EN
BANC
PEOPLE
OF THE
PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
G.
R.
No. L-17958
February
27, 1922
-versus-
LOL-LO AND
SARAW,
Defendants-Appellants.
D
E C I S I
O N
MALCOLM,
J :
The days when pirates roamed
the seas, when the picturesque buccaneers - Captain Avery and Captain
Kidd
and Bartholomew Roberts - gripped the imagination, when grotesque
brutes
like Blackbeard flourished, seem far away in the pages of history and
romance.
Nevertheless, the record before us tells a tale of twentieth century
piracy
in the south seas, but stripped of all touches of chivalry or of
generosity,
so as to present a horrible case of rapine and near murder.
On or about June 30,
1920, two boats left Matuta, a Dutch possession, for Peta, another
Dutch
possession. In one of the boats was one individual, a Dutch subject,
and
in the other boat eleven men, women, and children, likewise subjects of
Holland. After a number of days of navigation, at about 7 o'clock in
the
evening, the second boat arrived between the Islands of Buang and Bukid
in the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was surrounded by six vintas
manned
by twenty-four Moros all armed. The Moros first asked for food, but
once
on the Dutch boat, took for themselves all of the cargo, attacked some
of the men, and brutally violated two of the women by methods too
horrible
to described. All of the persons on the Dutch boat, with the exception
of the two young women, were again placed on it and holes were made in
it, with the idea that it would submerge, although as a matter of fact,
these people, after eleven days of hardship and privation, were
succored.
Taking the two women with them, and repeatedly violating them, the
Moros
finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the Moro
marauders
were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro, the
two women were able to escape.
Lol-lo and Saraw later
returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine
Islands.
There they were arrested and were charged in the Court of First
Instance
of Sulu with the crime of piracy. A demurrer was interposed by counsel
de officio for the Moros, based on the grounds that the offense charged
was not within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, nor of
any court of the Philippine Islands, and that the facts did not
constitute
a public offense, under the laws in force in the Philippine Islands.
After
the demurrer was overruled by the trial judge, a trial was had, and a
judgment
was rendered finding the two defendants guilty and sentencing each of
them
to life imprisonment (cadena perpetua), to return together with
Kinawalang
and Maulanis, defendants in another case, to the offended parties, the
thirty-nine sacks of copras which had been robbed, or to indemnify them
in the amount of 942 rupees, and to pay a one-half part of the costs.
A very learned and
exhaustive brief has been filed in this Court by the attorney de
officio.
By a process of elimination, however, certain questions can be quickly
disposed of.
The proven facts are
not disputed. All of the elements of the crime of piracy are present.
Piracy
is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful
authority
and done animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of universal
hostility.
It cannot be contended
with any degree of force as was done in the lower court and as is gain
done in this Court, that the Court of First Instance was without
jurisdiction
of the case. Pirates are in law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a
crime
not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may be
punished
in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be
found
or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy, unlike all
other crimes, has no territorial limits. As it is against all so may it
be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed
within
the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits,
though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes." (U. S. vs. Furlong
[1820],
5 Wheat., 184).
The most serious
question
which is squarely presented to this court for decision for the first
time
is whether or not the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the
crime
of piracy are still in force. Articles 153 to 156 of the Penal Code
read
as follows:
"Art. 153. The crime
of piracy committed against Spaniards, or the subjects of another
nation
not at war with Spain, shall be punished with a penalty ranging from
cadena
temporal to cadena perpetua.
"If the crime be
committed
against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with Spain, it
shall be punished with the penalty or presidio mayor.
"Art. 154. Those who
commit the crimes referred to in the first paragraph of the next
preceding
article shall suffer the penalty of cadena perpetua or death, and those
who commit the crimes referred to in the second paragraph of the same
article,
from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua:
"1. Whenever they
have
seized some vessel by boarding or firing upon the same.
"2. Whenever the
crime
is accompanied by murder, homicide, or by any of the physical injuries
specified in articles four hundred and fourteen and four hundred and
fifteen
and in paragraphs one and two of article four hundred and sixteen.
"3. Whenever it is
accompanied by any of the offenses against chastity specified in
Chapter
II, Title IX, of the book.
"4. Whenever the
pirates
have abandoned any persons without means of saving themselves.
"5. In every case,
the captain or skipper of the pirates.
"Art. 155. With
respect
to the provisions of this title as well as all others of this code,
when
Spain is mentioned it shall be understood as including any part of the
national territory.
"Art. 156. For the
purpose of applying the provisions of this code, every person, who,
according
to the Constitution of the Monarchy, has the status of a Spaniard shall
be considered as such."
The general rules of public
law recognized and acted on by the United States relating to the effect
of a transfer of territory from another State to the United States are
well-known. The political law of the former sovereignty is necessarily
changed. The municipal law in so far as it is consistent with the
Constitution,
the laws of the United States or the characteristics and institutions
of
the government, remains in force. As a corollary to the main rules,
laws
subsisting at the time of transfer, designed to secure good order and
peace
in the community, which are strictly of a municipal character, continue
until by direct action of the new government they are altered or
repealed.
[Chicago, Rock Island, etc., R. Co. vs. McGlinn (1885), 114 U.S., 542].
These principles of
the public law were given specific application to the Philippines by
the
Instructions of President McKinley of May 19,1889, to General Wesley
Merritt,
the Commanding General of the Army of Occupation in the Philippines,
when
he said:
"Thought the powers
of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, and immediately
operate
upon the political condition of the inhabitants, the municipal laws of
the conquered territory, such as affect private rights of person and
property,
and provide for the punishment of crime, are considered as continuing
in
force, so far as they are compatible with the new order of things,
until
they are suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent; and in
practice
they are not usually abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force, and
to be administered by the ordinary tribunals, substantially as they
before
the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be
adhered to on the present occasion." [Official Gazette, Preliminary
Number,
Jan. 71. 1903, p. 1. See also General Merritt's Proclamation of August
14, 1898].
It cannot admit of doubt
that the articles of the Spanish Penal Code dealing with piracy were
meant
to include the Philippine Islands. Article 156 of the Penal Code of the
Penal Code in relation to article 1 of the Constitution of the Spanish
Monarchy, would also make the provisions of the Code applicable not
only
to Spaniards but to Filipinos.
The opinion of Grotius
was that piracy by the law of nations is the same thing as piracy by
the
civil law, and he has never been disputed. The specific provisions of
the
Penal Code are similar in tenor to statutory provisions elsewhere and
to
the concepts of the public law. This must necessarily be so,
considering
that the Penal Code finds its inspiration in this respect in the
Novelas,
the Partidas, and the Novisima Recopilacion.
The Constitution of
the United States declares that the Congress shall have the power to
define
and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and
offenses
against the law of nations. [U.S Const. Art. I, sec. 8, cl.
10].
The Congress, in putting on the statute books the necessary ancillary
legislation,
provided that whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as
defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or found
in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life. [U.S. Crim. Code,
Sec.
290; penalty formerly death: U.S. Rev. Stat., sec. 5368]. The framers
of
the Constitution and the members of Congress were content to let a
definition
of piracy rest on its universal conception under the law of nations.
It is evident that
the provisions of the Penal Code now in force in the Philippines
relating
to piracy are not inconsistent with the corresponding provisions in
force
in the United States.
By the Treaty of Paris,
Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the United States. A logical
construction
of articles of the Penal Code, like the articles dealing with the crime
of piracy, would be that wherever "Spain" is mentioned, it should be
substituted
by the words "United States" and wherever "Spaniards" are mentioned,
the
word should be substituted by the expression "citizens of the United
States
and citizens of the Philippine Islands." Somewhat similar reasoning led
this court in the case of United States vs. Smith [(1919); 39 Phil.,
533]
to give to the word "authority" as found in the penal Code a limited
meaning,
which would no longer comprehend all religious, military, and civil
officers,
but only public officers in the Government of the Philippine Islands.
Under the construction
above indicated, Article 153 of the Penal Code would read as follows:
"The crime of piracy
committed against citizens of the United States and citizens of the
Philippine
Islands, or the subjects of another nation not at war with the United
States,
shall be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena
perpetua.
"If the crime be
committed
against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with the
United
States, it shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor."
We hold those provisions
of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy, notably Articles
153
and 154, to be still in force in the Philippines.
The
crime falls under
the first paragraph of Article 153 of the Penal Code in relation to
Article
154. There are present at least two of the circumstances named in the
last
cited article as authorizing either cadena perpetua or death. The crime
of piracy was accompanied by (1) an offense against chastity and (2)
the
abandonment of persons without apparent means of saving themselves. It
is, therefore, only necessary for us to determine as to whether the
penalty
of cadena perpetua or death should be imposed. In this connection, the
trial court, finding present the one aggravating circumstance of
nocturnity,
and compensating the same by the one mitigating circumstance of lack of
instruction provided by article 11, as amended, of the Penal Code,
sentenced
the accused to life imprisonment. At least three aggravating
circumstances,
that the wrong done in the commission of the crime was deliberately
augmented
by causing other wrongs not necessary for its commission, that
advantage
was taken of superior strength, and that means were employed which
added
ignominy to the natural effects of the act, must also be taken into
consideration
in fixing the penalty. Considering, therefore, the number and
importance
of the qualifying and aggravating circumstances here present, which
cannot
be offset by the sole mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction,
and
the horrible nature of the crime committed, it becomes our duty to
impose
capital punishment.
The vote upon the
sentence
is unanimous with regard to the propriety of the imposition of the
death
penalty upon the defendant and appellant Lol-lo [the accused who raped
one of the women] but is not unanimous with regard to the defendant and
appellant Saraw, since one member of the Court, Mr. Justice Romualdez,
registers his nonconformity. In accordance with the provisions of Act
No.
2726, it results, therefore, that the judgment of the trial court as to
the defendant and appellant Saraw is affirmed, and is reversed as to
the
defendant and appellant Lol-lo, who is found guilty of the crime of
piracy
and is sentenced therefor to be hung until dead, at such time and place
as shall be fixed by the Judge of First Instance of the Twenty-sixth
Judicial
District. The two appellants together with Kinawalang and Maulanis,
defendants
in another case, shall indemnify jointly and severally the offended
parties
in the equivalent of 924 rupees, and shall pay a one-half part of the
cost
of both instances. So ordered.
Araullo, C.J.,
Johnson, Avancena, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ.,
concur. |