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THE
UNITED STATES,
G.
R.
No. 11612
June
21,
1918
-versus-
SIMEON CAÑETE, ET AL., Defendants-Appellants. FISHER,
J :
This is an appeal from
a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Leyte,
whereby
the appellants were found guilty of the crime of libel.
Two Informations were filed in the trial court charging the fifty persons named in each Information with the crime of libel. In the Information in case No. 4138 of the trial court, the publication complained of is averred to be a libel upon the Rev. Nicanor Acebedo, and in case No. 4139, it is charged that the same publication is a libel upon one Timotea Camposano. By stipulation, the two cases were consolidated and tried together in the Court below. The trial judge acquitted all of the defendants in case No. 4138, except Simeon Cañete, Hermogenes Camposano, Margarito Nolasco, Balbino Alminario, and Eulogio Villablanca, who were found guilty and sentenced to short terms of imprisonment. In case No. 4139, in which Timotea Camposano is the complaining witness, the Court below acquitted all of the defendants, except Simeon Cañete and Hermogenes Camposano, each of whom was sentenced to pay a fine of P500, and Eulogio Villablanca whom he sentenced to pay a fine of P100. From the consolidated judgment thus rendered in the two cases, the convicted defendants have appealed to this Court. The publication upon which the informations are based consists of a charge in writing signed by appellants and their co-defendants in the trial court, and addressed to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, in which Father Acebedo, at that time a parish priest of Dagami, Leyte, of which the defendants are residents, is accused of maladministration, and misappropriation of the funds and property of the church of Dagami under his charge, drunkenness, taking indecent liberties of the women of his congregation, illicit relations with the complainant, Timoteo Camposano, and general immoral and indecent behavior. The charges are in such a character that We do not believe they should be given further publicity by reproducing them in this decision. The publication is unquestionably defamatory in character, and this is admitted by the appellants. They based their defense upon an attempt to prove that the charges were true and the contention that the communication was privileged, having been made only to Father Acebedo's superior, in order that the charges might be investigated. The Court below held that the defendants had failed in their effort to prove the truth of the charges, and in this conclusion We concur. Whatever ground for doubt or suspicion there may have been, the evidence falls short of proof that the complaining witnesses were in fact guilty of any of the charges made against them in the publication upon which this prosecution is based. Before considering the other defense upon which appellants rely, namely that the communication was privileged, it will be necessary to state the facts disclosed by the record regarding the circumstances under which the offensive publication was written, the conduct of the defendants, and their efforts to persuade the church authorities to make and investigation into the charges. The evidence shows that for a long time prior to the preparation of the complaint against Father Acebedo, which led to this prosecution, his conduct had been the subject of general dissatisfaction in his parish. The culmination of this feeling was a meeting held by a number of the accused at the house of Gil Camposano at which the conduct and character of Father Acebedo were discussed. The result of the discussion was a decision to request the church authorities to hold an investigation, and the appellant, Simeon Cañete was designated to formulate the complaint in writing. For this purpose Cañete availed himself of the services of one Pastor, who wrote out the charges in the form of a complaint addressed to the Catholic Archbishop of Manila. Thereupon, a number of the accused met again at the house of Gil Camposano, signed the document, and designated the accused, Simeon Cañete, to take it to Manila and present it to the Archbishop. The document was then taken to a number of prominent residents of Dagami, for the purpose of obtaining their signatures, if possible, and several additional signatures were added to it by this means. The subscribers include the presidente and vice-presidente of Dagami, the auxiliary justice of the peace, several concejales and ex-concejales, the chief of police, an ex-presidente of the municipality, and many other prominent members of the community, including a number of municipal teachers. The names subscribed to the charges against Father Acebedo include, as stated by the trial judge, "a very large proportion of the intelligent and educated men of the municipality, so that in a sense the present prosecution is an indictment against the whole municipality." The statement of the charges ended with a petition as follows:
The charges and petition
for the removal of Father Acebedo were taken by the appellant,
Cañete,
to Manila, and by him turned over to the Catholic Archbishop of Manila,
by whom the papers were referred to the Bishop of Calbayog, Leyte. He
in
turn referred the matter to his vicar general residing at Tanauan,
Leyte,
with instructions to conduct a judicial investigation before the
ecclesiastical
tribunal, if the complainants were disposed to make a deposit of P300
to
cover the costs, or to institute an administrative inquiry, at which
the
complainants and accused should be heard, if they were not willing to
make
such deposit. The Vicar General thereupon addressed a communication to
the complainants under the general designation, "the signers of the
libel
against Father Acebedo," asking them to state whether they desired an
administrative
or a judicial investigation, and in the latter event to make the
required
deposit. To this a reply was made on behalf of the defendants that they
were unable to make the deposit required of them, but would like to
have
the investigation conducted administratively or by an ex officio
judicial proceeding in the ecclesiastical courts. The Vicar General
answered
under date of February 9, 1915, that even were the inquiry to be
conducted
ex officio it would entail "not only work but also disbursements and
expenses
which will have to be paid by whomever it may concern." The
communication
ended with this statement:
Evidently discouraged by
these requirements, and the apparent reluctance of the church
authorities
to take any action in the matter, the defendants made no effort to
comply
with the conditions imposed upon them and in July, 1915, these
prosecutions
were commenced.
The prosecution relied upon proof of the publication of the defamatory writing, and made no attempt to prove actual malice. Defendants made some effort to prove the truth of the allegations, but in this they were unsuccessful. We are of the opinion, however, that the record, as a whole, justifies the conclusion that at the time of the preparation and presentation of the charges against Father Acebedo the belief prevailed very generally in Dagami that he had been guilty of the misconduct imputed to him, that the appellants and their codefendants below were actuated by no actual malice, and that their purpose was, in good faith, to bring about an investigation of the charges by Father Acebedo's ecclesiastical superiors. That being the case, are they guilty of libel, notwithstanding the fact that the proof fails to establish the truth of the charges? Is the petition addressed by them to the Arcbishop a privileged communication ? In the case of the United States vs. Bustos [37 Phil. Rep. 731], in which the defendants were charged with libel of a public official for statements made in a petition for his removal addressed to his administrative superior, Mr. Justice Malcolm, writing the opinion of the Court, said:
"In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege destroys that presumption. The onus of proving malice then lies on the plaintiff. The plaintiff must bring home to the defendant the existence of malice as the true motive of his conduct. Falsehood and the absence of probable cause will amount to proof of malice. [See White vs. Nicholls 18453, 3 How. 266]. "A privileged communication should not be subject to microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity. Such excessive scrutiny would defeat the protection which the law throws over privileged communications. The ultimate test is that of bona fides." It is true that the communication
in the Bustos case [supra] was addressed to a government
official,
but the American and British courts have extended the qualified
privilege
by analogy to include cases like the present, in which a member of a
church
makes a complaint regarding his minister to their common ecclesiastical
superior.
It is the established doctrine of the American courts that in matters purely ecclesiastical the decisions of the proper church tribunals are conclusive upon the civil tribunals. A church member who is expelled from membership by the church authorities, or a priest or minister who is by them deprived of his sacred office, is without remedy in the civil courts, which will not inquire into the correctness of the decisions of the ecclesiastical tribunals. [Landis vs. Campbell, 79 Mo., 433; Watson vs. Garvin, 54 Mo., 364; Stack vs. O'Hara, 98 Penn., 213]. The right of such ecclesiastical tribunals to. try members offending against the canons of conduct established by the church being thus recognized it is reasonable that their decisions should be privileged, however derogatory they may be to the reputation of the persons affected. "Persons who join churches voluntarily submit themselves to the jurisdiction of these bodies, and in matters of faith and individual conduct affecting their relations as members thereof subject themselves to the tribunals established by those bodies to pass upon such questions, and, if aggrieved by a decision against them, made in good faith by such judicatories they must seek their redress within the organization, as provided by its laws or regulations." [Landis vs. Campbell, supra]. In the case of Farnsworth vs. Storrs [59 Mass., 412], the defendant, the pastor of a church, was sued for libel for having published, by reading from his pulpit, a sentence of excommunication in which it was stated in plain terms that plaintiff had violated the Seventh Commandment. The defendants's plea of qualified privilege was sustained. Chief Justice Shaw, writing the opinion of the court, said:
"The proceedings of the church are quasi judicial and therefore those who complain, or give testimony, or act and vote, or pronounce the result, orally or in writing, acting in good faith, and within the scope of the authority conferred by this limited jurisdiction, and not falsely or colorably, making such proceedings a pretense for covering an intended scandal, are protected by law. It appears to us, that the defendant, as pastor of the church, and minister of the congregation, was acting within the scope of his authority, in reading a paper, which, it was proved had been adopted in a separate meeting of the church, and directed thus to be read." The right of ecclesiastical
tribunals to hear and decide cases involving the conduct of their
officers
and members being recognized, and this of necessity involving immunity
from charges of libel and slander based upon statements made in good
faith
by the members of such tribunals and by parties or witnesses giving
evidence
before them [York vs. Pease, 68 Mass., 282], a like immunity must be
extended
to persons who, in good faith, make charges, written or oral, to the
church
authorities, intended to provoke an investigation concerning the
conduct
or character of a member, officer, or minister of the institution. That
such charges are privileged communications, if made without actual
malice,
is the settled doctrine of the courts of the United States and of Great
Britain.
In the case of Shurtleff vs. Stevens [51 Vermont, 501], it appeared that the defendant, a member of a religious organization, had made charges against the plaintiff, a minister of the church, which led to his expulsion from membership by the tribunals of the organization. The lower court held that the charge was defamatory and that its publication implied malice. The Supreme Court of Vermont reversed this decision, ruling that the communication was one of qualified privilege and that in the absence of proof of express malice, did not constitute libel. The Court said:
Public policy is the foundation
of the doctrine of privileged communications. It is based upon the
recognition
of the fact that the right of the individual to enjoy immunity from the
publication of untruthful charges derogatory to his character is not
absolute
and must at times yield to the superior necessity of subjecting to
investigation
the conduct of persons charged with wrongdoing. In order to accomplish
this purpose and to permit private persons having, or in good faith
believing
themselves to have, knowledge of such wrongdoing, to perform the legal,
moral, social duty resulting from such knowledge of belief, without
restraining
them by the fear that an error, no matter how innocently or honestly
made,
may subject them to punishment for defamation, the doctrine of
qualified
privilege has been evolved, under which, "the occasion on which the
communication
was made rebuts the inference of malice prima facie arising
from
a statement prejudicial to the character of the plaintiff, and puts
upon
him the burden of proving that the defendant was actuated by motives of
personal spite or ill-will, independent of the occasion on which the
communication
was made." [Newell, Slander & Libel [3d ed.] pp. 477, 478].
When the publication complained of is such that, in the absence of express malice, it is privileged, the burden of proving malice rests with the plaintiff.
It
must be admitted
that the Libel Law [Act No. 277] contains no express recognition of the
doctrine of qualified privilege in such a case as this. The only
section
dealing expressly with the subject of privilege is the ninth, which by
its terms is limited to private communications made for the sole
purpose
of protecting the interests of the person making the communication or
the
interests of the person to whom such communications are made. The
communication
here in question was in no proper sense a private communication as it
was
clearly made with the intention and in the hope that it would be
followed
by a public investigation. We are of the opinion, however, that it is
an
error to assume that the right to freedom of speech as now enjoyed in
these
Islands is conferred by Act No. 277, or that the scope and limit of its
exercise must be found in that statute. On the contrary, the principle
which guarantees to the people of these Islands the privileges of
freedom
of speech and of the press is firmly embedded in the fundamental law of
the land, to which all statutes are subordinate. [Philippine Bill, Sec.
5; Jones Law, Sec 3]. The right to petition the Government for the
redress
of grievances rests upon an equally solid foundation.
Nevertheless, these rights would be of no practical value were their exercise, in the utmost of good faith, subjected to the condition that failure to establish the truth of all statements made with a view to inciting official action is to be punished as constituting the crime of defamation. With the fear of such consequences constantly before him, the citizen might well refrain from exercising his perilous privilege of petition or of free speech. The provisions relating to freedom of speech and the right of petition contained in the Philippine Bill and the Jones Law are taken from the Constitution of the United States. Judge Cooley, in his well-known work on Constitutional Limitations [6th ed., p. 523], expresses the opinion that publications which are privileged for some reason of public policy are within the constitutional protection. Assuming that this view is correct it is obvious that the constitutional right cannot be impaired, or abolished by implication, by the failure to make provision for it in the statute concerning libels. The Supreme Court of the United States, construing the provision in Section 5 of the Philippine Bill securing to accused persons the right to be heard by himself and counsel, said that if that provision of the paramount law makes the presence of the accused indispensable at every stage of the trial, "it is of no moment that the Philippine laws do not go so far, for they cannot lessen its force or effect. It is the right which these constitutional provisions secure to persons accused of crime in this country that was carried to the Philippines by the congressional enactment, and, therefore, according to a familiar rule, the prevailing course of decision here may and should be accepted as determinative of the nature and measure of the right there." [Diaz vs. United States, 223 U. S., 442]. The plainest principles of natural right and sound public policy require that the utmost possible freedom should be accorded every citizen to complain to the supervising, removing and appointing authorities of the misconduct of the public officials with whom he comes into contact, and like considerations make it equally proper that members of a religious organization should enjoy equal freedom in bringing to the attention of the church authorities the misbehavior of their spiritual leaders or of fellow-members. Manifestly, the right must be exercised in good faith, and may not with impunity be made the occasion for the venting of private spite. It is subject to the limitation and restriction that such complaints must be made to a functionary having authority to redress the evils complained of; that they must be made in good faith and that they must not be actuated by malice. As We are convinced that the conduct of defendants in making the complaint which has led to these prosecutions has conformed to the conditions upon which the qualified privilege they claim may be enjoyed, the judgment of the trial court in both cases is reversed and the appellants are acquitted, with the costs of both instances de officio. So ordered. Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Carson, Araullo, Street and Malcolm, JJ., concur. |
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