FIRST
DIVISION
CIRILA DOMINGO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
G.
R.
No. L-3150
February
1, 1907
-versus-
ANTONIO
OSORIO,
Defendant-Appellee.
D E C I S I
O N
ARELLANO, C.J.:
This is an appeal from
the Order of the Court below sustaining the defendant's demurrer to the
complaint on the ground that plaintiff's action was barred by the
statute
of limitations, and to which said order the plaintiff duly excepted.
The Complaint was filed
on the 1st of August, 1905, and subsequently amended on the 22nd of
December
following, the pertinent facts alleged therein being:
"I. That between the
1st of January, 1895, and the 16th of July, 1896, plaintiff, at
defendant's
request, furnished the material and performed the work necessary for
the
repair of several vehicles;
"II. That the value
of the material and work in the repairs mentioned in the preceding
paragraph
is one thousand forty-one pesos and forty-five cents, Mexican currency;
"III. That of the
money
mentioned in Paragraph II the defendant in or about the month of July,
1897, paid the sum of one hundred pesos (100), Mexican currency;
"IV. That there
remains
a balance due from the said defendant of nine hundred and forty-one
pesos
and forty- five cents (941.45), Mexican currency, which the defendant
refuses
to pay, although payment has been duly demanded."
And the plaintiff seeks
to recover the sum, or its equivalent in Philippine currency, with
legal
interest thereon from the 16th of July, 1896, and the costs. [Bill of
Exceptions,
p. 6].
To this Complaint,
the defendant demurred upon the following grounds:
I. That the amended
complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action.
II. That the alleged
cause of action is barred by the provisions of article 1967 of the
Civil
Code.
On the 16th of
January,
1906, the Court below decided the demurrer as follows: "Being of the
opinion
that the demurrer is well founded, it is hereby sustained and the
complaint
of the plaintiff is dismissed, and considering that the cause of action
is barred by the statute of limitation, it is ordered that the action
of
the plaintiff be dismissed and that the defendant, Antonio Osorio,
recover
from the plaintiff, Cirila Santiago, the costs of this action." [Bill
of
Exceptions, p. 7]. The errors assigned by the appellant are as
follows:
"I. That the court below erred in sustaining defendant's demurrer to
the
complaint; II. That the court below erred in dismissing plaintiff's
amended
complaint on the ground that plaintiff's cause of action is barred by
the
statute of limitations."
As to
the merits of
the case, the appellant in support of her second specification of error
contends that the prescription of three years provided in Article 1967
of the Civil Code for all actions for services rendered for goods sold
and delivered is not applicable to the case at bar, for this is not an
action to recover the daily wage of a mechanic, servant, or day
laborer,
nor the value of supplies furnished by the latter, but the costs of
certain
repairs made to some of defendant's vehicles by the plaintiff, by
direction
and at the request of the former, and that this action is an action in
personam arising from a contract for services included within the
provisions
of Article 1964 of the Civil Code, which provides for a prescriptive
period
of fifteen years.
Plaintiff's
appeal
can not be sustained upon this second assignment of error. According to
Article 1967, Paragraph 3, all action for the fulfillment of
obligations
"for the payment of mechanics, servants and laborers the amounts due
for
their services and for the supplies or disbursements they may have
incurred
with regard to the same," prescribe in three years. It is not,
therefore,
the obligation to pay the wages of the mechanic but the obligation to
pay
the value of his services, that is to say, the value of the work and
the
value of the material furnished for the repairs of the vehicles,
according
to the complaint and the provisions of the Civil Code, above quoted,
which
is sought to be recovered in this action. That the cause of action
alleged
in the complaint arises from the services rendered by a mechanic and
the
disbursements made and material supplied in connection with the same is
conclusively shown by the definition of the word "mechanic" and the
legal
precedent for the article of the code above quoted. The word
"mechanic",
according to all dictionaries, and particularly that of Spanish
Academy,
means "he who earns his livelihood with his hands" and by extension,
any
artisan, whether apprentice or master [Joaquin Dominguez Dictionary];
and
the legal precedent is no other than law 10, Title 11, Book 10 of the Novisima
Recopilacion, which provides a prescriptive period of three years
of
actions for the recovery of wages of servants, which provision is
therein
extended to "pharmacists and jewelers and other mechanics, dealers in
spices,
confectioners and other persons conducting the sale of foods stuffs,
who
after the lapse of three years can not recover the value of that which
they have sold at their stores or of work done by them." This law was
subsequent
to another law providing for the same prescriptive period as to actions
for the recovery of the fees of lawyers and attorneys. Consequently the
defense set up by the defendant, that plaintiff's action was barred by
the statute of limitations under article 1967 of the Civil Code, is in
accordance with law.
But, as
to the question
of procedure, We hold that the objection that the action is barred by
the
statute of limitations can not be taken by demurrer, but must be set up
as a defense in the answer to the complaint. American authorities
differ
upon this question and we shall not, therefore, resort to them in
determining
the proper construction that should be given to the provisions of the
Code
of Civil Procedure now in force. Paragraph 5 of Section 91 of the Code
of Civil Procedure does not authorize the objection of prescription to
be taken by demurrer. That paragraph relates to the objection "that the
complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action."
But the facts alleged in the complaint constitute per se a cause of
action.
According to the allegations of the complaint, which must be assumed to
be true for the purpose of the demurrer, there existed an obligation
arising
from a contract between the parties, which it is sought to enforce.
Prescription,
which is a legal and not a natural cause of the extinguishment of an
obligation,
can not be set up as a ground for demurrer by mere inference from the
only
facts alleged in the complaint, which facts were in themselves
sufficient
to show that the plaintiff had a perfect right to maintain an action
for
the enforcement of such obligation. In order to do so it would be
necessary
to assume facts which are not alleged in the complaint.
The law
of criminal
procedure now in force, General Orders No. 58, contains a provision
similar
to that of Paragraph 5 of Section 91 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
Paragraph
4 of Section 21 of the aforesaid General Orders reading, "That the
facts
charged do not constitute a public offense" may constitute a ground for
demurrer. Paragraph 5 of the same section provides the same if it
appear:
"That in (the complaint or information) contains averments which, if
true,
would constitute a legal justification or excuse." There is nothing
similar
to this last-quoted provision in the Code of Civil Procedure.
We are
of the opinion
that the appeal should be sustained upon the first assignment of error,
and accordingly, hereby reverse the Order of the Court below without
special
provision as to costs. After the expiration of twenty days let judgment
be entered in accordance herewith and ten days thereafter, the record
be
remanded to the Court below for execution. So ordered.
Torres, Mapa, Carson,
Willard, and Tracey, JJ., concur. |