ManilaEN
BANC
CEBU
INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY [CIT],
Petitioner,
G. R. No. L-58870
December 18, 1987
-versus-
HON.
BLAS OPLE, in His Capacity as Minister,Ministry of Labor and Employment, JULIUS
ABELLA,ARSENIO ABELLANA, RODRIGO ALIWALAS,ZOSIMO ALMOCERA, GERONIDES ANCOG,GREGORIO ASIA, ROGER BAJARIAS,
BERNARDOBALATAYO, JR., BASILIO CABALLES,
DEMOCRITOTEVES, VOLTAIRE DELA CERNA, ROBERTOCOBARRUBIAS, VILMA GOMEZ CHUA,
RUBENGALLITO, EDGARDO CONCEPCION,
VICTORCOQUILLA, JOSE DAKOYKOY, PATERNO
WONG,EVELYN LACAYA, RODRIGO GONZALES,
JEOGINAGOZO, MIGUEL CABALLES, CONSUELO
JAVELOSA,QUILIANO LASCO, FRANKLIN LAUTA,
JUSTINIANALARGO, RONALD LICUPA, ALAN MILANO,
MARIAMONSANTO, REYNALDO NOYNAY, RAMON
PARADELA,NATALIO PLAZA, LUZPURA QUIROGA,
NOEL RODIS,COSMENIA SAAVEDRA, LEONARDO
SAGARIO, LETICIASERRA, SIEGFREDO TABANAG, LUCINO
TAMAOSO,DANILO TERANTE, HELEN CALVO
TORRES, ERNESTOVILLANUEVA, DOLORES VILLONDO,
EDWARD YAP,ROWENA VIVARES, DOLORES SANANAM,
RODRIGOBACALSO, YOLANDA TABLANTE, ROMERO
BALATUCAN,CARMELITA LADOT, PANFILO CANETE,
EMMANUELCHAVEZ, JR., SERGIO GALIDO, ANGEL
COLLERA,ZOSIMO CUNANAN, RENE BURT LLANTO,
GIL BATAYOLA,VICENTE DELANTE, CANDELARIO DE
DIOS, JOSE
MA.chanrobles virtual law libraryESTELLA, NECITA TRINIDAD, ROTELLO
ILUMBA,TEODORICO JAYME, RAYMUNDO ABSIN,
RUDY MANEJA,REYNA RAMOS, ANASTACIA BLANCO, FE
DELMUNDO,ELNORA MONTERA, MORRISON
MONTESCLAROS,ELEAZAR PANIAMOGAN, BERNARDO
PILAPIL,RODOLFO POL, DEMOSTHENES REDOBLE,
PACHECOROMERO, DELLO SABANAL, SARAH
SALINAS, RENATOSOLATORIO, EDUARDO TABLANTE,
EMMANUEL TAN,FELICISIMO TESALUNA, JOSE VERALLO,
JR.,
MAGDALENOVERGARA, ESMERALDA ABARQUEZ,
MACARTHURDACUYCUY ACOMPANADA, TRINIDAD
ADLAWAN,FE ELIZORDO ALCANTARA, REOSEBELLA
AMPER,ZENAIDA BACALSO, ELIZA BADANA,
GEORGIA BAS,ERLINDA BURIAS, ELDEFONSO BURIAS,
CORAZONCASENAS, REGINO CASTANEDA, GEORGE
CATADA,CARMENCITA G. CHAVEZ, LORETIA
CUNANAN, FLORESDELFIN, TERESITA ESPINO, ELVIE
GALANZA, AMADEAGALELA, TERESITA. JUNTILLA,
LEONARDA KAPUNGAN,ADORACION LANAWAN, LINDA LAYAO,
GERARDO LAYSON,VIRGILIO LIBETARIO, RAYMOND PAUL LOGARTA,
NORMA LUCERO, ANATOLIA MENDEZ, ELIODORO MENDEZ,JUDALINE MONTE, ELMA OCAMPO, ESTEFA OLIVARES,GEORGE ORAIS, CRISPINA PALANG,
GRETA PEGARIDO,MELBA QUIACHON, REMEDIOS QUIROS,
VIRGINIA RANCES,EDNA DELOS REYES, VICENTE
TAN, MERGENCIA
ROSELL,JULIETA TATING, MERCIA TECARRO,
FELISA VERGARA,WEMINA VILLACIN, MACRINA
YBARSABAL, MILAGROS CATALAN, JULIETA AQUINDE, SONIA ARTIAGA, MA.
TERESITAOBANDO, ASUNCION ABAYAN, ESTHER
CARREON,
ECHEVARRE,BUENAFE SAMSON,
CONCEPCION GONZALES, VITALIANAVENERACION, LEONCIA ABELLAR and
REYNITA
VILLACARLOS.chanrobles virtual law library
Respondents. |
______________________________________________
DIVINE WORD COLLEGE OF LEGAZPI,
Petitioner,
G. R. No. L-68345
December 18, 1987
-versus-
HON. DEPUTY MINISTER
OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENTVICENTE
LEOGARDO, JR., HON. REGIONAL DIRECTOR[Regional Office No. 5] of the Ministry of
Labor and Employment,GERARDO S. CASTILLO,
CECILIA MANUELand
Other Alleged Complainants,
Respondents. |
______________________________________________
FAR
EASTERN UNIVERSITY EMPLOYEES LABOR
UNION,
Petitioner, |
G. R. Nos. L-69224-5
December 18, 1987
-versus-
FAR EASTERN UNIVERSITYand NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION,
Respondents. |
______________________________________________
GREGORIO
T. FABROS, ROGELIO B. DE GUZMAN, CRESENCIANO ESPINO, JOSE RAMOS SUNGA,BAYLON BANEZ, FERNANDO ELESTERIO,
ISMAELTABO, AMABLE TUIBEO CELSO TUBAY,
RAFAELHERNANDEZ, GERONIMO JASARENO, MELBALTAZAR, MA. LOURDES PASCUAL, T.
DELROSARIO ACADEMY TEACHERS AND
EMPLOYEESASSOCIATION, DENNIS MONTE, BECKY
TORRES,LOIDA VELASCO, ROMLY NERY, DAISY
N. AMPIG,PATRICIO DOLORES, ROGELIO RAMIREZ,
and
NILDA L. SEVILLA,
Petitioners, |
G. R. No. 70832
December 18, 1987
-versus-
HON.
JAIME C. LAYA,in His Capacity as Minister of
Education, Culture and Sports,
Respondents. |
______________________________________________
JASMIN
BISCOCHO, ROWENA MARIANO, AGNES GALLEGO,MA. ANA ORDENES, ISABEL DE LEON,
LUZVIMINDA
FIDEL,MARIQUIT REYES, SOTERA ORTIZ,
ANGELINA ROXAS,BITUIN DE PANO, ELIZABETH ORDEN,
APOLLO ORDEN,GUILLERMA CERCANO, IMELDA
CARINGAL, EFREN
BATIFORA,ROSIE VALDEZ, DELIA QUILATEZ,
FELIX RODRIGUEZ,
OSCAR RODRIGUEZ, JOVITA CEREZO,
JOSEFINA
BONDOC,BELEN POSADAS, DOLORES PALMA,
ANTONINA CRUS,CONRADO BANAYAT,
TERESITA LORBES,and CORAZON MIRANDA,
Petitioners |
G. R. No. L-76524
December 18, 1987
-versus-
HON.
AUGUSTO SANCHEZ,in His Capacity as Minister of
Labor and
Employment,ESPIRITU SANTO PAROCHIAL SCHOOL andESPIRITU SANTO PAROCHIAL SCHOOL
FACULTY
ASSOCIATION,
Respondents. |
______________________________________________
RICARDO
C. VALMONTE and CORAZON BADIOLA,
Petitioners,
G. R. No. 76596
December 18, 1987
-versus-
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
HON.
AUGUSTO SANCHEZ, in His Capacity as Minister of Labor and
Employment,ESPIRITU SANTO PAROCHIAL SCHOOL
FACULTY
ASSOCIATION,and ESPIRITU SANTO
PAROCHIAL SCHOOL,
Respondents. |
R
E S O L U T I O N
CORTES, J.:
Six cases
involving various private schools,
their teachers and non-teaching school personnel, and even parents with
children studying in said schools as well as the then Minister of Labor
and Employment, his Deputy, the National Labor Relations Commission,
and
the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports, have been
consolidated
in this single Decision in order to dispose of uniformly the common
legal
issue raised therein, namely, the allocation of the incremental
proceeds
of authorized tuition fee increases of private schools provided for in
Section 3 [a] of Presidential Decree No. 451, and thereafter, under the
Education Act of 1982 [Batas Pambansa Blg. 232].
Specifically, the
common problem presented by
these cases requires an interpretation of Section 3[a] of Pres. Decree
No. 451 which states:
Sec. 3. Limitations. -
The
increase in tuition or other school fees or other charges as well as
the
new fees or charges authorized under the next preceding section shall
be
subject to the following conditions:
[a] That no increase in tuition or
other
school
fees or charges shall be approved unless sixty [60%] per centum of the
proceeds is allocated for increase in salaries or wages of the members
of the faculty and all other employees of the school concerned, and the
balance for institutional development, student assistance and extension
services, and return to investments: Provided, That in no case
shall
the return to investments exceed twelve [12%] per centum of the
incremental
proceeds;
In addition,
there is also a need for a pronouncement
on the effect of the subsequent enactment of B. P. Blg. 232 which
provides
for the allocation of tuition fee increases in Section 42 thereof.
In a nutshell,
the present controversy was precipitated
by the claims of some school personnel for allowances and other
benefits
and the refusal of the private schools concerned to pay said allowances
and benefits on the ground that said items should be deemed included in
the salary increases they had paid out of the 60% portion of the
proceeds
from tuition fee increases provided for in Section 3 [a] of Pres.
Decree
No. 451. The interpretation and construction of laws being a matter of
judicial power and duty [Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803);
Endencia
v. David, 93 Phil. 696 (1953)], this Court has been called upon to
resolve
the controversy.cralaw:red
In the process of
reading and at times, having
to decipher, the numerous pleadings filed in the six cases, the Court
found
that the main issue has been approached by the parties from almost
diametrical
points, thereby bringing into focus three sub-issues: first, whether
or not allowances and other fringe benefits of faculty members and
other
school employees may be charged against the 60% portion of the tuition
fee increases provided for in Section 3[a] of Pres. Dec. No. 451; second,
whether or not the same items may be charged against said portion under
the provisions of B. P. Blg. 232; and, third, whether or not
schools
and their employees may enter into a collective bargaining agreement
allocating
more than 60% of said incremental proceeds for salary increases and
other
benefits of said employees. After these sub-issues have been resolved,
the Court will tackle the other incidents attending the individual
cases,
seriatim.
The factual
antecedents that brought these cases
before this Tribunal are as follows:
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF EACH
CASEA.chanrobles virtual law libraryCEBU INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY CASEThis case originated from a complaint filed
with
the Regional Office No. VII of the Ministry of Labor on February 11,
1981
against petitioner Cebu Institute of Technology [CIT] by private
respondents,
Panfilo Canete, et al., teachers of CIT, for non-payment of: [a] cost
of
living allowances [COLA] under Pres. Dec. Nos. 525, 1123, 1614, 1678
and
1713; [b] thirteenth (13th) month pay differentials; and [c] service
incentive
leave. By virtue of an Order issued by the then Deputy Minister of
Labor
Carmelo C. Noriel, a labor-management committee composed of one
representative
each from the Ministry of Labor and Employment [MOLE], the Minister of
Education, Culture and Sports [MECS], and two representatives each from
CIT and from the teachers, was created. Said committee was to ascertain
compliance with the legal requirements for the payment of COLA,
thirteenth
(13th) month pay and service incentive leave [Rollo, p. 84].
The position
taken by CIT during the conference
held by the labor-management committee was that it had paid the
allowances
mandated by various decrees but the same had been integrated in the
teacher's
hourly rate. It alleged that the payment of COLA by way of salary
increases
is in line with Pres. Dec. No. 451. It also claimed in its position
paper
that it had paid thirteenth month pay to its employees and that it was
exempt from the payment of service incentive leave to its teachers who
were employed on contract basis [Rollo, pp. 85-86].cralaw:red
After the report
and recommendation of the committee,
herein public respondent, then Minister of Labor and Employment, issued
the assailed Order dated September 29, 1981 and held that the basic
hourly
rate designated in the Teachers' Program is regarded as the basic
hourly
rate of teachers exclusive of the COLA, and that COLA should not be
taken
from the 60% incremental proceeds of the approved increase in tuition
fee.
The dispositive portion of the Order reads:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, CIT is hereby
ordered to
pay its teaching staff the following:
(1) COLA under P. D.'s 525 and 1123
from
February
1978 up to 1981;
(2) COLA under P. D.'s l6l4,1634,1678
and
l7l3;and
(3) Service incentive leave from l978
upto
l981.
CIT is further directed to integrate into
the
basic salaries of its teachers and (sic) COLA under P. D.'s 525
and 1123 starting on January 1981, pursuant to P. D. 1751. For purposes
of integration, the hourly rate shown in its Teachers' Program for
school
year 198182 shall be considered as the basic hourly rate.
Petitioner
assails the aforesaid Order in this Special
Civil Action of Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction and/or
Restraining
Order. The Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order on December 7,
1981
against the enforcement of the questioned Order of the Minister of
Labor
and Employment.
B.chanrobles virtual law libraryDIVINE WORD COLLEGE OF LEGAZPI
CASE
Upon a complaint
filed by ten faculty members
for alleged non-compliance by herein petitioner Divine Word College of
Legazpi with, among others, Pres. Dec. No. 451, i.e.,
allowances
were charged to the 60% incremental proceeds of tuition fee increase,
the
Labor Regulation Section of Regional Office No. V [Legazpi City] of the
Ministry of Labor and Employment conducted an inspection of the
employment
records of said school. On the basis of the report on the special
inspection
that the school did not comply with Pres. Dec. No. 451, herein
respondent
Regional Director issued an Order dated May 30, 1983, requiring
compliance
by the Divine Word College. The latter filed a Memorandum of Appeal
from
said Order which the Regional Director treated as a Motion for
Reconsideration.
Upon failure of the school to comply with the aforesaid Order, another
Order [August 2, 1983] was issued by herein respondent Regional
Director
requiring herein petitioner to pay the faculty members-complainants
[herein
private respondents] the amounts indicated therein or the total sum of
Six Hundred Seventeen Thousand Nine Hundred Sixty Seven Pesos and
Seventy
Seven Centavos [P 617,967.77]. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration
of the Order was denied.cralaw:red
On appeal, the
respondent Deputy Minister of Labor
and Employment affirmed the Order of the Regional Director, viz:
Coming now to the substantial merit of
the
case,
we share the view that the emergency allowances due the complainants
under
the several Presidential Decrees [P. D.'s 525, 1123, etc.] cannot be
charged
by the respondent against the 60% of the incremental proceeds from
increase
in tuition fees authorized under P. D. 451, not only because as per
decision
of the Supreme Court [UE vs. UE Faculty Association, et al., G. R. No.
57387, September 30, 1982] said allowances whether mandated by law or
secured
by collective bargaining should be taken only from the return to
investment
referred to in the decree if the school has no other resources to grant
the allowances but not from the 60% incremental proceeds, but also
because
to hold otherwise would, to our mind, inevitably result in the loss of
one benefit due the complainants, that is, the salary or wage increase
granted them by P. D. 451.
In other words, we believe that by paying
the
complainants' allowances out of the 60% incremental proceeds intended
for
their salary increase, they are practically being deprived of one
benefit
- their share in the 60% incremental proceeds in terms of salary or
wage
increase.
WHEREFORE, for the reasons abovestated,
the
Order
appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, and the appeal DISMISSED, for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.[Annex
"K " to Petition; Rollo, p. 108, 110].
This Special
Civil Action of Certiorari and Prohibition
with Preliminary Injunction questions the interpretation of, and
application
by the respondent Deputy Minister, of the provisions of Pres. Dec. No.
451, as set forth in the assailed Order.
On March 25,
1985, after considering the allegations,
issues and arguments adduced in the petition as well as the Comment
thereon
of the public respondent and dispensing with the private respondents'
Comment,
the Court resolved to dismiss the petition for lack of merit [Rollo, p.
198]. On April 26, 1985, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
with Motion to Consider the Case En Banc. On June 26, 1985 the
First
Division of the Court referred the case to the Court En Banc for
consolidation with G. R. No. 70832, entitled "Gregorio T. Fabros, et al
vs. Hon. Jaime C. Laya, etc. " since it involves the same issue on the
application of 60% incremental proceeds of authorized tuition fee
increases
[Rollo, p. 235]. The Court EN BANC resolved to accept the case.
[Resolution
of July 16, 1985]. These cases were further consolidated with other
cases
involving the same issues.
C.chanrobles virtual law libraryFAR EASTERN UNIVERSITY CASE
On December 17,
1978, petitioner Union filed with
the Ministry of Labor and Employment a complaint against respondent
University
for non-payment of legal holiday pay and under-payment of the
thirteenth
[13th] month pay. On July 7, 1979, while the case was pending, the
Union
President, in his personal capacity, filed another complaint for
violation
of Pres. Dec. No. 451 against the same respondent.The
two cases were forthwith consolidated and jointly heard and tried. On
March
10, 1980, Labor Arbiter Ruben A. Aquino promulgated a decision, the
dispositive
portion of which is quoted hereunder:
RESPONSIVE TO THE FOREGOING, respondent
is
hereby
directed, within ten [10] days from receipt hereof, to:
1. To (sic) pay the paid legal
holidays
that it withdrew since January 14, 1976 up to the present; and
2. Pay the 13th month pay differential
of
complainant's
for the covered period December 16, 1975 to December 17, 1978, date of
filing of complaint for non-payment of legal holiday pay and under
payment
of the 13th month pay, and thereafter. Barred forever are money claims
beyond three [3] years from the time the course (sic) of action
occurred. Respondent's formula on transportation allowance which was
deducted
from the 13th month pay is thus subject to this prescriptive period,
for
purposes of computation of differentials for the 13th month pay.
The claim under P. D. 451 is hereby
dismissed
for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[Annex
" E " to Petition; Rollo, p. 55, 65-66].
Both parties
appealed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
On September 18, 1984, the respondent Commission disposed of the appeal
in the following manner:
RESPONSIVE TO THE FOREGOING, the Decision
of
Labor Arbiter Ruben A. Aquino in the instant case dated March 10, 1980
is hereby modified in the sense that complainant's claims for legal
holiday
pay and 13th month pay are likewise dismissed for lack of merit and the
dismissal of the claim under P.D. 451 is hereby affirmed en (sic)
toto. [Annex "A" to Petition:
Rollo, p. 24, 35].
Petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration dated September
29, 1984 was denied for lack of merit on November 8, 1984. Before this
Court is the Petition for Certiorari filed by the Union assailing the
abovementioned
decision of the Commissioner.
D.chanrobles virtual law libraryFABROS CASE
This petition is
in the nature of a class suit
brought by petitioners in behalf of the faculty members and other
employees
of more than 4,000 private schools nationwide. Petitioners seek to
enjoin
the implementation of paragraphs 7 to 7.5 of MECS Order No. 5, Series
of
1985, on the ground that the said Order is null and void for being
contrary
to Pres. Dec. No. 451 and the rulings of the Supreme Court in the cases
of University of the East v. UE Faculty Association (G. R. No. L-57387,
September 20, 1982, 117 SCRA 5541, University of Pangasinan Faculty
Union
v. University of Pangasinan and NLRC [G.R. No. 63122, February 20,
1984,
127 SCRA 691 ], St. Louis University Faculty Club v. NLRC and St. Louis
University [G.R. No. 65585, September 28, 1984, 132 SCRA 380]).cralaw:red
On September 11,
1982, Batas Pambansa Blg. 232
[Education Act of 1982] was signed into law. On the matter of tuition
and
other school fees of private schools, Section 42 of said law provides
as
follows:
Sec. 42. Tuition and other School
Fees. -
Each private school shall determine its rate of tuition and other
school
fees or charges. The rates and charges adopted by schools pursuant to
this
provision shall be collectible, and their application or use
authorized,
subject to rules and regulations promulgated by the Ministry of
Education,
Culture and Sports. [Emphasis supplied].
Invoking
Section 42 of B. P. Blg. 232, among others,
as its legal basis, the then Minister of Education Jaime C. Laya
promulgated
on April 1, 1985 the disputed MECS Order No. 25, S. 1985 entitled Rules
and Regulations To Implement the Provisions of B. P. Blg. 232, The
Education
Act of 1982, Relative to Student Fees for School Year 1985-1986. The
relevant
portions of said Order are quoted hereunder:
7. Application or Use of Tuition andOther School Fees or Charges.
7.1. The proceeds from tuition fees and
other
school charges as well as other income of each school shall be treated
as an institutional fund which shall be administered and managed for
the
support of school purposes strictly: Provided, That for the
purpose
of generating additional financial resources or income for the
operational
support and maintenance of each school, two or more schools may pool
their
institutional funds, in whole or in part, subject to the prior approval
of their respective governing boards.
7.2. Tuition fees shall be used to
cover the
general expenses of operating the school in order to allow it to meet
the
minimum standards required by the Ministry or any other higher standard
to which the school aspires. They may be used to meet the costs of
operation,
for maintaining or improving the quality of
instruction/training/research
through improved facilities and through the payment of adequate and
competitive
compensation for its faculty and support personnel, including
compliance
with mandated increases in personnel compensation and/or allowance.
7.3. Tuition fees shall be used to
cover
minimum
and necessary costs including the following: [a] compensation of school
personnel such as teaching or academic staff, school administrators,
academic
non-teaching personnel, and non-academic personnel; [b] maintenance and
operating expenses, including power and utilities, rentals,
depreciation,
office supplies; and [c] interest expenses and installment payments on
school debts.
7.4. Not less than sixty [60] percent
of the
incremental tuition proceeds shall be used for salaries or wages,
allowances
and fringe benefits of faculty and support staff, including cost of
living
allowance, imputed costs of contributed services, thirteenth [13th]
month
pay, retirement fund contributions, social security, medicare, unpaid
school
personnel claims and payments as may be prescribed by mandated wage
orders,
collective bargaining agreements and voluntary employer practices; Provided,
That increases in fees specifically authorized for the purposes listed
in paragraph 4.3.3 hereof shall be used entirely for those purposes.
[Italics
supplied].
7.5. Other student fees and charges as
may be
approved, including registration, library, laboratory, athletic,
application,
testing fees and charges shall be used exclusively for the indicated
purposes,
including [a] the acquisition and maintenance of equipment, furniture
and
fixtures, and buildings; [b] the payment of debt amortization and
interest
charges on debt incurred for school laboratory, athletic, or other
purposes;
and [c] personal services and maintenance and operating expenses
incurred
to operate the facilities or services for which fees and charges are
collected.
The petition
prayed for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order which was granted by this Court after hearing. The
dispositive
portion of the resolution dated May 28, 1985 reads as follows:
After due consideration of the
allegations of
the petition dated May 22, 1985 and the arguments of the parties, the
Court
Resolved to issue, effective immediately and continuing until further
orders
from this Court, a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER enjoining the respondent
from enforcing or implementing paragraphs 7.4 to 7.5 of MECS Order No.
25, S. 1985, which provide for the use and application of sixty per
centum
[60%] of the increases in tuition and other school fees or charges
authorized
by public respondent for the school year 1985-1986 in a manner
inconsistent
with Section 3[a], P. D. No. 451, [which allocates such 60% of the
increases
exclusively "for increases in salaries or wages of the members of the
faculty
and other employees of the school concerned"] and directing accordingly
that such 60% of the authorized increases shall be held in escrow by
the
respective colleges and universities, i.e., shall be kept
intact
and not disbursed for any purpose pending the Court's resolution of the
issue of the validity of the aforementioned MECS Order in question.
[Rollo, p. 21].
In the same
resolution, the Philippine Association
of Colleges and Universities [PACU] was impleaded as respondent.
Subsequent to the
issuance of this resolution,
four [4] schools represented in this petition, moved for the lifting of
the Temporary Restraining Order as to them. In separate resolutions,
this
Court granted their prayers.cralaw:red
Ateneo de Manila
University, De La Salle University
[Taft Avenue] and De La Salle University-South, through their
respective
counsels, manifested that for the school year 1985-1986, tuition fee
increase
was approved by the MECS and that on the basis of Pres. Dec. No. 451,
60%
of the tuition fee increases shall answer for salary increase. However,
a budgeted salary increase, exclusive of living allowances and other
benefits,
was approved for the same school year which, when computed, amounts to
more than the 60%.cralaw:red
This Court
granted the motions in separate resolutions
lifting the Temporary Restraining Order with respect to these schools
in
order that they may proceed with the implementation of the general
salary
increase for their employees.cralaw:red
In the case of
St. Louis University, its Faculty
Club, Administrative Personnel Association and the University itself
joined
in a Petition seeking for leave that 49% of the increase in tuition and
other fees for school year 1985-1986 be released. Petitioners
manifested
that the remaining balance shall continue to be held in escrow by the
University.cralaw:red
In a resolution
dated January 28, 1986, the Court
resolved as follows:
Accordingly, the Temporary Restraining
Order
issued by this Court on May 28, 1985 is hereby ordered lifted with
respect
to Saint Louis University of Baguio City in order that it may proceed
immediately
with the implementation of salary increases for its employees.
E.chanrobles virtual law library
BISCOCHO CASE
The Espiritu
Santo Parochial School and the Espiritu
Santo Parochial School Faculty Association were parties to a labor
dispute
which arose from a deadlock in collective bargaining. The parties
entered
into conciliation proceedings. The union went on strike after efforts
at
conciliation failed. Subsequently, a return to work agreement was
forged
between the parties and both agreed to submit their labor dispute to
the
jurisdiction of the Minister of Labor.
In the exercise
of his power to assume jurisdiction,
the Minister of Labor and Employment issued an Order dated April 14,
1986
which provides for the following:
IN CONSIDERATION OF ALL THE FOREGOING,
the
Ministry
hereby declares the strike staged by the Union to be legal and orders
the
following:
[a] the school to submit the pertinent
record
of employment of Romualdo Noriego to the Research and Information
Division
of the NLRC for computation of his underpayment of wages and for the
parties
to abide by the said computation;
[b] the school to submit all pertinent
record
of collections of tuition fee increases for school year (sic)
1982-1983,
1983-1984 and 1984-1985 to the Research and Information Division of the
NLRC for proper computation and for equal distribution of the amount to
all employees and teachers during the abovementioned school year (sic)
as their salary adjustment under P. D. 451;
[c] the parties to wait for the final
resolution
of the illegal dismissal [case] docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 5-1450-85
and to abide by the said resolution;
[d] to furnish the MECS a copy of this
order
for
them to issue the guidelines in the implementation of PRODED Program;
[e] the parties to execute a
collective
bargaining
agreement with an economic package equivalent to 90% of the proceeds
from
tuition fee increases for school year 1985-1986 and another 90% for
school
year 1986-1987 and 85% for school year 1987-1988. The amount
afore-mentioned
shall be divided equally to all members of the bargaining unit as their
respective salary adjustments. Such other benefits being enjoyed by the
members of the bargaining unit prior to the negotiation of the CBA
shall
remain the same and shall not be reduced.
[f] the school to deduct the
amount
equivalent
to ten [10%] per cent of the backwages payable to all members of the
bargaining
unit as negotiation fee and to deliver the same to the Union Treasurer
for proper disposition. [Emphasis supplied].
SO ORDERED. [Rollo,
pp. 16-17].
Pursuant to the
said order, private respondent Union
agreed to incorporate in their proposed collective bargaining agreement
[CBA] with the school the following:
[2] The Union and School Administration
will
incorporate the following in their CBA:
(1) The computation of the tuition fee
increase
shall be gross to gross from which the corresponding percentage of 90%
will be taken. The resulting amount will be divided among 141.5
employees
for 1985-86 and 132.5 employees for 1986-87.
1/2 of the resulting increase will be
added
to
basic and divided by 13.3 to arrive at monthly increase in basic. The
other
1/2 will be divided by 12.3 to arrive at monthly increase in living
allowance.
Upon request/demand of the Union, the
School
will deduct from backwages of managerial employees and others outside
the
bargaining unit what Union will charge its own members in the form of
attorney's
fees, special assessment and union dues/agency fee.
(5) The signing of the CBA and payment
of
backwages
and others shall be on November 26, 1986 at the Espiritu Santo
Parochial
School Library. [Rollo, pp. 3-4].
The herein
petitioners, Jasmin Biscocho and 26 others,
all employees and faculty members of the respondent school, filed the
present
petition for prohibition to restrain the implementation of the April
14,
1986 Order of respondent Labor Minister as well as the agreements
arrived
at pursuant thereto. They contend that said Order and agreements affect
their rights to the 60% incremental proceeds under Pres. Dec. No. 451
which
provide for the exclusive application of the 60% incremental proceeds
to
basic salary.
Acting on the
petitioners' prayer, this Court
immediately issued a Temporary Restraining Order on November 25, 1986
"enjoining
the respondents from enforcing, implementing and proceeding with the
questioned
order of April 14, 1986 and collective bargaining agreement executed
between
respondents Union and the School Administration in pursuance thereof."
[Rollo, p. 20].
F.chanrobles virtual law libraryVALMONTE CASE
This Petition was
filed by parents with children
studying at respondent school, Espiritu Santo Parochial School, to
nullify
the Order dated April 14, 1986 issued by public respondent, then
Minister
of Labor and Employment, specifically paragraphs [e] and [f] thereof,
quoted
in the Biscocho case.cralaw:red
The award
contained in the said Order is the result
of the assumption of jurisdiction by the public respondent over a labor
dispute involving the private respondent school and faculty
association.
The latter had earlier filed a notice of strike because of a bargaining
deadlock on the demands of its members for additional economic
benefits.
After numerous conciliation conferences held while the union was on
strike,
the parties voluntarily agreed that the public respondent shall assume
jurisdiction over all the disputes between them. As to the subject
matter
of the instant case, the public respondent found that the latest
proposals
of the respondent school was to give 85% of the proceeds from tuition
fee
increases for the school years to be divided among the teachers and
employees
as salary adjustments. What the respondent faculty association offered
to accept was a package of 95% for school year 1985-1986, 90% for
school
year 1986-1987. The respondent school offered to strike the middle of
the
two positions, hence the Order complained of by the petitioners [See
Annex
"A", Petition; Rollo, pp. 9, 14-15; Comment of the Respondent Faculty
Association:
Rollo, p. 26].
II. RESOLUTION OF THE COMMON
LEGAL
ISSUE
This long-drawn
controversy has sadly placed on
the balance, diverse interests, opposed yet intertwined, and all
deserving,
and demanding, the protection of the State. On one arm of the balance
hang
the economic survival of private schools and the private school system,
undeniably performing a complementary role in the State's efforts to
maintain
an adequate educational system in the country. Perched precariously on
the other arm of the same balance is the much-needed financial uplift
of
schoolteachers, extolled for all times as the molders of the minds of
youth,
hence, of every nation's future. Ranged with them with needs and claims
as insistent are other school personnel. And then, anxiously waiting at
the sidelines, is the interest of the public at large, and of the
State,
in the continued availability to all who desire it, high-standard
education
consistent with national goals, at a reasonable and affordable price.cralaw:red
Amidst these
opposing forces the task at hand
becomes saddled with the resultant implications that the interpretation
of the law would bear upon such varied interests. But this Court can
not
go beyond what the legislature has laid down. Its duty is to say what
the
law is as enacted by the lawmaking body. That is not the same as saying
what the law should be or what is the correct rule in a given set of
circumstances.
It is not the province of the judiciary to look into the wisdom of the
law nor to question the policies adopted by the legislative branch. Nor
is it the business of this Tribunal to remedy every unjust situation
that
may arise from the application of a particular law. It is for the
legislature
to enact remedial legislation if that be necessary in the premises. But
as always, with apt judicial caution and cold neutrality, the Court
must
carry out the delicate function of interpreting the law, guided by the
Constitution and existing legislation and mindful of settled
jurisprudence.
The Court's function is, therefore, limited, and accordingly, must
confine
itself to the judicial task of saying what the law is, as enacted by
the
lawmaking body.
FIRST SUB-ISSUE
A. Whether or
not allowances and other fringe
benefits of employees may be charged against the 60% portion of the
incremental
proceeds provided for in Sec. 3[a] of Pres. Dec. No. 451.chanrobles virtual law library
1.
Arguments raised in the Cebu Institute
of Technology case.
In maintaining
its position that the salary increases
it had paid to its employees should be considered to have included the
COLA, Cebu Institute of Technology [CIT] makes reference to Pres. Dec.
No. 451 and its Implementing Rules. The line of reasoning of the
petitioner
appears to be based on the major premise that under said decree and
rules,
60% of the incremental proceeds from tuition fee increases may be
applied
to salaries, allowances and other benefits of teachers and other school
personnel. In support of this major premise, petitioner cites various
implementing
rules and regulations of the then Minister of Education, Culture and
Sports,
to the effect that 60% of the incremental proceeds may be applied to
salaries,
allowances and other benefits for members of the faculty and other
school
personnel [Petition citing Implementing Rules and Regulations of Pres.
Dec. No. 451 of various dates; Rollo, pp. 318-320]. Petitioner
concludes
that the salary increases it had granted the CIT teachers out of the
60%
portion of the incremental proceeds of its tuition fee increases from
1974-1980
pursuant to Pres. Dec. No. 451 and the MECS implementing rules and
regulations,
must be deemed to have included the COLA payable to said employees for
those years [Rollo, pp. 911].cralaw:red
With leave of
Court, the Philippine Association
of Colleges and Universities, filed its Memorandum as Intervenor in
support
of the proposition that schools may pay the COLA to faculty members and
other employees out of the 60% of the increase in tuition fees. In
addition
to the arguments already set forth in the memorandum of the petitioner
CIT, intervenor PACU attacks the Decision of this Court in University
of
the East v. University of the East Faculty Association et al., G.R. No.
57387 as "not doctrinal" and inapplicable to the CIT case. The Court
held
in the UE case, which was promulgated on September 30, 1982, during the
pendency of these cases, that:
Allowances and benefits should be
chargeable
to the return of investment referred to in Sec. 3[a], if the schools
should
happen to have no other resources than incremental proceeds of
authorized
tuition fee increases. [See dispositive portion of the Decision].
Intervenor PACU
alleges that the aforecited U.E.
decision does not categorically rule that COLA and other fringe
benefits
should not be charged against the 60% incremental proceeds of the
authorized
tuition fee increase.
The Solicitor
General, on the other hand, argues
in support of the Order of the public respondent that Pres. Dec. No.
451
allocates the 60% proceeds of tuition fee increases exclusively for
salary
increases of teachers and non-teaching supportive personnel of the
school
concerned, and that the Decree does not provide that said salary
increases
would take the place of the COLA [Rollo, pp. 244-245]. He cites as
authority
for this stance, two [2] memoranda of the then President dated June 6,
1978 and March 30, 1979 both of which provide that the 60% incremental
proceeds of tuition fee increases "shall be allocated for the increase
in the salaries of teachers and supportive personnel. " Anent the U.E.
case, the Solicitor General states that the Supreme Court, in deciding
said case, took note of the stand of the Office of the President that
the
60% incremental proceeds shall be solely applied to salaries of faculty
members and employees.cralaw:red
On August 7,
1986, considering the supervening
events, including the change of administration that have transpired
during
the pendency of these cases, the Court required the Solicitor General
to
state whether or not he maintains the action and position taken by his
predecessor-in-office. In his Compliance with said Resolution, the
Solicitor
General manifested the position that:
a. If the tuition fee increase was
collected
during the effectivity oil Presidential Decree No. 451, 60% thereof
shall
answer exclusively for salary increase of school personnel. Other
employment
benefits shall be covered by the 12% allocated for return of
investment,
this is in accordance with the ruling of this Honorable Court in
University
of the East vs. U.E. Faculty Association, et al., [117 SCRA 554], and
reiterated
in University of Pangasinan Faculty Union v. University of Pangasinan,
et al., [127 SCRA 691] and St. Louis Faculty Club v. NLRC [132 SCRA
380].
b. If the salary increase was
collected
during
the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg. (sic) 232, 60% thereof
shall
answer not only for salary increase of school personnel but also for
other
employment benefits. [Rollo, at pp.
513-514].
2.
Arguments raised in the Divine Word College
Case.
Petitioner Divine
Word College of Legazpi [DWC]
advances the theory that the COLA, 13th month pay and other personnel
benefits
decreed by law, must be deemed chargeable against the 60% portion
allocated
for increase of salaries or wages of faculty and all other school
employees.
In support of this stance, petitioner points out that said personnel
benefits
are not included in the enumeration of the items for which the balance
[less 60%] or 40% portion of the incremental proceeds may be alloted
under
Section 3[a] of Pres. Dec. No. 451 [Rollo, pp. 29-30]. Petitioner
likewise
cites the interpretation of the respondent Minister of Education,
Culture
and Sports embodied in the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P. D.
451, [DEC Issuance, May 13, 1987; Rollo, p. 30], that the 60%
incremental
proceeds of authorized tuition fee increases may be applied to
increases
in emoluments and/or benefits for members of faculty, including staff
and
administrative employees of the school as the valid interpretation of
the
law, as against that made by the respondent Deputy Minister of Labor in
the assailed Order. If the latter interpretation is upheld, petitioner
would go as far as questioning the constitutionality of Pres. Dec. No.
451 upon the ground that the same discriminates against the petitioner
and other private schools as a class of employers. According to the
petitioner,
the discrimination takes the form of requiring said class of employers
to give 60% of their profits to their employees in addition to the COLA
mandated by law, while other employers have to contend only with salary
increases and COLA. [Petition; Rollo, p. 46].cralaw:red
With regard to
the Decision of this Court in the
U.E. case, petitioner claims exemption therefrom upon the ground that
the
Court's interpretation of a law cannot be applied retroactively to
parties
who have relied upon the previous administrative interpretation which
has
not been declared invalid or unconstitutional [Petition; Rollo, pp.
50-51].
Petitioner further argues on this point that if the court had intended
to invalidate the MECS interpretation of the Decree, it should have
positively
stated so in the Decision. [Petition, Rollo, p. 50].cralaw:red
The Comment of
the public respondents cite as
settled jurisprudence applicable to the case at bar, the ruling of this
Court in the U.E. case, supra, which was reiterated in the
subsequent
cases of University of Pangasinan Faculty Union v. University of
Pangasinan
et all and St. Louis Faculty Club v. NLRC, et al.cralaw:red
Public
respondents Deputy Minister of Labor and
Employment and Regional Director of the MOLE [Region V] likewise attack
the validity of the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of Pres.
Dec. No. 451 cited by the petitioner insofar as said rules direct the
allotment
of the 60% of incremental proceeds from tuition fee hikes for
retirement
plan, faculty development and allowances. They argue that said rules
and
regulations were invalid for having been promulgated in excess of the
rule-making
authority of the then Minister of Education under Pres. Dec. No. 451
which
mandates that the 60% of incremental proceeds from tuition fee hikes
should
be allotted solely for salary increases [Comment; Rollo, pp. 184-185].
Finally, with respect to the issue on the allege unconstitutionality of
Pres. Dec. No. 451, the public respondents posit that a legislation
[such
as Pres. Dec. No. 451] which affects a particular class does not
infringe
the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the law as long as
it applies uniformly and without discrimination to everyone of that
class.
[Comment; Rollo, p. 14].cralaw:red
3.
Arguments raised in the Far Eastern
University case.
It is the
petitioner's contention that in respect
of Pres. Dec. No. 451, the decision of the NLRC is a defiance of the
rulings
of this Court in the cases of University of the East v. U.E. Faculty
Association,
et al. and of University of Pangasinan Faculty Union v. University of
Pangasinan
and NLRC [supra]. The Union submits that monetary benefits
other than increases in basic salary, are not chargeable to the 60%
incremental
proceeds.cralaw:red
The respondent
University, in its Comment dated
June 13, 1982, refers to Article 97[f] of the Labor Code which provides
a definition of the term "wages" to support its position that "salaries
or wages" as used in Pres. Dec. No. 451 should be interpreted to
include
other benefits in terms of money. As
mentioned in the Cebu Institute of Technology case, the Solicitor
General
filed its Compliance with this Court's resolution dated August 7, 1986
requiring him to manifest whether public respondents maintain the
position
they have taken in these consolidated cases. The resolution of
September
25, 1986 required petitioners to Comment on said Compliance.cralaw:red
The Comment dated
December 6, 1986 was received
by this Court after petitioner Union was required to show cause why no
disciplinary action should be taken against them for failure to comply
earlier. The Union agreed with the position taken by the Solicitor
General
that under Pres. Dec. No. 451, 60% of the tuition fee increases, shall
answer exclusively for salary increase. However, it expressed
disagreement
with the opinion that during the effectivity of B. P. Blg. 232, the 60%
ncremental proceeds shall answer not only for salary increases but also
for other employment benefits. The Union argues that whereas "Pres.
Dec.
No. 451 is a law on a particular subject, viz., increase of
tuition
fee by educational institutions and how such increase shall be
allocated,
B. P. Blg. 232 is not a law on a particular subject of increase of
tuition
fee; at most, it is a general legislation on tuition fee as it touches
on such subject in general, " [Comment on Compliance; Rollo, p. 376],
Suppletory
to its argument that B. P. Blg. 232 did not impliedly repeal Pres. Dec.
No. 451, the Union also invokes the principle that a special or
particular
law cannot be repealed by a general law.
RESOLUTION OF THE FIRST SUB-ISSUE
This Court has
consistently held, beginning with
the University of the East case, that if the schools have no resources
other than those derived from tuition fee increases, allowances and
benefits
should be charged against the proceeds of tuition fee increases which
the
law allows for return on investments under Section 3[a] of Pres. Dec.
No.
451, therefore, not against the 60% portion allocated for increases in
salaries and wages [See 117 SCRA at 571]. This ruling was reiterated in
the University of Pangasinan case and in the Saint Louis University
case.cralaw:red
There is no
cogent reason to reverse the Court's
ruling in the aforecited cases. Section 3[a] of Pres. Dec. No. 451
imposes
among the conditions for the approval of tuition fee increases, the
allocation
of 60% per cent of the incremental proceeds thereof for increases in
salaries
or wages of school personnel and not for any other item such as
allowances
or other fringe benefits. As aptly put by the Court in University of
Pangasinan
Faculty Union v. University of Pangasinan, supra:
The sixty [60%] percent incremental
proceeds
from the tuition fee increase are to be devoted entirely to wage or
salary
increases which means increases in basic salary. The law cannot be
construed
to include allowances which are benefits over and above the basic
salaries
of the employees. To charge such benefits to the 60% incremental
proceeds
would be to reduce the increase in basic salary provided by law, an
increase
intended also to help the teachers and other workers tide themselves
and
their families over these difficult economic times. [Italics supplied].
(127 SCRA 691, 702).
This
interpretation of the law is consistent with
the legislative intent expressed in the decree itself, i.e., to
alleviate the sad plight of private schools and that of their personnel
wrought by slump in enrollment and increasing operational costs on the
part of the schools, and the increasing costs of living on the part of
the personnel [Preamble, Pres. Dec. No. 451]. While coming to the
aid of the private school system by simplifying the procedure for
increasing
tuition fees, the decree imposes as a condition for the approval of any
such increase in fees, the allocation of 60% of the incremental
proceeds
thereof, to increases in salaries or wages of school personnel. This
condition
makes for a quid pro quo of the approval of any tuition fee
hike
by a school, thereby assuring the school personnel concerned of a share
in its proceeds. The condition having been imposed to attain one of the
main objectives of the decree, which is to help the school personnel
cope
with the increasing costs of living, the same cannot be interpreted in
a sense that would diminish the benefit granted said personnel.
In the light of
existing laws which exclude allowances
from the basic salary or wage in the computation of the amount of
retirement
and other benefits payable to an employee, this Court will not adopt a
different meaning of the terms "salaries or wages" to mean the opposite,
i.e. to include allowances in the concept of salaries or wages.cralaw:red
As to the alleged
implementing rules and regulations
promulgated by the then MECS to the effect that allowances and other
benefits
may be charged against the 60% portion of the proceeds of tuition fee
increases
provided for in Section 3[a] of Pres. Dec. No. 451, suffice it to say
that
these were issued ultra vires, and, therefore, not binding upon
this Court.cralaw:red
The rule-making
authority granted by Pres. Dec.
No. 451 is confined to the implementation of the decree and to the
imposition
of limitations upon the approval of tuition fee increases, to wit:
Sec. 4. Rules and Regulations. -
The
Secretary
of Education and Culture is hereby authorized, empowered and directed
to
issue the requisite rules and regulations for the effective
implementation
of this Decree. He may, in addition to the requirements and limitations
provided for under Sections 2 and 3 hereof, impose other requirements
and
limitations as he may deem proper and reasonable.
The power does
not allow the inclusion of other items
in addition to those for which 60% of the proceeds of tuition fee
increases
are allocated under Section 3[a] of the decree.
Rules and
regulations promulgated in accordance
with the power conferred by law would have the force and effect of law
[Victorias Milling Company, Inc. v. Social Security Commission, 114
Phil.
555 (1962)] if the same are germane to the subjects of the legislation
and if they conform with the standards prescribed by the same law
[People
v. Maceren, G. R. No. L-32166, October 18, 1977, 79 SCRA 450]. Since
the
implementing rules and regulations cited by the private schools add
allowances
and other benefits to the items included in the allocation of 60% of
the
proceeds of tuition fee increases expressly provided for by law, the
same
were issued in excess of the rule-making authority of said agency, and
therefore, without binding effect upon the courts. At best, the same
may
be treated as administrative interpretations of the law and as such,
they
may be set aside by this Court in the final determination of what the
law
means.
SECOND SUB-ISSUE
B. Whether or
not allowances and other fringe
benefits may be charged against the 60% portion of the incremental
proceeds
of tuition fee increases upon the effectivity of Education Act of 1982
[B.P. Blg. 232].chanrobles virtual law library
1.
Arguments raised in the Fabros case.
In assailing MECS
Order No. 25, S. 1985, petitioners
argue that the matter of allocating the proceeds from tuition fee
increases
is still governed by Pres. Dec. No. 451. It is their opinion that
Section
42 of B. P. Blg. 232 did not repeal Pres. Dec. No. 451 for the
following
reasons: first, there is no conflict between Section 42 of B.
P.
Blg. 232 and Section 3[a] of Pres. Dec. No. 451 or any semblance of
inconsistency
to deduce a case of a repeal by implication; second, Pres. Dec.
No. 451 is a specific law upon a particular subject - the purposes and
distribution of the incremental proceeds of tuition fee increases,
while
B. P. Blg. 232 is a general law on the educational system; as such, a
specific
law is not repealed by a subsequent general law in the absence of a
clear
intention; and third, Pres. Dec. No. 451 is still the only law
on
the subject of tuition fee increases, there being no prescription or
provision
in Section 42 of B. P. Blg. 232 or elsewhere in the law. They
furthermore
aver that the disputed MECS Order which imposed additional burdens
against
the 60% incremental proceeds of tuition fee increases are not provided
in either Pres. Dec. No. 451 or B. P. Blg. 232. The logical result as
intimated
by petitioners is that the inclusion of paragraph 7.4 and related
paragraphs
7 to 7.3 and 7.5 in the questioned MECS Order contravenes the statutory
authority granted to the public respondent and the same are, therefore,
void.cralaw:red
Respondent PACU
takes the contrary view contending
that MECS Order No. 25, S. 1985, complies with the mandate of Section
42
of B. P. Blg. 232 which law had already repealed Pres. Dec. No. 451.
PACU
notes that the University of the East case invoked by petitioners is
not
applicable because the issue in that case does not involve the effect
of
B. P. Blg. 232 on Pres. Dec. No. 451.cralaw:red
The Solicitor
General, representing the public
respondent, after giving a summary of the matters raised by petitioner
and respondent PACU, points out that the decisive issue in this case is
whether B. P. Big. 232 has repealed Pres. Dec. No. 451 because on the
answer
to this question depends the validity of MECS Order No. 25, S. 1985.
Public
respondent holds the view consistent with that of PACU on the matter of
B. P. Blg. 232 having repealed Pres. Dec. No. 451. To support this
contention,
the Solicitor General compared the respective provisions of the two
laws
to show the inconsistency and incompatibility which would result in a
repeal
by implication.
RESOLUTION OF THE SECOND
SUB-ISSUE
On the matter of
tuition fee increases, Section
42 of B. P. Blg. 232 provides:
Sec. 42. Tuition and Other
School
Fees.
- Each private school shall determine its rate of tuition and other
school fees or charges. The rates and charges adopted by schools
pursuant
to this provision shall be collectible, and their application or use
authorized,
subject to rules and regulations promulgated by the Ministry of
Education,
Culture and Sports. [Emphasis supplied].
The enactment
of B. P. Blg. 232 and the subsequent
issuance of MECS Order No. 25, S. 1985 revived the old controversy on
the
application and use of the incremental proceeds from tuition fee
increases.
As can be gleaned from the pleadings and arguments of the parties in
these
cases, one side, composed of the teachers and other employees of the
private
schools, insist on the applicability of Section 3[a] of Pres. Dec. No.
451 as interpreted arid applied in the University of the East,
University
of Pangasinan and St Louis University cases, while the private schools
uphold the view that the matter of allocating the incremental proceeds
from tuition fee increases is governed by Section 42 of B. P. Blg. 232
as implemented by the MECS Rules and Regulations. As stated, the
latter's
argument is premised on the allegation that B. P. Blg. 232 impliedly
repealed
Pres. Dec. No. 451.
On the second
sub-issue, therefore, this Court
upholds the view taken by the Solicitor General in the Fabros case,
that
the decisive issue is whether B. P. Blg. 232 has repealed Pres. Dec.
No.
451. In recognition of the vital
role
of private schools in the country's educational system, the government
has provided measures to regulate their activities. As early as March
10,
1917, the power to inspect private schools, to regulate their
activities,
to give them official permits to operate under certain conditions and
to
revoke such permits for cause, was granted to the then Secretary of
Public
Instruction by Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth
Act No. 180. Republic Act No. 6139, enacted on August 31, 1970,
provided
for the regulation of tuition and other fees charged by private schools
in order to discourage the collection of exorbitant and unreasonable
fees.
In an effort to simplify the "cumbersome and time-consuming" procedure
prescribed under Rep. Act No. 6139 and "to alleviate the sad plight of
private schools," Pres. Dec. No. 451 was enacted on May 11, 1974. While
this later statute was being implemented, the legislative body
envisioned
a comprehensive legislation which would introduce changes and chart
directions
in the educational system, hence, the enactment of B. P. Blg. 232. What
then was the effect of B. P. Blg. 232 on Pres. Dec. No. 451?
The Court after
comparing Section 42 of B. P.
Blg. 232 and Pres. Dec. No. 451, particularly Section 3[a] thereof,
finds
evident irreconcilable differences.cralaw:red
Under Pres. Dec.
No. 451, the authority to regulate
the imposition of tuition and other school fees or charges by private
schools
is lodged with the Secretary of Education and Culture [Sec. 1], where
Section
42 of B.P. Blg. 232 liberalized the procedure by empowering each
private
school to determine its rate of tuition and other school fees or
charges.cralaw:red
Pres. Dec. No.
451 provides that 60% of the incremental
proceeds of tuition fee increases shall be applied or used to augment
the
salaries and wages of members of the faculty and other employees of the
school; while B. P. Blg. 232 provides that the increment shall be
applied
or used in accordance with the regulations promulgated by the MECS.cralaw:red
A closer look at
these differences leads the Court
to resolve the question in favor of repeal. As pointed out by the
Solicitor
General, three aspects of the disputed provisions of law support the
above
conclusion. First, the legislative authority under Pres. Dec.
No.
451 retained the power to apportion the incremental proceeds of the
tuition
fee increases; such power is delegated to the Ministry of Education and
Culture under B. P. Blg. 232. Second, Pres. Dec. No. 451 limits
the application or use of the increment to salary or wage increase,
institutional
development, student assistance and extension services and return on
investment,
whereas B. P. Blg. 232 gives the MECS discretion to determine the
application
or use of the increments. Third, the extent of the application
or
use of the increment under Pres. Dec. No. 451 is fixed at the
pre-determined
percentage allocations; 60% for wage and salary increases, 12% for
return
on investment and the balance of 28% to institutional development,
student
assistance and extension services, while under B. P. Blg. 232, the
extent
of the allocation or use of the increment is likewise left to the
discretion
of the MECS.cralaw:red
The legislative
intent to depart from the statutory
limitations under Pres. Dec. No. 451 is apparent in the second sentence
of Section 42 of B. P. Blg. 232. Pres. Dec. No. 451 and Section
42
of B. P. Blg. 232 which cover the same subject matter, are so clearly
inconsistent
and incompatible with each other that there is no other conclusion but
that the latter repeals the former in accordance with Section 72 of B.
P. Blg. 232 to wit:
Sec. 72. Repealing clause. -
All laws or parts thereof inconsistent with any provision of this Act
shall
be deemed repealed or modified, as the case may be.
Opinion No. 16
of the Ministry of Justice dated January
29, 1985, quoted below, supports the above conclusion:
Both P. D. No.
451 and B. P. Blg. 232 deal with
the imposition of tuition and other school fees or charges and their
use
and application, although the latter is broader in scope as it covers
other
aspects of the education system. We note substantial differences or
inconsistencies
between the provisions of the two laws. P. D. No. 451 prescribes
certain
limitations in the increase of tuition and other school fees and their
application; whereas the latter law, B. P. Blg. 232 s silent on the
matter.
Under P. D. 451, rates of tuition/school fees need prior approval of
the
Secretary of Education, Culture [now Minister of Education, Culture and
Sports] who also determines the reasonable rates for new school fees;
whereas
under B. P. Blg. 232, each private school determines its rate of
tuition
and other school fees or charges. P. D. No. 451 authorizes the
Secretary
of Education and Culture to issue requisite rules and regulations to
implement
the said decree and for that purpose, he is empowered to impose other
requirements
and limitations as he may deem proper and reasonable in addition to the
limitations prescribed by the decree for increases in tuition fees and
school charges, particularly, the limitations imposed in the allocation
of increases in fees and charges; whereas under B. P. Blg. 232, the
collection
and application or use of rates and charges adopted by the school are
subject
to rules and regulations promulgated by the Ministry of Education,
Culture
and Sports without any mention of the statutory limitations on the
application
or use of the fees or charges. The authority granted to private schools
to determine its rates of tuition and unconditional authority vested in
the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports to determine by rules and
regulations the collection and application or use of tuition or fees
rates
and charges under B. P. Big. 232 constitute substantial and
irreconcilable
incompatibility with the provisions of P. D. No. 451, which should be
for
that reason deemed to have been abrogated by the subsequent legislation.cralaw:red
Moreover, B. P.
Blg. 232 is a comprehensive legislation
dealing with the establishment and maintenance of an integrated system
of education and as such, covers the entire subject matter of the
earlier
law, P. D. No. 451. The omission of the limitations or conditions
imposed
in P. D. No. 451 for increases in tuition fees and school charges is an
indication of a legislative intent to do away with the said limitations
or conditions. [Crawford, supra, p. 674]. It has also been said
that:
An act which purports to set out in full
all
that it intends to contain, operates as a repeal of anything omitted
which
was contained in the old act and not included in the amendatory act.
[People
vs. Almuete 69 SCRA 410; People vs. Adillo 68 SCRA 90]. (Ministry
of Justice, Op. No. 16, S. 1985).
Having
concluded that under B.P. Big. 232, the collection
and application or use of tuition and other school fees are subject
only
to the limitations under the rules and regulations issued by the
Ministry,
the crucial point now shifts to the said implementing rules.
The guidelines
and regulations on tuition and
other school fees issued after the enactment of B. P. Blg. 232
consistently
permit the charging of allowances and other benefits against the 60%
incremental
proceeds. Such was the tenor in the MECS Order No. 23, S. 1983; MECS
Order
No. 15, S. 1984; MECS Order No. 25, S. 1985; MECS Order No. 22, S.
1986;
and DECS Order No. 37, S. 1987. The pertinent portion of the latest
order
reads, thus:
In any case of increase, at least sixty
percent
[60%] of the incremental proceeds should be allocated for increases in
or provisions for salaries or wages, allowances and fringe benefits of
faculty and other staff, including accruals to cost of living
allowance,
13th month pay, social security, medicare, and retirement contribution
and increases as may be provided in mandated wage orders, collective
bargaining
agreements or voluntary employer practices.
The validity of
these orders, particularly MECS Order
No. 25, S. 1985, is attacked on the ground that the additional burdens
charged against "the 60% of the proceeds of the increases in tuition
fees
constitute both as (sic) an excess of statutory authority and
as
(sic) a substantial impairment of the accrued, existing
and
protected
rights and benefits of the members of faculty and non-academic
personnel
of private schools." [Memorandum for Petitioners, Rollo, p. 1911].
Petitioners
alleged that these additional burdens under the MECS Order are not
provided
in the law itself, either in Section 42 of B. P. Blg. 232 or Section
3[a]
of Pres. Dec. No. 451, except increases in salaries in the latter
provision.
Section 42 of B.
P. Blg. 232 grants to the Minister
of Education [now Secretary of Education] rule-making authority to fill
in the details on the application or use of tuition fees and other
school
charges. In the same vein is Section 70 of the same law which states:
Sec. 70. Rule-making Authority. -
The Minister of Education, Culture and Sports charged with the
administration
and enforcement of this Act, shall promulgate the necessary
implementing
rules and regulations.
Contrary to the
petitioners' insistence that the
questioned rules and regulations contravene the statutory authority
granted
to the Minister of Education, this Court finds that there was a valid
exercise
of rule-making authority.
The statutory
grant of rule-making power to administrative
agencies like the Secretary of Education is a valid exception to the
rule
on non-delegation of legislative power provided two conditions concur,
namely: [1] the statute is complete in itself, setting forth the policy
to be executed by the agency; and [2] said statute fixes a standard to
which the latter must conform [Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. v. Public
Service Commission, G. R. No. L-19850, January 30, 1964, and Pelaez v.
Auditor General, G. R. No. L-23825, December 24, 1965].cralaw:red
The Education Act
of 1982 is "an act providing
for the establishment and maintenance of an integrated system for
education
" with the following basic policy:
It is the policy of the State to
establish and
maintain a complete, adequate and integrated system of education
relevant
to the goals of national development. Toward this end, the government
shall
ensure, within the context of a free and democratic system, maximum
contribution
of the educational system to the attainment of the following national
development
goals:
1. To achieve and maintain an
accelerating
rate
of economic development and social progress;
2. To assure the maximum
participation of
all
the people in the attainment and enjoyment of the benefits of such
growth;
and
3. To achieve and strengthen
national
unity and
consciousness and preserve, develop and promote desirable cultural,
moral
and spiritual values in a changing world.
The State shall promote the right of
every
individual
to relevant quality education, regardless of sex, age, creed,
socioeconomic
status, physical and mental conditions, racial or ethnic origin,
political
or other affiliation. The State shall therefore promote and maintain
equality
of access to education as well as the enjoyment of the benefits of
education
by all its citizens.
The State shall promote the right of the
nation's
cultural communities in the exercise of their right to develop
themselves
within the context of their cultures, customs, traditions, interests
and
belief, and recognizes education as an instrument for their maximum
participation
in national development and in ensuring their involvement in achieving
national unity. [Section 3, Declaration of Basic Policy].
With the
foregoing basic policy as well as specific
policies clearly set forth in its various provisions, the Act is
complete
in itself and does not leave any part of the policy-making, a strictly
legislative function, to any administrative agency.
Coming now to the
presence or absence of standards
to guide the Minister of Education in the exercise of rule-making
power,
the pronouncement in Edu v. Ericta [G. R. No. L-32096, October 24,
1970,
35 SCRA 481, 497] is relevant:
The standard may be either expressed or
implied.
If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard
though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be
implied
from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the
Reflector
Law, clearly the legislative objective is public safety. What is sought
to be attained as in Calalang v. Williams is "safe transit upon the
roads."
[Italics supplied].
Thus, in the
recent case of Tablarin et al. v. Hon.
Gutierrez, et al. [G. R. No. 78164, July 31, 1987], the Court held that
the necessary standards are set forth in Section 1 of the 1959 Medical
Act, i.e., "the standardization and regulation of medical
education"
as well as in other provisions of the Act. Similarly, the standards to
be complied with by Minister of Education in this case may be found in
the various policies set forth in the Education Act of 1982.
MECS Order No.
25, s. 1985 touches upon the economic
relationship between some members and elements of the educational
community,
i.e., the private schools and their faculty and support staff. In
prescribing
the minimum percentage of tuition fee increments to be applied to the
salaries,
allowances and fringe benefits of the faculty and support staff, the
Act
affects the economic status and the living and working conditions of
school
personnel as well as the funding of the private schools.cralaw:red
The policies and
objectives on the welfare and
interests of the various members of the educational community are found
in Section 5 of B. P. Blg. 232. which states:
Sec. 5. Declaration of Policy
and
Objectives.
- It is likewise a declared government policy to foster, at all
times,
a spirit of shared purposes and cooperation among the members and
elements
of the educational community, and between the community and other
sectors
of society, in the realization that only in such an atmosphere can the
true goals and objectives of education be fulfilled.
Moreover, the
State shall:
1. Aid and support the natural right and
duty
of parents in the rearing of the youth through the educational system.
2. Promote and safeguard the welfare and
interests
of the students by defining their rights and obligations, according
them
privileges, and encouraging the establishment of sound relationships
between
them and the other members of the school community.
3. Promote the social and economic status
of
school personnel, uphold their rights, define their obligations, and
improve
their living and working conditions and career prospects.
4. Extend support to promote the
viability of
those institutions through which parents, students and school personnel
seek to attain their educational goals.
On the other
hand, the policy on the funding of schools
in general, are laid down in Section 33:
Sec. 33.
Declaration of Policy. -
It is hereby declared to be a policy of the State that the national
government
shall contribute to the financial support of educational programs
pursuant
to the goals of education as declared in the Constitution. Towards this
end, the government shall:
1. Adopt measures to broaden access to
education
through financial assistance and other forms of incentives to schools,
teachers, pupils and students; and
2. Encourage and stimulate private
support
to
education through, inter alia, fiscal and other assistance measures.
Given the
abovementioned policies and objectives,
there are sufficient standards to guide the Minister of Education in
promulgating
rules and regulations to implement the provisions of the Education Act
of 1982. As in the Ericta and Tablarin cases, there is sufficient
compliance with the requirements of the non-delegation principle.
THIRD SUB-ISSUE
C. Whether or
not schools and their employees
may enter into a collective bargaining agreement allocating more than
60%
of said incremental proceeds for salary increases and other benefits of
said employees.chanrobles virtual law library
1.
Arguments raised in the Biscocho and
Valmonte cases.
Assailed by the
petitioners in the Biscocho and
the Valmonte cases is the Order of the respondent Minister of Labor
directing
the execution of a CBA between the school and the respondent Espiritu
Santo
Parochial School Faculty Association which provides for an economic
package
equivalent to 90% of the proceeds of tuition fee increases for school
year
1985-1986, another 90% for school year 1986-1987, and 85% for school
year
1987-1988. Pursuant to said Order, petitioners in the Biscocho case
alleged
that the parties had agreed to incorporate in their CBA a provision
which
allocates one-half [1/2] of the 90% portion of the proceeds or 45% to
increases
in the monthly basic salaries and the other one-half [1/2] or 45% to
increases
in monthly living allowance.cralaw:red
The petitioners
in the two cases seek the nullification
of the MOLE Order for exactly opposite reasons. In the Biscocho case,
the
controversy springs from what petitioners perceive to be a diminution
of
the benefits to be received by the school employees insofar as the CBA
allocates only 45% for salary increases instead of 60%, which
petitioners
claim to be the portion set aside by Pres. Dec. No. 451 for that
purpose.
Parenthetically, the case questions the allocation of the remaining 45%
of the 90% economic package under the CBA, to allowances. Stripped down
to its essentials, the question is whether or not the 90% portion of
the
proceeds of tuition fee increases alloted for the economic package may
be allocated for both salary increases and allowances.cralaw:red
On the other
hand, petitioners in the Valmonte
case believe that the MOLE cannot order the execution of a CBA which
would
allocate more than 60% of the proceeds of tuition fee increases for
salary
increases of school employees. Furthermore, petitioners question the
authority
of the then Minister of Labor and Employment to issue the aforequoted
Order
insofar as this allocates the tuition fee increases of the respondent
private
school. According to them, only the Minister of Education, Culture and
Sports has the authority to promulgate rules and regulations on the use
of tuition fees and increases thereto, pursuant to the provisions of B.
P. Blg. 232. They further argue that the assailed Order collides with
the
provisions of Pres. Dec. No. 451 insofar as it allocates 90% of the
tuition
fee increases for salary adjustments of the members of the bargaining
unit
which exceeds the 60% of the said increases allocated by the decree for
the same purpose.cralaw:red
Before delving
further into the questions raised,
this Court notes that in the Valmonte case, respondent Minister and
respondent
Faculty Association raise a procedural objection to the filing of the
Petition
- the standing of the petitioners to bring this suit. Both respondents
decry the petitioners' lack of the interest required in Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court for the filing of the Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition,
since the latter do not appear to be in any way aggrieved by the
enforcement
of the Order. Petitioners - parents did not even participate in
the
proceedings below which led to the issuance of the assailed Order.cralaw:red
This Court finds
merit in the respondents' objection.
Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court [Secs. 1 and 2], only a person
aggrieved
by the act or proceeding in question may file a petition for certiorari
and/or prohibition. The Valmonte petition fails to indicate how the
petitioners
would be aggrieved by the assailed Order. It appears that the
petitioners
are not parties and never, at any time, intervened in the conciliation
conferences and arbitration proceedings before the respondent Minister.
The parties therein, who stand to be directly affected by the Order of
the respondent Minister, do not contest the validity of said Order. The
petition does not even state that petitioners act as representative of
the parents' association in the School or in behalf of other parents
similarly
situated.cralaw:red
If indeed,
petitioners Valmonte and Badiola are
aggrieved by the said Order, they should have intervened and moved for
a reconsideration of respondent Minister's Order before filing the
instant
petition. Petitioners failed to show that the case falls under any one
of the recognized exceptions to the rule that a motion for
reconsideration
should first be availed of before filing a petition for certiorari and
prohibition.cralaw:red
In view of the
foregoing, the resolution of the
third sub-issue will be based mainly on the arguments raised in the
Biscocho
case.
RESOLUTION OF THE THIRD SUB-ISSUE
The Biscocho case
involves the issue on the allocation
of the incremental proceeds of the tuition fee increases applied for by
the respondent Espiritu Santo Parochial School for school years
1985-1986,
1986-1987, and 1987-1988. With the repeal of Pres. Dec. No. 451
by
B. P. Blg. 232, the allocation of the proceeds of any authorized
tuition
fee increase must be governed by specific rules and regulations issued
by the Minister [now Secretary] of Education pursuant to his broadened
rule-making authority under Section 42 of the new law. Thus, insofar as
the proceeds of the authorized tuition fee increases for school year
1985-1986
are concerned, the allocation must conform with the pertinent section
of
MECS Order No. 25, s. 1985, to wit:
7. Application or Use of Tuition and
Other
School Fees or Charges.
7.4. Not less than sixty [60] percent
of the
incremental tuition proceeds shall be used for salaries or wages,
allowances
and fringe benefits of faculty and support staff, including cost of
living
allowance, imputed costs of contributed services, thirteenth [13th]
month
pay, retirement fund contributions, social security, medicare, unpaid
school
personnel claims, and payments as may be prescribed by mandated wage
orders,
collective bargaining agreements and voluntary employer practices: Provided,
That increases in fees specifically authorized for the purposes listed
in paragraph 4.3.3 hereof shall be used entirely for those purposes.
With regard to
the proceeds of the tuition fee increases
for school year 1986-1987, the applicable rules are those embodied in
MECS
Order No. 22, S. 1986 which made reference to MECS Order No. 25, S.
1985,
the pertinent portion of which is quoted above.
Finally, as to
the proceeds of the tuition fee
increases for school year 1987-1988, DECS Order No. 37, S. 1987 must
apply:
c. Allocation of lncremental Proceeds
[1] In any case of increase, at least
sixty
percent
(60%) of the incremental proceeds should be allocated for increases in
or provisions for salaries or wages, allowances and fringe benefits of
faculty and other staff, including accruals to cost of living
allowance,
13th month pay, social security, medicare and retirement contributions
and increases as may be provided in mandated wage orders, collective
bargaining
agreements or voluntary employer practices.
[2] Provided, that in all cases
of
increase
the allocation of the incremental proceeds shall be without prejudice
to
the Supreme Court cases on the interpretation and applicability of
existing
legislations on tuition and other fees especially on the allocation and
use of any incremental proceeds of tuition and other fees increases.
[Emphasis
supplied].
Based on the
aforequoted MECS and DECS rules and
regulations which implement B. P. Blg. 232, the 60% portion of the
proceeds
of tuition fee increases may now be allotted for both salaries and
allowances
and other benefits. The 60% figure is, however, a minimum which means
that
schools and their employees may agree on a larger portion, or in this
case,
as much as 90% for salaries and allowances and other benefits. This is
not in anyway to allow diminution or loss of the portion allotted for
institutional
development of the school concerned. Thus, paragraph 7.5 of MECS Order
No. 25, Series of 1985 specifically provides that other student fees
and
charges like registration, library, laboratory or athletic fees shall
be
used exclusively for the purposes indicated.
III. RESOLUTION OF THE SPECIFIC
ISSUES
IN CEBU INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY CASE
Petitioner
assigns three other errors in the petition
for certiorari:
1.chanrobles virtual law libraryRESPONDENT MINISTER OF THE
MINISTRY OF
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO A
DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW IN DIRECTLY ISSUING THE ORDER DATED
SEPTEMBER
29,1981 WITHOUT CONDUCTING A FORMAL INVESTIGATION AND ARBITRATION
PROCEEDINGS.chanrobles virtual law library2.chanrobles virtual law libraryPUBLIC RESPONDENT ERRED IN NOT
DECLARING
THAT PETITIONER IS EXEMPTED AND/OR NOT OBLIGED TO PAY SERVICE INCENTIVE
LEAVE.chanrobles virtual law library3.chanrobles virtual law libraryPUBLIC RESPONDENT ERRED IN NOT
DECLARING
THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' CLAIMS FOR COLA AND SERVICE INCENTIVE LEAVE
ARE
FULLY BARRED BY LACHES AND/OR EXTINGUISHED BY PRESCRIPTION.chanrobles virtual law library
1.
Petitioner assails the Order of the
Minister of Labor on the ground that the same was issued without the
benefit
of a hearing and was merely based on the report of the labor management
committee which is allegedly without power to pass upon the issues
raised.
On this premise, petitioner claims that it was denied its right to due
process.cralaw:red
Petitioner's
contention is without merit. The
labor-management committee was empowered to investigate the complaint
against
the petitioner for non-payment of the cost of living allowance, 13th
month
pay and service incentive leave from 1974-1981. [Annex "F";
Rollo, p. 37]. In the committee, petitioner was represented by its
counsel,
registrar and assistant accountant and in the conferences that were
held,
the representatives of the petitioner were present. Furthermore, the
petitioner's
position paper submitted to the committee reflects that in all the
deliberations,
it was never denied the right to present evidence and be heard on all
the
issues raised, particularly to demonstrate that it had complied with
the
various COLA, 13th month pay and service incentive leave decrees. The
evidence
presented during the conferences and the position paper of the parties
were made the basis of the committee's report and recommendation which,
in turn, became the basis of the order of the Minister of Labor
directing
the petitioner to pay the complainants their COLA and service incentive
leave benefits.cralaw:red
It could not,
therefore, be contended that the
petitioner was deprived of his right to be heard when it appears on the
record that it was permitted to ventilate its side of the issues. There
was sufficient compliance with the requirements of due process. In the
face of the well-settled principle that administrative agencies are not
strictly bound by the technical rules of procedure, this Court
dismisses
the petitioner's claim that formal investigative and arbitration
proceedings
should be conducted. "While a day in court is a matter of right in
judicial
proceedings, in administrative proceedings it is otherwise since they
rest
upon different principles." [Cornejo v. Gabriel and Provincial Board of
Rizal, 41 Phil. 188 (1920); Tajonera v. Lamaroza, G. R. Nos. L-48907
and
L-49035, December 19,1981, 110 SCRA 438].cralaw:red
2. Going
now to the matter of service incentive
leave benefits, petitioner claims that private respondents are engaged
by the school on a contract basis as shown by the individual teacher's
contract which defines the nature, scope and period of their
employment;
hence, they are not entitled to the said benefit according to Rule V of
the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code to wit:
Sec. 1. Coverage. - This rule [on
Service
Incentive Leave] shall apply to all employees, except:
[d] Field personnel and other employees
whose
performance is unsupervised by the employer including those who are
engaged
on task or contract basis, purely commission basis, or those who are
paid
in a fixed amount for performing work irrespective of the time consumed
in the performance thereof; [MOLE Rules and Regulations, Rule V, Book
III].
The phrase
"those who are engaged on task or contract
basis" should however, be related with "field personnel " applying the
rule on ejusdem generis that general and unlimited terms are
restrained
and limited by the particular terms that they follow, [Vera v. Cuevas,
G.R. No. L-33693, May 31, 1979, 90 SCRA 379]. Clearly,
petitioner's
teaching personnel cannot be deemed field personnel which refers "to
non-agricultural
employees who regularly perform their duties away from the principal
place
of business or branch office of the employer and whose actual hours of
work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty. [Par.
3, Article 82, Labor Code of the Philippines]. Petitioner's claim that
private respondents are not entitled to the service incentive leave
benefit
cannot, therefore, be sustained.
3. As a
last-ditch effort to bar private
respondents' claims, petitioner asserts that the same are barred by
laches
and/or extinguished by prescription according to Article 291 of the
Labor
Code which provides:
Art. 291. Money claims. -
All money claims arising from employer-employee relations accruing
during
the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three [3] years from
the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise, they shall be forever
barred.
All money claims accruing prior to the
effectivity
of this Code shall be filed with the appropriate entities established
under
this Code within one [1] year from the date of effectivity, and shall
be
processed or determined in accordance with implementing rules and
regulations
of the Code; otherwise, they shall be forever barred.
Considering
that the complaint alleging non-payment
of benefits was filed only on February 11, 1981, petitioner argues that
prescription has already set in.
From the
aforequoted provision, it is not fully
accurate to conclude that the entire claims for COLA and service
incentive
leave are no longer recoverable. This Court finds no reason to disturb
the following pronouncement of the Minister of Labor:
Simply stated, claims for COLA under P.
D. 525
which took effect on August 1, 1974, for the months of August,
September
and October 1974 must be filed within one [1] year from November 1,
1974,
otherwise, they shall be considered prescribed; claims under the same
decree
that accrued on or after November 1, 1974 should be initiated within
three
[3] years from the date of accrual thereof, otherwise, the same shall
be
deemed extinguished. Although this particular claim was filed on
February
11, 1981, petitioners herein are entitled to COLA under P. D. 525 from
February 1978 up to the present since the COLA that accrued in
February,
1978 has not yet prescribed at the time that the claim was filed in
February
1981. In the same vein, petitioners herein should be granted COLA under
P. D. 1123 from February 1978 up to 1981 inasmuch as said decree became
effective only on May 11, 1977. Further, petitioners are entitled to
the
full amount of COLA provided under P. D.'s 1614, 1634, 1678 and 1713.
It
must be pointed out that the earliest of the just cited four [4]
decrees, i.e., P. D. 1614, just took effect on April 1, 1979.
Thus, the
prescriptive
period under Art. 292 of the Labor Code, as amended, does not as yet
apply
to money claims under the just mentioned decrees.
DIVINE WORD COLLEGE CASE
In assailing the
disputed Order, petitioner contends
that the public respondents acted with grave and patent abuse of
discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in that:
1.chanrobles virtual law libraryTHE REGIONAL DIRECTOR HAS NO
JURISDICTION
OVER MONEY CLAIMS ARISING FROM EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP; AND2.chanrobles virtual law libraryTHE REGIONAL DIRECTOR AND DEPUTY
MINISTER
OF LABOR ADOPTEDTHE REPORT OF THE LABOR
STANDARDS
DIVISION
WITHOUTAFFORDING THE PETITIONER THE
OPPORTUNITY
TO BE HEARD.chanrobles virtual law library
1. Petitioner
school claims that the case
at bar is a money claim and should therefore be within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter pursuant to Article 217 of
the Labor Code, as amended.cralaw:red
It appears from
the record, however, that the
original complaint filed by ten [10] faculty members of the Divine Word
College was for non-compliance with Pres. Dec. No. 451 and with Labor
Code
provisions on service incentive leave, holiday and rest day pay and
which
complaint specifically prayed that an inspection of the College be
conducted.cralaw:red
Contrary to the
petitioner's protestation of lack
of jurisdiction, the Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized
representatives
[which includes Regional Directors] are accorded the power to
investigate
complaints for non-compliance with labor laws, particularly those which
deal with labor standards such as payment of wages and other forms of
compensation,
working hours, industrial safety, etc. This is provided for in Article
128 of the Labor Code, as amended:
Art. 128. Visitorial and enforcement
power.-
[a] The Secretary of Labor or his duly
authorized
representatives including labor regulation officers shall have access
to
employers' records and premises at any time of the day or night,
whenever
work is being undertaken therein, and the right to copy therefrom, to
question
any employee and investigate any fact, condition or matter which may be
necessary to determine violations or which may aid in the enforcement
of
this Code and of any labor law, wage order or rules and regulations
issued
pursuant thereto.
[b] The Secretary of Labor or his duly
authorized
representatives shall have the power to order and administer, after due
notice and hearing, compliance with the labor standards provisions of
this
Code based on the findings of labor regulation officers or industrial
safety
engineers made in the course of inspection, and to issue writs of
execution
to the appropriate authority for the enforcement of their order, except
in cases where the employer contests the findings of the labor
regulations
officer and raises issues which cannot be resolved without considering
evidentiary matters that are not verifiable in the normal course of
inspection.
[Emphasis supplied].
Furthermore,
Policy Instructions No. 6 which deals
with the distribution of jurisdiction over labor cases restates, inter
alia, that "labor standards cases arising from violation of labor
standards
laws discovered in the course of inspection or complaints where
employer-employee
relations still exist" are under the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the Regional Director.
Even assuming
that respondent Regional Director
was without jurisdiction to entertain the case at bar, petitioner is
now
barred at this stage to claim lack of jurisdiction having actively
participated
in the proceedings below. Petitioner never questioned the jurisdiction
of the respondent Regional Director.cralaw:red
2. The
petitioner claims that it was never
afforded the opportunity to be heard and was, therefore, denied due
process.cralaw:red
There is no
dispute that an inspection of the
College was conducted after a complaint by some faculty members was
filed
with the Regional Office of the Ministry of Labor and Employment.
A report was submitted on the basis of the findings contained therein.
Petitioner was furnished a copy of said report to which it filed a
comment.
Finding this to be without merit, the Regional Director issued an order
giving petitioner ten [10] days to manifest its compliance with the
findings,
otherwise, another would be issued to enforce payment. Petitioner
appealed
but instead of resolving the memorandum of appeal, which the Regional
Director
treated as a motion for reconsideration, said Director issued another
Order
dated August 2, 1983 directing the payment of the employees' share in
the
sixty [60%] percent incremental proceeds. Petitioner moved for a
reconsideration
of the latest order which the Regional Director, however, denied,
thereby
elevating the case to the Office of the Minister of Labor and
Employment.cralaw:red
The foregoing
facts demonstrate that petitioner
had the opportunity to refute the report on the inspection conducted.
It
submitted a comment thereto, which was in effect its position paper.
The
arguments therein and evidence attached thereto were considered by
respondent
Regional Director in the order issued subsequently. They, therefore,
had
ample opportunity to present their side of the controversy.cralaw:red
What due process
contemplates is not merely the
existence of an actual hearing. The "right to be heard" focuses more on
the substance rather than the form. In the case at bar, petitioner was
actually heard through the pleadings that it filed with the Regional
Office
V. As it itself admitted in its petition that it was afforded the
right to be heard on appeal [See Rollo, p. 581], petitioner cannot,
therefore,
insist that it was denied due process.
FAR EASTERN UNIVERSITY CASE
Two other issues
are raised in this petition,
to wit:
1.chanrobles virtual law libraryWHETHER OR NOT "TRANSPORTATION
ALLOWANCE"
SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS "EQUIVALENT TO 13TH-MONTH PAY" UNDER PRES. DEC.
NO. 851.chanrobles virtual law library2.chanrobles virtual law libraryWHETHER OR NOT LEGAL HOLIDAY PAY
BENEFIT
COULD BE VALIDLY WITHDRAWN AFTER BEING PRACTICED CONTINUOUSLY FOR EIGHT
[8] MONTHS.chanrobles virtual law library
1. The
issue on the thirteenth [13th] month
pay involves an interpretation of the provisions of Pres. Dec. No. 851
which requires all employers "to pay all their employees receiving a
basic
salary of not more than Pl,000 a month, regardless of the nature of the
employment, a 13th-month pay" [Sec. 1]. However, "employer[s] already
paying
their employees a 13th-month pay or its equivalent are not covered"
[Sec.
2]. (Emphasis supplied)
The Rules and
Regulations Implementing Pres. Dec.
No. 851 provide the following:
Sec. 3. Employees. -
The
Decree
shall apply to all employers except to:
[c] Employers already paying
their
employees
13th-month or more in a calendar year or its equivalent at the time of
this issuance;
The term "its equivalent" as used in
paragraph
[c] hereof shall include Christmas bonus, mid-year bonus,
profit-sharing
payments and other cash bonuses amounting to not less than 1/12th of
the
basic salary but shall not include cash and stock dividends, cost of
living
allowances and all other allowances regularly enjoyed by the employer,
as well as non-monetary benefits. Where an employer pays less than 1/1
2th of the employee's basic salary, the employer shall pay the
difference.
In the case at
bar, the 13th-month pay is paid in
the following manner:
FOR REGULAR EMPLOYEES:
Transportation Allowance [TA]
50% of basic for the first year of
service
plus
additional 5% every year thereafter but not to exceed 100% of basic
salary
Christmas Bonus [CB]
50% of basic salary for the first year
of
service
plus additional 5% every year thereafter but not to exceed 100% of
basic
salary.
For employees who have served the
University
for
more than 10 years, the University pays them emoluments equivalent to
the
14 months salaries.
13th Month Pay Formula:
Monthly Rate x No. of
months served for the year
Less TA/CB = 13th Mo. pay
12 months
FOR CASUAL EMPLOYEES:
13th Month Pay Formula:
Add salaries from 16 December of previous
year
to 15th December of present year [and] divide by 12 months = 13th Mo.
Pay
[Rollo, pp. 60, 72].
The
University's answer to the Union's claim of underpayment
of the 13th-month pay is that the "transportation allowance" paid to
its
employees partakes the nature of a mid-year bonus which under Section 2
of Pres. Dec. No. 851 and Section 3[c] of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations
is equivalent to the 13th-month pay,
The Labor Arbiter
ordered FEU to pay the 13th-month
pay differentials of the complainants reasoning that:
CLEARLY, transportation allowance cannot
be
considered
as "equivalent" of 13th-month pay as it is neither a Christmas bonus,
mid-year
bonus, profit-sharing payment, or other cash bonuses, pursuant to
paragraphs
[c] and [e], Section 3 of P. D. 851. The regularity of its payment
further
cements this proposition.
PERFORCE, complainants are underpaid of
their
13th-month pay in an amount equivalent to 50% of their basic salary for
the 1st year of service, plus additional 5% every year thereafter but
not
to exceed 100% of their basic salary which, per respondent's formula,
corresponds
to their transportation allowance. [Rollo, p. 61].
On appeal, the
Third Division of the National Labor
Relations Commission reversed the Labor Arbiter's ruling by dismissing
the complainant's claim for underpayment of the 13th-month pay for lack
of merit. The NLRC ruled that:
From the above findings and conclusion,
it is
clear that insofar as employees with ten [10] years of service or more
are concerned, they receive the equivalent of one [1] month pay for
Christmas
bonus and another one [1] month pay as transportation allowance or a
total
of fourteen [14] months salary in a year. Obviously, this group of
employees
are fully paid of their 13th-month pay and are not, therefore, subject
to the instant claim. As it is only those with less than ten [10] years
of service are included or encompassed by the Labor Arbiter's
resolution
on this particular issue. With this clarification, we shall now proceed
to discuss the crux of the controversy, that is, the determination of
whether
or not the so designated "transportation allowance" being paid to the
employees
should be considered among those deemed equivalent to 13th month pay.
As
adverted earlier, the Labor Arbiter opined that it cannot be so
considered
as the equivalent of 13th month pay.
xxx xxx xxx
In passing upon the issue, we deemed
it best
to
delve deeper into the nature and intendment of the transportation
allowances
as designated by both the complainants and the respondent. Complainants
claim that the transportation allowance they enjoy has always been
called
and termed allowance and never as bonus since the time the same was
given
to them. They assert that it simply was intended as an allowance and
not
a bonus. It would appear, however, that complainants do not dispute
respondent's
stand that transportation allowance is being paid only every March of
each
year as distinguished from other allowances that are being paid on a
monthly
basis or on a bi-monthly basis; that the amount of transportation
allowance
to be paid is dependent on the length of service of the employee
concerned
[i.e., 50% basic in the first year and additional 5% for each
succeeding
years, etc.]; that the said method of computing the amount of the
transportation
allowance to be paid the complainants is identical to that used in
determining
Christmas bonus [respondent's Exhibit "8"] that the reason behind said
transportation allowance is to financially assist employees in meeting
their tax obligations as the same become due on or about the month of
March
of each year.
xxx xxx xxx
We are inclined to believe and so hold
that
by
the manner by which said transportation allowance is being paid [only
once
a year] as well as the method of determining the amount to be paid
[similar
to Christmas bonus] and considering further the reason behind said
payment
[easing the burden of taxpayer-employee], the said transportation
allowance
given out by respondent while designating as such, partakes the nature
of a mid-year bonus. It bears to note in passing that in providing for
transportation allowance, respondent was not compelled by law nor by
the
CBA [Annex "A" of respondent's Appeal] as nowhere in the CBA nor in the
Labor Code can be found any provision on transportation allowance. It
was,
therefore, a benefit that stemmed out purely from the voluntary act and
generosity of the respondent FEU. Moreover, said transportation
allowance
is only being paid once a year. On the other hand, regular allowances
not
considered as 13th-month pay equivalent under P. D. 851, to our mind,
refer
to those paid on regular intervals and catering for specific employees'
needs and requirements that recur on a regular basis. Verily, if the
intendment
behind the disputed transportation allowance is to answer for the daily
recurring transportation expenses of the employees, the same should
have
been paid to employees on regular periodic intervals. All indications,
as we see it, point out to the conclusion that the disputed
transportation
allowance, while dominated as such apparently for lack of better term,
is in fact a form of bonus doled out by the respondent during the month
of March every year.
Hence, we hold that it is one of those
that
can
very well be considered as equivalent to the 13th month pay [Rollo, pp.
73, 74, 75, 76].
This Court
sustains the aforequoted view of public
respondent. The benefit herein designated as "transportation allowance"
is a form of bonus equivalent to the 13th month pay. Nevertheless,
where
this does not amount to 1/12 of the employees basic salary, the
employer
shall pay the difference.
The evident intention of the law was to
grant
an additional income in the form of a 13th month pay to employees not
already
receiving the same. This Court ruled in National Federation of Sugar
Workers
[NFSW] v. Ovejera [G. R. No. 59743, May 31, 1982, 114 SCRA 354]:
Otherwise put, the intention was to grant
some
relief not to all workers but only to the unfortunate ones
not actually paid a 13th month salary or what amounts to it, by
whatever
name called, but it was not envisioned that a double burden would be
imposed
on the employer already paying his employees a 13th month pay or its
equivalent,
whether out of pure generosity or on the basis of a binding agreement
and,
in the latter case, regardless of the conditional character of the
grant
[such as making the payment dependent on profit], so long as there is
actual
payment. Otherwise, what was conceived to be a 13th month salary would
in effect become a 14th or possibly 15th month pay.
Pragmatic considerations also weigh
heavily in
favor of crediting both voluntary and contractual bonuses for the
purpose
of determining liability for the 13th month pay. To require employers
[already
giving their employees a 13th month salary or its equivalent] to give a
second 13th month pay would be unfair and productive of undesirable
results.
To the employer who had acceded and is already bound to give bonuses to
his employees, the additional burden of a 13th month pay would amount
to
a penalty for his munificence or liberality. The probable reaction of
one
so circumstanced would be to withdraw the bonuses or resist further
voluntary
grants for fear that if and when a law is passed giving the same
benefits,
his prior concessions might not be given due credit; and this negative
attitude would have an adverse impact on the employees [pp.369,370].
The case of
Dole Philippines, Inc. v. Leogardo [G.
R. No. 60018, October 23, 1982, 117 SCRA 938 (1982)], citing the ruling
in the above case also pointed out that:
To hold otherwise would be to impose an
unreasonable
and undue burden upon those employers who had demonstrated their
sensitivity
and concern for the welfare of their employees. A contrary stance would
indeed create an absurd situation whereby an employer who started
giving
his employees the 13th month pay only because of the unmistakable force
of the law would be in a far better position than another who, by his
own
magnanimity or by mutual agreement, had long been extending to his
employees
the benefits contemplated under P. D. No. 851, by whatever nomenclature
these benefits have come to be known. Indeed, P. D. No. 851, a
legislation
benevolent in its purpose, never intended to bring about such
oppressive
situation. [p. 944].
2.
Presidential Decree No. 570-A was issued
on November 1, 1974 amending certain articles of Presidential Decree
No.
442 [Labor Code of the Philippines promulgated on May 1, 1974 which
took
effect six months thereafter]. Section 28 thereof provides that:
Section 28. A new provision is
hereby
substituted
in lieu of the original provision of Article 258 of the same Code to
read
as follows:
Art. 258. Right to holiday pay. -
[a] Every worker shall be paid his regular
holidays,
except in retail and service establishments regularly employing less
than
ten [10] workers;
[b] The term "holiday" as used in
this
Chapter,
shall include: New Year's day, Maundy Thursday, Good Friday, the ninth
of April, the first of May, the twelfth of June, the fourth of July,
the
thirtieth of November, the twenty fifth and thirtieth of December and
the
day designated by law for holding a general election.
[c] When employer may require
work on
holidays.
- The employer may require an employee to work on any holiday but
such
employee shall be paid a compensation equivalent twice his regular rate.
Presidential
Decree No. 850 issued on December 16,
1975, also amending certain articles of Pres. Dec. No. 442 adopted the
aforequoted provision. Two months later, on February 16, 1976, the
Rules
and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code, as amended, was released
the
pertinent portion of which states that:
Section 2. Status of employees
paid
by the month. - Employees who are uniformly paid by the
month,
irrespective of the number of working days therein, with a salary of
not
less than the statutory or established minimum wage shall be presumed
to
be paid for all days in the month whether worked or not.
For this purpose, the monthly minimum
wage
shall
not be less than the statutory minimum wage multiplied by 365 days
divided
by twelve.
Section 3. Holiday Pay. -
Every
employer shall pay his employees their regular daily wage for any
unworked
regular holiday.
As used in the Rule, the term "holiday"
shall
exclusively refer to: New Year's Day, Maundy Thursday, Good Friday, the
ninth of April, the first of May, the twelfth of June, the fourth of
July,
the thirtieth of November, the twenty-fifth and thirtieth of December
and
the day designated by law for a general election or national referendum
or plebiscite. [MOLE Rules and Reg. Book III, Rule IV, Sec.
2 (1976)].
After one week,
on February 23, 1976, the Minister
of Labor issued Policy Instructions No. 9, to clarify further the right
to holiday pay, thus:
The Rules Implementing P. D. 850 have
clarified
the policy in the implementation of the ten [10] paid legal holidays.
Before
P. D. 850, the number of working days a year in a firm was considered
important
in determining entitlement to the benefit. Thus, where an employee was
working for at least 313 days, he was definitely already paid. If he
was
working for less than 313, there was no certainty whether the ten [10]
paid legal holidays were already paid to him or not.
The ten [10] paid legal holidays law,
to
start
with, is intended to benefit principally daily employees. In the
case of monthly, only those whose monthly salary did not yet include
payment
for the ten [10] paid legal holidays are entitled to the benefit.
Under hte rules implementing P. D.
850, this
policy
has been fully clarified to eliminate controversies on the entitlement
of monthly paid employees. The new determining rule is
this:
If the monthly paid employee is receiving not less than P240, the
maximum
monthly minimum wage, and his monthly pay is uniform from January to
December,
he is presumed to be already paid the ten [10] paid legal
holidays.
However, if deductions are made from his monthly salary on account of
holidays
in months where they occur, then he is entitled to the ten (10) legal
holidays.
These new interpretations must be
uniformly and
consistently upheld.
This issuance shall take effect
immediately.
In the
meantime, respondent University paid its employees
holiday pay for the following days:
DATE
HOLIDAYS PAID
June 9, 1975 for the previous nine
legal
holidays
August, 1975 for the previous June 12
and
July
4
Jan. 14, 1976 for the previous Nov. 30,
Dec.
25and 30 and Jan. 1
After January
14, 1976, however, the University ceased
paying the holiday pay allegedly by reason of Policy Instructions No.
9.
Specifically, the University claimed that the monthly salary of its
employees
was, as of 1976, more than P 240.00 without deductions from their
monthly
salary on account of holidays in months where they occurred and that,
therefore,
by virtue of Policy Instructions No. 9, they were no longer entitled to
the ten paid legal holidays.
Petitioners, upon
the other hand, contend that
Policy Instructions No. 9 could not have possibly been the reason that
prompted the University to withdraw such benefits from its faculty and
employees because said implementing rule was issued only on April 23,
1976
or four months later.cralaw:red
The Labor Arbiter
ruled in favor of the complainant
Union for the reason that "the payment of the 10-paid legal holiday
benefits
from June 8, 1975 up to January 14, 1976 is considered an employer
practice
that can no longer be withdrawn." [Decision; Rollo, p. 59].cralaw:red
As in the case of
the 13th month pay, the NLRC
reversed the Labor Arbiter's ruling. The NLRC held that:
Apparently, Arbiter Ruben Aquino
concluded that
payment by the respondent of the legal holiday pay preceded the
effectivity
of the Rules and Regulations Implementing P. D. 850 and which rules
took
effect on February 16, 1976. Hence, his conclusion that the payment of
the legal holiday pay stemmed out from company practice and not from
law.
Tracing back, however, the payments made by respondent of said holiday
pay will show that, if ever, the same was made pursuant to P. D. 570-A
which took effect on November 1, 1974. Noteworthy is the undisputed
fact
that respondent first paid its employees legal holiday pay in June 1975
corresponding to nine [9] legal holidays. It bears to note that from
the
time of the effectivity of P. D. 570-A which was in November of 1974 up
to June of 1975, the time respondent first paid legal holiday pay for
nine
[9] legal holidays, there were indeed more or less nine legal holidays
that transpired to wit: November 30, 1974, December 25, 1974, December
30, 1974, January 1, 1975, February 27, 1975 (Referendum Day), Maundy
Thursday
of 1975, Good Friday of 1975, April 9, 1975 and finally, May 1st of
1975.
We are, therefore, inclined to lend credence to respondent's claim that
the payment of legal holiday pay was in fact made pursuant to law, P.
D.
570-A in particular; it is not one that arose out of company practice
or
policy.
Finding that said payment was made based
on an
honest although erroneous interpretation of law, which interpretation
was
later on corrected by the issuance (sic) of Policy Instructions
No. 9 and which issuance prompted respondent to withdraw the holiday
pay
benefits extended to the employees who were paid on a regular monthly
basis,
and finding further that under Policy Instructions No. 9, said subject
employees are deemed paid their holiday pay as they were paid on a
monthly
basis at a wage rate presumably above the statutory minimum, we believe
and so hold that the withdrawal of said holiday pay benefit was valid
and
justifiable under the circumstances. [Rollo, pp. 33-4].
This Court
cannot sustain the foregoing decision
of public respondent. Said decision relied on Section 2, Rule IV, Book
Ill of the implementing rules and on Policy Instructions No. 9 which
were
declared by this Court to be null and void in Insular Bank of Asia and
America Employee's Union [IBAAEU] v. Inciong [G. R. No. 52415, October
23, 1984, 132 SCRA 663]. In disposing of the issue at hand, this Court
reiterates the ruling in that case, to wit:
We agree with the petitioner's contention
that
Section 2, Rule IV, Book Ill of the implementing rules and Policy
Instructions
No. 9 issued by the then Secretary of Labor are null and void since in
the guise of clarifying the Labor Code's provision on holiday pay, they
in fact amended them by enlarging the scope of their exclusion.
It is
elementary in the rules of statutory construction
that when the language of the law is clear and unequivocal the law must
be taken to mean exactly what it says. In the case at bar, the
provisions
of the Labor Code on the entitlement to the benefits of holiday pay are
clear and explicit it provides for both the coverage of and
exclusion
from the benefits. In Policy Instructions No. 9, the then Secretary of
Labor went as far as to categorically state that the benefit is
principally
intended for daily paid employees, when the law clearly states that
every
worker shall be paid their regular holiday pay. This is a flagrant
violation
of the mandatory directive of Article 4 of the Labor Code which states
that "All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the
provisions
of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall
be
resolved in favor of labor. " Moreover, it shall always be presumed
that
the legislature intended to enact a valid and permanent statute which
would
have the most beneficial effect that its language permits.
[Orlosky
vs. Haskell, 155 A. 112]. (pp. 673-4).
BISCOCHO CASE
At issue also in
this petition is whether the
60% incremental proceeds may be subjected to attorney's fees,
negotiation
fees, agency fees and the like.cralaw:red
The Court notes
the fact that there are two classes
of employees among the petitioners: [1] those who are members of the
bargaining
unit; and [2] those who are not members of the bargaining unit. The
first
class may be further subdivided into two: those who are members of the
collective bargaining agent and those who are not.cralaw:red
It is clear that
the questioned Order of the respondent
Minister applies only to members of the bargaining unit. The CBA
prepared
pursuant to said Order, however, covered employees who are not members
of the bargaining unit, although said CBA had not yet been signed at
the
time this petition was filed on November 24, 1986. Assuming it
was
signed thereafter, the inclusion of employees outside the bargaining
unit
should be nullified as this does not conform to said Order which
directed
private respondents to execute a CBA covering only members of the
bargaining
unit.cralaw:red
Being outside the
coverage of respondent Minister's
order, and thus, not entitled to the economic package involved therein,
employees who are non-members of the bargaining unit should not be
assessed
negotiation fees, attorney's fees, agency fees and the like, for the
simple
reason that the resulting collective bargaining agreement does not
apply
to them. It should be clear, however, that while non-members of the
bargaining
unit are not entitled to the economic package provided by said order,
they
are, in lieu thereof, still entitled to their share in the 60%
incremental
proceeds of increases in tuition or other school fees or charges.cralaw:red
As far as
assessment of fees against employees
of the collective bargaining unit who are not members of the collective
bargaining agent is concerned, Article 249 of the Labor Code, as
amended
by B. P. Blg. 70, provides the rule:
Art. 249. Unfair labor practices
of
employers.-
xxx xxx xxx
[e] Employees of an appropriate
collective
bargaining unit who are not members of the recognized collective
bargaining
agent may be assessed a reasonable fee equivalent to the dues and other
fees paid by members of the recognized collective bargaining agent, if
such non-union members accept the benefits under the collective
agreement.
Employees of
the collective bargaining unit who are
not members of the collective bargaining agent have to pay the
foregoing
fees if they accept the benefits under the collective bargaining
agreement
and if such fees are not unreasonable. Petitioners who are members of
the
bargaining unit failed to show that the equivalent of ten [10%] percent
of their backwages sought to be deducted is unreasonable.
WHEREFORE, the
Court rules:
CEBU INSTITUTE
OF TECHNOLOGY CASE
In G. R. No. 58870, the Order of
respondent
Minister
of Labor and Employment dated September 29, 1981 is sustained insofar
as
it ordered petitioner Cebu Institute of Technology to pay its teaching
staff the following:
[1] Cost of living allowance under
Pres.
Dec.Nos.525
and 1123 from February 1978 up to 1981;
[2] Cost of living allowance under
Pres.
Dec.
Nos. 1614, 1634, 1678 and 1713; and
[3] Service incentive leave due them
from
1978.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued by
this
Court on December 7, 1981 is hereby lifted and set aside. No costs.
DIVINE WORD
COLLEGE CASE
The petition in G. R. No. 68345 is denied
for
lack of merit. The questioned Orders of respondent Deputy Minister of
Labor
and Employment dated December 19, 1983 and July 4, 1984 are sustained
insofar
as said Orders denied the payment of the emergency cost of living
allowances
of private respondents faculty teachers of the Divine Word College of
Legazpi
out of the sixty [60%] incremental proceeds of tuition and other school
fee increases collected during the effectivity of Pres. Dec. No. 451.
The
Rules and Regulations implementing Pres. Dec. No. 451 are hereby
declared
invalid for being ultra vires. No costs.
FAR EASTERN
UNIVERSITY CASE
The Decision of public respondent
National
Labor
Relations Commission dated September 18, 1984 is reversed insofar as it
affirmed in toto the dismissal of petitioner Far Eastern
University
Employee Labor Union's claim under Pres. Dec. No. 451 and its claim for
payment of holiday pay. Private respondent Far Eastern University is,
therefore,
ordered to pay its employees the following:
[1] Their sixty [60] percent share in
the
increases
in tuition and other school fees or charges which shall be allocated
exclusively
for increase in salaries or wages if the tuition or other school fee
increase
was collected during the effectivity of Pres. Dec. No. 451;
[2] Their claim for holiday pay which
was
withdrawn
since January 14, 1976 up to the present.
The Decision of respondent National Labor
Relations
Commission, however, is sustained insofar as it denied petitioner's
claim
for thirteenth [13th] month pay. No costs.
FABROS CASE
In G. R. No. 70832, the Petition for
Certiorari
and Prohibition is dismissed. MECS Order No. 25. S. 1985, particularly
paragraphs 7.0 to 7.5 thereof, which provide for the use and
application
of sixty [60%] percent of the increases in tuition and other school
fees
or charges, having been issued pursuant to B. P. Blg. 232 which
repealed
Pres. Dec. No. 451, is hereby declared valid. The Temporary Restraining
Order issued by this Court dated May 29, 1985 is lifted and set aside.
No costs.
BISCOCHO CASE
The assailed portions of the Order of the
Minister
of Labor and Employment dated April 14, 1986 are affirmed. The
collective
bargaining agreement prepared pursuant thereto should, however, be
modified
to cover only members of the bargaining unit. Only petitioners who are
members of the collective bargaining unit, if they accept the benefits
under the resulting collective bargaining agreement, shall be charged
ten
[10%] percent of the payable backwages as negotiation fees. The
Temporary
Restraining Order dated November 25, 1986 is lifted and set aside. No
costs.
VALMONTE CASE
The petition in G. R. No. 76596 is
dismissed
for lack of merit.
Effective
September 1, 1982, the application and
use of the proceeds from increases in tuition fees and other school
fees
or charges shall be governed by Section 42 of B. P. Blg. 232 as
implemented
by the Rules and Regulations issued by the then Ministry, now
Department
of Education, Culture and Sports.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J.,
Yap, Melencio-Herrera,
Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin and Sarmiento, JJ.,
concur.
Fernan, Narvasa, Cruz and Padilla, JJ.,
took no part. |