EN
BANC
ATTY.
ALFONSO PAA,
Petitioner,
G. R. No. 126560
December 4, 1997
-versus-
THE
HON. COURT OF APPEALS,CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
and DIRECTOR BARTOLOME C. AMOGUIS,
Respondents.
R
E S O L U T I O N
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Petitioner
urges us to set aside, on ground of
grave abuse of discretion, the resolution of respondent Court of
Appeals
of 30 April 1996 in CA-G. R. SP No. 40341 denying petitioner's "Motion
for Extension of Time to File Petition for Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court," and its resolution of 19 September 1996 denying
the
motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner was
the Administrative Officer of Regional
Office No. XI of the Department of Labor and Employment [DOLE]. In an
Order
dated 4 September 1992, then DOLE Secretary Ma. Nieves R. Confesor
ordered
petitioner "DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of leave credits
and retirement benefits and disqualification for (sic)
re-employment
in the government service," for conduct grossly prejudicial to the best
interest of the service, frequent absences from duty during office
hours,
and violation of reasonable office rules and regulations. Unsuccessful
in his bid for reconsideration, petitioner appealed to the Civil
Service
Commission.cralaw:red
In its Resolution
No. 95-0230 of 12 January 1995,[1]
the Civil Service Commission "found [petitioner] guilty of being
Notoriously
Undesirable" and imposed upon him "the penalty of dismissal from the
service
with all its accessories." Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which,
however, was denied by the Civil Service Commission in its Resolution
No.
960987 of 13 February 1996.[2]
On 12 April 1996,
petitioner filed with the Court
of Appeals a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for
Certiorari
Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,[3]
docketed by the Court of Appeals as CA-G. R. SP No. 40341. He alleged
that
he received a copy of the 13 February 1996 Civil Service Commission
resolution
on 29 March 1996 and he had then "until 13 April 1996 within which to
file
a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court as amended;"
and that he needed three [3] weeks to secure "certified true copies of
the resolutions and other pertinent documents [from] the Civil Service
Commission, Quezon City," which were to be attached to the petition. He
thus asked for an extension of 30 days from 13 April 1996 within which
to file the petition.cralaw:red
On 30 April 1996,
the Court of Appeals promulgated
a Resolution[4]
denying petitioner's aforementioned Motion for Extension of Time to
File
Petition, decreeing:
The instant "Motion for Extension of Time
to
File Petition for Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court" filed
on 12 April 1996 is hereby DENIED it being the wrong mode of appeal.
It is to be
noted that the questioned resolution
was rendered by the Civil Service Commission; that the Supreme Court
Revised
Administrative Circular No. 1-95 [Revised Circular No. 1-91]
specifically
provides that appeals from judgments or final orders or resolutions of
the quasi-judicial agencies [which includes the Civil Service
Commission]
is Petition for Review. [Pars. 1 and 5, supra].
Since the Court
of Appeals denied his motion for
reconsideration on 19 September 1996,[5]
petitioner filed the instant petition, designating it in both the
caption
and the body as one for "certiorari" under Rule 65 or Rule 45 of the
Rules
of Court as amended." Petitioner alleges:
I.chanrobles virtual law library
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED
GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO MYOPIC OR SHORTSIGHTEDNESS IN JUDGMENT
IN ADHERING AND LIMITING ITSELF ONLY TO APPEAL BY A PETITION FOR REVIEW
UNDER SUPREME COURT REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 1-95 [REVISED
CIRCULAR
NO. 1-91] GROSSLY IGNORING THAT AUTHORITY/POWER TO ISSUE WRITS OF
MANDAMUS,
PROHIBITION, CERTIORARI, HABEAS CORPUS AND QUO WARRANTO AND
AUXILIARY
WRITS OR PROCESSES, WHETHER OR NOT IN AID OF ITS APPELLATE JURISDICTION
AS GRANTED UNDER PAR. [1], SEC. 9 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7902 IN CASES
WHERE
THE QUASI-JUDICIAL BODY COMMITS ULTRAVIREZ (sic) ACTS
TANTAMOUNT
TO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR LACK/IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AS IN
THE
INSTANT CASE WHERE THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FOR THE FIRST TIME ON
APPEAL
CONSIDERED DOCUMENTS/ EVIDENCE WHICH WERE NEVER INTRODUCED/ PRESENTED
NOR
ADMITTED DURING THE FORMAL HEARING OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE.chanrobles virtual law library
II.chanrobles virtual law library
A QUESTION OF LAW AS TO WHETHER
DECISIONS
OR RESOLUTIONS OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION CAN NO
LONGER
BE REVIEWED BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS BY A PETITION FOR REVIEW
UNDER RULE 45 OF 65 OF THE NEW RULES OF COURT AS AMENDED DESPITE THE
PATENT
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
IN
DECIDING A CASE BASED ON DOCUMENTS/EVIDENCE INTRODUCED FOR THE FIRST
TIME
ON APPEAL, ORDINARY APPEAL BOT (sic) BEING THE PLAIN, SPEEDY
AND
ADEQUATE REMEDY IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF LAW.chanrobles virtual law library
III.chanrobles virtual law library
A QUESTION OF LAW AS TO WHETHER A
PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45 OR 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT AS AMENDED CAN
BE CONSIDERED A MODE OF APPEAL AND IF SO CONSIDERED AS A MODE OF APPEAL
WHETHER IT IS THE PROPER REMEDY TO CORRECT SUPER (sic) GRAVE
ABUSE
OF DISCRETION OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION IN DECIDING A CASE BASED
ON AN [sic] EVIDENCE NOT INTRODUCED DURING THE FORMAL HEARING OF THE
CASE
IT APPEARING UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCE THERE IS NO APPEAL, NOR ANY PLAIN,
SPEEDY, AND ADEQUATE REMEDY IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF LAW THAT CAN BE
MADE
AVAILABLE TO THE PETITIONER EXCEPT THE SAID PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
RULE
45 OR 65 OF THE RULED OF COURT AS AMENDED.
In its Comment,[6]
the Office of the Solicitor General submits that the Court of Appeals
did
not commit grave abuse of discretion as the petition which petitioner
actually
filed with the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40341 on 10 May 1996
was one for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as clearly
shown by the grounds petitioner relied upon, to wit:
I.chanrobles virtual law library
THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT NIEVES
CONFESOR
IN HER CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT AND REVIEWING
OFFICER
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT AGAINST THE PETITIONER COMMITTED SUPER (sic)
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION (sic) WHEN THE COMPLAINANTS IN SAID ADMINISTRATIVE
CASE MERELY
PETITIONED
FOR THE DEMOTION OF PETITIONER IN POSITION FROM CHIEF OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE
SERVICES TO SUPERVISING OFFICER OF THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS DIVISION OF
THE SAME REGIONAL OFFICE, NO. XI, DAVAO CITY, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT
BUT THE HONORABLE NIEVES CONFESOR CAPRICIOUSLY, WHIMSICALLY,
ARROGANTLY,
ULTRAVIREZLY (sic) WITHOUT REGARD TO THE CARDINAL RULES
OF
PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE RULED AND DECREED IN ANNEX "A" TO ANNEX "A-10"
LIKE
AN EMPRESS THAT PETITIONER SHOULD BE DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE WHERE
THE
SAID PETITIONER SPENT THE BEST 23 YEARS OF HIS LIFE HONESTLY,
FAITHFULLY
AND SINCERELY WITHOUT BEING CHARGED OF (sic) ANY SINGLE CASE,
ADMINISTRATIVE
OR OTHERWISE, EXCEPT THE PRESENT HARASSMENT CASE UNLIKE THE
AFOREMENTIONED
NIEVES CONFESOR WHO IN HER SHORT STINT AS SECRETARY [OF] LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT
WAS CHARGED IN THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN OF (sic) SEVERAL
CRIMINAL
AND ADMINISTRATIVE CASES RANGING FROM CORRUPTION TO ALL SORTS OF CASES
INCLUDING HER INEXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE OF (sic) THE FLOR
CONTEMPLACION
AND OTHER SIMILAR CASES INVOLVING OVERSEAS CONTRACT WORKERS ABROAD.chanrobles virtual law library
II.chanrobles virtual law library
THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT NIEVES
CONFESOR
ACTED WITH SUPER (sic) GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
FALSE
NARRATION OF FACTS OR UNTRUTHFUL STATEMENT IN THE NARRATION OF FACTS IN
VIOLATION OF ART. 171 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE TANTAMOUNT TO
FALSIFICATION
OF QUASI JUDICIAL PUBLIC DOCUMENTS WHEN IN THE QUESTIONED ORDER [ANNEX
"A" TO "A-10"] SHE ALTERED, SUBSTITUTED AND CHANGED THE FINDINGS OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR INVESTIGATOR ATTY. JOEL MARTINEZ BY MAKING IT
APPEAR
THAT PETITIONER WAS FOUND TO BE FREQUENTLY ABSENT, WAS DRUNK OF
SLEEPING
DURING REGULAR OFFICE HOURS WHEN THE AFOREMENTIONED INVESTIGATING
OFFICER
HAS (sic) NOT MADE ANY OF THOSE FINDINGS.chanrobles virtual law library
III.chanrobles virtual law library
THE HONORABLE NIEVES CONFESOR
COMMITTED
GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OF
GROSS
IGNORANCE OF THE LAW WHEN SHE ISSUED THE SEPTEMBER 4, 1992 ORDER [ANNEX
A TO ANNEX A-10] WHEREIN SHE IMPOSED THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DISMISSAL
WITH
FORFEITURE OF RETIREMENT BENEFITS AND LEAVE CREDITS ON THE PETITIONER
WHICH
IS GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE TO PETITIONER'S ALLEGED FINDINGS OF GUILT
FOR
VIOLATION OF REASONABLE OFFICE RULES AND REGULATIONS, FREQUENT ABSENCES
FROM DUTY DURING REGULAR OFFICE HOUSES (sic) AND CONDUCT
PREJUDICIAL
TO THE BEST INTEREST OF THE SERVICE AND PETITIONER FOR THE FIRST TIME
IN
HIS 23 YEARS OF SERVICE WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT WAS
CONFRONTED WITH AN ADMINISTRATIVE HARASSMENT CASE IN A PLACE SEVERAL
HUNDRED
KILOMETERS FROM HIS FAMILY WHEN UNDER THE CIVIL SERVICE LAW
[PRESIDENTIAL
DECREE NO. 807] AND CODE OF CONDUCT OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND
EMPLOYEES
[R. A. 6713] THE MAXIMUM PENALTY FOR FREQUENT UNAUTHORIZED ABSENCES
WHICH
IS CONSIDERED A GRAVE OFFENSE IS ONLY SUSPENSION FROM THE SERVICE FOR
SIX
MONTHS AND ONE DAY AND THE PENALTY FOR CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE BEST
INTEREST OF THE SERVICE IS SIX MONTHS AND ONE DAY TO ONE YEAR WHILE THE
PENALTY FOR VIOLATION OF REASONABLE OFFICE RULES AND REGULATIONS WHICH
IS A LIGHT OFFENSE, IS ONLY A REPRIMAND.chanrobles virtual law library
IV.chanrobles virtual law library
THE HONORABLE NIEVES CONFESOR
COMMITTED
GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING THE SEPTEMBER 4, 1992 ORDER [ANNEX A TO
ANNEX A-10] DISMISSING FROM THE SERVICE THE HEREIN PETITIONER WITH
FORFEITURE
OF RETIREMENT BENEFITS AND LEAVE CREDITS AMOUNTING TO CAPRICIOUS,
WHIMSICAL,
ARROGANT AND ULTRAVIREZ (sic) EXERCISE OF FUNCTIONS WHEN THE
CHIEF
OF THE LEGAL SERVICES, THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF LABOR AND THE
UNDERSECRETARY
OF LABOR HAVE ALREADY INDORSED TO HER FOR HER APPROVAL THE ORDER
DISMISSING
THE INSTANT ADMINISTRATIVE CASE AND AT THE SAME TIME RECOMMENDED THE
APPROVAL
OF PETITIONER'S APPLICATION FOR RETIREMENT.chanrobles virtual law library
V.chanrobles virtual law library
THE HONORABLE NIEVES CONFESOR
COMMITTED
GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO VIOLATION OF PARAGRAPH [c], SEC. 4 OF
R. A. 6713 WHICH IS THE CODE OF CONDUCT AND ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR
PUBLIC
OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES CONSISTING OF HER DELIBERATE MALICIOUS REFUSAL
TO ACT WITH JUSTNESS AND SINCERITY (sic) TOWARDS PETITIONER
WHEN
UNDER FALSE PRETEPSES (sic) SHE MISLEAD PETITIONER INTO FILING
OF (sic) HIS APPLICATION FOR RETIREMENT TO TAKE EFFECT ON APRIL
15,
1993 AND AFTER PETITIONER FILED SUCH APPLICATION FOR RETIREMENT AND
ACTUALLY
STOPPED WORKING IN [THE] OFFICE ON APRIL 15, 1993, THE SAID HONORABLE
NIEVES
CONFESOR DENIED PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION [ANNEXES F,
F-1,
F-2, F-3, F-4, AND F-5] AND RETIREMENT APPLICATION.chanrobles virtual law library
VI.chanrobles virtual law library
PUBLIC RESPONDENT CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING LIKEWISE TO FALSIFICATION
OF QUASI JUDICIAL PUBLIC DOCUMENTS WHEN IT ISSUED RESOLUTION NO.
95-0230
[ANNEX "B" TO "B-8" DATED JANUARY 12, 1995] AFFIRMING THE ORDER OF
HONORABLE
PUBLIC RESPONDENT NIEVES CONFESOR WHEN THE SAID CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION
MADE IT APPEAR IN SAID RESOLUTION THAT CERTAIN LETTERS AND MEMORANDA
WERE
PRESENTED DURING THE FORMAL HEARING OF THE CASE SUCH AS THOSE LETTERS
AND
MEMORANDA ENUMERATED FROM NOS. 1 TO 19 OF PAGES 7 AND 8 OF THE
QUESTIONED
RESOLUTION NO. 95-0230 WHEN NO SUCH LETTERS AND MEMORANDA WERE EVER
PRESENTED
IN THE FORMAL HEARING OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE AND HOW THE SAID
DOCUMENTS
FOUND THEIR WAY INTO THE RECORDS OF THE CASE AND FOR THE FIRST TIME
CONSIDERED
ON APPEAL BY PUBLIC RESPONDENT CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION WHICH WAS THE
BASIS
OF AFFIRMING THE QUESTIONED ORDER OF HON. NIEVES CONFESOR [ANNEX "A" TO
ANNEX "A-10"] AS WELL AS IN DECLARING PETITIONER NOTORIOUSLY
UNDESIRABLE
IS A "MIRACLE" WHICH HAS NEVER BEEN DISCUSSED NOR EXPLAINED BY PUBLIC
RESPONDENT
IN THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION NO. 95-0230.chanrobles virtual law library
VII.chanrobles virtual law library
THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT CIVIL
SERVICE
COMMISSION COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
FALSIFICATION
PUNISHABLE UNDER ART. 171 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE WHEN IT DENIED
PETITIONER'S
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION BY ISSUING RESOLUTION NO. 96-0987 DATED
FEBRUARY
13, 1996 WHEN IT CONSIDERED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL THE QUESTIONED
LETTERS AND MEMORANDA WHICH WERE NEVER INTRODUCED DURING THE FORMAL
HEARING
OF THE INSTANT ADMINISTRATIVE CASE.chanrobles virtual law library
VIII.chanrobles virtual law library
THE HONORABLE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
ACTED
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING RESOLUTION NO. 95-0230 AND
RESOLUTION
NO. 96-0987 DECLARING PETITIONER AS NOTORIOUSLY UNDESIRABLE ON THE
BASIS
OF DOCUMENTS NOT ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE NOR PASSED UPON IN THE FORMAL
HEARING
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE BUT WHICH FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL WAS
(sic) MIRACULOUSLY INSERTED INTO THE RECORDS OF THE CASE IN THE
CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION AND THESE CONSIST OF THE LETTERS AND MEMORANDA
MENTIONED
IN PAGES 7 AND 8 OF THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION NO. 95-0230 ENUMERATED AS
NOS. 1 TO 19.chanrobles virtual law library
IX.chanrobles virtual law library
THE HONORABLE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO KNOWINGLY RENDERING [AN] UNJUST
JUDGMENT WHEN INSTEAD OF REVIEWING THE FINDINGS AND ORDER OF HONORABLE
NIEVES CONFESOR [ANNEXES A TO A-10] DATED SEPTEMBER 4, 1992 IT
PROCEEDED
TO CONDUCT ITS OWN EX-PARTE INFORMAL INQUIRY BY CONSIDERING DOCUMENTS
OR
SCRAP[S] OF PAPERS (sic) MIRACULOUSLY INSERTED INTO THE RECORDS
OF THE CASE IN THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION WHICH WERE FOR THE FIRST
TIME
TREATED ON APPEAL THEREBY ISSUING A NEW FINDING THAT THE PETITIONER WAS
NOTORIOUSLY UNDESIRABLE WHICH FINDING WAS NEVER DREAMED NOR CONCEIVED
OF
BY ANY PARTY IN THE FORMAL HEARING OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE AND NOT
EVEN
BY THE OVERZEALOUS, OVER VIGILANT, OVER ACTING, OVERSPEEDING, OVER
HONEST
AND OVER INCORRUPTIBLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT NIEVES CONFESOR.[7]
The Solicitor
General then concluded that since under
Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 of this Court appeals from
judgments
of quasi-judicial agencies such as the Civil Service Commission should
be by verified petition for review, and considering further that
Circular
No. 2-90 of this Court provides that appeals taken to either this Court
or the Court of Appeals by the wrong or inappropriate mode of appeal
shall
be dismissed, then petitioner's motion for extension of time to file
petition
for certiorari was correctly denied by the Court of Appeals.
In its Comment[8]
filed by its Office for Legal Affairs, respondent Civil Service
Commission
claims as misplaced petitioner's reliance on Section 9[1] of B.P. Blg.
129 which vests upon the Court of Appeals exclusive original
jurisdiction
to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and
quo warranto, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
Respondent
Commission contends that the only mode of appeal from its decisions is
a petition for review, in accordance with Revised Circular No. 1-95 of
this Court and Section 9[3] of B.P. Bldg. 129, as amended by R. A. No.
7902. The latter provides:
Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. The
Court
of Appeals shall exercise:
[3] Exclusive appellate jurisdiction
over all
final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional
Trial
Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
commissions,
including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security
Commission,
the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission,
except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court
in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines
under the Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of
this
Act, and of subparagraph [1] of the third paragraph and subparagraph
[4]
of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
In his
Consolidated Reply,[9]
petitioner justified his filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court in light of the "super-grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the. Civil Service Commission" in issuing the challenged
resolution, and that an ordinary appeal was "not appropriate and
sufficient
to seek reddress (sic) for the reason that it would in effect
impliedly
give credence to the unlawful acts of the Civil Service Commission thus
admitting its despotic, arrogant exercise of authority"
We rule against
petitioner.cralaw:red
The Court of
Appeals committed no error in denying
petitioner's "Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for
Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court." Prior to the effectivity of
R. A. 7902, a party aggrieved by any decision, final order or
resolution
of the Civil Service Commission had only one remedy, namely, a special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court[10]
to be filed with this Court pursuant to Section 7 of Article IX-A of
the
Constitution, which reads, in part:
Sec. 7. Unless otherwise provided by law
this
Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission
may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved
party
within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
Conformably
with its implied authority in this Section,
Congress passed R. A. No. 7902 vesting upon the Court of Appeals
appellate
jurisdiction over cases decided or resolved by the Civil Service
Commission,
but not the other two Constitutional Commissions treated under Article
IX. Pursuant to Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, the mode of
appeal
from a decision of the Civil Service Commission, to bring it within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, is a petition for
review
to be filed within the period therein fixed. This petition for review
is
the same as that contemplated in Section 29 of the Judiciary Act of
1948
[R. A. No. 269], as amended, and in Circular No. 2-90, but not that
treated
in Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which refers to petitions filed in the
Supreme Court for the review of decisions or final orders of the Court
of Appeals.
Under the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, which
took effect on 1 July 1997, a petition for review as a mode of appeal
to
the Court of Appeals from decisions, final orders or resolutions of the
Court of Tax Appeals and quasi-judicial bodies, including the Civil
Service
Commission, is governed by Rule 43 thereof.cralaw:red
Considering that
petitioner announced in his motion
for extension of time that he would be filing a petition for review
under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted
for
peremptorily denying the motion.cralaw:red
Petitioner
claims, however, that a petition for
review was not his exclusive remedy, as he could also avail of a
special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. There are, of course,
settled
distinctions between a petition for review as a mode of appeal and a
special
civil action for certiorari, thus:
a. In appeal by certiorari, the petition
is
based
on questions of law which the appellant desires the appellate court to
resolve. In certiorari as an original action, the petition raises the
issue
as to whether the lower court acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion.
b. Certiorari, as a mode of appeal,
involves
the review of the judgment, award or final order on the merits. The
original
action for certiorari may be directed against an interlocutory order of
the court prior to appeal from the judgment or where there is no appeal
or any other plain, speedy or adequate remedy.
c. Appeal by certiorari must be made
within the
reglementary period for appeal. An original action for certiorari may
be
filed not later than sixty [60] days from notice of the judgment, order
or resolution sought to be assailed.
d. Appeal by certiorari stays the
judgment,
award
or order appealed from. An original action for certiorari, unless a
writ
of preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order shall have
been
issued, does not stay the challenged proceeding.
e. In appeal by certiorari, the
petitioner and
respondent are the original parties to the action, and the lower court
or quasi-judicial agency is not to be impleaded. In certiorari as an
original
action, the parties are the aggrieved, party against the lower court
quasi-judicial
agency and the prevailing parties, who thereby respectively become the
petitioner and respondents.
f. In certiorari for purposes of appeal,
the
prior filing of a motion for reconsideration is not required [Sec. 1,
Rule
45]; while in certiorari as an original action, a motion for
reconsideration
is a condition precedent [Villa-Rey Transit vs. Bello, L-18957, April
23,
1963], subject to certain exceptions.
g. In appeal by certiorari, the appellate
court
is in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction and power of review
for,
while in certiorari as an original action, the higher court exercises
original
jurisdiction under its power of control and supervision over the
proceedings
of lower courts.[11]
The original
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
over special civil actions for, inter alia, certiorari, is
vested
upon it in Section 9[1] of B. P. Blg. 129. This jurisdiction is
concurrent
with the Supreme Court[12]
and the Regional Trial Court.[13] If, indeed, petitioner
initially
believed that he had the alternative remedy of a special civil action
for
certiorari which would have been more effective and adequate, then it
was
not necessary for him to ask for an extension of time to file the
petition.
Under Rule 65 then, he had a reasonable period from receipt of a copy
of
the Civil Service Commission resolution denying his motion for
reconsideration
within which to file the petition. That reasonable period has been
interpreted
to be ninety [90] days.[14]
We are not, however, persuaded that petitioner initially thought of
filing
a special civil action. All along, what he had in mind was a petition
for
review, as evidenced by his express reference in his motion to a
petition
for review under Rule 45 and his indication of the date he received a
copy
of the resolution, viz., 29 March 1996, and the last day to
file
the petition, viz., 13 April 1996, which coincided with the
last
day prescribed under Rule 45.
If petitioner
then filed a special civil action
for certiorari on 10 May 1996, it was only because he had lost his
right
to appeal by way of the intended petition fore review. The proffered
justification
then for his belated filing of a special action for certiorari was
nothing
but a crude attempt to circumvent standing rules of procedure, which We
cannot tolerate. It is settled that a special civil action for
certiorari
will not lie as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal,[15]
and we find no special nor compelling reasons why We should make out an
exception here.cralaw:red
In any case, even
if We were to sympathize with
petitioner and permit his recourse under Rule 65, the end result would
remain unchanged since a perusal of the challenged resolutions of the
Civil
Service Commission fails to disclose any grave abuse of discretion on
its
part.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, the
instant petition is DISMISSED.
Costs against petitioner.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Regalado, Romero,
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ.,
concur.
Martinez, J., took no part.
Narvasa, C.J., and Mendoza, J.,
are on leave.cralaw:red
____________________________
Endnotes
[1]
Rollo, 29-37.
[2]
Id., 38-44.
[3]
Id., 45-46.
[4]
Id., 24; Per Cañizares-Nye, P., J., and Ramirez, P. and Callejo,
R., JJ., concurring.
[5]
Rollo, 27.
[6]
Rollo, 109-114.
[7]
Annex "A" of the Comment of the Office of the Solicitor General, Rollo,
116-118.
[8]
Id., 119-125.
[9]
Rollo, 131-133.
[10]
Dario v. Mison, 176 SCRA 84, 111 [1989].
[11]
Florenz D. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium 543-544, 6th Ed. 1997.
[12]
Section 5[1], Article VIII, Constitution; Section 17, Judiciary Act of
1948, as amended.
[13]Section 21[1], B.P. Blg. 129.
[14]
Paderanga v. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 741, 759 [1995], People v.
Magallanes,
249 SCRA 212, 229 [1995].
[15]
Vda. De Espina v. Abaya, 196 SCRA 312, 321 [1991]; Sy v. Romero, 214
SCRA
187, 193 [1992]; Hipolito v. Court of Appeals, 230 SCRA 191, 204
[1994];
Fajardo v. Bautista, 232 SCRA 291, 298 [1994]; De la Paz v. Panis, 245
SCRA 242, 250 [1995]. |