THIRD
DIVISION
PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
G. R. No. 106581
March 3, 1997
-versus-
RENATO
FLORES alias "JOHNNY"
and ROLANDO MACALINTAL,
Accused-Appellants.
D
E C I S I O N
MELO, J.:
This has
reference to an appeal interposed by
accused-appellants, Renato Flores and Rolando Macalintal, from the
decision
of the Regional Trial Court of the Fourth Judicial Region [Branch 5,
Lemery,
Batangas], finding them guilty of the crime of murder and sentencing
each
of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify
jointly
and severally the heirs of the deceased Edoviguez Adelantar in the sum
of P50,000.00.
The gravamen of
the charge as recited in the information
reads:
That on or about the 6th day of March,
1989,
at about 4:30 o'clock in the afternoon, in Barangay Pingas,
Municipality
of Alitagtag, Province of Batangas, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a kitchen
knife and iron pipe, conspiring and confederating together, acting in
common
accord and mutually helping each other, with intent to kill, and
without
any justifiable cause, with treachery and evident premeditation, did
then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
stab
with the said weapon, one Edoviguez Adelantar, suddenly and without
warning,
thereby inflicting upon the latter multiple stab wounds on the
different
parts of his body, which directly cause his death. [p. 3,
Rollo].
Upon
arraignment, both accused pleaded not guilty
and trial on the merits was thereupon undertaken, with the prosecution
presenting three witnesses, namely, Juanito Aninao, the lone eyewitness
to the incident; Patrolman Esguerra, the investigator of the case; and
Dr. Herminigildo de Claro, the Municipal Health Officer of Lemery,
Batangas
who conducted the post-mortem examination on the victim's cadaver.
After the
prosecution rested its case and on the
date scheduled for the accused to present their evidence, counsel for
accused
Renato Flores made an oral manifestation that Flores is waiving his
right
to present evidence and requested time to file a demurrer to evidence.
The same manifestation and motion were adopted by accused Rolando
Makalintal's
counsel. The court acceded and ordered both accused to file their
demurrer
to evidence within 20 days from the date of hearing, while the
prosecution
was ordered to file its opposition thereto within 10 days from receipt
of the aforementioned motion.cralaw:red
After considering
the issues and arguments raised
by the accused in their demurrer, the trial court promulgated on April
7, 1992, a decision on the merits, sentencing the accused to reclusion
perpetua, aside from ordering them to pay civil indemnity to the heirs
of the victim.cralaw:red
Both accused now
seek the reversal of their conviction
on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence for the prosecution to
establish
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.cralaw:red
Taking into
consideration the factual circumstances
of this case and to avert any possible miscarriage of justice, We are
remanding
this case to the lower court.cralaw:red
Rules of
procedure are promulgated so that the
power of the court to administer justice may be efficiently and
effectively
exercised. The Rules are not made in restraint of its power but to make
it completely and fully available for justice. In the words of Justice
Moreland:
The purpose of procedure is not to thwart
justice.
Its proper aim is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival
claims of contending parties. It was created not to hinder and delay
but
to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. It does not
constitute
the thing itself which courts are always striving to secure to
litigants.
It is designed as the means best adapted to obtain that thing. In other
words, it is means to an end. It is the means by which the powers of
the
court are made effective in just judgments. When it loses the character
of the one and takes on that of the other the administration of justice
becomes incomplete and unsatisfactory and lays itself open to grave
criticism.
[Manila Railroad Co. vs. AttorneyGeneral, 20 Phil
523 (1911)].
The rules of
procedure are merely tools designed
to facilitate the attainment of justice. When they are rigid and strict
in application, resulting in technicalities that tend to frustrate
rather
than promote justice, the Court is empowered to suspend the rules. For
if the application and operation of the Rules tend to subvert and
defeat,
instead of promoting and enhancing justice, their suspension is
justified.
Justice Jose Abad Santos in Viuda de Ordoveza vs. Raymundo (63 Phil
275;
278 [1936]) quoted an American case, thus: "It is always within the
power
of the court to suspend its own rules or expect a particular case from
its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require."
In Olacao vs.
NLRC (177 SCRA 38 [1989]), Legasto
vs. Court of Appeals (172 SCRA 722 [1989]), City Fair Corporation vs.
NLRC
(243 SCRA 572 [1995]), Republic vs. Court of Appeals (83 SCRA 453
[1973]),
Bank of America, NT & SA vs. Gerochi Jr. (230 SCRA 9 [1994]), We
suspended
the rules to allow the filing of appeals beyond the reglementary period
in the interest of substantial justice. In
a resolution in Domingo de Guzman vs. Sandiganbayan, [G.R. 103276,
April
11, 1996], the Court En Banc set aside its previous decision
affirming
de Guzman's conviction and the denial with finality of his subsequent
motion
for reconsideration, and instead remanded the case to the trial court
for
the reception of de Guzman's evidence. In said case, de Guzman's
counsel
filed with the trial court a demurrer to evidence which was denied.
Undaunted
by the denial, counsel filed another demurrer. This time, the trial
court
not only denied the same but convicted the accused, which conviction
was
elevated to this Court. In an En Banc resolution promulgated
on
June 16, 1994, the Court affirmed the conviction and, as earlier
stated,
subsequently denied with finality a motion for reconsideration. In view
of his looming imprisonment, de Guzman hired a new counsel who filed an
"Omnibus Motion for Leave to Vacate First Motion For Reconsideration in
the light of the Present Development and to Consider Evidence Presented
Herein and to Set Aside Conviction." Taking into consideration the
plight
of the petitioner and keeping in mind that substantial justice must
prevail,
the Court, per Justice Francisco, resolved to remand the case to the
Sandiganbayan
for reception of petitioner's evidence. Indeed, when there is a strong
showing that grave miscarriage of justice would result from the strict
application of the Rules, this Court will not hesitate to relax the
same
in the interest of substantial justice. Thus, We said in de Guzman:
The Rules of Court were conceived and
promulgated
to set forth guidelines in the dispensation of justice but not to bind
and chain the hand that dispenses it, for otherwise, courts will be
mere
slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion.
That
is precisely why courts in rendering real justice have always been, as
they in fact ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that when
on the balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive
rights,
and not the other way around. Truly then, technicalities, in the
appropriate
language of Justice Makalintal, "Should give way to the realities of
the
situation."
Accused-appellants
in the case at bench were with
the crime of murder. After the prosecution had rested,
accused-appellants'
counsel waived their principals' right to present evidence and, with
leave
of court, filed their demurrer to evidence. The lower court then
seemingly
deemed the case submitted for decision, thus, its subsequent judgment
of
conviction. In their appeal now before Us, accused-appellants assail
the
findings of fact of the lower court without seeking relief from the
effect
of their waiver.
Be that as it
may, this Court having been constitutionally
mandated to directly review cases where the imposable penalty is
reclusion
perpetua, has the power to review the entire case to correct any error,
even if unassigned. The adjudication of cases involving the
transcendental
matter of life and liberty of a person, requires our utmost consider
the
same in the interest of justice.cralaw:red
The lower court,
in view of the severity of the
imposable penalty, ought to have inquired into the voluntariness and
full
knowledge of the consequences of accused-appellants' waiver. Though the
Rules require no such inquiry to be undertaken by the court for the
validity
of such waiver or any judgment made as result o f the waiver, prudence,
however, requires the Court to ascertain the same to avoid any grave
miscarriage
of justice. Although accused-appellants' waiver amazed the lower court,
nevertheless, the record is devoid of any facts which would indicate
that
the lower court took steps to assure itself of accused-appellants'
voluntariness
and full knowledge of the consequences of their waiver.cralaw:red
Besides,
counsels' waiver should have put the
court on guard. Any lawyer worth his salt ought to know that the filing
of a demurrer to evidence with leave of court as was done below, has
the
beneficial effect of reserving the movant's right to present evidence
if
the demurrer is denied by the court. Thus, a counsel who files a
demurrer
with leave of court, but at the same time expressly waives his right to
present evidence should put a judge on guard that said counsel may not
entirely comprehend the consequences of the waiver. The trial court
should
have exercised prudence by warning counsel about the prejudicial
effects
of their waiver, that with such a waiver, the case would be deemed
submitted
for decision, and their leave to file motion for demurrer to evidence
will
have no effect.cralaw:red
We have searched
the records for some indications
which would clarify counsels' ambiguous actions, but sadly, the records
are bereft of the same. The transcripts of stenographic notes fail to
account
for what had transpired at that pivotal moment when counsel for
accused-appellants
waived their right to present evidence. whether counsels really
intended
to waive their clients' right to present evidence, or just to file a
demurrer
to evidence without waiving appellants' right to present evidence is
something
which we must determine with certainty in the interest of substantial
justice.cralaw:red
There being grave
doubts in Our minds as to the
voluntariness of the waiver and whether the same was done with full
comprehension,
we feel uneasy to bring this case to a conclusion without exercising
utmost
prudence. We are left no better option than to remand this case to the
trial court to ascertain accused-appellants' volition to such a waiver,
their knowledge of its consequences, and to receive accused-appellants'
evidence if the contrary is found, so that justice may be properly
administered.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, the
decision herein appealed from is
hereby SET ASIDE. Accordingly, let this case be remanded to the trial
court
for its proper disposition as above indicated.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Narvasa, C.J.,
Davide, Jr., Francisco and
Panganiban, JJ., concur. |