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JOSE
RODRIGUEZ,
G. R. No. L-61545
December 27, 1982
-versus-
THE
HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Petitioner Jose
Rodriguez and private respondent
Nieves V. Guiang were the two candidates for the office of Municipal
Mayor
of Bugallon, Pangasinan in the January 30, 1980 local elections.
Rodriguez
was the official candidate of the Nacionalista Party while Guiang ran
under
the banner of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan party. After the
counting
and canvass of votes cast in all the municipality's voting centers,
Rodriguez
was credited with 6,626 votes as against Guiang's 6,491 votes. On the
basis
of the 135 vote majority, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed
Rodriguez, the mayor on January 31, 1980.
On February 6, 1980, respondent Guiang filed an election protest with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan alleging voting irregularities, fraud, terrorism, and vote-buying; inaccuracy and unfair counting and tallying of votes; and misappreciation of ballots. On December 4, 1981, the Court of First Instance rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Petitioner Rodriguez filed his notice of appeal on December 16, 1981. The appeal bond was paid on December 29, 1981 and approved by the Court on January 5, 1982. The records of the case having been transmitted to the Commission on Elections, Rodriguez was notified in a March 5, 1982 letter received by his counsel on March 18, 1982, that he had 30 days from notice to file his appellant's brief. On April 19, 1982, Rodriguez filed a motion for extension of 30 days within which to file brief. The Commission granted him an extension of 15 days from April 19, 1982 or until May 3, 1982 to file his brief. However, the commission order was received by Rodriguez only on May 5, 1982. On the same date he received the COMELEC order giving him only up to May 3, 1982 or two days earlier to file brief, Rodriguez moved to reconsider the order and reiterated his earlier request for a 30-day extension. The COMELEC did not act upon this motion. Instead, the COMELEC Electoral Contests Adjudication Office issued a certification that as of May 5, 1982, no appeal brief had been filed while the COMELEC Cash Division certified that as of May 7, 1982, no appeal fee had been paid. On May 11, 1982, respondent Guiang filed a "Motion To Dismiss Appeal and to Affirm and Order That CFI Decision To Be (sic) Final and Executory." On May 18, 1982, Rodriguez filed the appellant's brief in the required number, furnishing the adverse party copies thereof. On May 19, 1982, Rodriguez paid the appeal fee and on May 21, 1982 filed his opposition to the motion to dismiss. The motion to dismiss and the opposition thereto were set for oral argument on July 29, 1982. Memoranda were filed by the petitioner and the private respondent. On August 17, 1982, the COMELEC dismissed the appeal. It also resolved the motion for reconsideration for further extension of time to file brief by simultaneously denying it with the appeal. We are constrained to set aside the order which dismissed the appeal on an exceedingly strict application of a technical rule governing extension of time. Section 12 of Resolution No. 1456 provides as one of the grounds for the dismissal of an appeal the failure of the appellant to file copies of his brief within the time provided by COMELEC rules That this is not a hard and fast rule admitting of no exceptions is evidenced by the Commission on Elections giving the petitioner an extension of time to file his brief in this case. The petition asked for an extension of 30 days to file his brief. The Commission gave him 15 days. The issue, therefore, is not a failure to file brief within the original period provided by the rules but the failure to file brief within an extension of time, cut in half by the Commission from that prayed for by the petitioner. Parenthetically, an extension could very well be for ten days, fifteen days as that granted in this case, twenty days, thirty days or perhaps even longer depending on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. There is no showing in the records of this petition why the extension of time to file brief should be 15 days and only 15 days and why it may not be 30 days as prayed for. The Commission on Elections is authorized by Section 192 of Presidential Decree No. 1296 to prescribe rules to govern the procedures and other matters relating to election contests. The Election Code calls for rules that would provide a simple and inexpensive procedure for the expeditious disposition of election contests. We support the concern of the Commission on Elections that election controversies be speedily settled. This was the thrust in the many cases under the 1935 Constitution where this Court interpreted liberally COMELEC powers to give it broad discretion which in the initial "statistically improbable" case, it felt it did not possess, so that unduly long election contests would not frustrate the expression of the people's will. [See Lagumbay v. Comelec, 16 SCRA 175; Espino v. Zaldivar, 21 SCRA 1204; Aquino v. Comelec, 22 SCRA 288; Pacis v. Comelec, 25 SCRA 377: Abes vs. Comelec, 21 SCRA 1252; Ong v. Comelec, 22 SCRA 241; Balindong v. Comelec, 27 SCRA 567; Ligot v. Comelec, 31 SCRA 45]. However, this concern for the expeditious disposition of election controversies does not free the COMELEC from compliance with established principles of fairness and justice and the adjudication of cases not on technicality but on their substantive merits, principles which this Court has consistently observed and which all appellate tribunals are required to follow. Section 15, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court governing procedure in the Court of Appeals provides that "[e]xtension of time for filing briefs will not be allowed, except for good and sufficient cause, and only if the motion for extension is filed before the expiration of the time sought to be extended." In Rago et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. [G. R. No. L-7016, May 30, 1955], where the petitioners vigorously objected to an extension of 45 days to file brief as violative of a Court of Appeals rule allowing only one extension of not more than 30 days to do so, We ruled:
The same thing is true in the payment of appeal fees. A justifiable delay may be condoned where the records of the case show that the merits of the election appeal should be considered and passed upon. In Lopez v. Court of Appeals [75 SCRA 401] where the motion for extension of time was filed after the last day to pay docket fee had passed, We ruled that "the payment of appeal docket fee is not a requirement for the protection of the prevailing party and non-compliance therewith within the time prescribed causes no substantial prejudice to anyone." And only recently, in De Guzman v. Cuevas [G. R. No. 28717, June 29, 1982], We reiterated the same exception to the rule. In this case, the petitioner has explained why he filed the appeal fees the day following the filing of the brief within the prayed for extension of time. The petitioner asked that rules on appeal be relaxed "in order that this case may be decided on the merits as to serve public interest, rather than terminate this case on procedural technicalities without knowing, who of the two, the protestee-appellant or the protestant-appellee, is the real choice of the Bugallon electorate." Petitioner cites Juliano v. Court of Appeals [20 SCRA 808]:
Significantly, the petitioner was led by the respondent Commission itself to pay the appeal fee within an extension of time. The March 5, 1982 letter of the Manager, Electoral Contests Adjudication Office, which letter was received by the petitioners counsel on March 18, 1982 reads:
You are hereby notified that the records of the above entitled case are now in this Office and the same are at your disposal for the preparation of your brief for the appellant. Appellant's brief shall be in fifteen [15] legible copies and filed with this Office within THIRTY [30] DAYS from receipt hereof with the ORDER of the lower Court appended thereto and together with PROOF OF SERVICE of THREE [3] copies thereof upon the protestee-appellant. An appeal fee of Two Hundred Fifty [P 250. 00] Pesos shall be paid upon the filing of the brief. Manila, March 5,1982. The COMELEC
should not dismiss the appeal on the
basis of a technicality which was partly, if not primarily, of its own
making. There is no reason why the rule that a reasonable
extension
of time should be allowed for good and sufficient cause followed not
only
by the Court of Appeals but this Court as well, should not also apply
whenever
the Commission on Elections acts in an appellate judicial capacity.
We went to great lengths in Pongasi v. Court of Appeals [71 SCRA 614] to explain why this should be so. We stated:
In Cucio vs. Court of Appeals, [L-38020, per Teehankee, J., May 24, 1974, 57 SCRA 64] where respondent Court denied "for lack of sufficient merit and not having taken advantage of the last chance" an urgent motion for a third and last extension of time [30 days] to submit printed brief for defendant-appellant and ordered the dismissal of the appeal, notwithstanding the plea of [a] advanced age (67 years) of counsel and his recurrent attacks of arthritis; [b] the distance of 150 kilometers required to be travelled from his office in Guimba to Manila for the preparation of the brief, requiring more than the normal three hours because of circuitous and muddy roads due to their being under construction in addition to the pressure of other professional work; and [c] the filing of the brief well within the third and last extension timely sought by appellant, this Court held that the appellate court acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners' reasonable request based upon good and sufficient cause, citing former Chief Justice Makalintal's admonition in Limon vs. Candido, L-22418, April 28, 1969, than the mere convenience of the courts or of the parties in the case, the ends of justice and fairness would be served thereby. In the very recent case of Obut vs. Court of Appeals, et al. [L-40535, April 30, 1976, per Muñoz Palma, J.], this Court ordered the reinstatement of the appeal of petitioner after considering the attendant circumstances such as [a] the appeal involved three cases the records of which were voluminous; [b] petitioner therein claimed that the preparation of the consolidated brief involved a comparative study of many exhibits; and [c] two of the cases appealed by petitioner were criminal in nature which carried in each case a penalty of imprisonment from 1 year and 1 day to 3 years, 6 months and 20 days of prision correccional plus fine of P 1,000.00, holding that a "too rigid application of the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court will not be given premium where it would obstruct rather than serve the broader interests of justice in the light of the prevailing circumstances in the case under consideration." In Barredo vs. court of Appeals, et al. [L-38945-47, September 12, 1974, 50 SCRA 168, per Chief Justice Makalintal], appellants, after having been granted an extension of 90 days within which to file their brief, again asked in a formal motion for another extension of 30 days. The appellate court denied the motion and dismissed the appeal, after 'considering that the appellants have already been given a total of 135 days within which to file the brief and that the failure to file the brief was due to "inexcusable negligence." On appeal, this Court held that
Nor has the Court confined this conclusion to appealed cases which are criminal in nature. In Montines et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. [L-35913, September 4, 1973, 53 SCRA 14, per Fernando, J See also Sollorano vs. Court of Appeals, L-28018, Feb. 25. 1975, 62 SCRA 478; Ordoveza vs. Raymundo, L-45155, July 31, 1936, 63 Phil. 275; Padasas et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-38071, April 25, 1974, 56 SCRA 619] involving a land controversy, the Court of Appeals likewise dismissed the appeal for failure of appellants to file their brief within the period fixed by it. In their motion for reconsideration and to admit printed brief, appellants' counsel alleged that he had to attend to the properties left by his deceased father in the provinces of Laguna and Quezon to ascertain the extent of the damage caused by the floods, as a consequence of which he suffered from acute rheumatism and slight cardiac trouble necessitating complete physical and mental rest, and that was the cause of his failure to "finalize, polish and type" in time the draft of the brief he had prepared for his clients. On appeal, this Court ordered the Court of Appeals to allow the appeal to take its due course on the ground that the case "falls squarely within the concept of caso fortuito or force majeure. In the words of Mr. Justice Enrique M. Fernando:
In dispensing
justice, Our action must reflect a
deep insight into the failings of human nature, a capability for making
allowances for human error and/or negligence, and the ability to
maintain
the scales of justice happily well-balanced between these virtues and
the
application of the law.
Since the early case of Gardiner v. Romulo [26 Phil. 521], this Court has made it clear that it frowns upon any interpretation of the law or the rules that would hinder in any way not only the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election but also the correct ascertainment of the results. This bent or disposition continues to the present. There are other
considerations that constrain
us to set aside the questioned order of dismissal. The appellant's
brief
was filed on May 18, 1982. The order dismissing the appeal was rendered
on August 17, 1982. In the three months time it took to decide the
appeal
on a technicality, the COMELEC could just as easily have decided it on
its merits. The twenty-one [21] assignments of errors involving 794
ballots
were summarized as follows:
A perusal of the brief shows that important factual and legal issues are raised. The ninety-nine page brief was already before the Commission when it deliberated on the dismissal. The respondent Commission could very well appreciate whether or not the appeal was frivolous or interposed for dilatory purposes. As We stated in Purisima v. Salonga, [15 SCRA 704] election law and rules are to be interpreted and applied in a liberal manner so as to give effect, not to frustrate, the will of the electorate. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The COMELEC Resolution dated August 17, 1982 is set aside. The case is remanded to the COMELEC for the adjudication of the appeal on its merits. Our temporary restraining order dated September 2, 1982 insofar as it restrains the implementation and enforcement of the August 17, 1982 Resolution in EAC No. 1-82 is made permanent. SO ORDERED. Fernando, C.J.,
Makasiar, Guerrero, Abad
Santos, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Vasquez, and
Relova
JJ., concur.
TEEHANKEE, J.,
Concurring:
Petitioner
filed timely his motion for 30-day
extension on April 19, 1982, since April 17 and 18 fell on Saturday and
Sunday [non-working days] and his brief was also filed timely on May
18,
1982, within the requested 30-day extension falling due on May 19, 1982.
AQUINO, J.,
Dissenting:
I dissent. Jose
Rodriguez had thirty days from
March 18, 1982 or up to April 17 within which to file his Appellant's
Brief.
On April 19, when he asked for a 30-day extension, the period for
filing
his brief had already expired. It could no longer be extended. As his
brief
was filed on May 18,1982, it was filed late. The Comelec did not err in
dismissing his appeal.
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