ManilaSECOND
DIVISION
JUDGE
ALEJANDRO C. SILAPAN,
Complainant,
A. M. No. P-2316
May 16, 1983
-versus-
BERNARDO
ALCALA, COURT INTERPRETER,
Court of First Instance of Davao del
Norte,
Branch I,
Tagum, Davao del Norte,
Respondent.
R
E S O L U T I O N
MAKASIAR, J.:
This is an
administrative case which was initiated,
motu proprio, by Executive Judge Alejandro C. Silapan of
the
Court
of First Instance of Davao del Norte, against Fernando Alcala, Court
Interpreter,
for grave misconduct in office, prolonged absence and negligence in the
performance of official duty, docketed thereat as Administrative Matter
No. 2-79.
It appears from
the records that on August 13,
1979, then Administrative Services OIC Adelaida A. Cabe of this Court,
addressed a telegram to Executive Judge Alejandro C. Silapan, which
reads:
EXECUTIVE JUDGE ALEJANDRO SILAPAN
CFI TAGUM DAVAO DEL NORTE
PLEASE FORWARD TO THIS OFFICE
IMMEDIATELY
RESIGNATION
LETTER OF INTERPRETER BERNANDO ALCALA TOGETHER WITH HIS
CLEARANCES
FROM MONEY PROPERTY ACCOUNTABILITY AND AS TO PENDING CRIMINAL
ADMINISTRATIVE
CASE FOR ACCEPTANCE.
ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES OIC CABE
[File 201 of Respondent]
On October 2,
1979, Administrative Services OIC Adelaida
A. Cabe sent another telegram to Executive Judge Alejandro C. Silapan,
which reads:
EXECUTIVE JUDGE ALEJANDRO SILAPAN
CFI TAGUM DAVAO DEL NORTE
INFORMING APPOINTMENT BENEDICTA
HILARIO AS
INTERPRETER
CANNOT BE PROCESSED UNTIL AFTER ACCEPTANCE OF RESIGNATION OF
BERNANDO
ALCALA STOP REITERATING OUR REQUEST TO FORWARD TO THIS OFFICE
IMMEDIATELY
ALLEGED RESIGNATION LETTER OF INTERPRETER ALCALA TOGETHER WITH
HIS
CLEARANCES FROM MONEY PROPERTY ACCOUNTABILITY AND AS TO
PENDING
CRIMINAL ADMINISTRATIVE CASE FOR ACCEPTANCE
ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES OIC CABE
[p. 1, Rec.].
On October 10,
1979, Executive Judge Alejandro C.
Silapan issued a memorandum addressed to respondent requiring him to
explain
in writing and under oath within 48 hours from receipt thereof why he
should
not be investigated for the aforementioned charges. Thus, pertinent
portions
of the memorandum read as follows:
1. Official records show that aside from
your
several absences in previous months, on June 15, 18, 19, 20, 25, 26, 27
and 28, 1979, you were absent from office, although on some of those
dates,
you were seen loitering in the premises of the courthouse. You even
came
in chambers two or three times before morning session began, repeatedly
telling me about your final decision to resign in order to engage in a
more profitable undertaking for a bigger income because your salary is
very low and not enough to support your growing family. Then, about the
end of June, you came to tell me that you already filed your terminal
leave
to take effect July 1, 1979 to last for 45 days, after which you will
be
out of the service.
During the early part of your terminal
leave,
you presented to me a law graduate holder of a civil service
eligibility
who is your friend and recommended him to me as your replacement. But
the
man never returned nor filed his application which led me to the
conclusion
that he must have decided that he did not like the job.
Believing in your honesty, integrity,
sincerity
and good conduct as an employee that you will not renege from your
"final
decision" to resign, I favorably endorsed to the Supreme Court the
application
of Benedicta Hilario for appointment upon the expiration of your
terminal
leave, but only to find out from the OIC Clerk of Court after receipt
of
the aforequoted telegram that you have withdrawn from him your
application
for terminal leave of absence not long from its filing, without giving
me information, thereby committing an act of dishonesty, insincerity
and
gross misconduct which does not only constitute an affront to the
dignity
and integrity of the undersigned but placed him in an embarrassing
situation,
not only before the Supreme Court but also with respect to the
applicant
who spent so much time and effort out of her school work as a teacher
to
secure the necessary documents supporting her application.
2. That since July 1 up to this
writing, you
have
been out of office which constitutes an unjustified prolonged absence
and
gross negligence in the performance of official duty, to the great
prejudice
of the service and public interest because the smooth trial of cases
and
speedy administration of justice have been seriously disrupted for lack
of a regular interpreter. [pp. 2-4, Rec.].
In his Answer
dated October 12, 1979, respondent
explained that he withdrew his application for terminal leave on August
28, 1979 after the office-in-charge of the Office of the Clerk of Court
had shown him the telegram from the Supreme Court requesting that his
resignation
letter be forwarded; that on that day he was touched when everybody in
the office advised him to report back to work; that thereafter, he
informed
the Judge that he was reporting for duty but the Judge told him: "I
have
already recommended somebody, nakakahiya, why did you not plan
it
well? You better look for another job"; that he became worried and
confused
not only because of the foregoing incident but also his business
transactions
had failed; and thus he resolved to stay out of the court and take a
wait-and-see
attitude [p. 5, Rec.].
On October 16,
1979, Judge Silapan issued two
orders.cralaw:red
The first order
reads:
Court interpreter Fernando Alcala having
chosen
to explain instead of resigning, let this case be captioned "In Re
BERNARDO
ALCALA, for dishonesty, grave misconduct in office, prolonged absence
and
negligence in the performance of official duty" and docketed as
'Administrative
Matter No. 2-79, for investigation.
The second
order likewise reads:
It appearing that explanation in writing
was
received from court interpreter Fernando Alcala, let this case be
investigated
on October 25, 1979, at 8:30 a.m. to be continued at 1:30 in the
afternoon,
with intransferable character.
Court interpreter Alcala is notified to
be
present
in his defense, with the assistance of counsel, if he so desires. His
non-appearance
will be deemed a waiver of the right to be heard and the case will be
submitted
for resolution. [pp. 7-8, Rec.].
On the day of
the scheduled hearing of October 25,
1979, upon motion of respondent, the case was re-set to October 29,
1970.
Thus:
When this case was called for
investigation,
the respondent court interpreter appeared and moved for postponement,
alleging
as his grounds that he is not yet ready for trial because [1] he has
not
yet finalized his agreement with his counsel in the person of Atty.
Amado
Ceniza; [2] because of the complicacies of life; [3] that he wants a
representative
of the Civil Service Commission to be present during the investigation
by this Court; and [4] that he is filing a motion for inhibition.
On the second ground which is
complicacies of
life, it is believed that the same has nothing to do with this
investigation.
On the third ground that a representative of the Civil Service
Commission
must be present during the investigation, the same has no basis in law.
On the fourth ground that the respondent will file a petition for
inhibition
of this judge to investigate the case, the same also is not
well-founded
because it is precisely the duty of the executive judge to investigate
cases of personnel in this court. But in the interest of justice and to
give a chance to the respondent to be represented by counsel, the
herein
investigation is postponed to Monday, October 29, 1979 at 8:30 in the
morning
to be continued at 1:30 in the afternoon, definitely with
intransferable
character [p. 10, rec.].
On October 29,
1979, respondent failed to appear
at the hearing despite due notice and the case was reset to November 5,
1970. Thus:
When this case was called for hearing at
five
minutes to 10, Mr. Fernando Alcala did not appear despite the fact that
he was duly notified. This setting is intransferable in character and
Mr.
Alcala was duly advised about it during the last hearing.
His non-appearance this morning would be
sufficient
ground for this court to have the case submitted and resolved but, in
order
to give him one last chance to ventilate his defenses, if any, let this
case be reset to November 5, 1979, definitely for the last time and
with
intransferable character.
If Mr. Alcala will not still appear and
be
ready
during the next scheduled hearing, the court will already resolve this
administrative matter in accordance with law [p. 15, Rec.].
On November 5,
1979, respondent again failed to appear
despite due notice. Hence, Judge Silapan proceeded with the scheduled
hearing
by calling to the witness stand the court bailiff and the deputy clerk
of court. Accordingly, Judge Silapan submitted to this Court his
report and recommendation contained in the following First Indorsement
dated November 9, 1979:
Respectfully endorsed to the Honorable
Court
Administrator, Supreme Court, Manila, the complete record of Adm.
Matter
No. 279 against court interpreter Fernando Alcala, with the report that
he refused to attend the investigation despite due notice and
sufficient
time to appear, and hereby recommending that if that Honorable Court
will
not terminate him for the causes stated in the charge which are duly
supported
by the evidence, especially that of abandonment because of his
prolonged
failure to report for duty without legal authority, thereby seriously
disrupting
the proceedings in this court and impeding the speedy administration of
justice, he should be transferred to the vacant position of clerk in
the
office of the clerk of court or to any other available position, to
pave
the way for the early appointment of applicant, Mrs. Benedicta Hilario,
for the good of the service and to promote public interest, it being a
hard reality that after Mr. Alcala has committed rank insincerity and
callous
disregard of the processes of this court which amounts to an
unmitigated
act of insubordination, there could no longer be harmony and
coordination
between him and the undersigned, which are indispensable factors for an
efficient and effective performance of official duty.
What Mr. Alcala has done is one of the
principal
causes of delay in the speedy disposition of cases, and the same should
not be taken lightly in order to serve a warning to other court
employees
that they must devote full time in their assigned work, because a good
administration of justice does not admit part-time employee and
part-time
businessman, and this is true not only to employees but to judges as
well.
We need full-time judges and full-time employees to man the courts so
that
there will be no business interruptions in the discharge of
judicial
functions. This will help solve the present problem of clogged court
dockets.
An interpreter-businessman, or even a judge-businessman, has a divided
time and attention, and more if it will be in his business undertaking
where his personal interest is at stake, to the great prejudice of his
judicial work [p. 34, Rec.].
The letter of
explanation of respondent is unsatisfactory.
The following are the duties of a court interpreter:
Under general supervision, acts as
translator
of the Court; attends all court hearings; administers oath to
witnesses;
marks and keeps under the direction of the Clerk of Court [Branch Clerk
of Court] all exhibits submitted in evidence; prepares all minutes of
the
court session; maintains and keeps in custody a record book of cases
calendared
for hearing; and performs such other duties as may be assigned by the
Judge
and/or Clerk of Court.
A careful
review of the records disclosed that the
charges of prolonged absence and negligence in the performance of
official
duty have been amply proven.
It has been shown
that on several occasions, complainant
Executive Judge was surprised when cases were scheduled for hearing
but,
however, not included in the calendar; that the records of said cases
were
brought to his attention only when complainant was already holding
session
[p. 28, Rec.]. Visibly, respondent displayed indifference to his
sworn duties as Court Interpreter resulting in inefficiency and neglect
in the discharge of his official duties. it is common knowledge among
judges
that such unconcerned behavior of court interpreters generates
confusion
during the trials and even embarrassment to the Presiding Judge. More
often
than not, judges become lenient to the granting of motions for
postponement
or continuance to cover up the shortcomings of the court personnel and
thus defeat the very mandate of the constitution to have a speedy
trial of cases.cralaw:red
It is true that
"frequent unauthorized absences"
is classified only as a "light civil service offense" and punishable
only
by [1)] reprimand or fine or suspension from one day to ten days in its
minimum period; [2] fine or suspension for eleven days to twenty days
in
its medium period; and [3] fine or suspension for twenty-one days to
thirty
days in its maximum period [CSC Memorandum Circular, No. 8, series of
1970;
see Domingo vs. Elbinias, 107 SCRA 28, 32]. Nonetheless, the repeated
absences
incurred by respondent were shown to be without just cause and amounted
to abandonment of office.cralaw:red
Respondent
unsuccessfully attempted to justify
his prolonged absence by explaining that he adopted a wait-and-see
attitude
after complainant judge told him to look for another job. The proferred
justification of respondent that he failed to report for work after the
expiration of his leave due to his belief that he was already separated
from his job, could not exculpate him.cralaw:red
It may be
pertinent to state that even respondent's
repeated verbal statement to complainant judge that he was resigning
did
not automatically separate him from the service. It is not the form of
resignation contemplated under our civil service system. The
resignation
must be in writing and accepted by the proper authority, i.e,
the
one who appointed him. As an employee of the Court of First Instance,
respondent
was appointed by the Chief Justice upon the recommendation of the Judge
of the said Court. Respondent has not tendered his written resignation
to the Chief Justice. He cannot, therefore, under such circumstance, be
considered resigned from his position.cralaw:red
As above-stated,
respondent's failure to return
to work after the expiration of his leave cannot be excused by his
erroneous
belief that he was already separated from the service when told by
complainant
Judge to look for another job. His educational attainment and service
record
preclude his entertaining such belief. File 201 of the respondent shows
that he finished 2nd year Law and had been a municipal policeman from
August
5, 1966 to March 31, 1971, a Court Bailiff from April 1, 1971 to
September
30, 1971 as well as Court Interpreter since October 1, 1971 up to the
filing
of the present charge.cralaw:red
Of particular
interest in the present case is
the justification advanced by respondent that he repeatedly absented
himself
in order to engage in a more profitable undertaking. Thus, in a letter
to complainant Judge dated May 16, 1980, respondent said:
In view of the letter of the Supreme
Court
requiring
me to explain why I should not be dropped from the service because of
my
prolonged absence from September 1, 1979 up to the present, I have the
honor to inform you that I am now interested to report for duty,
effective
today.
In this connection, I would like to state
that
during my absence I have tried my very best to pursue my plan to engage
in business, as I have informed you before, but unfortunately, I did
not
succeed [Respondent's File 201, emphasis supplied].
The facts of
the case clearly show that even before
the conversation of the complainant Judge and the respondent took place
about the end of June, 1979, respondent already repeatedly absented
himself,
admittedly in order to engage in a more profitable undertaking.
Certainly,
the fact that he engaged or was going to engage in a more lucrative
business
does not justify his absence from his work as a Court Interpreter.
Suffice it to
state that the pursuit of private
business by a government officer/employee is not per se
objectionable
as long as it does not interfere, directly or indirectly, with his
duties
as a public servant. The same is regulated by law, which requires
permission
therefor to avoid disciplinary action. Thus, paragraph [b], Section 36,
Article IX of Presidential No. 807 amending the old Civil Service Law
explicitly
provides:
xxx xxx xxx
[b] The following shall be grounds for
disciplinary
action.
xxx xxx xxx
[24] Pursuit of private business,
vocation
or
profession without the permission required by Civil Service rules and
regulations;
Respondent has
been unmindful of the exigencies of
the public service, and neglectful of his duties to the prejudice of
the
general public. His absence as Court Interpreter unnecessarily hampered
or impaired public service.
One of the
reasons of the prohibition of government
employees to engage in private business or other vocation is clearly
delineated
by Associate Justice Teehankee in the case of Ranosa vs. Garcia, Adm.
Matter
No. P-113, February 25, 1976, 62 SCRA 406, 408, that the rule is
designed
to assure that full-time officers of the courts render the full-time
service
required by their office so that there may be no undue delay in the
administration
of justice and in the disposition of cases as required by the Rules of
Court. [Respondent therein, a Branch Clerk of Court of the Court of
First
Instance of Albay, Branch II, at Legaspi City, was charged with illegal
practice of law for having appeared as attorney for plaintiffs in an
illegal
detainer case, notwithstanding the civil service prohibition against
doing
so as a full-time officer of the court].cralaw:red
Similarly, in an
earlier case, Jakosalem vs. Cordovez,
Adm. Matter No. 13-MJ, July 18, 1974, 58 SCRA 11, 15, involving a
municipal
Judge, this Court, underscoring the importance of observance of office
hours among government employees, said:
It is also just as well, and this
occasion is
as good as any, for this Court to essay the reminder that pursuance by
judges of other vocations is clearly circumscribed by well-known
provisions
of law and regulations prescribing definite office hours for judges and
other public servants. These provisions of law and regulations must be
strictly and faithfully observed so that all parties who have official
business to transact with judges [especially municipal judges who are
magistrates
of direct citizens exposure] would always know where and when to locate
them. [Emphasis supplied].
It is thus
appropriate to quote also Our earlier
rulings in the case of Municipal Council of Casiguran, Quezon vs. Mun.
Judge Morales, Adm. Matter No. 81-MJ, Nov. 13, 1974 and companion
cases,
61 SCRA 13, 21, where this Court declared:
The respondent totally ignored the
demands of
official duty which require sacrifice of one's personal interest and
convenience
for the public good. By the outcome of this case, We deem it fit to set
an example to those who want to remain in the public service, lest in
the
pursuit of their own personal ends they forget that total dedication to
duty is exacted of a worthy public servant.
Likewise, the
actuation of the respondent in introducing
to the complainant Judge an alleged friend whom he [respondent]
recommended
as his replacement and who subsequently failed to return and his
repeated
declaration to the complainant judge about his final decision to resign
in order to engage in a more profitable undertaking, compelled the
latter
to endorse the application of Mrs. Benedicta O. Hilario for appointment
as respondent's successor only to be subsequently thwarted as
respondent
interpreter withdrew his application for terminal leave. This certainly
embarrass the complainant Judge, who had to favorably endorse the
application
of Mrs. Benedicta O. Hilario as it was demanded by the exigencies of
the
service. To postpone the appointment of a new court interpreter on the
ground that the original occupant of the said position is still trying
his luck in his business venture, is to make the administration of
justice
subject to the financial or economic success of court employees.
Finally, the
willful disregard of the notices
of hearing by the respondent, betrays an arrogant defiance, which is
unbecoming
of a court employee.cralaw:red
However, since
the record shows that the respondent
was allowed by complainant Judge to return to the service as court
interpreter,
a fine equivalent to three [3] months' salary should be imposed on him.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, the
respondent, BERNANDO ALCALA, Court
Interpreter of Branch I, Court of First Instance of Davao del Norte,
Tagum,
Davao del Norte, for serious misconduct, is hereby ordered to pay a
fine
equivalent to his three [3] months' salary.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion Jr.,
Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro,
and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., took no part. |