THIRD
DIVISION
RAMON
S. PAULIN, ANGELA F. PAULIN
and JOSE BACHO,
Petitioners,
G. R. No. 103323
January 21, 1993
-versus-
HON.
CELSO M. GIMENEZ [In His Capacity
as Presiding Judge of RTC, Cebu City,
Branch
5],
HON. MAMERTO Y. COLIFLORES [In His
Capacity
as Judge of the MTC of Talisay, Branch
IX,
Cebu],
CASTRO BELME and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
D
E C I S I O N
MELO, J.:
The petition
before Us arose from a November
10, 1989 incident when the jeep ridden by private respondent and
Barangay
Captain Castro Belme Mabuyo was overtaken by the Nissan Patrol ridden
by
herein petitioners, the Spouses Dr. Ramon and Angela Paulin, smothering
the former with dust.Irked by this
incident,
Mabuyo followed the Nissan Patrol until it entered the back gate of
Rattan
Originals in Tanke, Talisay Cebu. Inquiring from a nearby security
guard
as to who owns the Nissan Patrol, he was informed that it belonged to
and
was driven by petitioner Dr. Ramon Paulin.
Later, while
Mabuyo was investigating some problems
of his constituents in Kilawan at Tanke, Cebu, Dr. Ramon Paulin and his
wife, Angie, allegedly pointed their guns at Mabuyo while Jose Bacho, a
companion of the spouses, acted as back-up. Mabuyo instructed one of
the
Barangay Tanods to call the police in Talisay and the rest to block the
exit of the spouses and their lone companion.Sensing
that they were outnumbered, the spouses put their guns down and upon
the
arrival of the police officers, they were brought to the police
station.
On the same date, Station Commander P/Lt. Ariel Palcuto filed a
complaint
for "grave threats," against the spouses Paulin and Bacho, herein
petitioners,
which was later docketed as Criminal Case No. 5204. On November 20,
1989,
the station commander filed a complaint for, "grave threats and oral
defamation,"
against private respondent Mabuyo, docketed as Criminal Case No. 5213.cralaw:red
The cases were
jointly tried and on June 13, 1990,
the Municipal Trial Court of Talisay, Cebu [Branch IX], acting on a
motion
of the Spouses Paulin and Jose Bacho, dismissed Criminal Case No. 5204.
On July 2, 1990, Mabuyo filed a, "Motion for Reconsideration," of the
said
dismissal order which the court granted in a resolution dated July 3,
1990.cralaw:red
At the hearing of
Criminal Case No. 5213 on July
5, 1990, petitioners vigorously sought the setting aside of the July 3,
1990 Resolution in Criminal Case No. 5204, but the same was denied in
another
Resolution.cralaw:red
Not satisfied
with the Resolution of respondent
Judge Mamerto Y. Coliflores, petitioners filed on July 31, 1990 a
petition
for "certiorari, prohibition, damages, with relief for preliminary
injunction
and the issuance of a temporary restraining order" with the Regional
Trial
Court of the Seventh Judicial Region, which was thereafter docketed as
Special Civil Action No. CEB-9207 and later re-raffled to Branch 5
stationed
in Cebu City presided over by respondent Judge Celso M. Gimenez, who
dismissed
the petition in a decision dated December 19, 1991. The decretal
portion
of the decision states:
All the foregoing considered, for lack of
merit
and for being a prohibited pleading under the Rule on Summary
Procedure,
as revised, the instant petition is hereby dismissed. Public respondent
is hereby ordered to proceed with the trial of Crim. Case Nos. 5204 and
5213 and to decide both cases on their merits within the period
provided
under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. The preliminary injunction
heretofore issued dated May 9, 1991, is hereby lifted and set aside.
[p.
118, Rollo].
Still not
contented, petitioners have now resorted
to the instant petition, arguing that [a] the decision of the municipal
trial court dated June 13, 1990 dismissing the case against them was a
judgment of acquittal, and may no longer be set aside without violating
petitioners' right against double jeopardy; and [b] the regional trial
court, in dismissing the petition in CEB-9207 abused its discretion as
it ignored petitioners' right against double jeopardy.
The main issue to
be resolved is whether or not
the municipal trial court's dismissal of Criminal Case No. 5204 against
petitioners precludes a subsequent reconsideration or reversal of such
dismissal as the same would violate petitioners' right against double
jeopardy.
The secondary issue dwells on the applicability of the Rule on Summary
Procedure prohibiting motions to dismiss and petitions for certiorari.cralaw:red
For double
jeopardy to be validly invoked by petitioners,
the following requisites must have been obtained in the original
prosecution:
(a) a valid complaint or information;
(b) a competent court;
(c) the defendant had pleaded to the
charge;
and
(d) the defendant was acquitted, or
convicted,
or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his
express consent (People v. Obsania, 23 SCRA 1249 [1968]: Caes v. IAC,
179
SCRA 54 [1989]).
Jurisprudence
on double jeopardy as well as the exceptions
thereto which finds application to the case at bar has been laid down
by
this Court as follows:
However, an appeal by the prosecution
from the
order of dismissal [of the criminal case] by the trial court shall not
constitute double jeopardy if [1] the dismissal is made upon motion, or
with the express consent of the defendant; [2] the dismissal is not an
acquittal or based upon consideration of the evidence or of the merits
of the case; and [3] the question to be passed upon by the appellate
court
is purely legal so that should the dismissal be found incorrect, the
case
would have to be remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings,
to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant. (People v.
Villalon,
192 SCRA 521 [1990], at p. 529).
For double
jeopardy to attach, the dismissal of the
case must be without the express consent of the accused (People v.
Gines,
197 SCRA 481 [1991]). Where the dismissal was ordered upon motion or
with
the express assent of the accused, he is deemed to have waived his
protection
against double jeopardy. In the case at bar, the dismissal was granted
upon motion of petitioners. Double jeopardy thus, did not attach. This
doctrine of waiver of double jeopardy was examined and formally
introduced
in People v. Salico (84 Phil. 722 [1949]), where Justice Felicisimo
Feria
stated:
When the case is dismissed, with the
express
consent of the defendant, the dismissal will not be a bar to another
prosecution
for the same offense; because, his action in having the case dismissed
constitutes a waiver of his constitutional right or privilege, for the
reason that he thereby prevents the court from proceeding to the trial
on the merits and rendering a judgment of conviction against him. (See
also People v. Marapao (85 Phil. 832 [1950]); Gandicela v. Lutero (88
Phil.
299 [1951]), People v. Desalisa (125 Phil. 27 [1966]); and, more
recently,
People v. Aquino (199 SCRA 610 [1991]).
Petitioners
insist that the June 13, 1990 decision
of the Municipal Trial Court [MTC] is an acquittal since it was issued
after it had allegedly considered the merits of the prosecution's
evidence.
In People v.
Salico [supra], distinctions
between acquittal and dismissal were made, to wit:
Acquittal is always based on the merits,
that
is, the defendant is acquitted because the evidence does not show that
defendant's guilt is beyond reasonable doubt; but dismissal does not
decide
the case on the merits or that the defendant is not guilty. Dismissals
terminate the proceedings, either because the court is not a court of
competent
jurisdiction, or the evidence does not show that the offense was
committed
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint or
information
is not valid or sufficient in form and substance, etc. [at pp. 732-733].
The MTC
decision dismissing the case is not an acquittal
from the charge considering that no finding was made as to the guilt or
innocence of the petitioners.
Under Section 14,
Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, as amended, it is stated:
If it appears at any time before judgment
that
a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall
dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new
one charging the proper offense in accordance with Rule 119, Sec. 11.
In Section 11
of the same Rule, it is provided:
When it becomes manifest at any time
before
judgment,
that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, and the
accused
cannot be convicted of the offense charged, or of any other offense
necessarily
included therein, the accused shall not be discharged, if there appears
to be good cause to detain him. In such case, the court shall commit
the
accused to answer for the proper offense and dismiss the original case
upon the filing of the proper information. [Id., Sec. 11, Rule
119]
In the case at
bar, the original case was dismissed
without the proper information having been filed, it appearing that the
proper charge should have been, "disturbance of public performance,"
punishable
under Article 153 of the Revised Penal Code instead of "grave threats,"
under Article 282 of the same penal code.
Jurisprudence
recognizes exceptional instances
when the dismissal may be held to be final, disposing of the case, once
and for all, even if the dismissal was made on motion of the accused
himself,
to wit:
[1] Where the dismissal is based on a
demurrer
to evidence filed by the accused after the prosecution has rested,
which
has the effect of a judgment on the merits and operates as an acquittal.
[2] Where the dismissal is made, also
on
motion
of the accused, because of the denial of his right to a speedy trial
which
is in effect a failure to prosecute. [Caes v. IAC, 179 SCRA 54 [1989]
at
pp. 60-61].
Petitioners'
motion to dismiss premised on procedural
grounds cannot be considered a demurrer to evidence nor was the
dismissal
sought by them predicated on the denial of their right to speedy trial.
Hence, the exceptions mentioned find no application in the instant
case,
especially so because when the municipal trial court dismissed the case
upon petitioners' motion, the prosecution still had to present several
witnesses.
Where the
prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity
to prosecute and prove its case, its right to due process is thereby
violated
[People v. Balisacan, G.R. No. L-26376, Aug. 31, 1966, 17 SCRA 1119; Uy
v. Genato, G. R. No. L-37399, May 29, 1974, 57 SCRA 123]. Where there
is
a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted of
jurisdiction.
Hence, the violation of the State's right to due process raises a
serious
jurisdictional error [Gumabon v. Director of the Bureau of Prisons, G.
R. No. L-30026, Jan. 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 420] as the decision rendered in
disregard of the right is void for lack of jurisdiction. [Aducayen v.
Flores,
51 SCRA 78 [1973], at p. 78].cralaw:red
Where the order
of dismissal was issued at a time
when the case was not ready for trial and adjudication, the order is
null
and void [People v. Pamittan, 30 SCRA 98 (1969)]. In People v. Bocar
[138
SCRA 166 (1985)], this Court found that the prosecution was denied due
process as it never had the chance to offer its evidence formally in
accordance
with the Rules of Court in view of the trial court's order of
dismissal.
The trial court was thereby ousted from its jurisdiction when it
violated
the right of the prosecution to due process by aborting its right to
complete
the presentation of its evidence and, therefore, the first jeopardy had
not been terminated. Hence, the remand of the case for further hearing
or trial is merely a continuation of the first jeopardy and does not
expose
the accused to a second jeopardy.cralaw:red
In the subsequent
case of People v. Albano [163
SCRA 511 (1988)], this Court reiterated its previous ruling in the
Bocar
case, holding that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction and acted
with grave abuse of discretion, tantamount to lack of jurisdiction,
when
it preemptively dismissed the case and as a consequence thereof,
deprived
the prosecution of its right to prosecute and prove its case, thereby
violating
its fundamental right to due process. With such violation, its orders
are,
therefore, null and void and cannot constitute a proper basis for a
claim
of double jeopardy.cralaw:red
In the more
recent case of Saldana v. Court of
Appeals [190 SCRA 396 (1990)], the issue raised was as follows: "Where
the trial court prematurely terminated the presentation of the
prosecution's
evidence and forthwith dismissed the information for insufficiency of
evidence,
may the case be remanded for further proceeding?" This Court, applying
the Bocar case, ruled that the order of the Court of Appeals
reinstating
the criminal case for further hearing by the trial court does not
violate
the rule on double jeopardy inasmuch as the trial court was ousted from
its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due
process.cralaw:red
The municipal
trial court thus did not violate
the rule on double jeopardy when it set aside the order of dismissal
for
the reception of further evidence by the prosecution because it merely
corrected its error when it prematurely terminated and dismissed the
case
without giving the prosecution the right to complete the presentation
of
its evidence. It follows then that the decision of respondent regional
trial court sustaining that of the court of origin cannot be said to be
tainted with grave abuse of discretion.cralaw:red
The Rule on
Summary Procedure was correctly applied
by the public respondents in this case.
Petitioners argue that public respondents gravely
abused their discretion in applying the provision prohibiting the
filing
of motions to dismiss and petitions for certiorari provided under the
Rule
on Summary Procedure. They claim that the prohibition under Section 15
of the Rule on Summary Procedure refers to motions to dismiss or to
quash
filed before the accused enters his plea. In any event, petitioners
insist
that they filed a demurrer to evidence which is not a prohibited
pleading
under the Rule on Summary Procedure.cralaw:red
Demurrer to
evidence due to its insufficiency
presupposes that the prosecution had already rested its case [Sec. 15,
Rule 119, 1985, Rules on Criminal Procedure]. Hence, the motion is
premature
if interposed at a time when the prosecution is still in the process of
presenting its evidence [Aquino v. Sison, 179 SCRA 648 (1989)], as what
happened in this case.cralaw:red
Petitioners, of
course, maintain that all the
prosecution's evidence was already on record since the affidavits of
complainant
and his witnesses, in law, constituted their direct testimonies and
that,
therefore, no other evidence could have been introduced by the
prosecution.cralaw:red
Submission of the
affidavits to the court does
not warrant the interference that the prosecution had already finished
presenting its evidence because the affiants are still required to
testify
and affirm the contents thereof; otherwise, these affidavits cannot
serve
as competent evidence for the prosecution. The Rule on Summary
Procedure
states:
Sec. 14. Procedure of Trial.-
Upon
a plea of not guilty being entered, the trial shall immediately
proceed.
The affidavits submitted by the parties shall constitute the direct
testimonies
of the witnesses who executed the same. Witnesses who testified may be
subjected to cross-examination. Should the affiant fail to testify, his
affidavit shall not be considered as competent evidence for the party
presenting
the affidavit, but the adverse party may utilize the same for any
admissible
purpose.
No witness
shall be allowed to testify unless he
had previously submitted an affidavit to the court in accordance with
Sections
9 and 10 hereof.
WHEREFORE, the
petition is dismissed and the decision
of the Regional Trial Court dated December 19, 1991 is affirmed.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr.,
Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Romero,
JJ., concur. |