as a form of discipline. The student suffered lesions and bruises from the corporal punishment. In reversing the trial court's finding of criminal liability for slight physical injuries, this Court stated thus: "Independently of any civil or administrative responsibility ... [w]e are persuaded that she did not do what she had done with criminal intent ... the means she actually used was moderate and that she was not motivated by ill-will, hatred or any malevolent intent." Considering the applicable laws, we then ruled that "as a matter of law, petitioner did not incur any criminal liability for her act of whipping her pupil." In People v. Carmen,[226] the accused members of the religious group known as the Missionaries of Our Lady of Fatima - under the guise of a "ritual or treatment" - plunged the head of the victim into a barrel of water, banged his head against a bench, pounded his chest with fists, and stabbed him on the side with a kitchen knife, in order to cure him of "nervous breakdown" by expelling through those means the bad spirits possessing him. The collective acts of the group caused the death of the victim. Since malicious intent was not proven, we reversed the trial court's finding of liability for murder under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code and instead ruled that the accused should be held criminally liable for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide under Article 365 thereof.
Indeed, the threshold question is whether the accused's initial acts of inflicting physical pain on the neophytes were attended by animus iniuriandi amounting to a felonious act punishable under the Revised Penal Code, thereby making it subject to Article 4(1) thereof. In People v. Regato, we ruled that malicious intent must be judged by the action, conduct, and external acts of the accused.[227] What persons do is the best index of their intention.[228] We have also ruled that the method employed, the kind of weapon used, and the parts of the body on which the injury was inflicted may be determinative of the intent of the perpetrator.[229] The Court shall thus examine the whole contextual background surrounding the death of Lenny Villa.
Lenny died during Aquila's fraternity initiation rites. The night before the commencement of the rites, they were briefed on what to expect. They were told that there would be physical beatings, that the whole event would last for three days, and that they could quit anytime. On their first night, they were subjected to "traditional" initiation rites, including the "Indian Run," "Bicol Express," "Rounds," and the "Auxies' Privilege Round." The beatings were predominantly directed at the neophytes' arms and legs.
In the morning of their second day of initiation, they were made to present comic plays and to play rough basketball. They were also required to memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternity's principles. Late in the afternoon, they were once again subjected to "traditional" initiation rituals. When the rituals were officially reopened on the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, the neophytes were subjected to another "traditional" ritual - paddling by the fraternity.
During the whole initiation rites, auxiliaries were assigned to the neophytes. The auxiliaries protected the neophytes by functioning as human barriers and shielding them from those who were designated to inflict physical and psychological pain on the initiates.[230] It was their regular duty to stop foul or excessive physical blows; to help the neophytes to "pump" their legs in order that their blood would circulate; to facilitate a rest interval after every physical activity or "round"; to serve food and water; to tell jokes; to coach the initiates; and to give them whatever they needed.
These rituals were performed with Lenny's consent.[231] A few days before the "rites," he asked both his parents for permission to join the Aquila Fraternity.[232] His father knew that Lenny would go through an initiation process and would be gone for three days.[233] The CA found as follows:
It is worth pointing out that the neophytes willingly and voluntarily consented to undergo physical initiation and hazing. As can be gleaned from the narration of facts, they voluntarily agreed to join the initiation rites to become members of the Aquila Legis Fraternity. Prior to the initiation, they were given briefings on what to expect. It is of common knowledge that before admission in a fraternity, the neophytes will undergo a rite of passage. Thus, they were made aware that traditional methods such as mocking, psychological tests and physical punishment would take place. They knew that the initiation would involve beatings and other forms of hazing. They were also told of their right and opportunity to quit at any time they wanted to. In fact, prosecution witness Navera testified that accused Tecson told him that "after a week, you can already play basketball." Prosecution witness Marquez for his part, admitted that he knew that the initiates would be hit "in the arms and legs," that a wooden paddle would be used to hit them and that he expected bruises on his arms and legs.... Indeed, there can be no fraternity initiation without consenting neophytes.[234] (Emphasis supplied)
Even after going through Aquila's grueling traditional rituals during the first day, Lenny continued his participation and finished the second day of initiation.
Based on the foregoing contextual background, and absent further proof showing clear malicious intent, we are constrained to rule that the specific animus iniuriandi was not present in this case. Even if the specific acts of punching, kicking, paddling, and other modes of inflicting physical pain were done voluntarily, freely, and with intelligence, thereby satisfying the elements of freedom and intelligence in the felony of physical injuries, the fundamental ingredient of criminal intent was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. On the contrary, all that was proven was that the acts were done pursuant to tradition. Although the additional "rounds" on the second night were held upon the insistence of Villareal and Dizon, the initiations were officially reopened with the consent of the head of the initiation rites; and the accused fraternity members still participated in the rituals, including the paddling, which were performed pursuant to tradition. Other than the paddle, no other "weapon" was used to inflict injuries on Lenny. The targeted body parts were predominantly the legs and the arms. The designation of roles, including the role of auxiliaries, which were assigned for the specific purpose of lending assistance to and taking care of the neophytes during the initiation rites, further belied the presence of malicious intent. All those who wished to join the fraternity went through the same process of "traditional" initiation; there is no proof that Lenny Villa was specifically targeted or given a different treatment. We stress that Congress itself recognized that hazing is uniquely different from common crimes.[235] The totality of the circumstances must therefore be taken into consideration.
The underlying context and motive in which the infliction of physical injuries was rooted may also be determined by Lenny's continued participation in the initiation and consent to the method used even after the first day. The following discussion of the framers of the 1995 Anti-Hazing Law is enlightening:
SENATOR GUINGONA. Most of these acts, if not all, are already punished under the Revised Penal Code.
Senator Lina. That is correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA. If hazing is done at present and it results in death, the charge would be murder or homicide.
Senator Lina. That is correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA. If it does not result in death, it may be frustrated homicide or serious physical injuries.
SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA. Or, if the person who commits sexual abuse does so it can be penalized under rape or acts of lasciviousness.
SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA. So, what is the rationale for making a new offense under this definition of the crime of hazing?
SENATOR LINA. To discourage persons or group of persons either composing a sorority, fraternity or any association from making this requirement of initiation that has already resulted in these specific acts or results, Mr. President.
That is the main rationale. We want to send a strong signal across the land that no group or association can require the act of physical initiation before a person can become a member without being held criminally liable.x x x x x x x x x
SENATOR GUINGONA. Yes, but what would be the rationale for that imposition? Because the distinguished Sponsor has said that he is not punishing a mere organization, he is not seeking the punishment of an initiation into a club or organization, he is seeking the punishment of certain acts that resulted in death, et cetera as a result of hazing which are already covered crimes.
The penalty is increased in one, because we would like to discourage hazing, abusive hazing, but it may be a legitimate defense for invoking two or more charges or offenses, because these very same acts are already punishable under the Revised Penal Code.
That is my difficulty, Mr. President.
SENATOR LINA. x x x
Another point, Mr. President, is this, and this is a very telling difference: When a person or group of persons resort to hazing as a requirement for gaining entry into an organization, the intent to commit a wrong is not visible or is not present, Mr. President. Whereas, in these specific crimes, Mr. President, let us say there is death or there is homicide, mutilation, if one files a case, then the intention to commit a wrong has to be proven. But if the crime of hazing is the basis, what is important is the result from the act of hazing.
To me, that is the basic difference and that is what will prevent or deter the sororities or fraternities; that they should really shun this activity called "hazing." Because, initially, these fraternities or sororities do not even consider having a neophyte killed or maimed or that acts of lasciviousness are even committed initially, Mr. President.
So, what we want to discourage is the so-called initial innocent act. That is why there is need to institute this kind of hazing. Ganiyan po ang nangyari. Ang fraternity o ang sorority ay magre-recruit. Wala talaga silang intensiyong makamatay. Hindi ko na babanggitin at buhay pa iyong kaso. Pero dito sa anim o pito na namatay nitong nakaraang taon, walang intensiyong patayin talaga iyong neophyte. So, kung maghihintay pa tayo, na saka lamang natin isasakdal ng murder kung namatay na, ay after the fact ho iyon. Pero, kung sasabihin natin sa mga kabataan na: "Huwag ninyong gagawin iyong hazing. Iyan ay kasalanan at kung mamatay diyan, mataas ang penalty sa inyo."x x x x x x x x x
SENATOR GUINGONA. I join the lofty motives, Mr. President, of the distinguished Sponsor. But I am again disturbed by his statement that the prosecution does not have to prove the intent that resulted in the death, that resulted in the serious physical injuries, that resulted in the acts of lasciviousness or deranged mind. We do not have to prove the willful intent of the accused in proving or establishing the crime of hazing. This seems, to me, a novel situation where we create the special crime without having to go into the intent, which is one of the basic elements of any crime.
If there is no intent, there is no crime. If the intent were merely to initiate, then there is no offense. And even the distinguished Sponsor admits that the organization, the intent to initiate, the intent to have a new society or a new club is, per se, not punishable at all. What are punishable are the acts that lead to the result. But if these results are not going to be proven by intent, but just because there was hazing, I am afraid that it will disturb the basic concepts of the Revised Penal Code, Mr. President.
SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, the act of hazing, precisely, is being criminalized because in the context of what is happening in the sororities and fraternities, when they conduct hazing, no one will admit that their intention is to maim or to kill. So, we are already criminalizing the fact of inflicting physical pain. Mr. President, it is a criminal act and we want it stopped, deterred, discouraged.
If that occurs, under this law, there is no necessity to prove that the masters intended to kill or the masters intended to maim. What is important is the result of the act of hazing. Otherwise, the masters or those who inflict the physical pain can easily escape responsibility and say, "We did not have the intention to kill. This is part of our initiation rites. This is normal. We do not have any intention to kill or maim."
This is the lusot, Mr. President. They might as well have been charged therefore with the ordinary crime of homicide, mutilation, et cetera, where the prosecution will have a difficulty proving the elements if they are separate offenses.x x x x x x x x x
SENATOR GUINGONA. Mr. President, assuming there was a group that initiated and a person died. The charge is murder. My question is: Under this bill if it becomes a law, would the prosecution have to prove conspiracy or not anymore?
SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, if the person is present during hazing x x x
SENATOR GUINGONA. The persons are present. First, would the prosecution have to prove conspiracy? Second, would the prosecution have to prove intent to kill or not?
SENATOR LINA. No more. As to the second question, Mr. President, if that occurs, there is no need to prove intent to kill.
SENATOR GUINGONA. But the charge is murder.
SENATOR LINA. That is why I said that it should not be murder. It should be hazing, Mr. President. [236] (Emphasis supplied)
During a discussion between Senator Biazon and Senator Lina on the issue of whether to include sodomy as a punishable act under the Anti-Hazing Law, Senator Lina further clarified thus:
SENATOR BIAZON. Mr. President, this Representation has no objection to the inclusion of sodomy as one of the conditions resulting from hazing as necessary to be punished. However, the act of sodomy can be committed by two persons with or without consent.
To make it clearer, what is being punished here is the commission of sodomy forced into another individual by another individual. I move, Mr. President, that sodomy be modified by the phrase "without consent" for purposes of this section.
SENATOR LINA. I am afraid, Mr. President, that if we qualify sodomy with the concept that it is only going to aggravate the crime of hazing if it is done without consent will change a lot of concepts here. Because the results from hazing aggravate the offense with or without consent. In fact, when a person joins a fraternity, sorority, or any association for that matter, it can be with or without the consent of the intended victim. The fact that a person joins a sorority or fraternity with his consent does not negate the crime of hazing.
This is a proposed law intended to protect the citizens from the malpractices that attend initiation which may have been announced with or without physical infliction of pain or injury, Mr. President. Regardless of whether there is announcement that there will be physical hazing or whether there is none, and therefore, the neophyte is duped into joining a fraternity is of no moment. What is important is that there is an infliction of physical pain.
The bottom line of this law is that a citizen even has to be protected from himself if he joins a fraternity, so that at a certain point in time, the State, the individual, or the parents of the victim can run after the perpetrators of the crime, regardless of whether or not there was consent on the part of the victim.x x x x x x x x x
SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, I understand the position taken by the distinguished Gentleman from Cavite and Metro Manila. It is correct that society sometimes adopts new mores, traditions, and practices.
In this bill, we are not going to encroach into the private proclivities of some individuals when they do their acts in private as we do not take a peek into the private rooms of couples. They can do their thing if they want to make love in ways that are not considered acceptable by the mainstream of society. That is not something that the State should prohibit.
But sodomy in this case is connected with hazing, Mr. President. Such that the act may even be entered into with consent. It is not only sodomy. The infliction of pain may be done with the consent of the neophyte. If the law is passed, that does not make the act of hazing not punishable because the neophyte accepted the infliction of pain upon himself.
If the victim suffers from serious physical injuries, but the initiator said, "Well, he allowed it upon himself. He consented to it." So, if we allow that reasoning that sodomy was done with the consent of the victim, then we would not have passed any law at all. There will be no significance if we pass this bill, because it will always be a defense that the victim allowed the infliction of pain or suffering. He accepted it as part of the initiation rites.
But precisely, Mr. President that is one thing that we would want to prohibit. That the defense of consent will not apply because the very act of inflicting physical pain or psychological suffering is, by itself, a punishable act. The result of the act of hazing, like death or physical injuries merely aggravates the act with higher penalties. But the defense of consent is not going to nullify the criminal nature of the act.
So, if we accept the amendment that sodomy can only aggravate the offense if it is committed without consent of the victim, then the whole foundation of this proposed law will collapse.
SENATOR BIAZON. Thank you, Mr. President.
SENATOR LINA. Thank you very much.
The President. Is there any objection to the committee amendment? (Silence.) The Chair hears none; the same is approved.[237]
(Emphasis supplied)
Realizing the implication of removing the state's burden to prove intent, Senator Lina, the principal author of the Senate Bill, said:
I am very happy that the distinguished Minority Leader brought out the idea of intent or whether there it is mala in se or mala prohibita. There can be a radical amendment if that is the point that he wants to go to.
If we agree on the concept, then, maybe, we can just make this a special law on hazing. We will not include this anymore under the Revised Penal Code. That is a possibility. I will not foreclose that suggestion, Mr. President.[238](Emphasis supplied)
Thus, having in mind the potential conflict between the proposed law and the core principle of mala in se adhered to under the Revised Penal Code, Congress did not simply enact an amendment thereto. Instead, it created a special law on hazing, founded upon the principle of mala prohibita. This dilemma faced by Congress is further proof of how the nature of hazing - unique as against typical crimes - cast a cloud of doubt on whether society considered the act as an inherently wrong conduct or mala in se at the time. It is safe to presume that Lenny's parents would not have consented[239] to his participation in Aquila Fraternity's initiation rites if the practice of hazing were considered by them as mala in se.
Furthermore, in Veda�a v. Valencia (1998), we noted through Associate Justice (now retired Chief Justice) Hilario Davide that "in our nation's very recent history, the people have spoken, through Congress, to deem conduct constitutive of ... hazing, [an] act[] previously considered harmless by custom, as criminal."[240] Although it may be regarded as a simple obiter dictum, the statement nonetheless shows recognition that hazing - or the conduct of initiation rites through physical and/or psychological suffering - has not been traditionally criminalized. Prior to the 1995 Anti-Hazing Law, there was to some extent a lacuna in the law; hazing was not clearly considered an intentional felony. And when there is doubt on the interpretation of criminal laws, all must be resolved in favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo.
For the foregoing reasons, and as a matter of law, the Court is constrained to rule against the trial court's finding of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa, there being no proof beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries or animus iniuriandi as required in mala in se cases, considering the contextual background of his death, the unique nature of hazing, and absent a law prohibiting hazing.
The accused fraternity members guilty of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however, that the accused fraternity members are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The Revised Penal Code also punishes felonies that are committed by means of fault (culpa). According to Article 3 thereof, there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act done without malice, from which an immediate personal harm, injury or material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution or advertence on the part of the person committing it.[241] In this case, the danger is visible and consciously appreciated by the actor.[242] In contrast, simple imprudence or negligence comprises an act done without grave fault, from which an injury or material damage ensues by reason of a mere lack of foresight or skill.[243] Here, the threatened harm is not immediate, and the danger is not openly visible. [244]
The test[245] for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act is as follows: Would a prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes on the doer the duty to take precaution against the mischievous results of the act. Failure to do so constitutes negligence.[246]
As we held in Gaid v. People, for a person to avoid being charged with recklessness, the degree of precaution and diligence required varies with the degree of the danger involved.[247] If, on account of a certain line of conduct, the danger of causing harm to another person is great, the individual who chooses to follow that particular course of conduct is bound to be very careful, in order to prevent or avoid damage or injury.[248] In contrast, if the danger is minor, not much care is required.[249] It is thus possible that there are countless degrees of precaution or diligence that may be required of an individual, "from a transitory glance of care to the most vigilant effort."[250] The duty of the person to employ more or less degree of care will depend upon the circumstances of each particular case.[251]
There was patent recklessness in the hazing of Lenny Villa.
According to the NBI medico-legal officer, Lenny died of cardiac failure secondary to multiple traumatic injuries.[252] The officer explained that cardiac failure refers to the failure of the heart to work as a pump and as part of the circulatory system due to the lack of blood.[253] In the present case, the victim's heart could no longer work as a pumping organ, because it was deprived of its requisite blood and oxygen.[254] The deprivation was due to the "channeling" of the blood supply from the entire circulatory system - including the heart, arteries, veins, venules, and capillaries - to the thigh, leg, and arm areas of Lenny, thus causing the formation of multiple hematomas or blood clots.[255] The multiple hematomas were wide, thick, and deep,[256] indicating that these could have resulted mainly from injuries sustained by the victim from fist blows, knee blows, paddles, or the like.[257] Repeated blows to those areas caused the blood to gradually ooze out of the capillaries until the circulating blood became so markedly diminished as to produce death. [258] The officer also found that the brain, liver, kidney, pancreas, intestines, and all other organs seen in the abdominals, as well as the thoracic organ in the lungs, were pale due to the lack of blood, which was redirected to the thighs and forearms.[259] It was concluded that there was nothing in the heart that would indicate that the victim suffered from a previous cardiac arrest or disease.[260]
The multiple hematomas or bruises found in Lenny Villa's arms and thighs, resulting from repeated blows to those areas, caused the loss of blood from his vital organs and led to his eventual death. These hematomas must be taken in the light of the hazing activities performed on him by the Aquila Fraternity. According to the testimonies of the co-neophytes of Lenny, they were punched, kicked, elbowed, kneed, stamped on; and hit with different objects on their arms, legs, and thighs.[261] They were also "paddled" at the back of their thighs or legs;[262] and slapped on their faces.[263] They were made to play rough basketball.[264] Witness Marquez testified on Lenny, saying: "[T]inamaan daw sya sa spine."[265] The NBI medico-legal officer explained that the death of the victim was the cumulative effect of the multiple injuries suffered by the latter.[266] The relevant portion of the testimony is as follows:
There is also evidence to show that some of the accused fraternity members were drinking during the initiation rites.[268]
Consequently, the collective acts of the fraternity members were tantamount to recklessness, which made the resulting death of Lenny a culpable felony. It must be remembered that organizations owe to their initiates a duty of care not to cause them injury in the process.[269] With the foregoing facts, we rule that the accused are guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Since the NBI medico-legal officer found that the victim's death was the cumulative effect of the injuries suffered, criminal responsibility redounds to all those who directly participated in and contributed to the infliction of physical injuries.
It appears from the aforementioned facts that the incident may have been prevented, or at least mitigated, had the alumni of Aquila Fraternity - accused Dizon and Villareal - restrained themselves from insisting on reopening the initiation rites. Although this point did not matter in the end, as records would show that the other fraternity members participated in the reopened initiation rites - having in mind the concept of "seniority" in fraternities - the implication of the presence of alumni should be seen as a point of review in future legislation. We further note that some of the fraternity members were intoxicated during Lenny's initiation rites. In this light, the Court submits to Congress, for legislative consideration, the amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the fact of intoxication and the presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members during hazing as aggravating circumstances that would increase the applicable penalties.
It is truly astonishing how men would wittingly - or unwittingly -impose the misery of hazing and employ appalling rituals in the name of brotherhood. There must be a better way to establish "kinship." A neophyte admitted that he joined the fraternity to have more friends and to avail himself of the benefits it offered, such as tips during bar examinations.[270] Another initiate did not give up, because he feared being looked down upon as a quitter, and because he felt he did not have a choice.[271] Thus, for Lenny Villa and the other neophytes, joining the Aquila Fraternity entailed a leap in the dark. By giving consent under the circumstances, they left their fates in the hands of the fraternity members. Unfortunately, the hands to which lives were entrusted were barbaric as they were reckless.
Our finding of criminal liability for the felony of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide shall cover only accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, Bantug, and Dizon. Had the Anti-Hazing Law been in effect then, these five accused fraternity members would have all been convicted of the crime of hazing punishable by reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment).[272] Since there was no law prohibiting the act of hazing when Lenny died, we are constrained to rule according to existing laws at the time of his death. The CA found that the prosecution failed to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, Victorino et al.'s individual participation in the infliction of physical injuries upon Lenny Villa.[273] As to accused Villareal, his criminal liability was totally extinguished by the fact of his death, pursuant to Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code.
Furthermore, our ruling herein shall be interpreted without prejudice to the applicability of the Anti-Hazing Law to subsequent cases. Furthermore, the modification of criminal liability from slight physical injuries to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide shall apply only with respect to accused Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson.
The accused liable to pay damages
The CA awarded damages in favor of the heirs of Lenny Villa in the amounts of P50,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto and P1,000,000 as moral damages, to be jointly and severally paid by accused Dizon and Villareal. It also awarded the amount of P30,000 as indemnity to be jointly and severally paid by accused Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson.
Civil indemnity ex delicto is automatically awarded for the sole fact of death of the victim.[274] In accordance with prevailing jurisprudence,[275] we sustain the CA's award of indemnity in the amount of P50,000.
The heirs of the victim are entitled to actual or compensatory damages, including expenses incurred in connection with the death of the victim, so long as the claim is supported by tangible documents.[276] Though we are prepared to award actual damages, the Court is prevented from granting them, since the records are bereft of any evidence to show that actual expenses were incurred or proven during trial. Furthermore, in the appeal, the Solicitor General does not interpose any claim for actual damages.[277]
The heirs of the deceased may recover moral damages for the grief suffered on account of the victim's death.[278] This penalty is pursuant to Article 2206(3) of the Civil Code, which provides that the "spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and the ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased."[279] Thus, we hereby we affirm the CA's award of moral damages in the amount of ?1,000,000.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 155101 finding petitioner Fidelito Dizon guilty of homicide is hereby MODIFIED and set aside IN PART. The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954 - finding Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries - is also MODIFIED and set aside in part. Instead, Fidelito Dizon, Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide defined and penalized under Article 365 in relation to Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. They are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. In addition, accused are ORDERED jointly and severally to pay the heirs of Lenny Villa civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of ?50,000, and moral damages in the amount of ?1,000,000, plus legal interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 12% from the date of the finality of this Decision until satisfaction.[280] Costs de oficio.
The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954, acquitting Victorino et al., is hereby affirmed. The appealed Judgments in G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080, dismissing the criminal case filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano, are likewise affirmed. Finally, pursuant to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the Petition in G.R. No. 151258 is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case against Artemio Villareal deemed closed and TERMINATED.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives for possible consideration of the amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the fact of intoxication and the presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members during hazing as aggravating circumstances that would increase the applicable penalties.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Perez, and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
[1] Sponsorship Speech of former Senator Joey Lina, Senate Transcript of Session Proceedings No. 34 (08 October 1992) 9th Congress, 1st Regular Sess. at 21-22 [hereinafter Senate TSP No. 34].
[2] Id.
[3] Senate Transcript of Session Proceedings No. 47 (10 November 1992) 9th Congress, 1st Regular Sess. at 20-21, 24-27 [hereinafter Senate TSP No. 47].
[4] Id.; Senate Transcript of Session Proceedings No. 62 (14 December 1992) 9th Congress, 1st Regular Sess. at 15 [hereinafter Senate TSP No. 62].
[5] Senate TSP No. 34, supra note 1.
[6] Id.
[7] U.S. v. Taylor, 28 Phil 599 (1914). The Court declared, "In the Philippine Islands there exist no crimes such as are known in the United States and England as common law crimes;" id. at 604.
[8] CA Decision (People v. Dizon, CA-G.R. CR No. 15520), pp. 1-5; rollo (G.R. No. 151258), pp. 62-66.
[9] RTC Decision [People v. Dizon, Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)], pp. 1-57; rollo (G.R. No. 151258), pp. 109-167.
[10] As explained in the Petition for Review of Villareal, "resident brods" are those fraternity members who are currently students of the Ateneo Law School, while "alumni brods" are those fraternity members who are graduates or former students of the law school; see Villareal's Petition for Review (Villareal v. People, G.R. No. 151258), pp. 5-7; rollo (G.R. No. 151258), pp. 17-19.
[11] RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 2, supra note 9; rollo, p. 110.
[12] Id.
[13] Id. at 66-67; rollo, pp. 175-176.
[14] CA Decision (Escalona v. RTC, CA-G.R. SP No. 89060), p. 4; rollo (G.R. No. 178057), p. 131.
[15] Penned by Associate Justice Eubulo G. Verzola and concurred in by Associate Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Eliezer R. de los Santos (with Concurring Opinion).
[16] RTC Decision (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. 38340), p. 21; rollo (G.R. No. 178057), p. 1114.
[17] CA Decision (Escalona v. RTC), pp. 12-14, supra note 14; rollo, pp. 139-141.
[18] Penned by Associate Justice Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo and concurred in by Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Hakim S. Abdulwahid.
[19] CA Decision (Escalona v. RTC), pp. 37-39, supra note 14; rollo, pp. 166-168.
[20] Villareal's Petition for Review (Villareal v. People, G.R. No. 151258), p. 13; rollo, p. 25.
[21] Dizon's Petition for Review (Dizon v. People, G.R. No. 155101), p. 1; rollo, p. 3.
[22] Id. at 17; rollo, p. 19.
[23] Id. at 10; rollo, p. 12.
[24] Id. at 22; rollo, p. 24.
[25] Id. at 23; rollo, p. 25.
[26] Id. at 23-24; rollo/i>, pp. 25-26.
[27] Id. at 26; rollo, p. 28.
[28] People's Petition for Certiorari (People v. CA, G.R. No. 154954), p. 2; rollo, p. 13.
[29] Id. at 167; rollo, p. 118.
[30] Villa's Petition for Review on Certiorari (Villa v. Escalona, G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080), p. 1; rollo, p. 84.
[31] Petralba v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 81337, 16 August 1991, 200 SCRA 644.
[32] People v. Badeo, G.R. No. 72990, 21 November 1991, 204 SCRA 122, citing J. Aquino's Concurring Opinion in People v. Satorre, G.R. No. L-26282, August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 439.
[33] People v. Bayotas, G.R. No. 102007, 2 September 1994, 236 SCRA 239; People v. Bunay, G.R. No. 171268, 14 September 2010, 630 SCRA 445.
[34] People v. Bunay, supra, citing People v. Bayotas, supra.
[35] CA Decision (People v. Dizon), p. 7, supra note 8; rollo, p. 68.
[36] Id.
[37] Id.
[38] Id.
[39] Id. at 7-8; rollo, pp. 68-69.
[40] Id. at 8; rollo, p. 69.
[41] Id.
[42] People v. Banihit, 393 Phil. 465 (2000); People v. Hernandez, 328 Phil. 1123 (1996), citing People v. Dichoso, 96 SCRA 957 (1980); and People v. Angco, 103 Phil. 33 (1958).
[43] People v. Hapa, 413 Phil. 679 (2001), citing People v. Diaz, 311 SCRA 585 (1999).
[44] People v. Hapa, supra, citing Parada v. Veneracion, 336 Phil. 354, 360 (1997).
[45] Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan, 495 Phil. 718 (2005).
[46] Id.
[47] People v. Bodoso, 446 Phil. 838 (2003).
[48] Id.
[49] Dizon's Petition for Review, supra note 21 at 20; rollo, p. 22.
[50] Id. at 23; rollo, p. 25.
[51] Villa's Petition for Review on Certiorari, supra note 30 at 19; rollo, p. 102.
[52] People v. Hernandez, G.R. Nos. 154218 & 154372, 28 August 2006, 499 SCRA 688.
[53] People v. Tampal, 314 Phil. 35 (1995), citing Gonzales v. Sandiganbayan, 199 SCRA 298 (1991); Acebedo v. Sarmiento, 146 Phil. 820 (1970).
[54] People v. Tampal, supra; Acebedo v. Sarmiento, supra.
[55] People v. Tampal, supra.
[56] Id.
[57] Id.
[58] People v. Hernandez, supra note 52, citing People v. Tampal, supra; Philippine Savings Bank v. Spouses Bermoy, 471 SCRA 94, 107 (2005); People v. Bans, 239 SCRA 48 (1994); People v. Declaro, 170 SCRA 142 (1989); and People v. Quizada, 160 SCRA 516 (1988).
[59] See People v. Hernandez, supra note 52.
[60] Id.
[61] Id.
[62] Id.
[63] CA Decision (Escalona v. RTC), pp. 24-30, supra note 14; rollo, pp. 151-157.
[64] Id. at 4; rollo, p. 131.
[65] Id.
[66] Id.
[67] Abardo v. Sandiganbayan, 407 Phil. 985 (2001).
[68] Id.
[69] Melo v. People, 85 Phil. 766 (1950).
[70] Id.
[71] Id.
[72] Id.
[73] People v. Nazareno, G.R. No. 168982, 5 August 2009, 595 SCRA 438.
[74] Id.; People v. Maquiling, 368 Phil. 169 (1999).
[75] People v. Velasco, 394 Phil. 517 (2000), citing Rules on Criminal Procedure, Rule 117, Sec 7; Paulin v. Gimenez, G. R. No. 103323, 21 January 1993, 217 SCRA 386; Comelec v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 108120, 26 January 1994, 229 SCRA 501; People v. Maquiling, supra note 74.
[76] People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, G.R. No. 159261, 21 February 2007, 516 SCRA 383, 397, citing People v. Serrano, 315 SCRA 686, 689 (1999).
[77] People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, supra, citing People v. Velasco, 340 SCRA 207, 240 (2000).
[78] Galman v. Sandiganbayan, 228 Phil. 42 (1986), citing People v. Bocar, 138 SCRA 166 (1985); Combate v. San Jose, 135 SCRA 693 (1985); People v. Catolico, 38 SCRA 389 (1971); and People v. Navarro, 63 SCRA 264 (1975).
[79] People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, supra note 76 [citing People v. Tria-Tirona, 463 SCRA 462, 469-470 (2005); and People v. Velasco, 340 SCRA 207 (2000)]; People v. Court of Appeals and Francisco, 468 Phil. 1 (2004); Galman v. Sandiganbayan, supra, citing People v. Bocar, supra.
[80] People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, supra note 76, citing People v. Serrano, supra note 76 at 690; People v. De Grano, G.R. No. 167710, 5 June 2009, 588 SCRA 550.
[81] People v. Nazareno, supra note 73; De Vera v. De Vera, G.R. No. 172832, 7 April 2009, 584 SCRA 506.
[82] People v. Nazareno, supra note 73; De Vera v. De Vera, supra.
[83] People v. De Grano, supra note 80, citing People v. Maquiling, supra note 74 at 704.
[84] Id.
[85] People's Petition for Certiorari, p. 8, supra note 28; rollo, p. 19.
[86] Id. at 80-81; rollo, pp. 91-92.
[87] Id. at 82-86; rollo, pp. 93-97.
[88] See Francisco v. Desierto, G.R. No. 154117, 2 October 2009, 602 SCRA 50, citing First Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 171989, 4 July 2007, 526 SCRA 564, 578.
[89] People v. Maquiling, supra note 74, citing Teknika Skills and Trade Services v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, 273 SCRA 10 (1997).
[90] People v. Maquiling, supra note 74, citing Medina v. City Sheriff of Manila, 276 SCRA 133, (1997); Jamer v. National Labor Relations Commission, 278 SCRA 632 (1997); and Azores v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 252 SCRA 387 (1996).
[91] De Vera v. De Vera, supra note 81; People v. Dela Torre, 430 Phil. 420 (2002); People v. Leones, 418 Phil. 804 (2001); People v. Ruiz, 171 Phil. 400 (1978); People v. Pomeroy, 97 Phil. 927 (1955), citing People v. Ang Cho Kio, 95 Phil. 475 (1954).
[92] See generally People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, supra note 76; and People v. Court of Appeals and Francisco, supra note 79.
[93] CA Decision (People v. Dizon), pp. 21-22, supra note 8; rollo, pp. 82-83.
[94] People v. Penesa, 81 Phil. 398 (1948).
[95] CA Decision (People v. Dizon), pp. 21-22, supra note 8; rollo, pp. 82-83.
[96] People v. Penesa, supra note 94.
[97] Id.
[98] Id.
[99] CA Decision (People v. Dizon), p. 16, supra note 8; rollo, p. 77.
[100] Id. at 21; rollo, p. 82.
[101] Id.
[102] See footnote 1 of Corpus v. Paje, 139 Phil. 429 (1969).
[103] RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 61, supra note 9; rollo, p. 170.
[104] Id. at 58; rollo, p. 167.
[105] Ramon C. Aquino, The Revised Penal Code - Volume One 3 (1961); see People v. Estrada, 389 Phil. 216 (2000); People v. Sandiganbayan, 341 Phil. 503 (1997).
[106] Vicente J. Francisco, The Revised Penal Code: Annotated and Commented - Book One 4 (3rd ed. 1958); see People v. Estrada, supra.
[107] Francisco, supra at 4; People v. Estrada, supra.
[108] Aquino, supra note 105 at 3.
[109] Id.
[110] Guillermo B. Guevara, Penal Sciences and Philippine Criminal Law 6 (1974).
[111] People v. Sandiganbayan, 341 Phil. 503 (1997).
[112] Francisco, supra note 106 at 33.
[113] Id. at 33-34.
[114] Mariano A. Albert, The Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815) 21-24 (1946).
[115] Id. at 21.
[116] Id. at 21.
[117] Guevarra v. Almodovar, 251 Phil. 427 (1989), citing 46 CJS Intent 1103.
[118] Black's Law Dictionary 670 (8th abr. ed. 2005); see People v. Regato, 212 Phil. 268 (1984).
[119] Guevarra v. Almodovar, supra note 117.
[120] Albert, supra note 114 at 23.
[121] People v. Ballesteros, 349 Phil. 366 (1998); Bagajo v. Marave, 176 Phil. 20 (1978), citing People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 297; 61 N.E. 286, 296; 62 L.R.A. 193.
[122] Black's Law Dictionary, supra note 118 at 520.
[123] See Francisco, supra note 106 at 34; Albert, supra note 114 at 23-25.
[124] U.S. v. Catolico, 18 Phil. 504 (1911); U.S. v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil. 488 (1910).
[125] U.S. v. Barnes, 8 Phil. 59 (1907); Dado v. People, 440 Phil. 521 (2002), citing Mondragon v. People, 17 SCRA 476, 481 (1966); People v. Villanueva, 51 Phil. 488 (1928); U.S. v. Reyes, 30 Phil. 551 (1915); U.S. v. Mendoza, 38 Phil. 691 (1918); People v. Montes, 53 Phil. 323 (1929); People v. Pacusbas, 64 Phil. 614 (1937); and People v. Penesa, supra note 94.
[126] People v. Fallorina, 468 Phil. 816 (2004), citing People v. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257 (1943); Francisco, supra note 106 at 51-52, citing People v. Sara, 55 Phil. 939 (1931).
[127] See generally Francisco, supra note 106 at 51.
[128] Id. at 52; People v. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257 (1943), citing People v. Nanquil, 43 Phil. 232 (1922); People v. Bindoy, 56 Phil. 15 (1931).
[129] Mahawan v. People, G.R. No. 176609, 18 December 2008, 574 SCRA 737, citing Rivera v. People, G.R. No. 166326, 25 January 2006, 480 SCRA 188, 196-197.
[130] People v. Quijada, 328 Phil. 505 (1996).
[131] Mahawan v. People, supra note 129, citing Rivera v. People, supra note 129.
[132] Dado v. People, supra note 125.
[133] People v. Delim, 444 Phil. 430, 450 (2003), citing Wharton, Criminal Law - Vol. 1, 473-474 (12th ed., 1932).
[134] See People v. Garcia, 467 Phil. 1102 (2004), citing People v. Carmen, G.R. No. 137268, 26 March 2001, 355 SCRA 267; U.S. v. Tayongtong, 21 Phil. 476 (1912); see generally U.S. v. Maleza, 14 Phil. 468 (1909).
[135] A. Catherine Kendrick, Ex Parte Barran: In Search of Standard Legislation for Fraternity Hazing Liability, 24 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 407 (2000)
[136] Id.
[137] In re Khalil H., No. 08110, 2010 WL 4540458 (N.Y. App. Div. Nov. 9, 2010) (U.S.) [citing Kuzmich, Comment, In Vino Mortuus: Fraternal Hazing and Alcohol-Related Deaths, 31 McGeorge L Rev. 1087, 1088-1089 (2000); and Symposium, The Works of Plato (The Modern Library 1956)]; Gregory E. Rutledge, Hell Night Hath No Fury Like a Pledge Scorned ... and Injured: Hazing Litigation in U.S. Colleges and Universities, 25 J.C. & U.L. 361, 368-9 (1998); Kendrick, 24 Am. J. Trial Advoc.
[138] In re Khalil H., supra; Rutledge, supra.
[139] Jamie Ball, This Will Go Down on Your Permanent Record (But We'll Never Tell): How the Federal Educational Rights and Privacy Act May Help Colleges and Universities Keep Hazing a Secret, 33 Sw. U. L. Rev. 477, 480 (2004), citing Rutledge, supra.
[140] Id.
[141] Id.
[142] Kendrick, supra note 135, citing Scott Patrick McBride, Comment, Freedom of Association in the Public University Setting: How Broad is the Right to Freely Participate in Greek Life?, 23 U. Dayton L. Rev. 133, 147-8 (1997).
[143] Id.
[144] Id.
[145] Id., citing Ex parte Barran, 730 So.2d 203 (Ala. 1998) (U.S.).
[146] See generally Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 8049 (1995), otherwise known as the Anti-Hazing Law.
[147] Id.
[148] In re Khalil H., supra note 137, citing Webster's Third International Dictionary, 1041 (1986); and People v. Lenti, 44 Misc.2d 118, 253 N.Y.S.2d 9 (N.Y. Nassau County Ct. 1964) (U.S.).
[149] See generally Republic Act No. 8049 (1995), Sec. 1, otherwise known as the Anti-Hazing Law; Susan Lipkins, Hazing: Defining and Understanding Psychological Damages, 2 Ann.2007 AAJ-CLE 2481 (2007).
[150] Reynaldo C. Ileto, The Diorama Experience: A Visual History of the Philippines 84 (2004).
[151] Id.
[152] Id.
[153] Id.; see Philippine Insurrection Records, Reel 31, Folder 514/10 - Cartilla del Katipunan, quoted in Luis Camara Dery, Alay sa Inang Bayan: Panibagong Pagbibigay Kahulugan sa Kasaysayan ng Himagsikan ng 1896, 16-24 (1999).
[154] Philippine Insurrection Records, supra, quoted in Dery, supra at 17.
[155] Philippine Insurrection Records, supra, quoted in Dery, supra at 18.
[156] Ileto, supra note 150.
[157] Stephen E. Ambrose, Duty, Honor, Country: A History of West Point 222 (1999).br>
[158] Id.
[159] Easler v. Hejaz Temple of Greenville, 285 S.C. 348, 329 S.E.2d 753 (S.C. 1985) (U.S.). (The South Carolina Supreme Court held, inter alia, that (1) evidence supported the jury finding that the manner in which the association carried out "mattress-rotating barrel trick," a hazing event, was hazardous and constituted actionable negligence; and (2) the candidate was not barred from recovery by the doctrine of assumption of risk. Id.)
[160] Id.
[161] Id.
[162] Id.
[163] CNN U.S., Pentagon Brass Disgusted by Marine Hazing Ceremony, January 31, 1997, available at
[164] CNN U.S., supra; see also Rutledge, supra.
[165] State v. Allen, 905 S.W.2d 874, 875 (Mo. 1995) (U.S.). (One of the pledges - Michael Davis - blacked out and never regained consciousness. He died the following afternoon. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the trial court's conviction of hazing. Id.)
[166] Id.
[167] Id.
[168] Ex parte Barran, 730 So.2d 203 (Ala. 1998) (U.S.). (The Alabama Supreme Court ruled that the (1) pledge knew and appreciated the risks inherent in hazing; and (2) pledge voluntarily exposed himself to hazing, supporting the fraternity's assumption of the risk defense. Consequently, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and reinstated the ruling of the trial court, which entered the summary judgment in favor of the defendants with respect to the victim's negligence claims. The case was remanded as to the other matters. Id.)
[169] Id.
[170] Lloyd v. Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity, No. 96-CV-348, 97-CV-565, 1999 WL 47153 (Dist. Ct., N.D. N.Y., 1999) (U.S.). (The plaintiff filed a law suit against Cornell University for the latter's liability resulting from the injuries the former sustained during the alleged hazing by the fraternity. The New York district court granted defendant Cornell's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint. Id.)
[171] Id.
[172] Kenner v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, Inc., 808 A.2d 178 (Pa. Super.Ct. 2002). (The Pennsylvania Superior Court held that: (1) the fraternity owed the duty to protect the initiate from harm; (2) breach of duty by fraternity was not established; (3) individual fraternity members owed the duty to protect the initiate from harm; and (4) the evidence raised the genuine issue of material fact as to whether the fraternity's chapter advisor breached the duty of care to initiate. Id.)
[173] Id.
[174] Morton v. State, 988 So.2d 698 (Flo. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (U.S.). (The District Court of Appeal of Florida reversed the conviction for felony hazing and remanded the case for a new trial because of erroneous jury instruction. Id.)
[175] Id.
[176] Id.
[177] Id.
[178] Id.
[179] Id.
[180] Rutledge, supra note 137.
[181] Rutledge, supra note 137, citing Fraternity Hazing: Is that Anyway to Treat a Brother?, TRIAL, September 1991, at 63.
[182] Rutledge, supra note 137, [citing Robert D. Bickel & Peter F. Lake, Reconceptualizing the University's Duty to Provide A Safe Learning Environment: A Criticism of the Doctrine of In Loco Parentis and the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 20 J.C. & U.L. 261 (1994); Jennifer L. Spaziano, It's All Fun and Games Until Someone Loses an Eye: An Analysis of University Liability for Actions of Student Organizations, 22 Pepp. L. Rev. 213 (1994); Fraternity Hazing: Is that Anyway to Treat a Brother?, TRIAL, Sept. 1991, at 63; and Byron L. Leflore, Jr., Alcohol and Hazing Risks in College Fraternities: Re-evaluating Vicarious and Custodial Liability of National Fraternities, 7 Rev. Litig. 191, 210 (1988)].
[183] Darryll M. Halcomb Lewis, The Criminalization of Fraternity, Non-Fraternity and Non-Collegiate Hazing, 61 Miss. L.J. 111, 117 (1991), citing Benjamin, The Trouble at the Naval Academy, 60 The Independent 154, 155 (1906). According to Lewis, the 1874 statute outlawing hazing was directed specifically at the United States Naval Academy.
[184] Gregory L. Acquaviva, Protecting Students from the Wrongs of Hazing Rites: A Proposal for Strengthening New Jersey's Anti-Hazing Act, 26 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 305, 311 (2008), citing Lewis, supra note 183 at 118.
[185] Acquaviva, supra, citing Lewis, supra note 183 at 118-119.
[186] Acquaviva, supra, citing Lewis, supra note 183 at 119.
[187] Acquaviva, supra at 313.
[188] Amie Pelletier, Note, Regulation of Rites: The Effect and Enforcement of Current Anti-Hazing Statutes, 28 New Eng. J. on Crim. & Civ. Confinement 377, 377 (2002).
[189] Id.
[190] Id., citing 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 120/10 (1992) (U.S.).
[191] 730 ILCS 5/5-8-2 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 96-1482 of the 2010 Sess.) (U.S.).
[192] Pelletier, supra note 188, citing Ind. Code Ann. � 35-42-2-2 (U.S.).
[193] Pelletier, supra note 188, citing Ind. Code Ann. � 35-42-2-2 (U.S.).
[194] Ind. Code Ann. � 35-42-2-2 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Sess.) (U.S.) citing State v. Lewis, 883 N.E.2d 847 (Ind. App. 2008) (U.S.).
[195] Ind. Code Ann. � 35-50-2-6 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Sess.) (U.S.).
[196] Pelletier, supra note 188, citing Mo. Rev. Stat. � 578.365 (2001) (U.S.).
[197] Mo. Stat. Ann. � 558.011 (West, Westlaw through 2010 First Extraordinary Gen. Ass. Sess.).
[198] Pelletier, supra note 188, citing Tex. Educ. Code Ann. � 37.152 (Vernon 1996) (U.S.).
[199] Tex. Stat. Code Ann., Penal Code � 12.35 (Vernon, Westlaw through 2009 Legis. Sess.) (U.S.).
[200] Pelletier, supra note 188, citing Utah Code Ann. � 76-5-107.5 (1999) (U.S.).
[201] Utah Code Ann. 1953 � 76-3-203 (Westlaw through 2010 Gen. Sess.) (U.S.).
[202] Pelletier, supra note 188, citing W. Va. Code � 18-16-3 (1999) (U.S.).
[203] See Pelletier, supra note 188, citing Wis. Stat. � 948.51 (1996) (U.S.).
[204] Wis. Stat. Ann. � 939.50 (Westlaw through 2009 Act 406) (U.S.).
[205] Pelletier, supra note 188 at 381.
[206] Id.
[207] CA Decision (People v. Dizon), p. 15, supra note 8; rollo, p. 76.
[208] Id.
[209] Id.
[210] TSN, 21 April 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), pp. 68-72, 90-91, 100-102, 108-109, 127-134.
[211] TSN, 26 May 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), pp. 29-32, 43.
[212] TSN, 3 June 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No.C-38340), pp. 24-28.
[213] People's Comment (Dizon v. People, G.R. No. 155101), p. 131; rollo, p. 626; People's Comment (Villareal v. People, G.R. No. 151258), p. 120-3; rollo, pp. 727-730.
[214] People's Comment (Dizon v. People, G.R. No. 155101), pp. 130-131; rollo, pp. 625-626; People's Comment (Villareal v. People, G.R. No. 151258), pp. 120-123; rollo, pp. 727-730.
[215] RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], pp. 18-35, supra note 9; rollo, pp. 127-144.
[216] People's Comment (Dizon v. People, G.R. No. 155101), pp. 130-131; rollo, pp. 625-626; People's Comment (Villareal v. People, G.R. No. 151258), pp. 120-123; rollo, pp. 727-730.
[217] Senate TSP No. 51 (17 November 1992) 9th Congress, 1st Regular Sess., pp. 12-13.
[218] TSN, 21 April 1992(People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), pp. 68-72, 90-91, 100-102, 108-109, 127-134; see TSN, 26 May 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No.C-38340), pp. 29-32, 43; and TSN, 3 June 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No.C-38340), pp. 24-28.
[219] RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 58, supra note 9; rollo, p. 167.
[220] Dado v. People, supra note 125.
[221] RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 58, supra note 9; rollo, p. 167.
[222] The aforementioned articles refer to the Revised Penal Code provisions on Physical Injuries. These are the following: (a) Art. 262 - Mutilation; (b) Art. 263 - Serious Physical Injuries; (c) Art. 264 - Administering Injurious Substances or Beverages; (d) Art. 265 - Less Serious Physical Injuries; and, (e) Art. 266 - Slight Physical Injuries and Maltreatment.
[223] Cf. United States v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil. 488 (1910); and Calimutan v. People, 517 Phil. 272 (2006).
[224] Cf. Calimutan v. People, supra, citing People v. Carmen, 407 Phil. 564 (2001); People v. Nocum, 77 Phil. 1018 (1947); People v. Sara, 55 Phil 939 (1931); and People v. Ramirez, 48 Phil 204 (1925).
[225] 176 Phil. 20 (1978).
[226] People v. Carmen, supra note 224.
[227] People v. Regato, supra note 118.
[228] Id.
[229] Cf. People v. Penesa, supra note 94.
[230] RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], pp. 38-44, supra note 9; rollo, pp. 147-153.
[231] RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], pp. 18-35, supra note 9; rollo, pp. 127-144.
[232] RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 38, supra note 9; rollo, p. 147; TSN, 16 July 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), p. 108.
[233] RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 38, supra note 9; rollo, p. 147; TSN, 16 July 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), p. 109.
[234] CA Decision (People v. Dizon), pp. 13-14, supra note 8; rollo, pp. 74-75.
[235] Senate TSP No. 47, supra note 3.
[236] Senate TSP No. 47, supra note 3.
[237] Senate TSP No. 62, supra note 4 at 13-15.
[238] Senate TSP No. 47, supra note 3.
[239] RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 38, supra note 9; rollo, p. 147; TSN, 16 July 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), pp. 108-109.
[240] Veda�a v. Valencia, 356 Phil. 317, 332 (1998).
[241] Caminos v. People, 587 SCRA 348 (2009) citing Luis B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code: Criminal Law - Book One 995 (15th ed. 2001); People v. Vistan, 42 Phil 107 (1921), citing U.S. vs. Gomez, G.R. No. 14068, 17 January 1919 (unreported); U.S. v. Manabat, 28 Phil. 560 (1914).
[242] People v. Vistan, supra, citing U.S. vs. Gomez, supra.
[243] Id.
[244] Id.
[245] Gaid v. People, G.R. No. 171636, 7 April 2009, 584 SCRA 489; Gan v. Court of Appeals, 247-A Phil. 460 (1988).
[246] Gaid v. People, supra; Gan v. Court of Appeals, supra.
[247] Gaid v. People, supra; People v. Vistan, supra note 241, citing U.S. vs. Gomez, supra note 241.
[248] Id.
[249] Id.
[250] See Gaid v. People, supra note 245, at 503 (Velasco, J., dissenting).
[251] Id.
[252] RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 37, supra note 9; rollo, p. 146.
[253] Id.
[254] Id. at 36; rollo, p. 145.
[255] Id.; TSN, 24 June 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), pp. 52-67.
[256] RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 37, supra note 9; rollo, p. 146.
[257] Id.; TSN, 24 June 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), pp. 68-69.
[258] RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 37, supra note 9; rollo, p. 146; TSN, 24 June 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), pp. 70-71.
[259] RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 37, supra note 9; rollo, p. 146.
[260] TSN, 24 June 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No.C-38340), p. 50.
[261] RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 18-21, supra note 9; rollo, p. 127-130.
[262] Id. at 23; rollo, p. 132.
[263] Id. at 25; rollo, p. 134.
[264] Id. at 26; rollo, p. 135.
[265] TSN, 21 April 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No.C-38340), pp. 175-176.
[266] RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 61, supra note 9; rollo, p. 170.
[267] TSN, 16 July 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No.C-38340), pp. 92-93.
[268] TSN, 21 April 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No.C-38340), pp. 110-111.
[269] Ballou v. Sigma Nu General Fraternity, 291 S.C. 140, 352 S.E.2d 488 (S.C. App. 1986) (U.S.) citing Easler v. Hejaz Temple of Greenville, 285 S.C. 348, 329 S.E.2d 753 (S.C. 1985) (U.S.).
[270] RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 34, supra note 9; rollo, p. 143.
[271] Id. at 27; rollo, p. 136.
[272] Republic Act No. 8049 (1995), Sec. 4(1), otherwise known as the Anti-Hazing Law.
[273] CA Decision (People v. Dizon), p. 22, supra note 8; rollo, p. 83.
[274] Bri�as v. People, 211 Phil. 37 (1983); see also People v. Yanson, G.R. No. 179195, 3 October 2011, citing People v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 189580, 9 February 2011.
[275] People v. Mercado, G.R. No. 189847, 30 May 2011 [citing People v. Flores, G.R. No. 188315, 25 August 2010; People v. Lindo, G.R. No. 189818, 9 August 2010; People v. Ogan, G.R. No. 186461, 5 July 2010; and People v. Cadap, G.R. No. 190633, 5 July 2010].
[276] Seguritan v. People, G.R. No. 172896, 19 April 2010, 618 SCRA 406.
[277] People's Consolidated Memoranda (Dizon v. People, G.R. No. 155101), p. 144; rollo, p. 1709.
[278] Heirs of Ochoa v. G & S Transport Corporation, G.R. No. 170071, 9 March 2011, citing Victory Liner Inc. v. Gammad, 486 Phil. 574, 592-593 (2004).
[279] Id.
[280] Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97412, 17 July 1994, 234 SCRA 78.
