GOVERNOR AMOR D. DELOSO,
                                    Petitioner,

THE SANDIGANBAYAN, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
and THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT,
                                                                                       Respondents.
 
 
 

The petitioner was the duly elected mayor of Botolan, Zambales in the local elections of November 1971. While he occupied the position of mayor, a certain Juan Villanueva filed a letter-complaint with the Tanodbayan accusing him of having committed acts in violation of the Anti-Graft Law [Republic Act 3019] in relation to the award of licenses to operate fish corrals in the municipal waters of Botolan, Zambales during the period 1976 to 1978 and the issuance of five [5] tractors of the municipality to certain individuals allegedly without any agreement as to the payment of rentals.

The complaint with respect to the award of licenses to operate fish corrals was dismissed. As regards the other complaint, the Tanodbayan filed five [5] separate Informations, all dated May 30, 1984 accusing the petitioner of violation of Section 3[e] of the Anti-Graft Law with the Sandiganbayan. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 9200-9204. Except for the names of the individuals who were allegedly favored by the petitioner and the dates when these favors were made, the Informations uniformly alleged:

That on or about 3 February 1978 in the Municipality of Botolan, Zambales, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Amor D. Deloso, a public officer being then the Municipal Mayor of the Municipality of Botolan, Zambales, taking advantage of his public and official position, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously give unwarranted benefits to Daniel Ferrer thru manifest partiality and evident bad faith in the discharge of his official functions by issuing to him a tractor purchased by the Municipality of Botolan thru a loan financed by the Land Bank of the Philippines for lease to local farmers at a reasonable cost, without any agreement as to the payment of rentals for the use of  tractor by Daniel Ferrer thereby causing undue injury to the Municipality of Botolan.  [Rollo, p. 30].

The petitioner was arraigned on January 6, 1989 before the Sandiganbayan. He pleaded not guilty to the charges against him.

The Office of the Special Prosecutor then filed a motion to suspend the petitioner pendente lite pursuant to Section 13 of  Republic Act No. 3019. On February 10, 1989, the Sandiganbayan issued the questioned resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the accused Amor D. Deloso is suspended pendente lite from his position as Provincial Governor of Zambales and from any other office that he may now be holding.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Secretary of the Department of Local Government for implementation and for him to inform this Court of the action he has taken thereon within five [5] days from receipt hereof.  [Rollo, p. 94].

In denying the plea for an earlier schedule of the trial of the cases, the Sandiganbayan said:

The Court notes that these cases have already been set for May 15, 16 and 17 as well as June 5, 6 and 7, 1989 at 8:00 o'clock in the morning and 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon. While the accused claims that this period is ordinately far, the Court must also contend with its own calendar. It will be easy enough for this Court to give the accused an earlier setting. However, such a setting will be best a pretense since other cases have already been set between now and May 15 where in many instances, the accused themselves are also under suspension by reason of the same provision of law. Under the above circumstances, no other earlier setting can be granted to the accused without making that setting merely a sham since other cases which have been set earlier will naturally have a right to expect priority.  [Rollo, p. 135].

We treat the respondent's Comment as an answer and decide this petition on its merits. The petitioner questions the constitutionality of the suspension provision of Section 13 of the Anti-Graft Law [Republic Act No. 3019].

This same issue was raised in the case of  Layno v. Sandiganbayan (136 SCRA 536 [1985]). After considering the facts as well as the merits of the case, the Court ruled that the petition need not be resolved through a ruling on the validity of the provision on mandatory suspension. We instead, decided the case in relation to the principles of due process and equal protection of the law.

Faced with similar factual circumstances in the instant petition, We apply anew the ruling in the Layno case and decide the instant petition in relation to the principles of due process and equal protection without having to declare categorically whether or not the suspension provision of Republic Act 3019 should be struck down as invalid. We limit ourselves to ascertaining whether or not, under the circumstances of this case, an indefinite suspension becomes unreasonable.

As early as 1974, then Justice Fred Ruiz Castro expressed in a separate opinion the mischief which would result if the Court allows the indefinite suspension of elective local officials charged with violations of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act:

The central point of Senator Padilla's position is that the penalty of suspension is definitely much lower than that of removal and it would be incongruous if We give to the penalty of suspension more serious consequences than are attached to the penalty of removal. Senator Padilla opted for the immediate restoration of the respondent to his position once the favorable result of the election is known.

Parenthetically, it must be stated that while there was an exchange of views between Senator Ganzon and Senator Manglapus on the Anti-Graft Law, the exchange was limited to the matter of the commencement of the investigation of the charges, which, according to Senator Ganzon, cannot be made within one year prior to an election.

And so it is that, on the basis of my discussion above, I bewail the apathy of the majority of the Court toward efforts to seek enlightenment on legal issues of grave importance from the deliberations of Congress upon the said issues. It is not quite becoming of judicial magistrates to shunt aside a suggestion that the interplay of legal provisions be carefully studied and analyzed.

In the deliberations of the Court on this case, I suggested that we examine the possible delimiting effects of the provisions of the first sentence of section 5 of the Decentralization Act on the provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act insofar as the suspension from office of an elective local official is concerned. In no uncertain words did I focus the attention of the Court on the serious ever-present possibility of harassment of an elective local official taking the form of the filing of a valid information against him under the provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act after his exoneration in an administrative case involving the same offense.

I also pointedly brought out the matter of the notorious delay in the courts of justice which could effectively frustrate an elected or re-elected local official from discharging the duties of his office for the entire term of his office, and thus nullify the will of the people who elected him. I likewise asked the Court to consider the situation where an elective local official runs for the National Assembly and is elected despite the fact that he is under suspension under the authority of the provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and sought a definitive answer to the question. What then would happen to the suspension meted out to him since it is the National Assembly that determines whether he should assume and continue in office?

All these and other germane questions were brushed aside by the majority of the Court with the sweeping statement that the provisions of the Decentralization Act apply only to administrative cases. It is the ex cathedra attitude, this kind of slothful thinking, that I find abhorrent and, therefore, deplore. (Oliveros v. Villaluz, 57 SCRA 163, 197-198 [1974]).

Under these circumstances, the preventive suspension which initially may be justified becomes unreasonable thus raising a due process question. As We ruled in Layno, Sr. v. Sandiganbayan, [supra]:

Petitioner is a duly elected municipal mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur. His term of office does not expire until 1986. Were it not for this information and the suspension decreed by the Sandiganbayan according to the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, he would have been all this while in the full discharge of his functions as such municipal mayor. He was elected precisely to do so. As of October 26, 1983, he has been unable to. It is a basic assumption of the electoral process implicit in the right of suffrage that the people are entitled to the services of elective officials of their choice. For misfeasance or malfeasance, any of them could, of course, be proceeded against administratively or, as in this instance, criminally. In either case, his culpability must be established. Moreover, if there be a criminal action, he is entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence. A preventive suspension may be justified. Its continuance, however, for an unreasonable length of time raises a due process question. For even if thereafter he were acquitted, in the meanwhile his right to hold office had been nullified. Clearly, there would be in such a case an injustice suffered by him. Nor is he the only victim. There is injustice inflicted likewise on the people of Lianga. They were deprived of the services of the man they had elected to serve as mayor. In that sense, to paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the protracted continuance of this preventive suspension had outrun the bounds of reason and resulted in sheer oppression. A denial of due process is thus quite manifest. It is to avoid such an unconstitutional application that the order of suspension should be lifted.

To adopt the theory of respondents that an officer appointed by the President, facing administrative charges can be preventively suspended indefinitely, would be to countenance a situation where the preventive suspension can, in effect, be the penalty itself without a finding of guilt after due hearing, contrary to the express mandate of the Constitution (No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law. [Art. XII, Sec. 4, Constitution of the Philippines]) and the Civil Service Law (No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law and after due process).  In the guise of a preventive suspension, his term of office could be shortened and he could, in effect, be removed without a finding of a cause duly established after due hearing, in violation of the Constitution.  [at pp. 8-9].

If the case against petitioner Layno were administrative in character, the Local Government Code would be applicable. It is therein clearly provided that while preventive suspension is allowable for the causes therein enumerated, there is this emphatic limitation on the duration thereof;  "In all cases, preventive suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of said suspension." [Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, Section 63 (2), last sentence. The first sentence reads as follows: "Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined, when there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of, when the evidence of culpability is strong, when the gravity of the offense so warrants, or when the continuance in office of the respondent influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence"]. It may be recalled that the principle against indefinite suspension applies equally to national government officials. So it was held in the leading case of Garcia v. Hon. Secretary (116 Phil. 348 [1962]). According to the opinion of Justice Barrera: "To adopt the theory of respondents that an officer appointed by the President, facing administrative charges, can be preventively suspended indefinitely, would be to countenance a situation where the preventive suspension can, in effect, be the penalty itself without a finding of guilt after due hearing, contrary to the express mandate of the Constitution and the Civil Service Law." [Ibid., 351-352).   Further: "In the guise of a preventive suspension, his term of office could be shortened and he could in effect, be removed without a finding of a cause duly established after due hearing, in violation of the Constitution." [Ibid., 352].   Clearly then, the policy of the law mandated by the Constitution frowns at a suspension of indefinite duration. In this particular case, the mere fact that petitioner is facing a charge under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does not justify a different rule of law. To do so would be to negate the safeguard of the equal protection guarantee.  [at p. 542].

The Order dated February 10, 1989 suspending the petitioner without a definite period cannot be sanctioned. We rule that henceforth, a preventive suspension of an elective public officer under Section 13 of Republic Act 3019, should be limited to the ninety [90] days under Section 42 of Presidential Decree No. 807, the Civil Service Decree, which period also appears reasonable and appropriate under the circumstances of this case.

The petitioner also questions the applicability of Section 13 of Republic Act 3019, as amended by Batasan Pambansa Blg. 192, to him. He opines that the suspension provision as amended which qualifies the public officer as incumbent does not apply to him since he is now occupying the position of Governor and not Mayor, the position wherein he was charged under the Anti-Graft Law.

This argument is untenable. The issue was settled in the case of Bayot v. Sandiganbayan [128 SCRA 383 (1984)], in this wise:

Further, the claim of petitioner that he cannot be suspended because he is presently occupying a position different from that under which he is charged is untenable. The amendatory provision clearly states that any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under Republic Act 3019 or for any offense involving fraud upon the government or public funds or property, whether as a simple or as a complex offense, and in whatever stage or execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Thus, by the use of the word "office", the same applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under which he was charged.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is granted. The preventive suspension imposed on petitioner Amor D. Deloso by virtue of the February 10, 1989 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan should be limited to only ninety [90] days after which, Deloso will assume once again the functions of governor of Zambales, without prejudice to the continuation of the trial of the pending cases against him in the Sandiganbayan. This decision is immediately executory. No costs.

SO ORDERED.