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Manila
FIRST
DIVISION
BA
FINANCE CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
G. R. No. L-61628
December 29, 1982
-versus-
HON.
GREGORIO G. PINEDA,
as Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, Branch XXII, and ANTONIO SY,
Respondents.
R
E S O L U T I O N
VASQUEZ, J.:
Private
respondent Antonio Sy was adjudged liable
in favor of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 7379 of the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija for damages resulting from a vehicular accident
involving a cargo truck supposedly owned by him. Claiming that the
adverse
decision in said case was due to the mishandling of the same by the
counsel
who represented him therein, he filed on December 1, 1981 Civil Case
No.
43869 before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, which was assigned
to
the sala presided over by the respondent Judge. Named as defendants in
said Civil Case No. 43869 are herein petitioner BA Finance Corporation,
whom private respondent claims to be the real owner of the cargo truck
involved in the accident; the Metro-Taisho Insurance Corporation, which
issued the insurance policy covering the same; Atty. Ireneo Calderon,
the
counsel who represented him in the case filed in the Court of First
Instance
of Nueva Ecija; and Robert Chua, the driver of the other vehicle that
figured
in the accident.
Petitioner BA
Finance Corporation was served summons
on December 18, 1981. Eleven days later, or on December 29, 1981,
petitioner,
through counsel, filed a motion for extension of time to file answer
and/or
motion to dismiss. In an Order dated January 4, 1982, served on
petitioner's
counsel on January 12, 1982, the respondent Judge gave the petitioner a
period of 15 days, counted from January 2, 1982 and to expire on
January
18, 1982 (sic) within which to file its answer or motion to
dismiss
the complaint.cralaw
On January 13,
1982, petitioner filed a motion
to dismiss on the ground that the complaint states no cause of
action.
In his Order dated March 1, 1982, a copy of which was served on the
petitioner
on March 8, 1982, the respondent Judge denied the motion to dismiss,
for
being "devoid of merit." On March 17, 1982, petitioner filed a
motion
for reconsideration of the Order dated March 1, 1982. On March 24,
1982,
petitioner received a copy of private respondent's motion to strike out
the petitioner's motion for reconsideration on the alleged ground that
the motion for reconsideration was filed out of time. It was argued by
counsel for the private respondent that when the petitioner filed its
motion
to dismiss on January 13, 1982, it had already used 11 days out of the
15 days' extension granted to it by the Court in the Order of January
4,
1982; that having received the Order denying its motion to dismiss on
March
8, 1982, the petitioner had only the remainder of 4 days or up to March
12, 1982 within which to file its answer to the complaint;
consequently,
the filing of the motion for reconsideration on March 17, 1982 was
already
beyond the reglementary period for filing the answer.cralaw
In the Order of
the respondent Judge dated April
5, 1982, the motion to strike out was granted, and the petitioner was
declared
in default for having failed to answer the complaint within the
reglementary
period, and private respondent was allowed to present his evidence ex-parte.
On April 19,
1982, the petitioner filed a motion
to lift order of default. The order of the respondent Judge dated May
4,
1982, served on the petitioner on May 18, 1982, denied the petitioner's
motion to lift order of default and directed the issuance of a
pre-trial
order for the other defendants who were not declared in default.cralaw
On May 28, 1982,
the petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration of the Order dated May 4, 1982.
On June 16, 1982,
petitioner received a copy
of an order dated June 10, 1982 setting aside the declaration of
default
of the herein petitioner and ordering it to file its answer to the
complaint
within 15 days from notice thereof. The petitioner had by then, or on
May
11, 1982, already filed its answer.
The proceedings
taken subsequent thereto are
not clear from the record. According to the petitioner, on August 12,
1982,
it received an order dated July 14, 1982, which reads as follows:
For failure to file answer within the
reglementary
period despite due summons, as prayed for by plaintiff, defendant
Roberto
Chua is hereby declared in default and plaintiff is allowed to present
evidence ex-parte against said defendant.
Anent plaintiff's Motion to Remove From
the
Records
Answer of Defendant BA Finance Corporation, the record shows that on
March
1, 1982, this Court issued an order denying defendant BA Finance
Corporation's
Motion to Dismiss. On March 17, 1982 counsel for BA Finance received
the
order denying the motion to dismiss. Under the new Rules, if the motion
to dismiss is denied or if determination thereof is deferred, the
movant
shall file his answer within the reglementary period under Rule 11,
computed
from the time he received notice of the denial or deferment, unless it
commences to run all over again from the time the defendant receives
notice
of the denial of his motion to dismiss. In the case at bar, since
defendant
received notice of the denial of its motion to dismiss on May 17, 1982,
it had fifteen [15] days from March 17, 1982 or up to April 1, 1982 to
file its answer. But on March 17, 1982 defendant filed its Motion for
Reconsideration
of the order denying the motion to dismiss. The Motion for
Reconsideration
is without proof of service; the registry receipt attached to the
motion
is not the proof of service required by the Rules. Without proof of
service,
a motion is nothing but a scrap of paper. It did not merit the
attention
of the court; it was stricken out of the record. Defendant allowed the
reglementary 15-day period to answer to elapse without filing its
answer.
It failed to file its answer on or before April 1, 1982. Since this
fact
had supervened, this Court, when it issued the Order dated April 6,
1982,
properly declared defendant BA Finance Corporation in default.
On April 19, 1982, said defendant filed
its
Motion
to Lift Order of Default which on May 4, 1982 was denied.
On May 28, 1982, said defendant filed its
Motion
for Reconsideration which on June 10, 1982 was granted and the Order of
April 5, 1982 was lifted. On June 11, 1982, said defendant filed its
answer.
Hence, plaintiff's Motion To Remove From the Records the Answer of
Defendant
BA Finance Corporation. Plaintiff observes that BA Finance
Corporation's
Motion for Reconsideration filed May 28, 1982 is identical with that of
its Opposition [To Plaintiff's Motion to Declare Defendant BA Finance
Corporation
in Default and Motion to Strike Out Motion for Reconsideration of BA
Finance]
filed on March 29, 1982, and thus concludes that the former [Motion for
Reconsideration] is a pro-forma motion resorted to solely to
gain
time and delay proceedings, whereby in this case said defendant was
able
to file its answer on June 11, 1982. lt is a settled rule that pro-forma
Motion for Reconsideration is disallowed and is not worth the
attention
of the court for it is mere scrap of paper. And the Order of the Court
based on such motion pro-forma is null and void.
In view of the foregoing, the Order of
this
Court
dated June 10, 1982 is hereby set aside and declared null and void. And
the Answer filed on June 11, 1982 is hereby stricken out of the
record.
Let the pre-trial be set anew on August 6, 1982, at 2.00 P.M.
Pasig, Metro Manila, July 14, 1982.
[Sgd.] Gregorio G. Pineda
GREGORIO G. PINEDA
Judge
[Rollo, pp. 77-78]
Petitioner
further alleged that on August 31, 1982,
it received a copy of the Decision rendered in Civil Case No. 43869
dated
August 17, 1982 which orders the defendants therein, including herein
petitioner,
but excluding Atty. Ireneo Calderon, to pay unto the private respondent
the total sum of P 228,255.64 as moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney's
fees.
In their
"Opposition" to the petition which they
intended as their Comment thereon, the respondents claimed that after
private
respondent Antonio Sy filed an opposition to the petitioner's Motion
for
Reconsideration, the petitioner succeeded by false representations in
securing
the order lifting the order of default and allowing it to file an
answer
to the complaint; that upon discovering such irregularity, private
respondent
filed a "Motion to Remove From the Records Answer of Defendant BA
Finance
Corporation"; and that it was on the basis of said motion that the
respondent
Court issued its order of July 14, 1982 which declared its previous
order
of June 10, 1982 as null and void and ordered the answer to be stricken
out from the record.cralaw
After the
respondents have filed their comment
to the petition, We issued a Temporary Restraining Order in the
Resolution
of October 11, 1982, enjoining the respondent Judge from further acting
on Civil Case No. 43869 until further orders from this Court.cralaw
It is distressing
to note that a provision of
the Revised Rules of Court which had been in force since January 1,
1964,
or for the last 19 years, on a subject as significant or as commonplace
as the period to file an answer to the complaint could be misapplied
and
misconstrued by a Court of First Instance in a major metropolitan area.
It can only be hoped that a similar unfamiliarity with the Rules is not
true with other courts in more remote areas of the country. The
provision
in question, Section 4 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, cannot be any
clearer:
Sec. 4. Time to plead. - If
the
motion to dismiss is denied or if determination thereof is deferred,
the
movant shall file his answer within the period prescribed by Rule 11,
computed
from the time he received notice of the denial or deferment, unless the
court provides a different period.
Admittedly, the
above provision is a departure from
the doctrine previously upheld as to the period when to file an answer
in case a motion to dismiss the complaint is denied. While the
above-quoted
provision is new, there being no similar provision in the Rules of
Court
of 1940, the language thereof is clear and leaves no doubt as to the
intendment
thereof. It has received a categorical interpretation from the Supreme
Court since January 31, 1969 in Matute vs. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA
768,
wherein this pronouncement was made:
Rule 11, Section I of the Revised Rules
of
Court
gives the defendant a period of fifteen [15] days after service of
summons
within which to file his answer and serve a copy thereof upon the
plaintiff,
unless a different period is fixed by the court. However, within the
period
of time for pleading, the defendant is entitled to move for dismissal
of
the action on any of the ground enumerated in Rule 16. If the motion to
dismiss is denied or if determination thereof is deferred, the movant
shall
file his answer within the period prescribed by Rule 11, computed from
the time he receives notice of the denial or deferment, unless the
court
provides a different period [Rule 16, Section 4]. In other words the
period
for filing a responsive pleading commences to run all over to
again,
from the time the defendant receives notice of the denial of his motion
to dismiss. [See also, Acosta-Ofalia v. Sundiam 85 SCRA 412].
Had the
respondent Court, exhibited a modicum of
awareness of the law and jurisprudence directly applicable to the
question
presented for its determination, this proceeding would not have been
filed
at all. It is undisputed that the petitioner was given an extension of
time within which to file its answer which was to expire on January 18,
1982. On January 13, 1982, it filed a Motion to Dismiss which was
denied,
and notice of which was served on the petitioner on March 8, 1982. When
the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on March 17, 1982, it
was well within the 15-day period within which to file the Answer
counted
from the date it received notice of the denial of its Motion to Dismiss
which was on March 8, 1982. Yet, on the erroneous belief that the
petitioner
had only to its credit the balance of the period to answer that it did
not consume by the time it filed its motion to dismiss, the respondent
Judge ruled that the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration on March
17, 1982 was already beyond the reglementary period and forthwith
declared
the defendant in default.
We could have
stopped further discussion of the
instant petition at this point. However, We cannot allow to pass
unnoticed
the subsequent developments in the case which had been characterized
not
only by obscurity, but also by actuations which are less than
commendable.
After declaring the petitioner in default in the Order of April 5,
1982,
and after denying the Motion to Lift Order of Default in the order of
May
4, 1982, the respondent Judge made a complete turnabout in his order of
June 10, 1982 by setting aside the default declaration of the
petitioner,
giving no reason therefor except the catch phrase "in the interest of
justice."
Then, another change of mind on the part of the respondent Judge was
manifested
in his Order of July 14, 1982 which reiterated the Order of April 5,
1982
declaring the petitioner in default. This time, the respondent Judge
woke
up to his mistake and ruled that the petitioner had 15 days from the
date
it received notice of the denial of its Motion to Dismiss on March 11,
1982 within which to file its Answer.cralaw
Nonetheless,
respondent Judge stubbornly persisted
in maintaining his view that the Answer of the respondent to the
Complaint
was filed out of time by alleging two new grounds, namely: [1] the
Motion
for Reconsideration filed by the petitioner against the denial of its
Motion
to Dismiss is a mere scrap of paper for lack of proof of service; and
[2]
the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioner against the
Order
of May 4, 1982 which denied the petitioner's Motion to Lift Order of
Default
is pro-forma for being identical to petitioner's opposition to
the
plaintiff's Motion to Declare the Petitioner in Default. The lack of
palpable
merit of said grounds leads to a natural impression that the respondent
Judge was determined to prevent the petitioner from being given a
chance
to defend itself in the case filed against it by the private
respondent,
contrary to repeated exhortations and pronouncements from the Supreme
Court
frowning upon judgments by default on purely technical grounds. The new
arguments resorted to by the respondent Judge were not even mentioned
in
the motion of the private respondent to strike out the answer, nor were
they mentioned by the respondent Judge in his first order declaring the
petitioner in default. The motion to strike out filed by the private
respondent
and the Order of respondent Judge dated April 5, 1982 declaring the
petitioner
in default made reference only to the alleged fact that the Motion for
Reconsideration of the denial of the Motion to Dismiss was filed beyond
the reglementary period. Such ground as aforementioned, had been
acknowledged
by the respondent Judge himself in his Order of July 14, 1982 to be
erroneous.cralaw
The allegation
that the Motion for Reconsideration
of the denial of the Motion to Dismiss filed by the petitioner lacks
the
requisite notice of hearing and proof of service is a factual
distortion.
On page 4 of said Motion for Reconsideration which has been attached as
Annex "F" of the petition [Rollo, pp. 51-54], it clearly appears that
the
petitioner's counsel set the said motion for hearing on April 16, 1982
and that a copy of the same was sent by registered mail to the counsel
for the private respondent on March 17, 1982. The private respondent
filed
a motion to strike out the said motion for reconsideration [Rollo, pp.
55-58 dated March 24, 1982], thereby showing that private
respondent
had notice of the Motion for Reconsideration long before the scheduled
hearing thereof on April 16, 1982.cralaw
The imputation
that the motion to reconsider the
Order of May 4, 1982 which denied the petitioner's Motion to Lift Order
of Default is pro-forma reveals a misconception of the concept
of
pro-forma motions for reconsideration. It is not every
motion
for
reconsideration that reiterates grounds or arguments aired in a
previous
motion that may be declared pro-forma. It will be noted that
the
Motion for Reconsideration herein involved is of an interlocutory
order,
and not of a final judgment or final order. There should be a
distinction
in determining whether a motion for reconsideration may be declared pro-forma
depending on whether it is directed against a final judgment or order,
or only against an interlocutory order. In the case of the former, a
repetition
of arguments or grounds already sufficiently discussed in prior
incidents
may properly be categorized as being merely for purposes of delay. In
the
case of interlocutory orders, a reiteration of the ground or argument
previously
advanced is not necessarily indicative that the movant filed the motion
merely for gaining delay. It must be remembered that normally, when an
interlocutory order is sought to be reviewed or annulled by means of
any
of the extra legal remedies of prohibition or certiorari, it is
required
that a motion for reconsideration of the questioned order must first be
filed, such being considered a speedy and adequate remedy at law which
must first be resorted to as a condition precedent for filing of any of
such proceedings [Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 65, Rules of Court]. There is no
similar requirement in taking an appeal from a final judgment or order
should the questioned interlocutory order be subject to attack only on
one ground, as in the case of the default declaration herein involved,
a motion for reconsideration against the order complained of would
necessarily
and inevitably contain a repetition of the ground previously alleged.
In
so doing, the movant is praying the court to give his motion a second
look,
in the hope that the court would realize its supposed error, correct
the
same, and thereby preclude the necessity of seeking relief in a higher
tribunal.cralaw
In the case
presently considered, the reiteration
of the argument that the respondent Judge committed error in his
computation
of the period to file an answer after a motion to dismiss shall have
been
denied becomes a necessity in view of the fact that although the first
motion for reconsideration of the order of default was granted, the
respondent
Judge subsequently revoked his favorable action thereon. The motion to
reconsider the order of revocation must necessarily invoke the same
ground
showing why the ground upon which the default order is based is
erroneous.
That said argument is no idle reiteration of the reason previously
alleged,
or that the Motion for Reconsideration was not filed for purposes of
delay
is indubitably shown by the fact that the respondent Judge sustained
the
same and corrected his error with respect to the period of time within
which to file an answer on the basis thereof.cralaw
By and large, it
adequately appears that the questioned
actuations of the respondent Judge in this case have been characterized
not only by palpable error but also by grave abuse of discretion which
should be corrected and warned against.cralaw
WHEREFORE, the
Petition is hereby granted. All
the proceedings conducted by the respondent Judge in Civil Case No.
43869,
including the judgment rendered therein dated August 17, 1982, insofar
as herein petitioner is concerned, are hereby annulled and set
aside.
The Answer with Counterclaim filed by the petitioner dated June 10,
1982
shall be deemed admitted. Costs against private respondent.cralaw
SO ORDERED.cralaw
Teehankee,
Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova, and
Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
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