THIRD
DIVISION
PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
G. R. No. 124135
September 15, 1997
-versus-
DANNY
QUELIZA,
Accused-Appellant.
D
E C I S I O N
MELO, J.:
Accused-Appellant,
Danny Queliza, seeks reversal
of the judgment rendered by Branch 54 of the Regional Trial Court of
the
First Judicial Region, stationed in Alaminos, Pangasinan, which found
him
guilty of the crime of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code
and consequently sentenced him as follows:
WHEREFORE, in accordance with the
evidence
adduced
and law applicable hereof, and finding that moral certainty has been
reached
as to find the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, if is now the painful duty
of this court to impose on the accused the single indivisible sentence
of Death but as since this sentence is proscribed at the time of the
commission
of the crime by the 1987 Constitution, the medium degree of Reclusion
Perpetua
is imposed and to pay to the heirs of the victim civil damages in the
following
amounts:
A. P9,500.00 for compensatory
damages;
B. P100,000.00 for loss of
earning;
C. P100,000.00 for moral damages;
and
D. P50,000.00 for indemnification
awarded
to the heirs in accordance with law [pp. 38-39, Rollo].
Accused-appellant
Danny Queliza was charged under
an Information docketed as Criminal Case No. 2596-A, for the crime of
murder,
reading as follows:
That on or about October 30, 1992, in the
evening
in Barangay Aporao, Municipality of Bani, province of Pangasinan,
Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused
with intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot VICTORIANO CABANGON
with
a short firearm, inflicting him injuries to wit:
Point of entry: frontal area skull,
right
side,
I cm., rough edges, (positive) powder [sic] burns, with minimal amount
of brain tissue at the surface. Right eye is bulging. Linear fracture 6
cm. Length traversing the frontal area of the skull. Brain tissue is
lacerated
with moderate amount of clotted blood at the cranial area.
which cause the instantaneous death of
Victoriano
Cabangon as a consequence, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of
the victim.
CONTRARY to Art. 248 of the Revised Penal
Code.
[p. 8, Rollo]
Upon
arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty
and following trial, the judgment, now under review, was rendered.
Hence,
the instant appeal premised on the following assigned errors:
1.chanrobles virtual law library
THE LOWER COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN
INTERPRETING
THE TESTIMONIES OF THE WITNESSES FOR THE PROSECUTION TO BE AFFIRMATIVE
IN NATURE AND, THEREFORE, MORE CREDIBLE THAN THOSE OF THE WITNESSES FOR
THE DEFENSE WHICH THE LOWER COURT HELD TO BE NEGATIVE.chanrobles virtual law library
2.chanrobles virtual law library
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
OVERLOOKING
AND DISREGARDING FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCE OF GREAT AND SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT
AND IMPORTANCE WHICH, IF PROPERLY CONSIDERED, WOULD HAVE RESULTED TO
THE
ACQUITTAL OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
3.chanrobles virtual law library
THE LOWER COURT OBVIOUSLY ERRED IN
HOLDING
THAT THE PROSECUTION WAS ABLE TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.chanrobles virtual law library
4.chanrobles virtual law library
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
ACQUITTING
THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME ON GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT. [Rollo,
p. 57]
Based on the
record, the undisputed facts of the
case are the following:
At around 8 o'clock on the night of
October 30,
1992, as Victoriano Aguilar Cabangon, 26 years old, Teresita Cabangon,
22 years old, husband and wife, together with their 5-year-old son,
were
resting in their bamboo hut at Barangay Apurao, Bani, Pangasinan,
Victoriano,
who was already asleep, was suddenly killed by a gunshot directed at
the
frontal area of his skull.
The prosecution's version is based on the
testimony
of its witnesses, Victoriano's widow, Teresita, who positively
identified
accused-appellant Danny Queliza, as the culprit; Loreta Aguilar
Cabangon,
mother of the deceased; Restituto Rivera, the embalmer; and Dr. Vicente
C. Tongson, the Rural Health Doctor. The Office of the Solicitor
General
summarized the events as follows:
Appellant Danny Queliza, victim
Victoriano
Cabangon
and his mother Loreta were neighbors at Barangay Apurao, Bani,
Pangasinan.
Five days before the fateful night of October 30, 1992, appellant had a
quarrel with victim's cousin, Ruben Ardesani. In that incident, the
victim
had made manifestations siding with his cousin whom he felt was
aggrieved.
Appellant resented this and threatened the victim saying that the
latter's
life was only worth P12,000.00 [Records, p. 55].
At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of
October
30, 1992, his wife Teresita and their 5-year old son were peacefully
lying
down for the night in their house [bamboo hut] illuminated by an
electric
bulb. Father and son had already fallen asleep while Teresita was still
awake listening to the program "Mr. Lonely" [TSN, Sept. 9, 1993, pp.
4-7].
All of a sudden, appellant pushed the door open and forthwith fired a
gun
at the victim's head. Appellant glanced at Teresita and fled. The
victim
died on the spot. Horrified by the scene, Teresita cried for help
[T.S.N.,
Sept. 9, 1993, pp. 4-12].
Moments before the gruesome murder, the
victim's
mother, Loreta Cabangon, was in her yard [about five meters away from
the
victim's house] to answer a call of nature. She saw appellant and two
others
arrive at the victim's porch then illuminated by an electric lamp.
Appellant
went up alone at the victim's balcony. Not long after, she heard a gun
report coming from the victim's house and thereafter saw appellant jump
out of the victim's house holding a gun and sped away [T.S.N., Sept.
15,
1993, pp. 5-18; Sept. 13, 1993, p. 15].
Loreta shouted for help and dashed to
the
victim's
house where she met Teresita at the porch crying and shouting, "Nay
awan
ni Victoriano pinatay ni Danny Queliza" ("Mother, Victoriano is already
gone, he was killed by Danny Queliza") [T.S.N., Sept. 15, 1993, pp.
11-12;
Sept. 13, 1993, p. 15].
On the same night, the incident reached
the
barangay
and police authorities. Pat. Cecilio Dollaga was one of the policemen
who
responded and investigated the case. When he interviewed Teresita, the
latter named appellant as her husband's assailant [Id., pp.
14-15;
T.S.N., Sept. 9, 1993, p. 15; T.S.N., May 19, 1994, pp. 3-4].
The post-mortem examination on the
cadaver of
the victim shows that he died of "Intracranial Hemorrhage, secondary to
Brain Tissue Injury secondary to Gunshot wound (Exh. "A", Records, p.
6).
After the victim's burial, Teresita gave her sworn statement at the
Police
Station, Bani, Pangasinan (Exh. "B" and "B-1"; TSN, Sept. 9, 1993, p.
16).[Rollo,
p. 83].
Accused-appellant,
on the other hand, presented the
defense of alibi. Corroborated by witnesses William Raboy and Cornelia
Romero, accused-appellant's defense is to the effect that at the time
of
the incident he was in Arnedo, Bolinao to go swimming at the sea with
his
cousins; and that he returned to his hometown only on December 21, 1992
when he voluntarily surrender to the police authorities of Bani,
Pangasinan
to deny any knowledge of the incident.
The defense also
clings to the testimony of Pat.
Cecilio Dollaga to the effect that when he interrogated Teresita
Cabangon,
she declared that she did no know the killer of her husband [T.S.N.,
pp.
17, 19, 21, Oct. 28, 1993].cralaw:red
Lastly, the
defense notes that the trial in this
case was conducted before Judge Segundo Paz who passed away before he
could
decide the case, and that the decision was penned by Judge Jules A.
Mejia,
who did not have the opportunity of observing the demeanor of the
witnesses
for both the prosecution and the defense.cralaw:red
In giving
credence to the prosecution's evidence,
the trial court noted the opposing contentions of Teresita Cabangon, as
corroborated by Loreta Cabangon, and that of Patrolman Dollaga.
Teresita
Cabangon testified that when she was asked by Dollaga who killed her
husband,
she identified the accused-appellant. This was corroborated by Loreta
Cabangon,
who testified that she heard her daughter-in-law reveal to Dollaga the
identity of the assailant. On the other hand, Dollaga said that for
three
times during his interrogation on the very night of the incident, he
asked
the widow who killed her husband and she disclaimed knowledge thereof.
Faced with these contradictory contentions, the trial court preferred
the
affirmative over the negative testimony.cralaw:red
Nevertheless, the
trial court held that even assuming
that Teresita Cabangon indeed did not, on the initial investigation,
identify
the author of the crime, such failure, "lacks spontaneity because of
the
condition of the declarant, surrounding circumstances such as fright,
tension,
stress, instability under an atmosphere of serious or continuing fear
specially
since it was nighttime, just a few hours after her husband was
murdered"
and that the "diversion of her thoughts may be the result of attention
to other matters, more importantly her own safety which is in fact the
first law of nature."
Further, the
trial court did not give credence
to the insistence of accused-appellant that he was not the assailant
because
he was not at the place of the crime at the time of its occurrence. The
court said that "alibi cannot stand to exculpate hint as he was
positively
identified by Teresita as the very person who shot her sleeping
husband,
coupled by the testimony of the mother of the deceased that after the
shot
was heard, she saw the accused jump from the porch carrying a hand gun
in his right hand." The trial court ruled out the reliability of alibi
as a defense since "it was not physically impossible for the accused to
proceed to Arnedo, Bolinao from Apurao, Bani on the night of October
30,
1992", a distance which would not take more than two hours to traverse.cralaw:red
The trial court
also did not see any personal
reason on the part of the widow and the mother of the deceased nor any
grudge that may push them to falsely testify against accused-appellant,
unlike the witnesses for the defense, who were perceived to be biased
in
favor of accused-appellant.
Lastly, the trial court appreciated against
accused-appellant
the qualifying/aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident
premeditation,
and nocturnity, it being undisputed that the deceased was asleep with
his
family when he was shot, that the attack was so sudden and that the
victim
could not have been given even the slightest opportunity to prepare for
or repel or avoid the attack, even if he were awake. Evident
premeditation
is said to have been present since minutes before the gunshot was
heard,
three persons, one of whom was identified as accused-appellant, were
seen
only six meters away from the house of the victim. The trial court
concluded
that the mode of attack was purposely sought to facilitate the
commission
of the crime and to facilitate accused-appellant's escape.cralaw:red
We sustain the
conviction of accused- appellant.cralaw:red
Under his
assignment of errors, which he discussed
jointly, accused-appellant questions the finding of the trial court
that
the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution is affirmative in
nature
and that of the witnesses for the defense is negative. He likewise
assails
the trial court for overlooking and disregarding what he says are
certain
facts and circumstances which, if properly considered, would have
resulted
in his acquittal. Lastly, he objects to the trial court's finding that
the prosecution was able to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.cralaw:red
At the outset, it
is significant to note that
the circumstance that Judge Jules Mejia, the one who penned the
assailed
decision, is not the one who heard the witnesses, a fact which Judge
Mejia
honestly admitted in his decision, will not automatically warrant a
reversal
of the decision. In the recent case of People v. Rabutin [G. R. Nos.
118131-32,
May 5, 1997], We held:
This Court had ruled that while the trial
judge
who presided at the trial of the case would be in a better position to
ascertain the truth or falsity of the testimony of the witnesses, it
does
not necessarily follow that a judge who was not present during the
trial
cannot render a valid and just decision. This is the main reason why
all
trial courts are mandatorily required to be courts of record. Whoever
is
tasked to render judgment in every case can rely on the transcribed
stenographic
notes taken during the trial as basis for his decision. (People v.
Peralta,
237 SCRA 220 [1994]). [pp. 10-11].
We agree with
the finding of the court a quo that
based on jurisprudence, affirmative testimony has greater value than a
negative one (People v. Salazar, 248 SCRA 157 [1995]) since the defense
of denial crumbles in the face of the complainant's positive
identification
of the culprit (People v. Balsacao, 241 SCRA 309 [1995]). However, We
rule
that the distinction between affirmative and negative testimony is not
applicable to the opposing contentions of Teresita Cabangon and
Patrolman
Dollaga.
In Revilla v.
Court of Appeals (217 SCRA 583 [1993]),
negative and positive testimony were distinguished as follows:
Evidence is negative when the witness
states
that he did not see or know the occurrence of a fact, and positive when
the witness affirms that a fact did not occur [2 Moore on Facts, p.
1338]
(p. 592).
Based on the
above distinction, it is plain that
the declarations of Teresita Cabangon and Patrolman Dollaga are both
positive
in nature. Teresita said that she identified her killer when she was
interrogated
by Dollaga. Patrolman Dollaga, on the other hand, testified to
something
known to himself, namely, that Teresita did not divulge the identity of
the assailant.
However, taken in
its totality, in contrast to
the defense of denial made by accused-appellant, which is indeed
negative
testimony, we give greater weight to Teresita's positive identification
of the culprit and her testimony on the circumstances of the murder.
This
was corroborated by Loreta Cabangon that [a] she saw accused-appellant
enter the balcony of the house of the deceased moments before the fatal
gunshot was heard; and [b] immediately thereafter she saw
accused-appellant
with a gun in his right hand leaving the victim's house.cralaw:red
Even assuming
that Teresita did delay in revealing
the identity of her husband's assailant, this should not destroy the
essence
of her testimony, mainly, the positive identification of
accused-appellant
as the culprit. Defense witnesses Patrolman Dollaga and Councilman
Moises
corroborated each other's testimony that Teresita Cabangon delayed in
revealing
the identity of her dead husband's assailant. The record shows that it
was only on November 16, 1992, or a delay of only 16 days from the
commission
of the crime on October 30, 1992, when Teresita Cabangon reported the
crime
to the police authorities and named accused-appellant as her husband's
assailant. She did this when she executed her affidavit which was
presented
during the preliminary investigation of the case at bench.cralaw:red
However, We
believe that the slight delay is not
a far from ordinary human experience. We have to understand the human
psyche
given the morbid and horrific situation Teresita Cabangon was in. She
witnessed
her husband's death. For a moment, her husband was sleeping peacefully;
the next moment, he was dead. So violent was his death that the poor
wife
saw blood come out from his head and she saw his right eye bulge. Such
dreadful circumstances would undoubtedly leave the helpless wife in
fright
and in shock. Fear of the assailant's return to kill her and her son
was
also a natural reaction. Hence, it was normal and not unreasonable for
Teresita Cabangon to have taken her time to muster enough strength to
identify
her husband's assailant, whom she saw with her own eyes that fatal
night.cralaw:red
There is no rule
that the suspect in a crime be
named by a witness hurriedly. In fact, in People v. Corpus (240 SCRA
203
[1995]), we had an opportunity to rule that the unhurried and
deliberate
manner in which a witness identifies the accused even strengthened her
credibility, to wit:
It is true that Calapini did not point to
accused-appellant
as one of her assailants immediately and straight-away upon seeing him
at the hospital. The records show that Calapini took her time to
scrutinize
accused-appellant's features. She studiously looked him over before
identifying
him as one of the assailants. Surely, she cannot be faulted for
deliberating
and making sure that the person presented before her was indeed one of
the culprits. When she became certain, however, she decisively and
without
the slightest hesitation, identified the accused appellant.[p. 208]
We have
consistently ruled that persons do not necessarily
react uniformly to a given situation, for what is natural to one may be
strange to another (People v. Cabrera, 241 SCRA 28 [1995]; People v.
Paguntalan,
242 SCRA 753 [1995]; People v. Halili, 245 SCRA 312 [1995]; People v.
Espinoza,
247 SCRA 66 [1995]). What is important is the fact that Teresita
Cabangon,
notwithstanding the anxiety and fear that she had to go through after
witnessing
the brutal killing of her husband, gained enough courage to name her
husband's
assailant. This she did despite fear of retaliation from
accused-appellant,
who actually resides in the same town where Teresita resides.
Teresita's
testimony is further strengthened by
Loreta Cabangon's narration of events, particularly the fact of hearing
Teresita Cabangon utter the statement "Nay awan ni Victoriano
pinatay
ni Danny Queliza" [Mother, Victoriano is already gone, he was
killed
by Danny Queliza"]. This emotional lament is significantly part of the
res gestae.cralaw:red
In a long line of
jurisprudence (People v. Esquilona,
248 SCRA 139 [1995]; People v. Tolentino, 218 SCRA 337 [1993];
Pantranco
North Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 224 SCRA 477 [1993]; Anciro v.
People, 228 SCRA 629 [1993]), the requisites of res gestae as
an
exception to the hearsay rule were laid down: [1] that the principal
act
or the res gestae be a startling occurrence; [2] the statement is
spontaneous
or was made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise, and
the
statement is made during the occurrence or immediately prior or
subsequent
thereto; and [3] the statement made must concern the occurrence in
question
and its immediately attending circumstances.cralaw:red
Any delay on
Teresita Cabangon's part to identify
her husband's assailant is emphatically overcome by the aforestated
statement
which was correctly considered by the trial court as part of the res
gestae.
Accused-appellant, in a desperate attempt to
discredit the mother daughter tandem, banks on inconsistencies in their
testimony, which upon perusal are actually minor in character. Whether
Teresita saw her husband's assailant while she was lying down or while
she was sitting is of no consequence considering that the identified
who
the assailant was. Her absence at the crime scene during the
investigation
made by Patrolman Dollaga is of no moment, considering that she was
nonetheless
later subjected to investigation. Her failure on the stand to remember
the size of the weapon which she had earlier described as six to twelve
inches long during the preliminary investigation, cannot be taken
against
her. Whether Loreta Cabangon looked out of the window or whether she
looked
out of the door when she heard the fatal gunshot is not significant.
These
inconsistencies are minor details which can not prompt us to discredit
these two witnesses.cralaw:red
It has always
been our ruling that inconsistencies
in the testimony of a witness with respect to minor details or
inconsequential
matters may be disregarded without impairing the credibility of the
witness
(People v. Magalong, 244 SCRA 117 [1995]; People v. Compil, 244 SCRA
135
[1995]). In fact, such minor inconsistencies even tend to strengthen
then
rather than weaken a witness' credibility (People v. Lorenzo, 240 SCRA
634 [1995]) for these inconsistencies negate and erase any suspicion of
rehearsed testimony (People v. Padilla, 242 SCRA 629 [1995]). Besides,
in the present case, there is clearly consistency relative to the
principal
occurrence and positive identification of the assailant (People v.
Panganiban,
241 SCRA 91 [1995]).cralaw:red
Accused-appellant's
defense is underpinned by
his assertion that he was in another municipality at the night of the
murder.
His testimony on this point was corroborated by Cornelia Romero who
testified
that accused-appellant, together with two others, had dinner at her
house
and stayed overnight.
Time and again, We have ruled that alibi is a
weak defense and even if it is supported by the testimony of friends of
the accused, deserves the barest consideration (People v. Gamiao, 240
SCRA
284 [1995]). It will only be given weight if it would preclude any
doubt
that the accused could not have been physically presented at the place
of the crime or its vicinity at the time of the commission (People v.
Daquipil,
240 SCRA 314 [1995]; People v. De Roxas, 241 SCRA 369 [1995]; People v.
Morin, 241 SCRA 709 [1995]; People v. Rivera, 242 SCRA 26 [1995];
People
v. De la Iglesia, 241 SCRA 718 [1995]; People v. Umali, 241 SCRA 17
[1995];
People v. Dayson, 242 SCRA 124 [1995]; People v. Espinosa, 243 SCRA 7
[1995];
People v. Parica, 243 SCRA 557 [1995]; People v. Escoto, 244 SCRA 87
[1995]).cralaw:red
We agree with the
trial court's finding that it
was not physically impossible for accused-appellant to have been at the
crime scene on October 31, 1992 at 8 p.m. From the cross-examination of
the accused-appellant, the following facts were established:
1. Barangay Apurao, Bani, Pangasinan [the
crime
scene] and Arnedo, Bolinao [where accused-appellant allegedly was] are
separated by three barangays, namely, Luac, Tugue, and San Jose.
2. From Apurao to Luac, the distance is
one
kilometer.
From Luac to Tugue is about two kilometers. From Tugue to San Jose is
about
two kilometers.
3. From San Jose, Bani to the town proper
in
Bolinao, travel time is around 30 minutes. From Bolinao town proper to
Arnedo, travel time is 20 minutes or a distance of two kilometers, as
testified
by accused-appellant, for verily, judicial notice was taken of the fact
that one kilometer can be easily travelled within 7 to 8 minutes
[People
v. Sumbillo, et al., G. R. No. 105292, April 18, 1997].
Considering
that the above-stated barangays and towns
could be traversed by motorized vehicles, we are persuaded with the
trial
court's finding that accused-appellant could not have consumed more
than
two hours to travel from Arnedo, Bolinao to Apurao, Bani, considering
that
it was nighttime and roads were not too busy.
As held in People
v. Gamiao, supra:
The trial court correctly disbelieved
appellant's
defense of alibi, a handy but shabby excuse which indictees never seem
to tire of. [I]t is not enough to prove that the accused was
somewhere
else when the crime was committed, but it must likewise be demonstrated
that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of
the crime at the time of its commission. Caoile himself admitted in his
testimony that the distance between the locus criminis and
Tabacan,
Dinalupihan, Bataan where he claimed to be, is only about 100 km.,
which
could be negotiated by a public utility vehicle in not more than 2
hours,
even taking into consideration the traffic congestion normally
encountered
by a commuter. [pp. 261-262]
Moreover,
accused-appellant's defense of alibi must
necessarily fall in the light of the testimony of Teresita Cabangon and
Loreta Cabangon positively and unequivocally identifying him as the
assailant
and placing him at the crime scene immediately after the shooting. The
only corroborative evidence presented by the defense to show that
accused-appellant
was in Arnedo, Bolinao during the time of the incident was the
testimony
of Cornelia Ramos, which, however, fell apart on cross-examination
where
it was elicited that Cornelia Ramos was not a disinterested witness. It
was shown that the land where her family was staying is owned by the
aunt
of accused-appellant. The witness herself testified that
accused-appellant
did not have the habit of sleeping in her house, and that when
accused-appellant
did allegedly spend the night in her house on October 30, 1992, it was,
quite strangely, the first time he did so.
In sum, we give
great weight to Teresita Cabangon's
testimony that it was accused-appellant who fired the fatal gunshot
which
killed her husband while he was asleep last October 30, 1992, which
declaration
is corroborated by Loreta Cabangon's testimony that she saw the
accused-appellant
near the crime scene before and after the murder, carrying a hand gun.
These declarations are credible in themselves, they belie the
accused-appellant's
defense of alibi, and prove beyond reasonable doubt that it was
accused-appellant
who murdered the deceased.cralaw:red
However, we
modify the penalty imposed by the
trial court from the medium degree of reclusion perpetua to the single
indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua. Based on the evidence, the
qualifying
aggravating circumstance of treachery already absorbs the aggravating
circumstance
of nocturnity since nighttime forms part of the peculiar treacherous
means
and manner adopted to insure the execution of the crime (People vs.
Bardon,
165 SCRA 416 [1988]; People v. Abitona, 240 SCRA 335 [1995]; People vs.
Saliling, 249 SCRA 185 [1995]). It is clear from the circumstances of
the
murder that accused-appellant made some preparation to kill the victim
by choosing nighttime when the victim had already retired for the day,
in order to ensure the execution of the crime and to make it impossible
for the victim to defend himself.cralaw:red
As regards the
aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation, we hold that the presence of the requisites therefor,
were
not clearly and sufficiently shown. The elements of evident
premeditation
are: [a] the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; [b]
an act manifestly indicating that the accused had clung to his
determination;
and [c] sufficient lapse or interval of time between such determination
and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequence of his act
(People
vs. Saliling, supra, People vs. Besana, 220 SCRA 93 [1993]). The
presence
of evident premeditation must not be deduced from mere presumption or
sheer
speculation (People vs. Barros, 245 SCRA 312 [1995]) and it must be
proven
as clearly as the crime itself (People vs. Halili, 245 SCRA 340
[1995]).
The mere fact that accused-appellant was seen minutes before the
gunshot
was heard together with two persons six meters away is not sufficient
to
conclude the attendance of evident premeditation. At any rate, with or
without this aggravating circumstance, the penalty would still be
reclusion
perpetua which is an indivisible penalty [People vs. Saliling, supra].
As to
accused-appellant's civil liability, by
and large, the trial court was correct in awarding the following,
supported
as they are by the testimony of Teresita Cabangon:
(a) Funeral expenses amounted to P500.00
per
day during the seven-day wake of the victim [T.S.N., Sept. 9, 1993, p.
17]. Loreta Cabangon further testified that she spent P7,000.00,
consumed
5 gantas of rice, and spent P200.00 per viand of food during the wake
and
vigil [T.S.N., Sept. 13, 1993, p. 19].
(b) As regards the victim's income, it
was
shown
that he was a farmer who harvested 60 cavans of palay a year, which he
sold at P5.00 per kilo. He was also a fisherman who used to catch 5
liters
of shrimps a day and sold the same at P60.00 or P30.00 per liter
depending
on the size of the container used. Lastly, he worked at the
construction
of a dike and earned P100.00 a day therefor [T.S.N., Sept. 9, 1993, pp.
19-22].
Thus, the trial
court correctly awarded P9,500.00
as compensatory damages for funeral expenses; P100,000.00 for projected
loss of earnings considering that the victim, who was 26 years old, was
the lone provider for his family's basic needs; and, of course
P50,000.00
as indemnity for the death of the victim, in line with the current
jurisprudence.
However, the amount of P100,000.00 as moral damages for the physical
suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, and moral shock of the
victim's
widow, considering the manner by which the victim was killed, awarded
by
the trial court seems to be a bit inflated. We believe that P20,000.00
would be more reasonable.
WHEREFORE, the
decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED, with the modifications above-stated. No special pronouncement
is made as to costs.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, CJ.,
Romero, Francisco and Panganiban,
JJ., concur. |