ManilaEN
BANC
JOSE
RODRIGUEZ,
Petitioner,
G. R. No. L-61545
December 27, 1982
-versus-
THE
HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and NIEVES GUIANG,
Respondents.
R
E S O L U T I O N
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Petitioner Jose
Rodriguez and private respondent
Nieves V. Guiang were the two candidates for the office of Municipal
Mayor
of Bugallon, Pangasinan in the January 30, 1980 local elections.
Rodriguez
was the official candidate of the Nacionalista Party while Guiang ran
under
the banner of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan party. After the
counting
and canvass of votes cast in all the municipality's voting centers,
Rodriguez
was credited with 6,626 votes as against Guiang's 6,491 votes. On the
basis
of the 135 vote majority, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed
Rodriguez, the mayor on January 31, 1980.
On February 6,
1980, respondent Guiang filed an
election protest with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
alleging
voting irregularities, fraud, terrorism, and vote-buying; inaccuracy
and
unfair counting and tallying of votes; and misappreciation of
ballots.
On December 4, 1981, the Court of First Instance rendered a decision,
the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court
finds
for the protestant as against the protestee and hereby declares the
protestant
NIEVES V. GUIANG, the duly elected Municipal Mayor of the Municipality
of Bugallon, Province of Pangasinan at the local elections held last
January
30, 1980, and qualified to assume and serve the term of office therefor
which ends six years from the first Monday of March 1980, as provided
in
Section 7 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 51, and to enjoy all the privileges
and
emoluments appurtenant thereto.
By, virtue hereof, NIEVES V. GUIANG has
the
right
to assume the position of Municipal Mayor of Bugallon, Pangasinan,
immediately.
The protestee, JOSE "JOE" RODRIGUEZ, is
hereby
ordered to immediately deliver and relinquish to the protestant, NIEVES
V. GUIANG, the functions, prerogatives, privileges and emoluments and
all
other consequences of the office of Municipal Mayor of Bugallon,
Pangasinan
unto the said NIEVES V. GUIANG, under penalty of law.
The protestee is likewise ordered to pay
the
protestant the amount of P 5,095.00 as incidental expenses, P5,000.00
as
attorney's fees and costs.
Protestee's counter-protest and claim for
damages,
incidental expenses and other expenses are dismissed for lack of merit.
The Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to
immediately
notify his Excellency, President Ferdinand E. Marcos of the Republic of
the Philippines, of this Decision upon its finality in accordance with
Sec. 198 of the 1978 Election Code.
Petitioner
Rodriguez filed his notice of appeal on
December 16, 1981. The appeal bond was paid on December 29, 1981 and
approved
by the Court on January 5, 1982. The records of the case having
been
transmitted to the Commission on Elections, Rodriguez was notified in a
March 5, 1982 letter received by his counsel on March 18, 1982, that he
had 30 days from notice to file his appellant's brief.
On April 19, 1982, Rodriguez filed a motion
for
extension of 30 days within which to file brief. The Commission granted
him an extension of 15 days from April 19, 1982 or until May 3, 1982 to
file his brief. However, the commission order was received by Rodriguez
only on May 5, 1982.
On the same date
he received the COMELEC order
giving him only up to May 3, 1982 or two days earlier to file brief,
Rodriguez
moved to reconsider the order and reiterated his earlier request for a
30-day extension. The COMELEC did not act upon this motion. Instead,
the
COMELEC Electoral Contests Adjudication Office issued a certification
that
as of May 5, 1982, no appeal brief had been filed while the COMELEC
Cash
Division certified that as of May 7, 1982, no appeal fee had been paid.cralaw:red
On May 11, 1982,
respondent Guiang filed a "Motion
To Dismiss Appeal and to Affirm and Order That CFI Decision To Be
(sic)
Final and Executory." On May 18, 1982, Rodriguez filed
the
appellant's
brief in the required number, furnishing the adverse party copies
thereof.
On May 19, 1982, Rodriguez paid the appeal fee and on May 21, 1982
filed
his opposition to the motion to dismiss. The motion to dismiss and the
opposition thereto were set for oral argument on July 29, 1982.
Memoranda
were filed by the petitioner and the private respondent.cralaw:red
On August 17,
1982, the COMELEC dismissed the
appeal. It also resolved the motion for reconsideration for further
extension
of time to file brief by simultaneously denying it with the appeal.cralaw:red
We are
constrained to set aside the order which
dismissed the appeal on an exceedingly strict application of a
technical
rule governing extension of time. Section 12 of Resolution No. 1456
provides
as one of the grounds for the dismissal of an appeal the failure of the
appellant to file copies of his brief within the time provided by
COMELEC
rules That this is not a hard and fast rule admitting of no exceptions
is evidenced by the Commission on Elections giving the petitioner an
extension
of time to file his brief in this case.cralaw:red
The petition
asked for an extension of 30 days
to file his brief. The Commission gave him 15 days. The issue,
therefore,
is not a failure to file brief within the original period provided by
the
rules but the failure to file brief within an extension of time, cut in
half by the Commission from that prayed for by the petitioner.
Parenthetically,
an extension could very well be for ten days, fifteen days as that
granted
in this case, twenty days, thirty days or perhaps even longer depending
on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. There is no
showing
in the records of this petition why the extension of time to file brief
should be 15 days and only 15 days and why it may not be 30 days as
prayed
for.cralaw:red
The Commission on
Elections is authorized by Section
192 of Presidential Decree No. 1296 to prescribe rules to govern the
procedures
and other matters relating to election contests. The Election Code
calls
for rules that would provide a simple and inexpensive procedure for the
expeditious disposition of election contests.cralaw:red
We support the
concern of the Commission on Elections
that election controversies be speedily settled. This was the thrust in
the many cases under the 1935 Constitution where this Court
interpreted
liberally COMELEC powers to give it broad discretion which in the
initial "statistically improbable" case, it felt it did not possess, so
that unduly long election contests would not frustrate the expression
of
the people's will. [See Lagumbay v. Comelec, 16 SCRA 175; Espino v.
Zaldivar,
21 SCRA 1204; Aquino v. Comelec, 22 SCRA 288; Pacis v. Comelec, 25 SCRA
377: Abes vs. Comelec, 21 SCRA 1252; Ong v. Comelec, 22 SCRA 241;
Balindong
v. Comelec, 27 SCRA 567; Ligot v. Comelec, 31 SCRA 45].cralaw:red
However, this
concern for the expeditious disposition
of election controversies does not free the COMELEC from compliance
with
established principles of fairness and justice and the adjudication of
cases not on technicality but on their substantive merits, principles
which
this Court has consistently observed and which all appellate tribunals
are required to follow. Section 15, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court
governing procedure in the Court of Appeals provides that "[e]xtension
of time for filing briefs will not be allowed, except for good and
sufficient
cause, and only if the motion for extension is filed before the
expiration
of the time sought to be extended." In Rago et al. v. Court of Appeals,
et al. [G. R. No. L-7016, May 30, 1955], where the petitioners
vigorously
objected to an extension of 45 days to file brief as violative of a
Court
of Appeals rule allowing only one extension of not more than 30 days to
do so, We ruled:
Under Section 16, Rule 48, extensions of
time
for the filing of briefs are not generally allowed, except for good and
sufficient cause. This rule applies both to the Court of Appeals and
the
Supreme Court. This rule provides that extensions of time for the
filing
of briefs may be given for good and sufficient cause, which
indicates
that the court may grant as many extensions as may be asked if good
reasons
are shown. While the Court of Appeals adopted as a matter of policy
that
only one extension of not more than thirty days would be allowed for
the
filing of briefs, that cannot be considered as mandatory. It being
merely
directory, its application can be liberalized when circumstances so
warrant.
As it appears that the Court of Appeals has not made an improper use of
its discretion, We hold that the errors assigned are not well taken.
The same thing
is true in the payment of appeal fees.
A justifiable delay may be condoned where the records of the case show
that the merits of the election appeal should be considered and passed
upon. In Lopez v. Court of Appeals [75 SCRA 401] where the motion for
extension
of time was filed after the last day to pay docket fee had passed, We
ruled
that "the payment of appeal docket fee is not a requirement for the
protection
of the prevailing party and non-compliance therewith within the time
prescribed
causes no substantial prejudice to anyone." And only recently, in De
Guzman
v. Cuevas [G. R. No. 28717, June 29, 1982], We reiterated the same
exception
to the rule. In this case, the petitioner has explained why he filed
the
appeal fees the day following the filing of the brief within the prayed
for extension of time. The petitioner asked that rules on appeal be
relaxed
"in order that this case may be decided on the merits as to serve
public
interest, rather than terminate this case on procedural technicalities
without knowing, who of the two, the protestee-appellant or the
protestant-appellee,
is the real choice of the Bugallon electorate." Petitioner cites
Juliano
v. Court of Appeals [20 SCRA 808]:
Well-settled is the doctrine that
election
contests
involve public interest, and technicalities and procedural barriers
should
not be allowed to stand if they constitute an obstacle to the
determination
of the true will of the electorate in the choice of their elective
officials.
And also settled is the rule that laws governing election contests must
be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the
choice
of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections.
[Gardener
v. Romulo, 26 Phil. 521; Galang v. Miranda, 35 Phil. 269; Jalandoni v.
Sarcon, G.R. No. L-6496, January 27, 1962; Macasunding v. Macalangan
G.R.
No. L-22779, March 31, 1965; Cauton v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No.
L-25467, April 27, 1967]. In an election case, the court has an
imperative
duty to ascertain by all means within its command who is the real
candidate
elected by the electorate. [Ibasco v. Ilao, G.R. No. L-17512, December
29, 1960]. An appeal in an election contest shall proceed as in a
criminal case and the appellant court may take notice of every error in
fact or in law committed by the lower court. [Mendoza v. Mendiola, 53
Phil.
267, 270; Cababasada v. Valmoria 83 Phil. 112, 114].
Significantly,
the petitioner was led by the respondent
Commission itself to pay the appeal fee within an extension of time.
The
March 5, 1982 letter of the Manager, Electoral Contests Adjudication
Office,
which letter was received by the petitioners counsel on March 18, 1982
reads:
Greetings:
You are hereby notified that the
records of
the
above entitled case are now in this Office and the same are at your
disposal
for the preparation of your brief for the appellant. Appellant's brief
shall be in fifteen [15] legible copies and filed with this Office
within
THIRTY [30] DAYS from receipt hereof with the ORDER of the lower Court
appended thereto and together with PROOF OF SERVICE of THREE [3] copies
thereof upon the protestee-appellant. An appeal fee of Two Hundred
Fifty
[P 250. 00] Pesos shall be paid upon the filing of the brief.
Manila, March 5,1982.
[Emphasis supplied].
The COMELEC
should not dismiss the appeal on the
basis of a technicality which was partly, if not primarily, of its own
making. There is no reason why the rule that a reasonable
extension
of time should be allowed for good and sufficient cause followed not
only
by the Court of Appeals but this Court as well, should not also apply
whenever
the Commission on Elections acts in an appellate judicial capacity.
We went to great
lengths in Pongasi v. Court of
Appeals [71 SCRA 614] to explain why this should be so. We stated:
Verily, the granting of extension of time
for
filing briefs is a matter of judicial discretion; however, as stressed
by this Court more than once, that discretion is to be exercised
soundly
and judiciously with an understanding of human limitations and pressing
circumstances which warrant a relaxation, nay, even a suspension of the
rules.
In Cucio vs.
Court of Appeals, [L-38020, per Teehankee, J., May 24, 1974, 57 SCRA 64] where respondent Court denied "for lack
of
sufficient merit and not having taken advantage of the last chance" an
urgent motion for a third and last extension of time [30 days] to
submit printed brief for defendant-appellant and ordered the dismissal
of the appeal, notwithstanding the plea of [a] advanced age (67 years)
of counsel and his recurrent attacks of arthritis; [b] the distance of
150 kilometers required to be travelled from his office in Guimba to
Manila
for the preparation of the brief, requiring more than the normal three
hours because of circuitous and muddy roads due to their being under
construction
in addition to the pressure of other professional work; and [c] the
filing
of the brief well within the third and last extension timely sought by
appellant, this Court held that the appellate court acted with grave
abuse
of discretion in denying petitioners' reasonable request based upon
good
and sufficient cause, citing former Chief Justice Makalintal's
admonition
in Limon vs. Candido, L-22418, April 28, 1969, than the mere
convenience
of the courts or of the parties in the case, the ends of justice and
fairness
would be served thereby.
In the very
recent case of Obut vs. Court of Appeals,
et al. [L-40535, April 30, 1976, per Muñoz Palma, J.], this
Court
ordered the reinstatement of the appeal of petitioner after considering
the attendant circumstances such as [a] the appeal involved three cases
the records of which were voluminous; [b] petitioner therein claimed
that
the preparation of the consolidated brief involved a comparative study
of many exhibits; and [c] two of the cases appealed by petitioner were
criminal in nature which carried in each case a penalty of imprisonment
from 1 year and 1 day to 3 years, 6 months and 20 days of prision
correccional
plus fine of P 1,000.00, holding that a "too rigid application of the
pertinent
provisions of the Rules of Court will not be given premium where it
would
obstruct rather than serve the broader interests of justice in the
light
of the prevailing circumstances in the case under consideration."
In Barredo vs.
court of Appeals, et al. [L-38945-47,
September 12, 1974, 50 SCRA 168, per Chief Justice Makalintal],
appellants,
after having been granted an extension of 90 days within which to file
their brief, again asked in a formal motion for another extension of
30
days. The appellate court denied the motion and dismissed the appeal,
after
'considering that the appellants have already been given a total of 135
days within which to file the brief and that the failure to file the
brief
was due to "inexcusable negligence." On appeal, this Court held that
The particular circumstances obtaining
[in this
case] call for the relaxation of the rule that the client must bear the
adverse consequence of counsel's failure to observe the procedural
requirements
prescribed by the Rules of Court. Two of the petitioners have been
committed
of grave offenses and sentenced to long prison terms through no fault
of
their own. Their appeal would fail not on the merits but on a
procedural
lapse of counsel which was not entirely inexcusable. The ends of
justice
will be better served if their appeal is reinstated.
Nor has the
Court confined this conclusion to appealed
cases which are criminal in nature. In Montines et al. vs. Court of
Appeals,
et al. [L-35913, September 4, 1973, 53 SCRA 14, per Fernando, J See
also
Sollorano vs. Court of Appeals, L-28018, Feb. 25. 1975, 62 SCRA 478;
Ordoveza
vs. Raymundo, L-45155, July 31, 1936, 63 Phil. 275; Padasas et al. vs.
Court of Appeals, et al., L-38071, April 25, 1974, 56 SCRA 619]
involving
a land controversy, the Court of Appeals likewise dismissed the appeal
for failure of appellants to file their brief within the period fixed
by
it. In their motion for reconsideration and to admit printed brief,
appellants'
counsel alleged that he had to attend to the properties left by his
deceased
father in the provinces of Laguna and Quezon to ascertain the extent of
the damage caused by the floods, as a consequence of which he suffered
from acute rheumatism and slight cardiac trouble necessitating complete
physical and mental rest, and that was the cause of his failure to
"finalize,
polish and type" in time the draft of the brief he had prepared for his
clients. On appeal, this Court ordered the Court of Appeals to allow
the
appeal to take its due course on the ground that the case "falls
squarely
within the concept of caso fortuito or force
majeure.
In the words of Mr. Justice Enrique M. Fernando:
This is one instance where a failure of
this
particular litigation being passed upon by an appellate court may be
fraught
with undesirable consequences. What is before the courts is a land
controversy
Defendants-appellants rely on long-continued possession. The parcels
they
occupy may be considered minuscule, but that appears to be all the
worldly
goods with which they are endowed. One however, is entitled to the full
protection of the law, whether at the stage of trial or appeal.
[Emphasis
supplied]
We repeat what We said in Obut vs. Court
of
Appeals,
et al., supra, that "what should guide judicial action is the
principle
that a party-litigant is to be given the fullest opportunity to
establish
the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to lose
life,
liberty, honor or property on technicalities." [Emphasis supplied].
In dispensing
justice, Our action must reflect a
deep insight into the failings of human nature, a capability for making
allowances for human error and/or negligence, and the ability to
maintain
the scales of justice happily well-balanced between these virtues and
the
application of the law.
Since the early
case of Gardiner v. Romulo [26
Phil. 521], this Court has made it clear that it frowns upon any
interpretation
of the law or the rules that would hinder in any way not only the free
and intelligent casting of the votes in an election but also the
correct
ascertainment of the results. This bent or disposition continues to the
present.cralaw:red
There are other
considerations that constrain
us to set aside the questioned order of dismissal. The appellant's
brief
was filed on May 18, 1982. The order dismissing the appeal was rendered
on August 17, 1982. In the three months time it took to decide the
appeal
on a technicality, the COMELEC could just as easily have decided it on
its merits. The twenty-one [21] assignments of errors involving 794
ballots
were summarized as follows:
I.Selective adjudication. The lower
Court
restrained
Protestee-Appellant to object to or contest the invalid ballots of the
Protestant on those ballot boxes which were opened and revised but
which
were not counter protested. [This is unprecedented and a departure to
existing
rules].II.The lower Court restrained
Protestee-Appellant
to claim valid votes cast for him in protested voting centers, but
which
were not covered by the counter protest. [Also unprecedented].III.Invalidating ballots of the
Protegee-Appellant
containing accidental or innocent marks such as lines or cross
indicating
desistance to vote. [164 ballots].
A perusal of the
brief shows that important factual
and legal issues are raised. The ninety-nine page brief was already
before
the Commission when it deliberated on the dismissal. The respondent
Commission
could very well appreciate whether or not the appeal was frivolous or
interposed
for dilatory purposes. As We stated in Purisima v. Salonga, [15 SCRA
704]
election law and rules are to be interpreted and applied in a liberal
manner
so as to give effect, not to frustrate, the will of the electorate.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, the
petition is hereby granted. The
COMELEC Resolution dated August 17, 1982 is set aside. The case is
remanded
to the COMELEC for the adjudication of the appeal on its merits. Our
temporary
restraining order dated September 2, 1982 insofar as it restrains the
implementation
and enforcement of the August 17, 1982 Resolution in EAC No. 1-82 is
made
permanent.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Fernando, C.J.,
Makasiar, Guerrero, Abad
Santos, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Vasquez, and
Relova
JJ., concur.
Concepcion, Jr.,
J., is on leave.
Separate
Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J.,
Concurring:
Petitioner
filed timely his motion for 30-day
extension on April 19, 1982, since April 17 and 18 fell on Saturday and
Sunday [non-working days] and his brief was also filed timely on May
18,
1982, within the requested 30-day extension falling due on May 19, 1982.
AQUINO, J.,
Dissenting:
I dissent. Jose
Rodriguez had thirty days from
March 18, 1982 or up to April 17 within which to file his Appellant's
Brief.
On April 19, when he asked for a 30-day extension, the period for
filing
his brief had already expired. It could no longer be extended. As his
brief
was filed on May 18,1982, it was filed late. The Comelec did not err in
dismissing his appeal. |