THIRD
DIVISION
NELSON
C. DAVID,
Petitioner,
G. R. No. 126556
July 28, 1997
-versus-
COURT
OF APPEALS
and PETRON CORPORATION,
Respondents.
R
E S O L U T I O N
MELO, J.:
The Petition
for Review before Us questions the
April 24, 1996 decision and October 7, 1996 resolution of respondent
Court
of Appeals which declared void a special order of Branch 4 of the
Regional
Trial Court of the Third Judicial Region stationed at Balanga, Bataan,
ordering partial execution pending appeal to the extent of P50 million
out of an award of P1,291,456,320.00 to be paid by Petron Corporation.
The award is for the use of water over a 3-year period beginning 1992
up
to 1994. The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Limay, Bataan,
passed
Municipal Ordinance No. 90 charging private respondent Petron
Corporation
the amount of approximately P430 million per year for the use of the
municipality's
water. Private respondent questioned the legality of the said ordinance
before the above-named regional trial court, claiming, among other
things,
that it does not consume more than P7 million worth of water per year.
The Regional
Trial Court rendered judgment upholding
the validity of the aforementioned ordinance. Private respondent
elevated
the matter to the Court of Appeals where its appeal is now pending,
docketed
as CA-G. R. No. CV-52293. Meanwhile, before perfection of the appeal,
petitioner
filed a motion for partial execution pending appeal. As earlier
mentioned,
the Regional Trial Court issued the order granting partial execution to
the extent of P50 million. This order was questioned before respondent
Court of Appeals by way of a petition of certiorari. The Court of
Appeals,
finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Regional Trial
Court
for ordering the partial execution pending appeal, resolved to set
aside
the order. Hence, the present recourse by way of a petition for review.cralaw:red
The Court finds
no reversible error committed
by respondent Court of Appeal in setting aside the order of the
regional
trial court which granted partial execution pending appeal.
The then prevailing rule invoked by
petitioner
and
accordingly applied by the Regional Trial Court was Section 2, Rule 39
of the former Rules of Court which provides:
Sec. 2. Execution pending appeal.-
On motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party, the
court may, in its discretion, order execution to issue even before the
expiration of the time to appeal, upon good reasons to be stated in a
special
order. If a record on appeal is filed thereafter the motion and the
special
order shall be included therein.
The execution
of a judgment before becoming final
by reason of appeal is recognized. However, this highly exceptional
case
must find itself firmly founded upon good reasons for such execution.
For
instance, execution pending appeal was granted by this Court where the
prevailing party is of advanced age and in a precarious state of health
and the obligation in the judgment is non-transmissible, being for
support
[De Leon vs. Soriano, 95 Phil. 806 (1954)], or where the judgment
debtor
is insolvent [Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, 53 SCRA 168 (1973)].
Execution
pending appeal was also allowed by this Court where defendants were
exhausting
their income and have no other property aside from the proceeds of the
subdivision lots subject of the action [Lao vs. Mencias, 21 SCRA 1021
(1967)].
Mere issuance of
a bond to answer for damages
is no longer considered a good reason for execution pending appeal.
This
was expounded in Roxas vs. Court of Appeals [157 SCRA 370 (1988)], thus:
Execution pending appeal in accordance
with
Section
2 of Rule 39 is, of course, the exception. Normally, execution of a
judgment
should not be had until and unless it has become final and
executory
i.e., the right of appeal has been renounced or waived, the period for
appeal has lapsed without an appeal having been taken, or appeal having
been taken, the appeal has been resolved and the records of the case
have
been returned to the court of origin in which case, execution
"shall
issue as a matter of right.
On the other hand, when the period of
appeal
has not expired, execution of the judgment should not be allowed, save
only if there be good reasons therefor, in the court's discretion. "As
provided in Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules, the existence of good
reasons
is what confers discretionary power on a Court to issue a writ of
execution
pending appeal. The reasons allowing execution must constitute superior
circumstances demanding urgency which will outweigh the injury or
damages
should the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment.
It is not intended obviously that
execution
pending
appeal shall issue as a matter of course. "Good reasons, special,
important,
pressing reasons must exist to justify it; otherwise instead of an
instrument
of solicitude and justice, it may well become a tool of oppression and
inequity. But to consider the mere posting of a bond a "good reason"
would
precisely make immediate execution of a judgment pending appeal
routinary,
the rule rather than the exception. Judgments would be executed
immediately,
as a matter of course, once rendered, if all that the prevailing party
needed to do was to post a bond to answer for damages that might result
therefrom. This is a situation, to repeat, neither contemplated nor
intended
by law. [pp. 377-378].
Respondent
court's basis for setting aside the trial
court's order for the partial execution of the judgment pending appeal
is herein quoted as follows:
The special reasons which prompted the
court a
quo to grant the petition for execution pending appeal are
not
the special reasons contemplated by the rules in this particular case.
There is no urgency or immediate necessity in the execution of the
P50,000,000.00
allowed by the trial court. It is of judicial notice that aside from
the
regular income of the Municipality of Limay, Bataan derived from local
taxes, it also receives regular allotment from the national government
for its daily operation. The immediate release of the P50,000,000.00
from
Petron to the respondent Municipality of Limay, Bataan is not so urgent
that its non-release will cause the paralyzation of the governmental
function
of the town.
It is likewise unrebutted by respondents
in
their
rejoinder that Petron pays around P46,620,916.22 in realty taxes and
fees
yearly to the town of Limay, Bataan. This amount plus the subsidy it
receives
from the national government and the direct incomes from taxes and
other
fees it collects can be appropriated for its infrastructure projects.
[pp.
23-24, Rollo].
This Court
upholds respondent Court of Appeals' ruling
that the basis relied upon by the regional trial court does not
constitute
good reason or reasons for the execution of the judgment pending appeal
even though such execution was only a partial of the judgment, the
amount
awarded being in the substantial amount of P50 million pesos. The
posting
of a corresponding bond to answer for damages does not cure the
insufficiency
or lack of good reason. Certiorari lies against an order granting
execution
pending appeal where the same is not founded upon good reason. The fact
that the losing party had also appealed from the judgment does not bar
the certiorari proceedings as the appeal could not be an adequate
remedy
from such premature execution. [Jaca vs. Davao Lumber Co., 113 SCRA 107
(1982)].
The Court of
Appeals, while recognizing that it
should defer ruling on the correctness of the judgment sought to be
executed,
as the merits of the case itself were duly submitted to the
jurisdiction
of the said court in the proper case by way of regular appeal,
nonetheless
fell into the error of expressing its opinion on the validity of
Municipal
Ordinance No. 90 [See: pp. 13-14, Decision, pp. 249-250, Rollo]. Such obiter
dictum of the Court of Appeals must be disregarded in the light of
Silverio vs. Court of Appeals [141 SCRA 527 (1986)], where in a similar
case involving the issue of the order of execution pending appeal, we
held
that the ruling of the Court of Appeals dismissing the petition for
certiorari
finding no grave abuse of discretion cannot be duly extended to expand
the main thrust of the said decision beyond its true import.cralaw:red
In this
resolution, therefore, this Court purposely
limits itself to resolving only to the wisdom of the trial court's
exercise
of discretion in ordering the execution of the judgment pending appeal.
It is imperative that We allow the main appeal, CA-G. R. No. CV-52293,
pending before the Court of Appeals to take its normal course.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the instant petition
is hereby denied for lack of merit.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr.,
Francisco and Panganiban, JJ.,
concur.
Narvasa, CJ., is on leave. |