EN
BANC
LUPO
ALMODIEL ATIENZA,
Complainant,
A. M. No. MTJ-92-706
March 29, 1995
-versus-
JUDGE
FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR.,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 28,
Manila,
Respondent.
D
E C I S I O N
QUIASON, J.:
This is a
complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for gross
immorality and appearance of impropriety against Judge Francisco
Brillantes,
Jr., Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 20, Manila.
Complainant alleges that he has two
children
with Yolanda De Castro, who are living together at No. 34 Galaxy
Street,
Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila. He stays in said house which
he purchased in 1987, whenever he is in Manila.
In December 1991,
upon opening the door to his
bedroom, he saw respondent sleeping on his [complainant's] bed. Upon
inquiry,
he was told by the houseboy that respondent had been co-habiting with
De
Castro. Complainant did not bother to wake up respondent and instead
left
the house after giving instructions to his houseboy to take care of his
children.cralaw:red
Thereafter,
respondent prevented him from visiting
his children and even alienated the affection of his children from him.
Complainant claims that respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko
with
whom he has five children, as appearing in his 1986 and 1991 sworn
statements
of assets and liabilities. Furthermore, he alleges that respondent
caused
his arrest on January 13, 1992, after he had a heated argument with De
Castro inside the latter's office.cralaw:red
For his part,
respondent alleges that complainant
was not married to De Castro and that the filing of the administrative
action was related to complainant's claim on the Bel-Air residence,
which
was disputed by De Castro.cralaw:red
Respondent denies
that he caused complainant's
arrest and claims that he was even a witness to the withdrawal of the
complaint
for grave slander filed by De Castro against complainant. According to
him, it was the sister of De Castro who called the police to arrest
complainant.cralaw:red
Respondent also
denies having been married to
Ongkiko, although he admits having five children with her. He alleges
that
while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony before a Nueva
Ecija
town mayor on April 25, 1965, the same was not a valid marriage for
lack
of a marriage license. Upon the request of the parents of Ongkiko,
respondent
went through another marriage ceremony with her in Manila on June 5,
1965.
Again, neither party applied for a marriage license. Ongkiko abandoned
respondent 17 years ago, leaving their children to his care and custody
as a single parent.cralaw:red
Respondent claims
that when he married De Castro
in civil rites in Los Angeles, California on December 4, 1991, he
believed,
in all good faith and for all legal intents and purposes, that he was
single
because his first marriage was solemnized without a license.cralaw:red
Under the Family
Code, there must be a judicial
declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage before a party
thereto
can enter into a second marriage. Article 40 of said Code provides:
The absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may
be invoked for the purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Respondent
argues that the provision of Article 40
of the Family Code does not apply to him considering that his first
marriage
took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the
Philippines;
while the second marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the Family
Code.
Article 40 is
applicable to remarriages entered
into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988
regardless
of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the
Family
Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the
Civil
Code or other laws." This is particularly true with Article 40, which
is
a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that was
impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case.cralaw:red
The fact that
procedural statutes may somehow
affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive
application
to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is
not
violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected
[Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 229 (1968)]. The reason is that
as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from,
procedural
laws [Billones v. Court of Industrial Relations, 14 SCRA 674 (1965)].cralaw:red
Respondent is the
last person allowed to invoke
good faith. He made a mockery of the institution of marriage and
employed
deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman, who beget him five children.
Respondent passed the bar examinations in
1962
and was admitted to the practice of law in 1963. At the time he went
through
the two marriage ceremonies with Ongkiko, he was already a lawyer. Yet,
he never secured any marriage license. Any law student would know that
a marriage license is necessary before one can get married. Respondent
was given an opportunity to correct the flaw in his first marriage when
he and Ongkiko were married for the second time. His failure to secure
a marriage license on these two occasions betrays his sinister motives
and bad faith.cralaw:red
It is evident
that respondent failed to meet the
standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal profession.
While the deceit employed by respondent existed prior to his
appointment
as a Metropolitan Trial Judge, his immoral and illegal act of
cohabiting
with De Castro began and continued when he was already in the judiciary.cralaw:red
The Code of
Judicial Ethics mandates that the
conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety, not only
with
respect to his performance of his judicial duties but also as to his
behavior
as a private individual. There is no duality of morality. A public
figure
is also judged by his private life. A judge, in order to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must
behave
with propriety at all times, in the performance of his judicial duties
and in his everyday life. These are judicial guideposts too
self-evident
to be overlooked. No position exacts a greater demand on moral
righteousness
and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary [Imbing
v.
Tiongzon, 229 SCRA 690 (1994)].cralaw:red
WHEREFORE,
respondent is DISMISSED from the service
with forfeiture of all leave and retirement benefits and with prejudice
to reappointment in any branch, instrumentality, or agency of the
government,
including government-owned and controlled corporations. This decision
is
immediately executory.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J.,
Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin,
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur. |