
FIRST
DIVISION
PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
G. R. Nos. 116716-18
September 30, 1996
-versus-
ANTONIO
GABAN y FROMENTO,
Accused-Appellant.
D
E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Three times the
accused, ANTONIO GABAN y FROMENTO,
raped his 15-year old daughter. This, the trial court found. Taking
into
account the manner by which he ravished his own kin, coupled with the
pain
that accompanied every defloration, and aggravated by the mother's
taking
her own life when she could no longer endure the shame and agony as a
result
thereof, the accused, along with the likes of Leo
Echegaray,[1]
should have been an early recipient of the lethal syringe were it not
for
the proscription of the death penalty at the time he succumbed to his
libido.
Antonio Gaban
lived with his family in a small
house in Sitio Siwayan, Aroroy, Masbate. He was engaged in gold panning
while his wife maintained a sari-sari store. They had four
children,
the eldest being Cristina. In the early morning hours of Saturdays, his
wife would go marketing leaving behind her husband and their children
at
home. Antonio was fully aware of his wife's routine.cralaw:red
One Saturday
morning in April 1990, when his wife
went out on her usual chore and their children were sound asleep,
Antonio
woke Cristina up. With a knife on hand, he told Cristina that he was
going
to have sex with her. He threatened her with death if she made any move
to resist. After cowing his daughter into submission, Antonio proceeded
with his evil scheme. He undressed himself and then pulled down
Cristina's
shorts and panty. He spread out her legs, laid on top of her, kissed
her
body and finally inserted his penis into her vagina, while all the time
his knife was pointed at her neck.[2]
Shocked and petrified, Cristina could do nothing but cry. She could not
utter a word in fear for her life.cralaw:red
Meanwhile,
Cristina kept her ordeal to herself.
She thought everything would be over. But contrary to Cristina's
expectation,
her father's lust for her was not to be his last. He molested her again
in September, and repeated the sexual assault in November 1990. Still
Cristina
did not divulge these incidents to her mother, obviously because of her
father's constant threats to kill not only her but also her mother,
brother
and two younger sisters.[3]
However, time came when she could no longer keep her woe to herself. On
19 February 1991, she finally narrated her misfortune to a relative,
Helen
Mariño, through whom the mother of Cristina learned of Antonio's
bestiality.cralaw:red
Sometime in
September 1991, after having cried
and cried that brought her into a state of shock, Cristina's mother,
obviously
in utter dismay and humiliation, took her own life by drinking poison.[4] Soon after the interment
of her
mother, Cristina received a letter from her father expressing his
repentance
and pleading for forgiveness.[5]
But, despite her father's entreaty, Cristina went to the police
authorities
in the company of Helen Mariño and Lydia Gaban to file her
complaint.
When the case was being tried, the defense counsel asked Cristina if
she
could forgive her father. But Cristina was averse to the idea as she
likened
her father to the devil.cralaw:red
Accused-appellant
invokes alibi. He said
that in the months of April, September and November 1990, he was away
from
home as he was in Metro Manila attending to his business of renting
sidecars
in Dagat-Dagatan, Navotas. He claims that the relatives of his wife
merely
concocted the rape charges against him as he was a womanizer, and that
they did so only after they had abandoned their previous plan to charge
him with parricide for the death of his wife.cralaw:red
After trial, the
court a quo found appellant guilty
of rape on three counts, sentenced him to reclusion perpetua in each
case,
and ordered him to indemnify his daughter Cristina P50,000.00 for the
three
cases.[6]
Appellant still
insists on his innocence. First,
he harps on the failure of Cristina to resist and to shout for help. Second,
he claims he was in Navotas, Metro Manila, when he allegedly abused her
in his house in Sawayan, Aroroy, Masbate. Third, the rape
charges
against him were merely fabricated by relatives of his wife because he
was a womanizer.cralaw:red
The defense must
fail. The trial court found the
testimony of complaining witnesses Cristina candid, straightforward and
persuasive. We have no reason to hold otherwise. We accord full faith
and
credence to her narration that she was ravished three times on separate
dates by her own father. We are convinced that the acts complained of
did
occur and were perpetrated by appellant and confirmed by the court a
quo. It has always been the position of the Court that when the
question
arises as to which of the conflicting versions of the prosecution and
the
defense is worthy of belief, the assessment of the trial court is
generally viewed as correct and entitled to great weight. Highest
respect
is given to the actual findings of the court below unless it is shown
that
certain facts of value have been plainly overlooked which, if
considered,
could affect the result of the case. But appellant has not presented
any
substantial argument, must less pointed to any material evidence in
support
of his defense, which may have been overlooked by the trial court to
justify
a reversal of its conclusion.[7]
The detailed
narration of the complaining witness,
a girl in her teens, on how she was repeatedly violated by her father
is
certainly worth credence. It is extremely difficult to believe that the
complainant, young as she was, could have the guile and craft to accuse
her father of such heinous crime. Hence, the defense of sinister
motivation
in the filing of the rape charges is incredible aside from its being
bereft
of evidentiary support. This Court has often held that a 15-year old
country
girl who barely finished elementary grades would not just complain that
she had been raped because no one would wish to be exposed to public
ridicule,
shame and dishonor, nor would allow her private parts to be examined.
No
one indeed would want to go through the troubles and humiliation of a
trial
for such debasing offense unless she was really raped and her motive
was
solely to seek justice.[8]
The innocent but natural and straightforward testimony of Cristina
alone
is sufficient to sustain the conviction of her father. In fact it is
entitled
to greater weight since her accusing words are directed against a close
relative, her own father.[9]
As the Court a quo would succinctly put it:
Cristina Gaban was 15 years old and was
in
Grade
Five in 1990. Brought up in a poor family in a Barangay deprived of the
economic and social abundance and amenities enjoyed by her counterparts
in urban centers, Cristina Gaban appeared to be modest and simple in
ways,
taste, and outlook in life. And yet, she was very candid and
straightforward
when she denounced her father as a devil and the very one who
deflowered
her in her youth. It is uncommon to see a girl of her likes and
upbringing
to fabricate a criminal story and come out with a shocking revelation
about
the beastly act done by her father to her if, indeed, nothing revolting
and unconscionable to the conscience of man was ever inflicted upon her
person and honor.[10]
The fact that
Cristina did not put up a strong resistance
nor shout for help did not diminish her credibility. Appellant's
threats
and intimidation must be considered in light of the perception and
judgment
of the complainant at the time of the rape and not by any hard and fast
rule.[11]
Physical resistance need not be established in rape when threats and
intimidation
are employed and the victim submits herself to the embrace of her
rapist
because of fear.[12]
In rape, the force used need not be irresistible, as long as it is
present
and brings the desired result.[13] In this case, not only is
appellant
her own parent who exercised an overpowering influence, if not moral
ascendancy,
over her but, worse, he even used a knife to threaten her to submit to
his bestial lust and desires. That Antonio resorted to force and
intimidation
in raping his 15-year old daughter magnifies no end his animal
instinct.
The failure of Cristina to resist was aptly explained by the Court
below
thus:
True, Cristina Gaban was always in the
company
of her younger siblings on those occasions when her father had sex with
her. But her father seemed to be using his head as he did the thing
when
his wife was not around and his small children were still sleeping. To
shout for help could be her natural reaction, as anyone similarly
situated
would do, to protect herself from the animalistic and demonic assault
of
her father. But to Cristina's mind, to shout for help would be very
risky
for her. Note that her father threatened to kill her, including her
mother
and the other children if she refused to give in to his beastly desire.[14]
Alibi
cannot prevail over the positive and
unwavering identification of appellant by the complainant.[15]
His allegation that he only went home to Masbate upon invitation of his
wife to help her in the running of their business is at most
self-serving
and bereft of any support. He did not even present the letter
purportedly
sent to him by his wife. It was awkward and unusual for appellant,
assuming
that he was indeed in Navotas, to go home to Masbate just to help his
wife
in her business when she was only operating a small sari-sari store.
After all, their children, Cristina in particular, were already capable
of helping their mother in tending the store. The business of renting
out
sidecars in Navotas, in which he was engaged, could be more profitable
than running a small sari-sari store. In fact, even defense
witness
Danilo Guadayo admitted on cross-examination that he was unsure whether
appellant was in Navotas in 1990 when he perpetrated the rapes.[16]
The pretension of appellant that he was in Navotas the whole of 1990,
does
not inspire belief since no one testified that he was really there when
the rapes were committed.[17]
Significantly,
appellant did not endeavor to refute
the evidence for the government that after the commission of the crimes
but soon after his wife's demise, he sent a letter to Cristina pleading
for forgiveness. In that letter Antonio expressly acknowledged the
wrong
he had done to her, begged for her forgiveness and promised to be a
good
father to her again. This letter eloquently manifested his admission of
guilt.[18]
In fine, We find
accused-appellant guilty of raping
his own daughter on three separate occasions. The prison terms imposed
on him by the court a quo, i.e., reclusion perpetua in each of
the
three counts, are proper. However, the civil indemnity of P50,000.00
should
be for moral damages in each case or a total of P150,000.00.[19]
An award of P25,000.00 in each case or a total of P75,000.00 for
exemplary
damages to deter other sex perverts or two-legged beasts from sexually
assaulting or molesting innocent minors and hapless victims, especially
their own kins, is likewise appropriate.[20]
WHEREFORE, the
decision appealed from finding
accused-appellant Antonio Gaban y Fromento guilty of rape on
three
counts and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua in each case
is
affirmed, with the modification that he should indemnify Cristina Gaban
a total of P150,000.00 for moral damages and P75,000.00 for exemplary
damages
or a total of P225,000.00. Costs against accused-appellant.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Padilla, Vitug,
Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr.,
JJ., concur.cralaw:red
_____________________________________
Endnotes
[1]Sentenced to
Death
under R. A. 7659 for raping his 10-year old daughter [G. R. No.
117472],
25 June 1996.
[2]
Decision, p. 1; Rollo, p. 9.
[3]
T.S.N., 9 February 1993, pp. 2-4.
[4]
Id., p. 7.
[5]
Records, p. 100.
[6]
Decision penned by Judge Manuel S. Pecson, RTC-Br. 47, Masbate.
[7]
People v. Lazaro, G. R. No. 99263, 12 October 1995, 249 SCRA 234.
[8]
People v. Campesino, No. L-45480, 31 July 1984, 131 SCRA 56.
[9]
People v. Lao, G.R. No. 117092, 6 October 1995, 249 SCRA 137.
[10]
Decision, p. 3; Rollo, p. 11.
[11]
See Note 6.
[12]
People v. Padre, G. R. Nos. 112969-70, 24 October 1995, 249 SCRA 422.
[13]
People v. Bogtong, G. R. No. 75853, 31 January 1989, 169 SCRA 797.
[14]
Decision, p. 4; Rollo, p. 12.
[15]
People v. Munar, No. L-40462, 31 July 1984, 131 SCRA 44.
[16]
T.S.N., 14 January 1994, p. 7.
[17]
People v. Tampus, G. R. No. L-42608, 8 February 1979, 88 SCRA 217.
[18]
People v. Calimquin, G. R. No. 61255, 28 October 1993, 125 SCRA 499.
[19]
People v. Villanueva, G. R. Nos. 112164-65, 28 February 1996.
[20]
Ibid. |