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Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 2016 > February 2016 Decisions > G.R. No. 215014, February 29, 2016 - REBECCA FULLIDO, Petitioner, v. GINO GRILLI, Respondent.:




G.R. No. 215014, February 29, 2016 - REBECCA FULLIDO, Petitioner, v. GINO GRILLI, Respondent.

PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 215014, February 29, 2016

REBECCA FULLIDO, Petitioner, v. GINO GRILLI, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the May 31, 2013 Decision1 and the September 24, 20142 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 06946, which affirmed the April 26, 2012 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 47, Tagbilaran City (RTC) in Civil Case No. 7895, reversing the March 31, 2011 Decision4 of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Dauis, Bohol (MCTC) in Civil Case No. 244, a case for unlawful detainer filed by Gino Grilli (Grilli) against Rebecca Fullido (Fullido).

The Facts

Sometime in 1994, Grilli, an Italian national, met Fullido in Bohol and courted her. In 1995, Grilli decided to build a residential house where he and Fullido would stay whenever he would be vacationing in the country.

Grilli financially assisted Fullido in procuring a lot located in Biking I, Dauis, Bohol, from her parents which was registered in her name under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 30626.5 On the said property, they constructed a house, which was funded by Grilli. Upon completion, they maintained a common-law relationship and lived there whenever Grilli was on vacation in the Philippines twice a year.

In 1998, Grilli and Fullido executed a contract of lease, 6 a memorandum of agreement7 (MOA) and a special power of attorney8 (SPA), to define their respective rights over the house and lot.

The lease contract stipulated, among others, that Grilli as the lessee, would rent the lot, registered in the name of Fullido, for a period of fifty (50) years, to be automatically renewed for another fifty (50) years upon its expiration in the amount of P10,000.00 for the whole term of the lease contract; and that Fullido as the lessor, was prohibited from selling, donating, or encumbering the said lot without the written consent of Grilli. The pertinent provisions of the lease contract over the house and lot are as follows:

That for and in consideration of the total amount of rental in the amount of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, paid by the LESSEE to the LESSOR, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, the latter hereby leases to the LESSEE a house and lot, and all the furnishings found therein, land situated at Biking I, Dauis, Bohol, Philippines, absolutely owned and belonging to the LESSOR and particularly described as follows, to wit:

xxxx

That the LESSOR and the LESSEE hereby agree as they have agreed to be bound by the following terms and conditions, to wit:

l. That the term of the lease shall be FIFTY (50) YEARS from August 16, 1998 to August 15, 2048, automatically renewed for the same term upon the expiration thereof;

xxx

lease to any third person, without the written consent of the LESSEES.9

The said lease contract was duly registered in the Register of Deeds of Bohol.

The MOA, on the other hand, stated, among others, that Grilli paid for the purchase price of the house and lot; that ownership of the house and lot was to reside with him; and that should the common-law relationship be terminated, Fullido could only sell the house and lot to whomever Grilli so desired. Specifically, the pertinent terms of the MOA read:

NOW WHEREFORE, FOR AND IN CONSIDERATION of the foregoing premises, the parties hereto agree as they hereby covenant to agree that the FIRST PARTY (Grilli) shall permanently reside on the property as above-mentioned, subject to the following terms and conditions:

1. That ownership over the above-mentioned properties shall reside absolutely with herein FIRST PARTY, and the SECOND PARTY (Fullido) hereby acknowledges the same;

2. That the SECOND PARTY is expressly prohibited to sell the above-stated property, except if said sale is with the conformity of the FIRST PARTY;

3. That the SECOND PARTY hereby grants the FIRST PARTY, the absolute and irrevocable right, to reside in the residential building so constructed during his lifetime, or any time said FIRST PARTY may so desire;

4. That in the event the common-law relationship terminates, or when the SECOND PARTY marries another, or enters into another common-law relationship with another, said SECOND PARTY shall be obliged to execute a DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE over the above-stated parcel of land and residential building, in favor of whomsoever the FIRST PARTY may so desire, and be further obliged to turn over the entire consideration of the said sale to the FIRST PARTY , or if the law shall allow, the FIRST PARTY shall retain ownership of the said land, as provided for in paragraph 7 below;

xxx

7. That if the cases referred to in paragraph 4 shall occur and in the event that a future law shall be passed allowing foreigners to own real properties in the Philippines, the ownership of the above-described real properties shall pertain to the FIRST PARTY, and the herein undersigned SECOND PARTY undertakes to execute all the necessary deeds, documents, and contracts to effect the transfer of title in favor of the FIRST PARTY;

XXX.10

Lastly, the SPA allowed Grilli to administer, manage, and transfer the house and lot on behalf of Fullido.

Initially, their relationship was harmonious, but it turned sour after 16 years of living together. Both charged each other with infidelity. They could not agree who should leave the common property, and Grilli sent formal letters to Fullido demanding that she vacate the property, but these were unheeded. On September 8, 2010, Grilli filed a complaint for unlawful detainer with prayer for issuance of preliminary injunction against Fullido before the MCTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 244.

Grilli's Position

The complaint stated that the common-law relationship between Grilli and Fullido began smoothly, until Grilli discovered that Fullido was pregnant when he arrived in the Philippines in 2002. At first, she told him that the child she was carrying was his. After the delivery of the child, however, it became apparent that the child was not his because of the discrepancy between the child's date of birth and his physical presence in the Philippines and the difference between the baby's physical features and those of Grilli. Later on, she admitted that the child was indeed sired by another man.

Grilli further claimed that he was so devastated that he decided to end their common-law relationship. Nevertheless, he allowed Fullido to live in his house out of liberality and generosity, but this time, using another room. He did not demand any rent from Fullido over the use of his property.

After a year, Fullido became more hostile and difficult to handle. Grilli had to make repairs with his house every time he arrived in the Philippines because she was not maintaining it in good condition. Fullido also let her two children, siblings and parents stay in his house, which caused damage to the property. He even lost his personal belongings inside his house on several occasions. Grilli verbally asked Fullido to move out of his house because they were not getting along anymore, but she refused. He could no longer tolerate the hostile attitude shown to him by Fullido and her family, thus, he filed the instant complaint.

Fullido's Position

Fullido countered that she met Grilli sometime in 1993 when she was still 17 years old working as a cashier in Alturas Supermarket. Grilli was then a tourist in Bohol who persistently courted her.

At first, Fullido was hesitant to the advances of Grilli because she could not yet enter into a valid marriage. When he assured her and her parents that they would eventually be married in three years, she eventually agreed to have a relationship with him and to live as common-law spouses. Sometime in 1995, Grilli offered to build a house for her on a parcel of land she exclusively owned which would become their conjugal abode. Fullido claimed that their relationship as common-law spouses lasted for more than 18 years until she discovered that Grilli had found a new and younger woman in his life. Grilli began to threaten and physically hurt her by knocking her head and choking her.

When Fullido refused to leave their house even after the unlawful detainer case was filed, Grilli again harassed, intimidated and threatened to hurt her and her children. Thus, she filed a petition for Temporary Protection Order (TPO) and Permanent Protection Order (PPO) against Grilli under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262 before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Bohol (RTC-Branch 3). In an Order,11 dated February 23, 2011, the RTC-Branch 3 granted the TPO in favor of Fullido and directed that Grilli must be excluded from their home.

Fullido finally asserted that, although it was Grilli who funded the construction of the house, she exclusively owned the lot and she contributed to the value of the house by supervising its construction and maintaining their household.

The MCTC Ruling

In its decision, dated March 31, 2011, the MCTC dismissed the case after finding that Fullido could not be ejected from their house and lot. The MCTC opined that she was a co-owner of the house as she contributed to it by supervising its construction. Moreover, the MCTC respected the TPO issued by RTC-Branch 3 which directed that Grilli be removed from Fullido's residence. The dispositive portion of the MCTC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
  1. Dismissing the instant case;

  2. Ordering the Plaintiff to pay to Defendant the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages, and Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary damages, and Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) as Attorney's Fees; and

  3. Denying the prayer for the issuance of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction.
SO ORDERED.12ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Not in conformity, Grilli elevated the matter before the RTC.

The RTC Ruling


In its decision, dated April 26, 2012, the RTC reversed and set aside the MCTC decision. The RTC was of the view that Grilli had the exclusive right to use and possess the house and lot by virtue of the contract of lease executed by the parties. Since the period of lease had not yet expired, Fullido, as lessor, had the obligation to respect the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the leased premises by Grilli as lessee. The RTC opined that absent a judicial declaration of nullity of the contract of lease, its terms and conditions were valid and binding. As to the TPO, the RTC held that the same had no bearing in the present case which merely involved the possession of the leased property.

Aggrieved, Fullido instituted an appeal before the CA alleging that her land was unlawfully transferred by Grilli to a certain Jacqueline Guibone (Guibone), his new girlfriend, by virtue of the SPA earlier executed by Fullido.

The CA Ruling

In its assailed decision, dated May 31, 2013, the CA upheld the decision of the RTC emphasizing that in an ejectment case, the only issue to be resolved would be the physical possession of the property. The CA was also of the view that as Fullido executed both the MOA and the contract of lease, which gave Grilli the possession and use of the house and lot, the same constituted as a judicial admission that it was Grilli who had the better right of physical possession. The CA stressed that, if Fullido would insist that the said documents were voidable as her consent was vitiated, then she must institute a separate action for annulment of contracts. Lastly, the CA stated that the TPO issued by the RTC-Branch 3 under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9262 was without prejudice to any other action that might be filed by the parties.

Fullido filed a motion for reconsideration,13 but she failed to attach the proofs of service of her motion. For said reason, it was denied by the CA in its assailed resolution, dated September 24, 2014.

Hence, this present petition raising the following:

ISSUES

I

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND DEPARTED FROM ESTABLISHED LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN DENYING THE PETITION FOR REVIEW AND IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF RTC BOHOL BRANCH 47 EJECTING PETITIONER FROM THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES, WHICH EJECTMENT ORDER IS ANCHORED ON PATENTLY NULL AND VOID CONTRACTS.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND DEPARTED FROM ESTABLISHED LAW IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE RTC BOHOL BRANCH 47 EJECTING PETITIONER FROM THEIR CONJUGAL ABODE WHERE RESPONDENT HAS BEEN EARLIER ORDERED TO VACATE BY VIRTUE OF A PERMANENT PROTECTION ORDER THUS EFFECTIVELY SETTING ASIDE, NEGATING AND/OR VIOLATING AN ORDER ISSUED BY A COURT OF CO-EQUAL JURISDICTION.

III

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED AND DEPARTED FROM ESTABLISHED LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN DENYING THE PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, AMONG OTHERS, FOR NON-COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 1 RULE 52 VIS-A-VIS SECTION 13, RULE 13 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
14ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Fullido argues that she could not be ejected from her own lot based on the contract of lease and the MOA because those documents were null and void for being contrary to the Constitution, the law, public policy, morals and customs; that the MOA prevented her from disposing or selling her own land, while the contract of lease favoring Grilli, a foreigner, was contrary to the Constitution as it was a for a period of fifty (50) years, and, upon termination, was automatically renewable for another fifty (50) years; that the TPO, which became a PPO by virtue of the July 5, 2011 Decision15 of RTC-Branch 3, should not be defeated by the ejectment suit; and that the CA should have liberally applied its procedural rules and allowed her motion for reconsideration.

In his Comment,16 Grilli countered that he was the rightful owner of the house because a foreigner was not prohibited from owning residential buildings; that the lot was no longer registered in the name of Fullido as it was transferred to Guibone, covered by TCT No. 101-2011000335; that if Fullido wanted to assail the lease contract, she should have first filed a separate action for annulment of the said contract, which she did in Civil Case No. 8094, pending before the Regional Trial Court of Bohol; and that by signing the contracts, Fullido fully agreed with their terms and must abide by the same.

In her Reply,17 Fullido insisted that the contract of lease and the MOA were null and void, thus, these could not be the source of Grilli's de facto possession.

The Court's Ruling


The Court finds the petition meritorious.

Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. The possession of the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess. The only issue to be resolved in an unlawful detainer case is the physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties.18

In this case, Fullido chiefly asserts that Grilli had no right to institute the action for unlawful detainer because the lease contract and the MOA, which allegedly gave him the right of possession over the lot, were null and void for violating the Constitution. Contrary to the findings of the CA, Fullido was not only asserting that the said contracts were merely voidable, but she was consistently invoking that the same were completely void.19 Grilli, on the other hand, contends that Fullido could not question the validity of the said contracts in the present ejectment suit unless she instituted a separate action for annulment of contracts. Thus, the Court is confronted with the issue of whether a contract could be declared void in a summary action of unlawful detainer.

Under the circumstances of the case, the Court answers in the affirmative.

A void contract cannot be
the source of any right; it
cannot be utilized in an
ejectment suit


A void or inexistent contract may be defined as one which lacks, absolutely either in fact or in law, one or some of the elements which are essential for its validity.20 It is one which has no force and effect from the very beginning, as if it had never been entered into; it produces no effect whatsoever either against or in favor of anyone.21Quod nullum est nullum producit effectum. Article 1409 of the New Civil Code explicitly states that void contracts also cannot be ratified; neither can the right to set up the defense of illegality be waived.22 Accordingly, there is no need for an action to set aside a void or inexistent contract.23

A review of the relevant jurisprudence reveals that the Court did not hesitate to set aside a void contract even in an action for unlawful detainer. In Spouses Alcantara v. Nido,24 which involves an action for unlawful detainer, the petitioners therein raised a defense that the subject land was already sold to them by the agent of the owner. The Court rejected their defense and held that the contract of sale was void because the agent did not have the written authority of the owner to sell the subject land.

Similarly, in Roberts v. Papio,25 a case of unlawful detainer, the Court declared that the defense of ownership by the respondent therein was untenable. The contract of sale invoked by the latter was void because the agent did not have the written authority of the owner. A void contract produces no effect either against or in favor of anyone.

In Ballesteros v. Abion,26 which also involves an action for unlawful detainer, the Court disallowed the defense of ownership of the respondent therein because the seller in their contract of sale was not the owner of the subject property. For lacking an object, the said contract of sale was void ab initio.

Clearly, contracts may be declared void even in a summary action for unlawful detainer because, precisely, void contracts do not produce legal effect and cannot be the source of any rights. To emphasize, void contracts may not be invoked as a valid action or defense in any court proceeding, including an ejectment suit. The next issue that must be resolved by the Court is whether the assailed lease contract and MOA are null and void.

The lease contract and the MOA
circumvent the constitutional
restraint against foreign
ownership of lands.


Under Section 1 of Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution, natural resources shall not be alienated, except with respect to public agricultural lands and in such cases, the alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. Concomitantly, Section 5 thereof states that, save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. The prohibition on the transfer of lands to aliens was adopted in the present 1987 Constitution, under Sections 2, 3 and 7 of Article XII thereof. Agricultural lands, whether public or private, include residential, commercial and industrial lands. The purpose of prohibiting the transfer of lands to foreigners is to uphold the conservation of our national patrimony and ensure that agricultural resources remain in the hands of Filipino citizens.27cralawred

The prohibition, however, is not limited to the sale of lands to foreigners. It also covers leases of lands amounting to the transfer of all or substantially all the rights of dominion. In the landmark case of Philippine Banking Corporation v. Lui She,28 the Court struck down a lease contract of a parcel of land in favor of a foreigner for a period of ninety-nine (99) years with an option to buy the land for fifty (50) years. Where a scheme to circumvent the Constitutional prohibition against the transfer of lands to aliens is readily revealed as the purpose for the contracts, then the illicit purpose becomes the illegal cause rendering the contracts void. Thus, if an alien is given not only a lease of, but also an option to buy, a piece of land by virtue of which the Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise dispose of his property, this to last for 50 years, then it becomes clear that the arrangement is a virtual transfer of ownership whereby the owner divests himself in stages not only of the right to enjoy the land but also of the right to dispose of it — rights which constitute ownership. If this can be done, then the Constitutional ban against alien landholding in the Philippines, is indeed in grave peril.29

In Llantino v. Co Liong Chong,30 however, the Court clarified that a lease contract in favor of aliens for a reasonable period was valid as long as it did not have any scheme to circumvent the constitutional prohibition, such as depriving the lessors of their right to dispose of the land. The Court explained that "[a]liens are not completely excluded by the Constitution from use of lands for residential purposes. Since their residence in the Philippines is temporary, they may be granted temporary rights such as a lease contract which is not forbidden by the Constitution. Should they desire to remain here forever and share our fortune and misfortune, Filipino citizenship is not impossible to acquire."31 The lessee-foreigner therein eventually acquired Filipino citizenship.

Consequently, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 471 was enacted to regulate the lease of lands to aliens. It provides that the maximum period allowable for the duration of leases of private lands to aliens or alien-owned corporations, associations, or entities not qualified to acquire private lands in the Philippines shall be twenty-five (25) years, renewable for another period of twenty-five (25) years upon mutual agreement of both lessor and lessee.32 It also provides that any contract or agreement made or executed in violation thereof shall be null and void ab initio.33

Based on the above-cited constitutional, legal and jurisprudential limitations, the Court finds that the lease contract and the MOA in the present case are null and void for virtually transferring the reigns of the land to a foreigner.

As can be gleaned from the contract, the lease in favor of Grilli was for a period of fifty (50) years, automatically extended for another fifty (50) years upon the expiration of the original period. Moreover, it strictly prohibited Fullido from selling, donating, or encumbering her land to anyone without the written consent of Grilli. For a measly consideration of PI 0,000.00, Grilli would be able to absolutely occupy the land of Fullido for 100 years, and she is powerless to dispose the same. The terms of lease practically deprived Fullido of her property rights and effectively transferred the same to Grilli.

Worse, the dominion of Grilli over the land had been firmly cemented by the terms of the MOA as it reinforced Grilli's property rights over the land because, first, it brazenly dictated that ownership of the land and the residential building resided with him. Second, Fullido was expressly prohibited from transferring the same without Grilli's conformity. Third, Grilli would permanently reside in the residential building. Fourth, Grilli may capriciously dispose Fullido's property once their common-law relationship is terminated. This right was recently exercised when the land was transferred to Guibone. Lastly, Fullido shall be compelled to transfer the land to Grilli if a law would be passed allowing foreigners to own real properties in the Philippines.

Evidently, the lease contract and the MOA operated hand-in-hand to strip Fullido of any dignified right over her own property. The term of lease for 100 years was obviously in excess of the allowable periods under P.D. No. 471. Even Grilli admitted that "this is a case of an otherwise valid contract of lease that went beyond the period of what is legally permissible."34 Grilli had been empowered to deprive Fullido of her land's possession, control, disposition and even its ownership. The jus possidendi, jus utendi, jus fruendi, jus abutendi and, more importantly, the jus disponendi - the sum of rights which composes ownership - of the property were effectively transferred to Grilli who would safely enjoy the same for over a century. The title of Fullido over the land became an empty and useless vessel, visible only in paper, and was only meant as a dummy to fulfill a foreigner's desire to own land within our soils.

It is disturbing how these documents were methodically formulated to circumvent the constitutional prohibition against land ownership by foreigners. The said contracts attempted to guise themselves as a lease, but a closer scrutiny of the same revealed that they were intended to transfer the dominion of a land to a foreigner in violation of Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Even if Fullido voluntary executed the same, no amount of consent from the parties could legalize an unconstitutional agreement. The lease contract and the MOA do not deserve an iota of validity and must be rightfully struck down as null and void for being repugnant to the fundamental law. These void documents cannot be the source of rights and must be treated as mere scraps of paper.

Grilli does not have a
cause of action for unlawful
detainer


Ultimately, the complaint filed by Grilli was an action for unlawful detainer. Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court lays down the requirements for filing a complaint for unlawful detainer, to wit:

Who may institute proceedings, and when. - Subject to the provision of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (l) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs.

[Emphasis Supplied]

A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following: (1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter's right of possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.35

The Court rules that Grilli has no cause of action for unlawful detainer against Fullido. As can be gleaned from the discussion above, the complainant must either be a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld. In other words, the complainant in an unlawful detainer case must have some right of possession over the property.

In the case at bench, the lease contract and the MOA, from which Grilli purportedly drew his right of possession, were found to be null and void for being unconstitutional. A contract that violates the Constitution and the law is null and void ab initio and vests no rights and creates no obligations. It produces no legal effect at all.36 Hence, as void contracts could not be the source of rights, Grilli had no possessory right over the subject land. A person who does not have any right over a property from the beginning cannot eject another person possessing the same. Consequently, Grilli's complaint for unlawful detainer must be dismissed for failure to prove his cause of action.

In Pari Delicto Doctrine
is not applicable


On a final note, the Court deems it proper to discuss the doctrine of in pari delicto. Latin for "in equal fault," in pari delicto connotes that two or more people are at fault or are guilty of a crime. Neither courts of law nor equity will interpose to grant relief to the parties, when an illegal agreement has been made, and both parties stand in pari delicto.37

The application of the doctrine of in pari delicto is not always rigid. An accepted exception arises when its application contravenes well-established public policy. In this jurisdiction, public policy has been defined as that principle of the law which holds that no subject or citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good.38 Thus, whenever public policy is advanced by either party, they may be allowed to sue for relief against the transaction.39

In the present case, both Grilli and Fullido were undoubtedly parties to a void contract. Fullido, however, was not barred from filing the present petition before the Court because the matters at hand involved an issue of public policy, specifically the Constitutional prohibition against land ownership by aliens. As pronounced in Philippine Banking Corporation v. Lui She, the said constitutional provision would be defeated and its continued violation sanctioned if the lands continue to remain in the hands of a foreigner.40 Thus, the doctrine of in pari delicto shall not be applicable in this case.chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The May 31, 2013 Decision of the Court of Appeals and its September 24, 2014 Resolution in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 06946 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.  The complaint filed by Gino Grilli before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Dauis-Panglao, Dauis, Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 244, is DISMISSED for lack of cause of action.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., cocnur.
Brion, J., on leavechanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Endnotes:


1 Penned by Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando with Associate Justice Pampio A. Abarintos and Associate Justice Edgardo L. Delos Santos, concurring; rollo, pp. 31-49.

2 Id. at 51-54.

3 Penned by Presiding Judge Suceso A. Arcamo; id. at 112-116.

4 Penned by Acting Presiding Judge Jorge D. Cabalit; id. at 106-111.

5 Id. at 55-56.

6 Id. at 59-60.

7 Id. at 57-58.

8 Id. at 61-62.

9 Id. at 59-60.

10 Id. at 57-58.

11 Id. at 90-91.

12Rollo, p. 111

13 Id. at 146-162.

14 Id. at 11-12.

15 Penned by Presiding Judge Leo Moises Lison; id. at 92-105.

16 Id. at 246-461.

17 Id. at 296-310.

18Piedad v. Spouses Gurieza, G.R. No. 207525, June 18, 2014 RA 71, 76.

19Rollo, p. 138 and 207

20 Jurado, Comments and Jurisprudence on Obligations and Contracts, 2010 ed., p. 574, citing Manresa, 5th Ed., Bk. 2, p. 608.

21 The Manila Banking Corp. v. Silverio, 504 Phil. 17, 30 (2005).

22 Article 1409, New Civil Code.

23 Spouses Rongavilla v. Court of Appeals, 355 Phil. 721, 739 (1998).

24 632 Phil. 343(2010).cralawred

25 544 Phil. 280 (2007).

26 517 Phil 253 (2006)

27Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds, 79 Phil. 461, 473 (1947).

28 128 Phil. 53(1967).

29 Id. at 67-68.

30 266 Phil. 645 (1990).

31 Id. at 651.

32 Section 1, P.D. No. 471.

33 Section 2, P.D. No. 471; See also R.A. No 7652 or the Investors' Lease Act which provides that a lease contract in favor of a foreign investor may be granted for a period of for a period exceeding fifty (50) years, renewable once for a period of not more than twenty-five (25) years. To be considered as a foreign investor, an alien must make an equity investment in the Philippines through actual remittance of foreign exchange or transfer of assets, whether in the form of capital goods, patents, formulae, or other technological rights or processes, upon registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Pursuant to such definition, Grilli cannot be considered as a foreign investor because it was neither shown that he made an equity investment in the country nor that he had registered the same with the SEC. Hence, R.A. No. 7652 cannot apply in his favor.

31 Id. at 651.

32 Section 1, P.D. No. 471.

33 Section 2, P.D. No. 471; See also R.A. No 7652 or the Investors' Lease Act which provides that a lease contract in favor of a foreign investor may be granted for a period of for a period exceeding fifty (50) years, renewable once for a period of not more than twenty-five (25) years. To be considered as a foreign investor, an alien must make an equity investment in the Philippines through actual remittance of foreign exchange or transfer of assets, whether in the form of capital goods, patents, formulae, or other technological rights or processes, upon registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Pursuant to such definition, Grilli cannot be considered as a foreign investor because it was neither shown that he made an equity investment in the country nor that he had registered the same with the SEC. Hence, R.A. No. 7652 cannot apply in his favor.

34Rollo, p. 254.

35Zacarias v. Anacay, G.R. No. 202354, September 24, 2014, 736 SCRA 508, 516.

36Chavez v. PCGG, 366 Phil. 863, 869 (1999).

37 Constantino v. Heirs of Constantino, Jr., G.R. No. 181508, October 2,2013, 706 SCRA 580, 589.

38Maltos v. Heirs of Borromeo, G.R. No. 172720, September 14, 2015.

39De Los Santos v. Roman Catholic Church of Midsayap, 94 Phil. 405 (1954).cralawred

40 Supra note 26, at 69.



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February-2016 Jurisprudence                 

  • G.R. No. 212878, February 01, 2016 - MARLOW NAVIGATION PHILS., INC., MARLOW NAVIGATION CO., LTD., W. BOCKSTLEGEL REEDEREI (GERMANY), ORLANDO D. ALIDIO AND ANTONIO GALVEZ, JR., Petitioners, v. WILFREDO L. CABATAY, Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 213910, February 03, 2016 - VINSON* D. YOUNG A.K.A. BENZON ONG AND BENNY YOUNG A.K.A. BENNY ONG, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AS REPRESENTED BY THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 198994, February 03, 2016 - IRIS MORALES, Petitioners, v. ANA MARIA OLONDRIZ, ALFONSO JUAN OLONDRIZ, JR., ALEJANDRO MORENO OLONDRIZ, ISABEL ROSA OLONDRIZ AND FRANCISCO JAVIER MARIA OLONDRIZ, Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 181186, February 03, 2016 - SIGUION REYNA MONTECILLO AND ONGSIAKO LAW OFFICES, Petitioners, v. HON. NORMA CHIONLO-SIA, IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 56 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF LUCENA CITY, AND THE TESTATE ESTATE OF DECEASED SUSANO RODRIGUEZ, REPRESENTED BY THE SPECIAL ADMINISTRATRIX, Respondents.

  • A.M. No. RTJ-13-2361 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 13-4144-RTJ], February 02, 2016 - OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, v. PRESIDING JUDGE JOSEPH CEDRICK O. RUIZ, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 61, MAKATI CITY, Respondent.

  • OCA I.P.I. No. 13-4148-P, February 10, 2016 - SPS. JOSE AND MELINDA CAILIPAN, Complainants, v. LORENZO O. CASTAÑEDA, SHERIFF IV, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 96, QUEZON CITY, Respondents

  • G.R. No. 205814, February 15, 2016 - SPOUSES ALFREDO TEAÑO* AND VERONICA TEAÑO, Petitioners, v. THE MUNICIPALITY OF NAVOTAS, REPRESENTED BY MAYOR TOBIAS REYNALD M. TIANGCO, AND MUNICIPAL TREASURER MANUEL T. ENRIQUEZ, Respondents.

  • G.R. No. 195145, February 10, 2016 - MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES SULPICIO AND PATRICIA RAMOS, Respondents.

  • G.R. No. 192075, February 10, 2016 - ROBERTO PALO Y DE GULA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 194548, February 10, 2016 - JUANA VDA. DE ROJALES, SUBSTITUTED BY HER HEIRS, REPRESENTED BY CELERINA ROJALES-SEVILLA, Petitioner, v. MARCELINO DIME, SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS, REPRESENTED BY BONIFACIA MANIBAY, Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 218396, February 10, 2016 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NESTOR ROXAS Y CASTRO, Accused-Appellant.

  • G.R. No. 208343, February 03, 2016 - SPOUSES CEFERINO C. LAUS AND MONINA P. LAUS, AND SPOUSES ANTONIO O. KOH AND ELISA T. KOH, Petitioners, v. OPTIMUM SECURITY SERVICES, INC., Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 199194, February 10, 2016 - REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. JOSE B. SAREÑOGON, JR., Respondent.

  • A.C. No. 7618, February 02, 2016 - SPOUSES JONATHAN AND ESTER LOPEZ, Complainants, v. ATTY. SINAMAR E. LIMOS, Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 199371, February 03, 2016 - PETRON LPG DEALERS ASSOCIATION AND TOTAL GAZ LPG DEALERS ASSOCIATION, Petitioners, v. NENA C. ANG, ALISON C. SY, NELSON C. ANG, RENATO C. ANG, AND/OR OCCUPANTS OF NATIONAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, Respondents.

  • G.R. No. 208451, February 03, 2016 - MANILA MEMORIAL PARK CEMETERY, INC., Petitioner, v. EZARD D. LLUZ, NORMAN CORRAL, ERWIN FUGABAN, VALDIMAR BALISI, EMILIO FABON, JOHN MARK APLICADOR, MICHAEL CURIOSO, JUNLIN ESPARES, GAVINO FARINAS, AND WARD TRADING AND SERVICES, Respondents.

  • G.R. No. 190846, February 03, 2016 - TOMAS P. TAN, JR., Petitioner, v. JOSE G. HOSANA, Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 204970, February 01, 2016 - SPOUSES CLAUDIO AND CARMENCITA TRAYVILLA, Petitioners, v. BERNARDO SEJAS AND JUVY PAGLINAWAN, REPRESENTED BY JESSIE PAGLINAWAN, Respondents.

  • G.R. No. 205764, February 03, 2016 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LEE QUIJANO ENAD, Accused-Appellant.

  • G.R. No. 196651, February 03, 2016 - UWE MATHAEUS, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES ERIC AND GENEVIEVE MEDEQUISO, Respondents.

  • G.R. No. 207355, February 03, 2016 - JENNIFER A. AGUSTIN-SE AND ROHERMIA J. JAMSANI-RODRIGUEZ, Petitioners, v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, REPRESENTED BY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO, OVERALL DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, AND JOHN I.C. TURALBA, ACTING DEPUTY SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, Respondents.

  • G.R. No. 209212, February 10, 2016 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plintiff and Appellee, v. ROMEL SAPITULA Y PACULAN, Accused-Appellant.

  • G.R. No. 191185, February 01, 2016 - GUILBEMER FRANCO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

  • A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3210-RTJ, February 03, 2016 - JUVY P. CIOCON-REER, ANGELINA P. CIOCON, MARIVIT P. CIOCON-HERNANDEZ, AND REMBERTO C. KARAAN, SR., Complainants, v. JUDGE ANTONIO C. LUBAO, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 22, GENERAL SANTOS CITY, Respondent.

  • A.C. No. 7594, February 09, 2016 - ADELPHA E. MALABED, Complainant, v. ATTY. MELJOHN B. DE LA PEÑA, Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 207535, February 10, 2016 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICARDO LAGBO A.K.A RICARDO LABONG Y MENDOZA, Accused-Appellant.

  • G.R. No. 201073, February 10, 2016 - PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. Petitioner, v. PAL EMPLOYEES SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC., Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 180402, February 10, 2016 - COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner, v. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 208021, February 03, 2016 - OSCAR S. VILLARTA, Petitioner, v. GAUDIOSO TALAVERA, JR., Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 193748, February 03, 2016 - MERVIC REALTY, INC. AND VICCY REALTY, INC., Petitioners, v. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 181789, February 03, 2016 - GMA NETWORK, INC., Petitioner, v. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, CENTRAL CATV, INC., PHILIPPINE HOME CABLE HOLDINGS, INC., AND PILIPINO CABLE CORPORATION, Respondents.

  • G.R. No. 202978, February 01, 2016 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VICTOR P. PADIT, Accused-Appellant.

  • A.C. No. 9807, February 02, 2016 - ERLINDA SISTUAL, FLORDELISA S. LEYSA, LEONISA S. ESPABO AND ARLAN C. SISTUAL, Complainants, v. ATTY. ELIORDO OGENA, Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 180642, February 03, 2016 - NUEVA ECIJA I ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE INCORPORATED (NEECO I), Petitioner, v. ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 194134, February 01, 2016 - JOSE ROMULO L. FRANCISCO, Petitioner, v. LOYOLA PLANS CONSOLIDATED INC., JESUSA CONCEPCION AND GERARDO B. MONZON, Respondents.

  • G.R. No. 187417, February 24, 2016 - CHRISTINE JOY CAPIN-CADIZ, Petitioner, v. BRENT HOSPITAL AND COLLEGES, INC., Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 170192, February 10, 2016 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. MARISSA BAYKER, Accused-Appellant.

  • G.R. No. 202187, February 10, 2016 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. ELISEO D. VILLAMOR, Appellant.

  • G.R. No. 210542, February 24, 2016 - ROSALINA CARODAN, Petitioner, v. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 215014, February 29, 2016 - REBECCA FULLIDO, Petitioner, v. GINO GRILLI, Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 215107, February 24, 2016 - REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE TOLL REGULATORY BOARD, Petitioner, v. C.C. UNSON COMPANY, INC., Respondent.

  • A.M. No. P-15-3300 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No.12-4011-P), February 10, 2016 - JOSEPHINE E. LAM, Complainant, v. NILA M. GARCIA, JUNIOR PROCESS SERVER, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, SIATON, NEGROS ORIENTAL, Respondent.

  • A.M. No. P-16-3423 [Formerly A.M. No. 13-9-89-MTCC], February 16, 2016 - RE: CIVIL SERVICE EXAMINATION IRREGULARITY (IMPERSONATION) OF MS. ELENA T. VALDEROSO, CASH CLERK II, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES, ANTIPOLO CITY.

  • G.R. No. 210233, February 15, 2016 - REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES RODOLFO SY AND BELEN SY, LOLITA SY, AND SPOUSES TEODORICO AND LEAH ADARNA, Respondents.

  • G.R. No. 206256, February 24, 2016 - ALBERT C. AUSTRIA, Petitioner, v. CRYSTAL SHIPPING, INC., AND/OR LARVIK SHIPPING A/S, AND EMILY MYLA A. CRISOSTOMO, Respondents.

  • G.R. No. 202695, February 29, 2016 - COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner, v. GJM PHILIPPINES MANUFACTURING, INC., Respondent.

  • A.C. No. 5325, February 09, 2016 - NEMESIO FLORAN AND CARIDAD FLORAN, Complainants, v. ATTY. ROY PRULE EDIZA, Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 201927, February 17, 2016 - VICENTE D. CABANTING AND LALAINE V. CABANTING, Petitioners, v. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC., Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 184332, February 17, 2016 - ANNA TENG, Petitioner, v. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (SEC) AND TING PING LAY, Respondents.

  • G.R. No. 198434, February 29, 2016 - HEIRS OF LEANDRO NATIVIDAD AND JULIANA V. NATIVIDAD, Petitioners, v. JUANA MAURICIO-NATIVIDAD, AND SPOUSES JEAN NATIVIDAD CRUZ AND JERRY CRUZ, Respondents.

  • G.R. No. 182629, February 24, 2016 - MERCEDES N. ABELLA, MA. THERESA A. BALLESTEROS AND MARIANITO N. ABELLA, Petitioners, v. HEIRS OF FRANCISCA C. SAN JUAN namely: GLICERIA SAN JUAN CAPISTRANO, BENIGNA SAN JUAN VASQUEZ, EVARISTO SAN JUAN, NIEVES SAN JUAN LUSTRE AND MATILDE SAN JUAN QUILONIO, Respondents.

  • G.R. No. 207389, February 17, 2016 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FEDERICO DE LA CRUZ Y SANTOS, Accused-Appellant.

  • G.R. No. 216566, February 17, 2016 - MAGELLAN AEROSPACE CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. PHILIPPINE AIR FORCE, Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 175760, February 17, 2016 - REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. SOGOD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 199537, February 10, 2016 - REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. ANDREA TAN, Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 179287, February 01, 2016 - PCI JIMMY M. FORTALEZA AND SPO2 FREDDIE A. NATIVIDAD, Petitioners, v. HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND ELIZABETH N. OROLA VDA. DE SALABAS, Respondents.; G.R. NO. 182090 - ELIZABETH N. OROLA VDA. DE SALABAS, Petitioner, v. HON. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, HON. MANUEL B. GAITE, P/INSP. CLARENCE DONGAIL, P/INSP. JONATHAN LORILLA,1 PO3 ALLEN WINSTON HULLEZA AND PO2 BERNARDO CIMATU, Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 206758, February 17, 2016 - MARICEL S. NONAY, Petitioner, v. BAHIA SHIPPING SERVICES, INC., FRED OLSEN LINES AND CYNTHIA MENDOZA, Respondents.

  • G.R. No. 195026, February 22, 2016 - CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, DR. MARIA LUISA R. SOLIVEN, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 174462, February 10, 2016 - PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS TELECOMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION (POTC), PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION (PHILCOMSAT), Petitioners, v. SANDIGANBAYAN (3rd DIVISION), REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), Respondents.

  • G.R. No. 199683, February 10, 2016 - ARLENE T. SAMONTE, VLADIMIR P. SAMONTE, MA. AUREA S. ELEPANO, Petitioners, v. LA SALLE GREENHILLS, INC., BRO. BERNARD S. OCA, Respondents.

  • G.R. No. 183486, February 24, 2016 - THE HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION, LIMITED, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION AND CITYTRUST BANKING CORPORATION (NOW BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS), Respondents.

  • G.R. No. 194960, February 03, 2016 - PRO BUILDERS, INC., Petitioner, v. TG UNIVERSAL BUSINESS VENTURES, INC., Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 203678, February 17, 2016 - CONCORDE CONDOMINIUM, INC., BY ITSELF AND COMPRISING THE UNIT OWNERS OF CONCORDE CONDOMINIUM BUILDING, Petitioner, v. AUGUSTO H. BACULIO; NEW PPI CORPORATION; ASIAN SECURITY AND INVESTIGATION AGENCY AND ITS SECURITY GUARDS; ENGR. NELSON B. MORALES, IN HIS CAPACITY AS BUILDING OFFICIAL OF THE MAKATI CITY ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT; SUPT. RICARDO C. PERDIGON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CITY FIRE MARSHAL OF THE MAKATI CITY FIRE STATION; F/C SUPT. SANTIAGO E. LAGUNA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS REGIONAL DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF FIRE PROTECTION-NCR, AND ANY AND ALL PERSONS ACTING WITH OR UNDER THEM, Respondents.

  • G.R. No. 174481, February 10, 2016 - THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CRISTY DIMAANO Y TIPDAS, Accused-Appellant.

  • G.R. No. 218867, February 17, 2016 - SPOUSES EDMOND LEE AND HELEN HUANG, Petitioners, v. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 190534, February 10, 2016 - C.F. SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT, INC., RONALD AUSTRIA, AND ABU DHABI NATIONAL TANKER CO., Petitioners, v. LEGAL HEIRS OF THE LATE GODOFREDO REPISO, REPRESENTED BY HIS WIFE LUZVIMINDA REPISO, Respondents.

  • A.C. No. 10945 (Formerly CBD 09-2507), February 23, 2016 - ANGELITO RAMISCAL AND MERCEDES ORZAME, Complainants, v. ATTY. EDGAR S. ORRO, Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 208406, February 29, 2016 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. ALLAN RODRIGUEZ Y GRAJO, Appellant.

  • G.R. No. 177382, February 17, 2016 - VIVA SHIPPING LINES, INC., Petitioner, v. KEPPEL PHILIPPINES MINING, INC., METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF LUCENA, PROVINCE OF QUEZON, ALEJANDRO OLIT, NIDA MONTILLA, PIO HERNANDEZ, EUGENIO BACULO, AND HARLAN BACALTOS, Respondents.

  • G.R. No. 203322, February 24, 2016 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. REMAN SARIEGO, Appellant.

  • G.R. No. 186102, February 24, 2016 - NATIONAL TRANSMISSION CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. HEIRS OF TEODULO EBESA, NAMELY: PORFERIA L. EBESA, EFREN EBESA, DANTE EBESA AND CYNTHIA EBESA, AND ATTY. FORTUNATO VELOSO, Respondents.

  • G.R. No. 192233, February 17, 2016 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. SPO1 CATALINO GONZALES, JR., Accused-Appellant.

  • A.M. No. P-15-3393 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 13-4055-P], February 23, 2016 - SEGUNDINA P. NOCES-DE LEON AND LEONOR P. ALAVE, Petitioners, v. TERENCIO G. FLORENDO, SHERIFF IV, BRANCH 21, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, VIGAN CITY, ILOCOS SUR, Respondent.

  • IPI No. 15-35-SB-J, February 23, 2016 - RE: VERIFIED COMPLAINT DATED JULY 13, 2015 OF ALFONSO V. UMALI, JR., Complainant, v. HON. JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE, SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondent.

  • A.M. No. P-15-3361 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 10-3381-P], February 23, 2016 - ATTY. JOHN V. AQUINO, Petitioner, v. ELENA S. ALCASID, CLERK III, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT, OLONGAPO CITY, Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 185603, February 10, 2016 - REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. LOCAL SUPERIOR OF THE INSTITUTE OF THE SISTERS OF THE SACRED HEART OF JESUS OF RAGUSA, Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 208404, February 24, 2016 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VICENTE LUGNASIN AND DEVINCIO GUERRERO, Accused-Appellants.

  • G.R. No. 183529, February 24, 2016 - OFELIA C. CAUNAN, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.

  • G.R. No. 207816, February 24, 2016 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RAUL YAMON TUANDO, Accused-Appellant.

  • G.R. No. 171041, February 10, 2016 - REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. MOLDEX REALTY, INC., Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 188720, February 23, 2016 - QUEZON CITY PTCA FEDERATION, INC., Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY JESLI A. LAPUS, Respondent.

  • A.C. No. 8037, February 17, 2016 - RE: DECISION DATED AUGUST 19, 2008, 3RD DIVISION, COURT OF APPEALS IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 79904 [HON. DIONISIO DONATO T. GARCIANO, ET AL. V. HON. PATERNO G. TIAMSON, ETC., ET AL.], Petitioner, v. ATTY. JOSE DE G. FERRER, Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 220481, February 17, 2016 - VICTOR S. LIMLINGAN AND EMMANUEL A. LEYCO, Petitioners, v. ASIAN INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT, INC., Respondent.; G.R. No. 220503 - ASIAN INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT, INC., Petitioner, v. VICTOR S. LIMLINGAN AND EMMANUEL A. LEYCO, Respondents.

  • G.R. No. 208976, February 22, 2016 - THE HONORABLE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, v. LEOVIGILDO DELOS REYES, JR., Respondent.

  • A.C. No. 10605, February 17, 2016 - BIENVENIDO T. CANLAPAN, Complainant, v. ATTY. WILLIAM B. BALAYO, Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 209180, February 24, 2016 - REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. REGHIS M. ROMERO II AND OLIVIA LAGMAN ROMERO, Respondents.; G.R. NO. 209253 - OLIVIA LAGMAN ROMERO, Petitioner, v. REGHIS M. ROMERO II, Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 208948, February 24, 2016 - JOSE B. LURIZ, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

  • G.R. No. 173921, February 24, 2016 - PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., Petitioner, v. ISAGANI DAWAL, LORNA CONCEPCION, AND BONIFACIO SINOBAGO, Respondents.; G.R. No. 173952 - ISAGANI DAWAL, LORNA CONCEPCION, AND BONIFACIO SINOBAGO, Petitioners, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., AVELINO L. ZAPANTA, AND CESAR B. LAMBERTE, Respondents.

  • A.M. No. P-16-3419 [Formerly OCAIPI No. 11-3648-P], February 23, 2016 - AUGUSTO V. SANTOS, Complainant, v. SHERIFF IV ANTONIO V. LEAÑO, JR., SHERIFF III BENJIE E. LACSINA, SHERIFF III ALVIN S. PINEDA, Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 184288, February 16, 2016 - ERIC N. ESTRELLADO AND JOSSIE M. BORJA, Petitioners, v. KARINA CONSTANTINO DAVID, THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, HIPOLITO R. GABORNI AND ROBERTO S. SE, Respondents.

  • G.R. No. 175210, February 01, 2016 - MARIO JOSE E. SERENO, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE ASSOCIATION OF PETROCHEMICAL MANUFACTURERS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (APMP), Petitioner, v. COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND RELATED MATTERS (CTRM) OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (NEDA), COMPOSED OF THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE NEDA SECRETARIAT, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARIES OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, FINANCE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AGRICULTURE, ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATION, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, AGRARIAN REFORM, THE GOVERNOR OF THE BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE TARIFF COMMISSION, AND BRENDA R. MENDOZA IN HER CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF THE TRADE, INDUSTRY & UTILITIES STAFF, Respondents.

  • G.R. No. 170631, February 10, 2016 - CARAVAN TRAVEL AND TOURS INTERNATIONAL, INC., Petitioner, v. ERMILINDA R. ABEJAR, Respondent.

  • A.C. No. 8667, February 03, 2016 - INOCENCIO I. BALISTOY, Petitioner, v. ATTY. FLORENCIO A. BRON, Respondent.

  • IPI No. 14-222-CA-J, February 23, 2016 - RE: COMPLAINT OF ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO AGAINST JUSTICES MARIA ELISA SEMPIO DIY, RAMON PAUL L. HERNANDO, AND CARMELITA SALANDANAN-MANAHAN, OF THE COURT OF APPEALS CEBU.

  • G.R. No. 193176, February 24, 2016 - PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, Petitioner, v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, RENATO D. TAYAG, ISMAEL M. REINOSO, GENEROSO TANSECO, MANUEL MORALES, RUBEN B. ANCHETA, GERONIMO Z. VELASCO, TROADIO T. QUIAZON, JR., FERNANDO MARAMAG, EDGARDO TORDESILLAS, ARTURO R. TANCO, JR., GERARDO SICAT, PANFILO O. DOMINGO, POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MANUEL B. SYQUIO, RAFAEL M. ATAYDE, HONORIO POBLADOR, JR., GEORGE T. SCHOLEY,1 TIRSO ANTIPORDA, JR., CARLOS L. INDUCTIVO, AND TEODORO VALENCIA, Respondents.