SECOND
DIVISION
THE
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
G.
R.
No. 26324
February
23, 1927
-versus-
UY ENG
EUI, ET AL.,
Defendants.
MARIANO
GRANADOS
AND FRANCISCO SEVILLA,
Bondsmen-Appellants.
D
E C I S I
O N
STREET,
J :
This
is an appeal from
an Order of the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila, entered
in the criminal case of People vs. Uy Eng Hui, et al., refusing to set
aside the forfeiture of a bond declared against the appellants, Mariano
Granados and Francisco Sevilla, as bondsmen of the accused Uy Eng Hui.
It appears that in
the case mentioned Uy Eng Hui, Ang Ka, and Ong Malic were prosecuted
for
a violation of the Opium Law and that the two appellants, Granados and
Sevilla, became bondsmen for Uy Eng Hui in the amount of P500,
conditioned
[among other things] for his appearance at the time set for the trial
of
said cause. Uy Eng Hui then went away to China, with the result that
when
the case was called for trial on December 9, 1925, he failed to put in
an appearance. The case, therefore, proceeded to trial against his two
co-accused, Ang Ka and Ong Malic, who were acquitted for insufficiency
of the proof. Meanwhile, for non-appearance of Uy Eng Hui, the Court,
on
December 28, 1925, entered an order declaring the bond forfeited and
ordering
his immediate arrest. On January 2, 1926, the bondsmen were notified of
the forfeiture of the bond; and on February 8, the court ordered
execution
to issue. Sufficient property of the bondsmen not having been found to
satisfy the writ of execution, a writ of garnishment was issued a
little
later to attach a sum of money on deposit in one of the banks to the
credit
of the bondsmen. On March 25, Uy Eng Hui arrived in Manila from China
and
was on that day delivered by the bondsmen to the sheriff. At the same
time
the sureties filed a petition asking the court to set aside the
forfeiture
of the bond and to release their funds in bank from the garnishment.
This
petition was duly set for hearing in April and was finally denied by
the
court on July 12, 1926. Meanwhile, the fiscal, in view of the failure
of
the prosecution against Ang Ka and Ong Malic for lack of sufficient
proof,
requested the court to dismiss the complaint against Uy Eng Hui. The
court
acceded to this motion and the case was dismissed on April 22, 1926.
The proceedings taken
for the forfeiture and the enforcement of the bond for non-appearance
of
the principal were in proper form, under the authority of the United
States
vs. Painaga [27 Phil., 18]; and We are of the opinion that no error was
committed by the lower court in maintaining the forfeiture and ordering
the execution of the judgment to be proceeded with. The circumstance
that
the principal in the bond was in the end captured by the bondsmen and
surrendered
to the Court and the further fact that the case against him was
subsequently
dismissed at the suggestion of the fiscal did not, either singly or
together,
cure the breach of the bond that had already resulted from the
non-appearance
of the principal on the day set for the trial. The law allows the
bondsmen
of an accused person who has thus defaulted thirty days within which
satisfactorily
to explain his neglect. This contemplates a showing that, at the time
the
default occurred, the principal was prevented by some sufficient cause
not imputable to his own negligence from complying with his duty. In
the
case before us the principal had voluntarily absented himself from the
jurisdiction of the court and the default was in law wholly inexcusable.
It is suggested that
under Section 76 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the bondsmen should
be exonerated because they finally surrendered the defendant to the
Court.
But the section referred to contemplates a surrender of the principal
before
the forfeiture is declared. In the case before us the bond had been
declared
forfeited before the principal was brought into Court.
It appears from the
record that on February 2, 1926, or before the expiration of thirty
days
from notification of the forfeiture, one of the bondsmen filed a
petition
requesting the Court to grant an extension of thirty days for the
surrender
of the accused. This motion was not granted. On the contrary, it
appears
to have been denied, judging from a typewritten note bearing the name
of
the trial judge at the foot of the petition; and even if it was not
formally
denied, it was by implication overruled by the order of February 8
providing
for the execution of the bond.
Appellants' attorney
seems to be under the impression that the order of forfeiture of the
bond,
of December 28, 1925, was insufficient for the reason that the bondsmen
were not in terms called upon to appear and show cause why execution
should
not be had. The law contains no requirement in the sense suggested. On
the contrary, in Section 76 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is
made
obligatory on the court to declare the undertaking forfeited; and if
the
bondsmen wish to be relieved from the effects of this forfeiture, it is
incumbent upon them, within the period of thirty days, to show cause
why
the forfeiture should be discharged. This they have not done.
We note that in the
appealed order, the Judge of the Court below expressed the opinion that
the Order of forfeiture of December 28, 1925, had become final at the
expiration
of thirty days from the date of notification of that order to the
bondsmen,
and he supposed that for this reason the Court had completely lost
jurisdiction
over the matter, except for the purpose of giving effect to the
forfeiture.
This pronouncement possibly does not reflect with entire precision the
nature of the legal problem presented to the Court, since it was
evident
lack of merit in the appellants' position rather than lack of
jurisdiction
in the Court that made the denial of the appellants' motion necessary.
The Order appealed
from is, in Our opinion, in conformity with law, and the same will be
affirmed.
So ordered, with costs jointly and severally against the appellants.
Johnson, Villamor,
Ostrand, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
Malcolm, J.,
dissents. |