CEBU INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY [CIT],
                                                    Petitioner,

______________________________________________
 

DIVINE WORD COLLEGE OF LEGAZPI,
                                            Petitioner,

______________________________________________
 
 

______________________________________________
 
 
 

______________________________________________
 
 

______________________________________________
 

RICARDO C. VALMONTE and CORAZON BADIOLA,
                                                                               Petitioners,

Specifically, the common problem presented by these cases requires an interpretation of Section 3[a] of Pres. Decree No. 451 which states:

Sec. 3.  Limitations. -  The increase in tuition or other school fees or other charges as well as the new fees or charges authorized under the next preceding section shall be subject to the following conditions:

[a] That no increase in tuition or other school fees or charges shall be approved unless sixty [60%] per centum of the proceeds is allocated for increase in salaries or wages of the members of the faculty and all other employees of the school concerned, and the balance for institutional development, student assistance and extension services, and return to investments: Provided, That in no case shall the return to investments exceed twelve [12%] per centum of the incremental proceeds;

xxx   xxx   xxx

In a nutshell, the present controversy was precipitated by the claims of some school personnel for allowances and other benefits and the refusal of the private schools concerned to pay said allowances and benefits on the ground that said items should be deemed included in the salary increases they had paid out of the 60% portion of the proceeds from tuition fee increases provided for in Section 3 [a] of Pres. Decree No. 451. The interpretation and construction of laws being a matter of judicial power and duty [Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803); Endencia v. David, 93 Phil. 696 (1953)], this Court has been called upon to resolve the controversy.

In the process of reading and at times, having to decipher, the numerous pleadings filed in the six cases, the Court found that the main issue has been approached by the parties from almost diametrical points, thereby bringing into focus three sub-issues: first, whether or not allowances and other fringe benefits of faculty members and other school employees may be charged against the 60% portion of the tuition fee increases provided for in Section 3[a] of Pres. Dec. No. 451; second, whether or not the same items may be charged against said portion under the provisions of B. P. Blg. 232; and, third, whether or not schools and their employees may enter into a collective bargaining agreement allocating more than 60% of said incremental proceeds for salary increases and other benefits of said employees. After these sub-issues have been resolved, the Court will tackle the other incidents attending the individual cases, seriatim.

The factual antecedents that brought these cases before this Tribunal are as follows:
 

The position taken by CIT during the conference held by the labor-management committee was that it had paid the allowances mandated by various decrees but the same had been integrated in the teacher's hourly rate. It alleged that the payment of COLA by way of salary increases is in line with Pres. Dec. No. 451. It also claimed in its position paper that it had paid thirteenth month pay to its employees and that it was exempt from the payment of service incentive leave to its teachers who were employed on contract basis [Rollo, pp. 85-86].

After the report and recommendation of the committee, herein public respondent, then Minister of Labor and Employment, issued the assailed Order dated September 29, 1981 and held that the basic hourly rate designated in the Teachers' Program is regarded as the basic hourly rate of teachers exclusive of the COLA, and that COLA should not be taken from the 60% incremental proceeds of the approved increase in tuition fee. The dispositive portion of the Order reads:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, CIT is hereby ordered to pay its teaching staff the following:

(1) COLA under P. D.'s 525 and 1123 from February 1978 up to 1981;

(2) COLA under P. D.'s l6l4,1634,1678 and l7l3;and

(3) Service incentive leave from l978 upto l981.

CIT is further directed to integrate into the basic salaries of its teachers and (sic) COLA under P. D.'s 525 and 1123 starting on January 1981, pursuant to P. D. 1751. For purposes of integration, the hourly rate shown in its Teachers' Program for school year 198182 shall be considered as the basic hourly rate.

SO ORDERED.

Upon a complaint filed by ten faculty members for alleged non-compliance by herein petitioner Divine Word College of Legazpi with, among others, Pres. Dec. No. 451, i.e., allowances were charged to the 60% incremental proceeds of tuition fee increase, the Labor Regulation Section of Regional Office No. V [Legazpi City] of the Ministry of Labor and Employment conducted an inspection of the employment records of said school. On the basis of the report on the special inspection that the school did not comply with Pres. Dec. No. 451, herein respondent Regional Director issued an Order dated May 30, 1983, requiring compliance by the Divine Word College. The latter filed a Memorandum of Appeal from said Order which the Regional Director treated as a Motion for Reconsideration. Upon failure of the school to comply with the aforesaid Order, another Order [August 2, 1983] was issued by herein respondent Regional Director requiring herein petitioner to pay the faculty members-complainants [herein private respondents] the amounts indicated therein or the total sum of Six Hundred Seventeen Thousand Nine Hundred Sixty Seven Pesos and Seventy Seven Centavos [P 617,967.77]. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the Order was denied.

On appeal, the respondent Deputy Minister of Labor and Employment affirmed the Order of the Regional Director, viz:

xxx   xxx   xxx

Coming now to the substantial merit of the case, we share the view that the emergency allowances due the complainants under the several Presidential Decrees [P. D.'s 525, 1123, etc.] cannot be charged by the respondent against the 60% of the incremental proceeds from increase in tuition fees authorized under P. D. 451, not only because as per decision of the Supreme Court [UE vs. UE Faculty Association, et al., G. R. No. 57387, September 30, 1982] said allowances whether mandated by law or secured by collective bargaining should be taken only from the return to investment referred to in the decree if the school has no other resources to grant the allowances but not from the 60% incremental proceeds, but also because to hold otherwise would, to our mind, inevitably result in the loss of one benefit due the complainants, that is, the salary or wage increase granted them by P. D. 451.

In other words, we believe that by paying the complainants' allowances out of the 60% incremental proceeds intended for their salary increase, they are practically being deprived of one benefit - their share in the 60% incremental proceeds in terms of salary or wage increase.

WHEREFORE, for the reasons abovestated, the Order appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, and the appeal DISMISSED, for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.[Annex "K " to Petition; Rollo, p. 108, 110].

On March 25, 1985, after considering the allegations, issues and arguments adduced in the petition as well as the Comment thereon of the public respondent and dispensing with the private respondents' Comment, the Court resolved to dismiss the petition for lack of merit [Rollo, p. 198]. On April 26, 1985, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Consider the Case En Banc. On June 26, 1985 the First Division of the Court referred the case to the Court En Banc for consolidation with G. R. No. 70832, entitled "Gregorio T. Fabros, et al vs. Hon. Jaime C. Laya, etc. " since it involves the same issue on the application of 60% incremental proceeds of authorized tuition fee increases [Rollo, p. 235]. The Court EN BANC resolved to accept the case. [Resolution of July 16, 1985]. These cases were further consolidated with other cases involving the same issues.
 

RESPONSIVE TO THE FOREGOING, respondent is hereby directed, within ten [10] days from receipt hereof, to:

1. To (sic) pay the paid legal holidays that it withdrew since January 14, 1976 up to the present; and

2. Pay the 13th month pay differential of complainant's for the covered period December 16, 1975 to December 17, 1978, date of filing of complaint for non-payment of legal holiday pay and under payment of the 13th month pay, and thereafter. Barred forever are money claims beyond three [3] years from the time the course (sic) of action occurred. Respondent's formula on transportation allowance which was deducted from the 13th month pay is thus subject to this prescriptive period, for purposes of computation of differentials for the 13th month pay.

The claim under P. D. 451 is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.[Annex " E " to Petition; Rollo, p. 55, 65-66].

RESPONSIVE TO THE FOREGOING, the Decision of Labor Arbiter Ruben A. Aquino in the instant case dated March 10, 1980 is hereby modified in the sense that complainant's claims for legal holiday pay and 13th month pay are likewise dismissed for lack of merit and the dismissal of the claim under P.D. 451 is hereby affirmed en (sic) toto.  [Annex "A" to Petition: Rollo, p. 24, 35].

This petition is in the nature of a class suit brought by petitioners in behalf of the faculty members and other employees of more than 4,000 private schools nationwide. Petitioners seek to enjoin the implementation of paragraphs 7 to 7.5 of MECS Order No. 5, Series of 1985, on the ground that the said Order is null and void for being contrary to Pres. Dec. No. 451 and the rulings of the Supreme Court in the cases of University of the East v. UE Faculty Association (G. R. No. L-57387, September 20, 1982, 117 SCRA 5541, University of Pangasinan Faculty Union v. University of Pangasinan and NLRC [G.R. No. 63122, February 20, 1984, 127 SCRA 691 ], St. Louis University Faculty Club v. NLRC and St. Louis University [G.R. No. 65585, September 28, 1984, 132 SCRA 380]).

On September 11, 1982, Batas Pambansa Blg. 232 [Education Act of 1982] was signed into law. On the matter of tuition and other school fees of private schools, Section 42 of said law provides as follows:

Sec. 42. Tuition and other School Fees. -  Each private school shall determine its rate of tuition and other school fees or charges. The rates and charges adopted by schools pursuant to this provision shall be collectible, and their application or use authorized, subject to rules and regulations promulgated by the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports. [Emphasis supplied].

7. Application or Use of Tuition and Other School Fees or Charges.
 
7.1. The proceeds from tuition fees and other school charges as well as other income of each school shall be treated as an institutional fund which shall be administered and managed for the support of school purposes strictly: Provided, That for the purpose of generating additional financial resources or income for the operational support and maintenance of each school, two or more schools may pool their institutional funds, in whole or in part, subject to the prior approval of their respective governing boards.

7.2. Tuition fees shall be used to cover the general expenses of operating the school in order to allow it to meet the minimum standards required by the Ministry or any other higher standard to which the school aspires. They may be used to meet the costs of operation, for maintaining or improving the quality of instruction/training/research through improved facilities and through the payment of adequate and competitive compensation for its faculty and support personnel, including compliance with mandated increases in personnel compensation and/or allowance.

7.3. Tuition fees shall be used to cover minimum and necessary costs including the following: [a] compensation of school personnel such as teaching or academic staff, school administrators, academic non-teaching personnel, and non-academic personnel; [b] maintenance and operating expenses, including power and utilities, rentals, depreciation, office supplies; and [c] interest expenses and installment payments on school debts.

7.4. Not less than sixty [60] percent of the incremental tuition proceeds shall be used for salaries or wages, allowances and fringe benefits of faculty and support staff, including cost of living allowance, imputed costs of contributed services, thirteenth [13th] month pay, retirement fund contributions, social security, medicare, unpaid school personnel claims and payments as may be prescribed by mandated wage orders, collective bargaining agreements and voluntary employer practices; Provided, That increases in fees specifically authorized for the purposes listed in paragraph 4.3.3 hereof shall be used entirely for those purposes. [Italics supplied].

7.5. Other student fees and charges as may be approved, including registration, library, laboratory, athletic, application, testing fees and charges shall be used exclusively for the indicated purposes, including [a] the acquisition and maintenance of equipment, furniture and fixtures, and buildings; [b] the payment of debt amortization and interest charges on debt incurred for school laboratory, athletic, or other purposes; and [c] personal services and maintenance and operating expenses incurred to operate the facilities or services for which fees and charges are collected.

After due consideration of the allegations of the petition dated May 22, 1985 and the arguments of the parties, the Court Resolved to issue, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER enjoining the respondent from enforcing or implementing paragraphs 7.4 to 7.5 of MECS Order No. 25, S. 1985, which provide for the use and application of sixty per centum [60%] of the increases in tuition and other school fees or charges authorized by public respondent for the school year 1985-1986 in a manner inconsistent with Section 3[a], P. D. No. 451, [which allocates such 60% of the increases exclusively "for increases in salaries or wages of the members of the faculty and other employees of the school concerned"] and directing accordingly that such 60% of the authorized increases shall be held in escrow by the respective colleges and universities, i.e., shall be kept intact and not disbursed for any purpose pending the Court's resolution of the issue of the validity of the aforementioned MECS Order in question. [Rollo, p. 21].

Subsequent to the issuance of this resolution, four [4] schools represented in this petition, moved for the lifting of the Temporary Restraining Order as to them. In separate resolutions, this Court granted their prayers.

Ateneo de Manila University, De La Salle University [Taft Avenue] and De La Salle University-South, through their respective counsels, manifested that for the school year 1985-1986, tuition fee increase was approved by the MECS and that on the basis of Pres. Dec. No. 451, 60% of the tuition fee increases shall answer for salary increase. However, a budgeted salary increase, exclusive of living allowances and other benefits, was approved for the same school year which, when computed, amounts to more than the 60%.

This Court granted the motions in separate resolutions lifting the Temporary Restraining Order with respect to these schools in order that they may proceed with the implementation of the general salary increase for their employees.

In the case of St. Louis University, its Faculty Club, Administrative Personnel Association and the University itself joined in a Petition seeking for leave that 49% of the increase in tuition and other fees for school year 1985-1986 be released. Petitioners manifested that the remaining balance shall continue to be held in escrow by the University.

In a resolution dated January 28, 1986, the Court resolved as follows:

Accordingly, the Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on May 28, 1985 is hereby ordered lifted with respect to Saint Louis University of Baguio City in order that it may proceed immediately with the implementation of salary increases for its employees.

E.
BISCOCHO CASE

In the exercise of his power to assume jurisdiction, the Minister of Labor and Employment issued an Order dated April 14, 1986 which provides for the following:

IN CONSIDERATION OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Ministry hereby declares the strike staged by the Union to be legal and orders the following:

[a] the school to submit the pertinent record of employment of Romualdo Noriego to the Research and Information Division of the NLRC for computation of his underpayment of wages and for the parties to abide by the said computation;

[b] the school to submit all pertinent record of collections of tuition fee increases for school year (sic) 1982-1983, 1983-1984 and 1984-1985 to the Research and Information Division of the NLRC for proper computation and for equal distribution of the amount to all employees and teachers during the abovementioned school year (sic) as their salary adjustment under P. D. 451;

[c] the parties to wait for the final resolution of the illegal dismissal [case] docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 5-1450-85 and to abide by the said resolution;

[d] to furnish the MECS a copy of this order for them to issue the guidelines in the implementation of PRODED Program;

[e] the parties to execute a collective bargaining agreement with an economic package equivalent to 90% of the proceeds from tuition fee increases for school year 1985-1986 and another 90% for school year 1986-1987 and 85% for school year 1987-1988. The amount afore-mentioned shall be divided equally to all members of the bargaining unit as their respective salary adjustments. Such other benefits being enjoyed by the members of the bargaining unit prior to the negotiation of the CBA shall remain the same and shall not be reduced.

[f]  the school to deduct the amount equivalent to ten [10%] per cent of the backwages payable to all members of the bargaining unit as negotiation fee and to deliver the same to the Union Treasurer for proper disposition.  [Emphasis supplied].

SO ORDERED.  [Rollo, pp. 16-17].

[2] The Union and School Administration will incorporate the following in their CBA:

(1) The computation of the tuition fee increase shall be gross to gross from which the corresponding percentage of 90% will be taken. The resulting amount will be divided among 141.5 employees for 1985-86 and 132.5 employees for 1986-87.

1/2 of the resulting increase will be added to basic and divided by 13.3 to arrive at monthly increase in basic. The other 1/2 will be divided by 12.3 to arrive at monthly increase in living allowance.

xxx   xxx   xxx

(4) xxx   xxx    xxxx

Upon request/demand of the Union, the School will deduct from backwages of managerial employees and others outside the bargaining unit what Union will charge its own members in the form of attorney's fees, special assessment and union dues/agency fee.

(5) The signing of the CBA and payment of backwages and others shall be on November 26, 1986 at the Espiritu Santo Parochial School Library. [Rollo, pp. 3-4].

Acting on the petitioners' prayer, this Court immediately issued a Temporary Restraining Order on November 25, 1986 "enjoining the respondents from enforcing, implementing and proceeding with the questioned order of April 14, 1986 and collective bargaining agreement executed between respondents Union and the School Administration in pursuance thereof." [Rollo, p. 20].
 

This Petition was filed by parents with children studying at respondent school, Espiritu Santo Parochial School, to nullify the Order dated April 14, 1986 issued by public respondent, then Minister of Labor and Employment, specifically paragraphs [e] and [f] thereof, quoted in the Biscocho case.

The award contained in the said Order is the result of the assumption of jurisdiction by the public respondent over a labor dispute involving the private respondent school and faculty association. The latter had earlier filed a notice of strike because of a bargaining deadlock on the demands of its members for additional economic benefits. After numerous conciliation conferences held while the union was on strike, the parties voluntarily agreed that the public respondent shall assume jurisdiction over all the disputes between them. As to the subject matter of the instant case, the public respondent found that the latest proposals of the respondent school was to give 85% of the proceeds from tuition fee increases for the school years to be divided among the teachers and employees as salary adjustments. What the respondent faculty association offered to accept was a package of 95% for school year 1985-1986, 90% for school year 1986-1987. The respondent school offered to strike the middle of the two positions, hence the Order complained of by the petitioners [See Annex "A", Petition; Rollo, pp. 9, 14-15; Comment of the Respondent Faculty Association: Rollo, p. 26].
 

This long-drawn controversy has sadly placed on the balance, diverse interests, opposed yet intertwined, and all deserving, and demanding, the protection of the State. On one arm of the balance hang the economic survival of private schools and the private school system, undeniably performing a complementary role in the State's efforts to maintain an adequate educational system in the country. Perched precariously on the other arm of the same balance is the much-needed financial uplift of schoolteachers, extolled for all times as the molders of the minds of youth, hence, of every nation's future. Ranged with them with needs and claims as insistent are other school personnel. And then, anxiously waiting at the sidelines, is the interest of the public at large, and of the State, in the continued availability to all who desire it, high-standard education consistent with national goals, at a reasonable and affordable price.

Amidst these opposing forces the task at hand becomes saddled with the resultant implications that the interpretation of the law would bear upon such varied interests. But this Court can not go beyond what the legislature has laid down. Its duty is to say what the law is as enacted by the lawmaking body. That is not the same as saying what the law should be or what is the correct rule in a given set of circumstances. It is not the province of the judiciary to look into the wisdom of the law nor to question the policies adopted by the legislative branch. Nor is it the business of this Tribunal to remedy every unjust situation that may arise from the application of a particular law. It is for the legislature to enact remedial legislation if that be necessary in the premises. But as always, with apt judicial caution and cold neutrality, the Court must carry out the delicate function of interpreting the law, guided by the Constitution and existing legislation and mindful of settled jurisprudence. The Court's function is, therefore, limited, and accordingly, must confine itself to the judicial task of saying what the law is, as enacted by the lawmaking body.
 

A. Whether or not allowances and other fringe benefits of employees may be charged against the 60% portion of the incremental proceeds provided for in Sec. 3[a] of Pres. Dec. No. 451.

1. Arguments raised in the Cebu Institute of Technology case.

In maintaining its position that the salary increases it had paid to its employees should be considered to have included the COLA, Cebu Institute of Technology [CIT] makes reference to Pres. Dec. No. 451 and its Implementing Rules. The line of reasoning of the petitioner appears to be based on the major premise that under said decree and rules, 60% of the incremental proceeds from tuition fee increases may be applied to salaries, allowances and other benefits of teachers and other school personnel. In support of this major premise, petitioner cites various implementing rules and regulations of the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports, to the effect that 60% of the incremental proceeds may be applied to salaries, allowances and other benefits for members of the faculty and other school personnel [Petition citing Implementing Rules and Regulations of Pres. Dec. No. 451 of various dates; Rollo, pp. 318-320]. Petitioner concludes that the salary increases it had granted the CIT teachers out of the 60% portion of the incremental proceeds of its tuition fee increases from 1974-1980 pursuant to Pres. Dec. No. 451 and the MECS implementing rules and regulations, must be deemed to have included the COLA payable to said employees for those years [Rollo, pp. 911].

With leave of Court, the Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities, filed its Memorandum as Intervenor in support of the proposition that schools may pay the COLA to faculty members and other employees out of the 60% of the increase in tuition fees. In addition to the arguments already set forth in the memorandum of the petitioner CIT, intervenor PACU attacks the Decision of this Court in University of the East v. University of the East Faculty Association et al., G.R. No. 57387 as "not doctrinal" and inapplicable to the CIT case. The Court held in the UE case, which was promulgated on September 30, 1982, during the pendency of these cases, that:

Allowances and benefits should be chargeable to the return of investment referred to in Sec. 3[a], if the schools should happen to have no other resources than incremental proceeds of authorized tuition fee increases.  [See dispositive portion of the Decision].

The Solicitor General, on the other hand, argues in support of the Order of the public respondent that Pres. Dec. No. 451 allocates the 60% proceeds of tuition fee increases exclusively for salary increases of teachers and non-teaching supportive personnel of the school concerned, and that the Decree does not provide that said salary increases would take the place of the COLA [Rollo, pp. 244-245]. He cites as authority for this stance, two [2] memoranda of the then President dated June 6, 1978 and March 30, 1979 both of which provide that the 60% incremental proceeds of tuition fee increases "shall be allocated for the increase in the salaries of teachers and supportive personnel. " Anent the U.E. case, the Solicitor General states that the Supreme Court, in deciding said case, took note of the stand of the Office of the President that the 60% incremental proceeds shall be solely applied to salaries of faculty members and employees.

On August 7, 1986, considering the supervening events, including the change of administration that have transpired during the pendency of these cases, the Court required the Solicitor General to state whether or not he maintains the action and position taken by his predecessor-in-office. In his Compliance with said Resolution, the Solicitor General manifested the position that:

a. If the tuition fee increase was collected during the effectivity oil Presidential Decree No. 451, 60% thereof shall answer exclusively for salary increase of school personnel. Other employment benefits shall be covered by the 12% allocated for return of investment, this is in accordance with the ruling of this Honorable Court in University of the East vs. U.E. Faculty Association, et al., [117 SCRA 554], and reiterated in University of Pangasinan Faculty Union v. University of Pangasinan, et al., [127 SCRA 691] and St. Louis Faculty Club v. NLRC [132 SCRA 380].

b. If the salary increase was collected during the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg. (sic) 232, 60% thereof shall answer not only for salary increase of school personnel but also for other employment benefits. [Rollo, at pp. 513-514].

Petitioner Divine Word College of Legazpi [DWC] advances the theory that the COLA, 13th month pay and other personnel benefits decreed by law, must be deemed chargeable against the 60% portion allocated for increase of salaries or wages of faculty and all other school employees. In support of this stance, petitioner points out that said personnel benefits are not included in the enumeration of the items for which the balance [less 60%] or 40% portion of the incremental proceeds may be alloted under Section 3[a] of Pres. Dec. No. 451 [Rollo, pp. 29-30]. Petitioner likewise cites the interpretation of the respondent Minister of Education, Culture and Sports embodied in the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P. D. 451, [DEC Issuance, May 13, 1987; Rollo, p. 30], that the 60% incremental proceeds of authorized tuition fee increases may be applied to increases in emoluments and/or benefits for members of faculty, including staff and administrative employees of the school as the valid interpretation of the law, as against that made by the respondent Deputy Minister of Labor in the assailed Order. If the latter interpretation is upheld, petitioner would go as far as questioning the constitutionality of Pres. Dec. No. 451 upon the ground that the same discriminates against the petitioner and other private schools as a class of employers. According to the petitioner, the discrimination takes the form of requiring said class of employers to give 60% of their profits to their employees in addition to the COLA mandated by law, while other employers have to contend only with salary increases and COLA. [Petition; Rollo, p. 46].

With regard to the Decision of this Court in the U.E. case, petitioner claims exemption therefrom upon the ground that the Court's interpretation of a law cannot be applied retroactively to parties who have relied upon the previous administrative interpretation which has not been declared invalid or unconstitutional [Petition; Rollo, pp. 50-51]. Petitioner further argues on this point that if the court had intended to invalidate the MECS interpretation of the Decree, it should have positively stated so in the Decision. [Petition, Rollo, p. 50].

The Comment of the public respondents cite as settled jurisprudence applicable to the case at bar, the ruling of this Court in the U.E. case, supra, which was reiterated in the subsequent cases of University of Pangasinan Faculty Union v. University of Pangasinan et all and St. Louis Faculty Club v. NLRC, et al.

Public respondents Deputy Minister of Labor and Employment and Regional Director of the MOLE [Region V] likewise attack the validity of the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of Pres. Dec. No. 451 cited by the petitioner insofar as said rules direct the allotment of the 60% of incremental proceeds from tuition fee hikes for retirement plan, faculty development and allowances. They argue that said rules and regulations were invalid for having been promulgated in excess of the rule-making authority of the then Minister of Education under Pres. Dec. No. 451 which mandates that the 60% of incremental proceeds from tuition fee hikes should be allotted solely for salary increases [Comment; Rollo, pp. 184-185]. Finally, with respect to the issue on the allege unconstitutionality of Pres. Dec. No. 451, the public respondents posit that a legislation [such as Pres. Dec. No. 451] which affects a particular class does not infringe the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the law as long as it applies uniformly and without discrimination to everyone of that class.  [Comment; Rollo, p. 14].

3.  Arguments raised in the Far Eastern University case.

It is the petitioner's contention that in respect of Pres. Dec. No. 451, the decision of the NLRC is a defiance of the rulings of this Court in the cases of University of the East v. U.E. Faculty Association, et al. and of University of Pangasinan Faculty Union v. University of Pangasinan and NLRC [supra].  The Union submits that monetary benefits other than increases in basic salary, are not chargeable to the 60% incremental proceeds.

The respondent University, in its Comment dated June 13, 1982, refers to Article 97[f] of the Labor Code which provides a definition of the term "wages" to support its position that "salaries or wages" as used in Pres. Dec. No. 451 should be interpreted to include other benefits in terms of money.  As mentioned in the Cebu Institute of Technology case, the Solicitor General filed its Compliance with this Court's resolution dated August 7, 1986 requiring him to manifest whether public respondents maintain the position they have taken in these consolidated cases. The resolution of September 25, 1986 required petitioners to Comment on said Compliance.

The Comment dated December 6, 1986 was received by this Court after petitioner Union was required to show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against them for failure to comply earlier. The Union agreed with the position taken by the Solicitor General that under Pres. Dec. No. 451, 60% of the tuition fee increases, shall answer exclusively for salary increase. However, it expressed disagreement with the opinion that during the effectivity of B. P. Blg. 232, the 60% ncremental proceeds shall answer not only for salary increases but also for other employment benefits. The Union argues that whereas "Pres. Dec. No. 451 is a law on a particular subject, viz., increase of tuition fee by educational institutions and how such increase shall be allocated, B. P. Blg. 232 is not a law on a particular subject of increase of tuition fee; at most, it is a general legislation on tuition fee as it touches on such subject in general, " [Comment on Compliance; Rollo, p. 376], Suppletory to its argument that B. P. Blg. 232 did not impliedly repeal Pres. Dec. No. 451, the Union also invokes the principle that a special or particular law cannot be repealed by a general law.
 

This Court has consistently held, beginning with the University of the East case, that if the schools have no resources other than those derived from tuition fee increases, allowances and benefits should be charged against the proceeds of tuition fee increases which the law allows for return on investments under Section 3[a] of Pres. Dec. No. 451, therefore, not against the 60% portion allocated for increases in salaries and wages [See 117 SCRA at 571]. This ruling was reiterated in the University of Pangasinan case and in the Saint Louis University case.

There is no cogent reason to reverse the Court's ruling in the aforecited cases. Section 3[a] of Pres. Dec. No. 451 imposes among the conditions for the approval of tuition fee increases, the allocation of 60% per cent of the incremental proceeds thereof for increases in salaries or wages of school personnel and not for any other item such as allowances or other fringe benefits. As aptly put by the Court in University of Pangasinan Faculty Union v. University of Pangasinan, supra:

The sixty [60%] percent incremental proceeds from the tuition fee increase are to be devoted entirely to wage or salary increases which means increases in basic salary. The law cannot be construed to include allowances which are benefits over and above the basic salaries of the employees. To charge such benefits to the 60% incremental proceeds would be to reduce the increase in basic salary provided by law, an increase intended also to help the teachers and other workers tide themselves and their families over these difficult economic times. [Italics supplied]. (127 SCRA 691, 702).

In the light of existing laws which exclude allowances from the basic salary or wage in the computation of the amount of retirement and other benefits payable to an employee, this Court will not adopt a different meaning of the terms "salaries or wages" to mean the opposite, i.e. to include allowances in the concept of salaries or wages.

As to the alleged implementing rules and regulations promulgated by the then MECS to the effect that allowances and other benefits may be charged against the 60% portion of the proceeds of tuition fee increases provided for in Section 3[a] of Pres. Dec. No. 451, suffice it to say that these were issued ultra vires, and, therefore, not binding upon this Court.

The rule-making authority granted by Pres. Dec. No. 451 is confined to the implementation of the decree and to the imposition of limitations upon the approval of tuition fee increases, to wit:

Sec. 4. Rules and Regulations. - The Secretary of Education and Culture is hereby authorized, empowered and directed to issue the requisite rules and regulations for the effective implementation of this Decree. He may, in addition to the requirements and limitations provided for under Sections 2 and 3 hereof, impose other requirements and limitations as he may deem proper and reasonable.

Rules and regulations promulgated in accordance with the power conferred by law would have the force and effect of law [Victorias Milling Company, Inc. v. Social Security Commission, 114 Phil. 555 (1962)] if the same are germane to the subjects of the legislation and if they conform with the standards prescribed by the same law [People v. Maceren, G. R. No. L-32166, October 18, 1977, 79 SCRA 450]. Since the implementing rules and regulations cited by the private schools add allowances and other benefits to the items included in the allocation of 60% of the proceeds of tuition fee increases expressly provided for by law, the same were issued in excess of the rule-making authority of said agency, and therefore, without binding effect upon the courts. At best, the same may be treated as administrative interpretations of the law and as such, they may be set aside by this Court in the final determination of what the law means.
 

B. Whether or not allowances and other fringe benefits may be charged against the 60% portion of the incremental proceeds of tuition fee increases upon the effectivity of Education Act of 1982 [B.P. Blg. 232].

1. Arguments raised in the Fabros case.

In assailing MECS Order No. 25, S. 1985, petitioners argue that the matter of allocating the proceeds from tuition fee increases is still governed by Pres. Dec. No. 451. It is their opinion that Section 42 of B. P. Blg. 232 did not repeal Pres. Dec. No. 451 for the following reasons: first, there is no conflict between Section 42 of B. P. Blg. 232 and Section 3[a] of Pres. Dec. No. 451 or any semblance of inconsistency to deduce a case of a repeal by implication; second, Pres. Dec. No. 451 is a specific law upon a particular subject - the purposes and distribution of the incremental proceeds of tuition fee increases, while B. P. Blg. 232 is a general law on the educational system; as such, a specific law is not repealed by a subsequent general law in the absence of a clear intention; and third, Pres. Dec. No. 451 is still the only law on the subject of tuition fee increases, there being no prescription or provision in Section 42 of B. P. Blg. 232 or elsewhere in the law. They furthermore aver that the disputed MECS Order which imposed additional burdens against the 60% incremental proceeds of tuition fee increases are not provided in either Pres. Dec. No. 451 or B. P. Blg. 232. The logical result as intimated by petitioners is that the inclusion of paragraph 7.4 and related paragraphs 7 to 7.3 and 7.5 in the questioned MECS Order contravenes the statutory authority granted to the public respondent and the same are, therefore, void.

Respondent PACU takes the contrary view contending that MECS Order No. 25, S. 1985, complies with the mandate of Section 42 of B. P. Blg. 232 which law had already repealed Pres. Dec. No. 451. PACU notes that the University of the East case invoked by petitioners is not applicable because the issue in that case does not involve the effect of B. P. Blg. 232 on Pres. Dec. No. 451.

The Solicitor General, representing the public respondent, after giving a summary of the matters raised by petitioner and respondent PACU, points out that the decisive issue in this case is whether B. P. Big. 232 has repealed Pres. Dec. No. 451 because on the answer to this question depends the validity of MECS Order No. 25, S. 1985. Public respondent holds the view consistent with that of PACU on the matter of B. P. Blg. 232 having repealed Pres. Dec. No. 451. To support this contention, the Solicitor General compared the respective provisions of the two laws to show the inconsistency and incompatibility which would result in a repeal by implication.
 

On the matter of tuition fee increases, Section 42 of B. P. Blg. 232 provides:

Sec. 42.  Tuition and Other School Fees. - Each private school shall determine its rate of tuition and other school fees or charges. The rates and charges adopted by schools pursuant to this provision shall be collectible, and their application or use authorized, subject to rules and regulations promulgated by the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports. [Emphasis supplied].

On the second sub-issue, therefore, this Court upholds the view taken by the Solicitor General in the Fabros case, that the decisive issue is whether B. P. Blg. 232 has repealed Pres. Dec. No. 451.  In recognition of the vital role of private schools in the country's educational system, the government has provided measures to regulate their activities. As early as March 10, 1917, the power to inspect private schools, to regulate their activities, to give them official permits to operate under certain conditions and to revoke such permits for cause, was granted to the then Secretary of Public Instruction by Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180. Republic Act No. 6139, enacted on August 31, 1970, provided for the regulation of tuition and other fees charged by private schools in order to discourage the collection of exorbitant and unreasonable fees. In an effort to simplify the "cumbersome and time-consuming" procedure prescribed under Rep. Act No. 6139 and "to alleviate the sad plight of private schools," Pres. Dec. No. 451 was enacted on May 11, 1974. While this later statute was being implemented, the legislative body envisioned a comprehensive legislation which would introduce changes and chart directions in the educational system, hence, the enactment of B. P. Blg. 232. What then was the effect of B. P. Blg. 232 on Pres. Dec. No. 451?

The Court after comparing Section 42 of B. P. Blg. 232 and Pres. Dec. No. 451, particularly Section 3[a] thereof, finds evident irreconcilable differences.

Under Pres. Dec. No. 451, the authority to regulate the imposition of tuition and other school fees or charges by private schools is lodged with the Secretary of Education and Culture [Sec. 1], where Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 232 liberalized the procedure by empowering each private school to determine its rate of tuition and other school fees or charges.

Pres. Dec. No. 451 provides that 60% of the incremental proceeds of tuition fee increases shall be applied or used to augment the salaries and wages of members of the faculty and other employees of the school; while B. P. Blg. 232 provides that the increment shall be applied or used in accordance with the regulations promulgated by the MECS.

A closer look at these differences leads the Court to resolve the question in favor of repeal. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, three aspects of the disputed provisions of law support the above conclusion. First, the legislative authority under Pres. Dec. No. 451 retained the power to apportion the incremental proceeds of the tuition fee increases; such power is delegated to the Ministry of Education and Culture under B. P. Blg. 232. Second, Pres. Dec. No. 451 limits the application or use of the increment to salary or wage increase, institutional development, student assistance and extension services and return on investment, whereas B. P. Blg. 232 gives the MECS discretion to determine the application or use of the increments. Third, the extent of the application or use of the increment under Pres. Dec. No. 451 is fixed at the pre-determined percentage allocations; 60% for wage and salary increases, 12% for return on investment and the balance of 28% to institutional development, student assistance and extension services, while under B. P. Blg. 232, the extent of the allocation or use of the increment is likewise left to the discretion of the MECS.

The legislative intent to depart from the statutory limitations under Pres. Dec. No. 451 is apparent in the second sentence of Section 42 of B. P. Blg. 232.  Pres. Dec. No. 451 and Section 42 of B. P. Blg. 232 which cover the same subject matter, are so clearly inconsistent and incompatible with each other that there is no other conclusion but that the latter repeals the former in accordance with Section 72 of B. P. Blg. 232 to wit:

Sec. 72.  Repealing clause. -  All laws or parts thereof inconsistent with any provision of this Act shall be deemed repealed or modified, as the case may be.

Both P. D. No. 451 and B. P. Blg. 232 deal with the imposition of tuition and other school fees or charges and their use and application, although the latter is broader in scope as it covers other aspects of the education system. We note substantial differences or inconsistencies between the provisions of the two laws. P. D. No. 451 prescribes certain limitations in the increase of tuition and other school fees and their application; whereas the latter law, B. P. Blg. 232 s silent on the matter. Under P. D. 451, rates of tuition/school fees need prior approval of the Secretary of Education, Culture [now Minister of Education, Culture and Sports] who also determines the reasonable rates for new school fees; whereas under B. P. Blg. 232, each private school determines its rate of tuition and other school fees or charges. P. D. No. 451 authorizes the Secretary of Education and Culture to issue requisite rules and regulations to implement the said decree and for that purpose, he is empowered to impose other requirements and limitations as he may deem proper and reasonable in addition to the limitations prescribed by the decree for increases in tuition fees and school charges, particularly, the limitations imposed in the allocation of increases in fees and charges; whereas under B. P. Blg. 232, the collection and application or use of rates and charges adopted by the school are subject to rules and regulations promulgated by the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports without any mention of the statutory limitations on the application or use of the fees or charges. The authority granted to private schools to determine its rates of tuition and unconditional authority vested in the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports to determine by rules and regulations the collection and application or use of tuition or fees rates and charges under B. P. Big. 232 constitute substantial and irreconcilable incompatibility with the provisions of P. D. No. 451, which should be for that reason deemed to have been abrogated by the subsequent legislation.

Moreover, B. P. Blg. 232 is a comprehensive legislation dealing with the establishment and maintenance of an integrated system of education and as such, covers the entire subject matter of the earlier law, P. D. No. 451. The omission of the limitations or conditions imposed in P. D. No. 451 for increases in tuition fees and school charges is an indication of a legislative intent to do away with the said limitations or conditions. [Crawford, supra, p. 674]. It has also been said that:

An act which purports to set out in full all that it intends to contain, operates as a repeal of anything omitted which was contained in the old act and not included in the amendatory act. [People vs. Almuete 69 SCRA 410; People vs. Adillo 68 SCRA 90].  (Ministry of Justice, Op. No. 16, S. 1985).

The guidelines and regulations on tuition and other school fees issued after the enactment of B. P. Blg. 232 consistently permit the charging of allowances and other benefits against the 60% incremental proceeds. Such was the tenor in the MECS Order No. 23, S. 1983; MECS Order No. 15, S. 1984; MECS Order No. 25, S. 1985; MECS Order No. 22, S. 1986; and DECS Order No. 37, S. 1987. The pertinent portion of the latest order reads, thus:

In any case of increase, at least sixty percent [60%] of the incremental proceeds should be allocated for increases in or provisions for salaries or wages, allowances and fringe benefits of faculty and other staff, including accruals to cost of living allowance, 13th month pay, social security, medicare, and retirement contribution and increases as may be provided in mandated wage orders, collective bargaining agreements or voluntary employer practices.

Section 42 of B. P. Blg. 232 grants to the Minister of Education [now Secretary of Education] rule-making authority to fill in the details on the application or use of tuition fees and other school charges. In the same vein is Section 70 of the same law which states:

Sec. 70.  Rule-making Authority. - The Minister of Education, Culture and Sports charged with the administration and enforcement of this Act, shall promulgate the necessary implementing rules and regulations.

The statutory grant of rule-making power to administrative agencies like the Secretary of Education is a valid exception to the rule on non-delegation of legislative power provided two conditions concur, namely: [1] the statute is complete in itself, setting forth the policy to be executed by the agency; and [2] said statute fixes a standard to which the latter must conform [Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. v. Public Service Commission, G. R. No. L-19850, January 30, 1964, and Pelaez v. Auditor General, G. R. No. L-23825, December 24, 1965].

The Education Act of 1982 is "an act providing for the establishment and maintenance of an integrated system for education " with the following basic policy:

It is the policy of the State to establish and maintain a complete, adequate and integrated system of education relevant to the goals of national development. Toward this end, the government shall ensure, within the context of a free and democratic system, maximum contribution of the educational system to the attainment of the following national development goals:

1. To achieve and maintain an accelerating rate of economic development and social progress;

2. To assure the maximum participation of all the people in the attainment and enjoyment of the benefits of such growth; and

3. To achieve and strengthen national unity and consciousness and preserve, develop and promote desirable cultural, moral and spiritual values in a changing world.

The State shall promote the right of every individual to relevant quality education, regardless of sex, age, creed, socioeconomic status, physical and mental conditions, racial or ethnic origin, political or other affiliation. The State shall therefore promote and maintain equality of access to education as well as the enjoyment of the benefits of education by all its citizens.

The State shall promote the right of the nation's cultural communities in the exercise of their right to develop themselves within the context of their cultures, customs, traditions, interests and belief, and recognizes education as an instrument for their maximum participation in national development and in ensuring their involvement in achieving national unity. [Section 3, Declaration of Basic Policy].

Coming now to the presence or absence of standards to guide the Minister of Education in the exercise of rule-making power, the pronouncement in Edu v. Ericta [G. R. No. L-32096, October 24, 1970, 35 SCRA 481, 497] is relevant:

The standard may be either expressed or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to be attained as in Calalang v. Williams is "safe transit upon the roads." [Italics supplied].

MECS Order No. 25, s. 1985 touches upon the economic relationship between some members and elements of the educational community, i.e., the private schools and their faculty and support staff. In prescribing the minimum percentage of tuition fee increments to be applied to the salaries, allowances and fringe benefits of the faculty and support staff, the Act affects the economic status and the living and working conditions of school personnel as well as the funding of the private schools.

The policies and objectives on the welfare and interests of the various members of the educational community are found in Section 5 of B. P. Blg. 232. which states:

Sec. 5.  Declaration of Policy and Objectives. - It is likewise a declared government policy to foster, at all times, a spirit of shared purposes and cooperation among the members and elements of the educational community, and between the community and other sectors of society, in the realization that only in such an atmosphere can the true goals and objectives of education be fulfilled.

1. Aid and support the natural right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth through the educational system.

2. Promote and safeguard the welfare and interests of the students by defining their rights and obligations, according them privileges, and encouraging the establishment of sound relationships between them and the other members of the school community.

3. Promote the social and economic status of school personnel, uphold their rights, define their obligations, and improve their living and working conditions and career prospects.

4. Extend support to promote the viability of those institutions through which parents, students and school personnel seek to attain their educational goals.

Sec. 33.  Declaration of Policy. -  It is hereby declared to be a policy of the State that the national government shall contribute to the financial support of educational programs pursuant to the goals of education as declared in the Constitution. Towards this end, the government shall:

1. Adopt measures to broaden access to education through financial assistance and other forms of incentives to schools, teachers, pupils and students; and

2. Encourage and stimulate private support to education through, inter alia, fiscal and other assistance measures.

C. Whether or not schools and their employees may enter into a collective bargaining agreement allocating more than 60% of said incremental proceeds for salary increases and other benefits of said employees.

1. Arguments raised in the Biscocho and Valmonte cases.

Assailed by the petitioners in the Biscocho and the Valmonte cases is the Order of the respondent Minister of Labor directing the execution of a CBA between the school and the respondent Espiritu Santo Parochial School Faculty Association which provides for an economic package equivalent to 90% of the proceeds of tuition fee increases for school year 1985-1986, another 90% for school year 1986-1987, and 85% for school year 1987-1988. Pursuant to said Order, petitioners in the Biscocho case alleged that the parties had agreed to incorporate in their CBA a provision which allocates one-half [1/2] of the 90% portion of the proceeds or 45% to increases in the monthly basic salaries and the other one-half [1/2] or 45% to increases in monthly living allowance.

The petitioners in the two cases seek the nullification of the MOLE Order for exactly opposite reasons. In the Biscocho case, the controversy springs from what petitioners perceive to be a diminution of the benefits to be received by the school employees insofar as the CBA allocates only 45% for salary increases instead