THIRD
DIVISION
LEOVILLO
C. AGUSTIN,
Petitioner,
G. R. No. 107846
April 18, 1997
-versus-
COURT
OF APPEALS
and FILINVEST
FINANCE CORP.,
Respondents.
R
E S O L U T I O N
FRANCISCO, J.:
This is an
appeal by certiorari from the decision
of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. 24684[1]
which affirmed the order of Regional Trial Court, Branch 40, Manila, in
Civil Case No. 84804.[2]
The dispute
stemmed from an unpaid promissory
note dated October 28, 1970, executed by petitioner Leovillo C. Agustin
in favor of ERM Commercial for the amount of P43,480.80. The note was
payable
in monthly installments[3]
and secured by a chattel mortgage over an Isuzu diesel truck,[4]
both of which were subsequently assigned to private respondent
Filinvest
FinanceCorporation.[5]
When petitioner defaulted in paying the installments, private
respondent
demanded from him the payment of the entire balance or, in lieu
thereof,
the possession of the mortgaged vehicle. Neither payment nor surrender
was made. Aggrieved, private respondent filed a complaint with the
Regional
Trial. Court of Manila, Branch 26 [RTC Branch 26] against petitioner
praying
for the issuance of a writ of replevin or, in the alternative, for the.
payment of P32,723.97 plus interest at the rate of 14% per annum from
due
date until fully paid.[6]
Trial ensued and, thereafter, a writ of replevin was issued by RTC
Branch
26. By virtue thereof, private respondent acquired possession of the
vehicle.
Upon repossession, the latter discovered that the vehicle was no longer
in running condition and that several parts were missing which private
respondent replaced. The vehicle was then foreclosed and sold at public
auction.cralaw:red
Private
respondent subsequently filed a "supplemental
complaint" claiming additional reimbursement worth P8,852.76 as value
of
replacement parts[7]
and for expenses incurred in transporting the mortgaged vehicle from
Cagayan
to Manila. In response, petitioner moved to dismiss the supplemental
complaint
arguing that RTC Branch 26 had already lost jurisdiction over the case
because of the earlier extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage. The
lower
court granted the motion and the case was dismissed. Private respondent
elevated the matter to the appellate court, docketed as CA-G. R. No.
56718-R,[8]
which set aside the order of dismissal and ruled that repossession
expenses
incurred by private respondent should be reimbursed.[9]
This decision became final and executory, hence the case was
accordingly
remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 40 [RTC Branch
40]
for reception of evidence to determine the amount due from petitioner.[10]
After trial, RTC Branch 40 found petitioner liable for the repossession
expenses, attorney's fees, liquidated damages, bonding fees and other
expenses
in the seizure of the vehicle in the aggregate sum of P18,547.38.
Petitioner
moved for reconsideration. Acting thereon, RTC Branch 40 modified its
decision
by lowering the monetary award to P8,852.76, the amount originally
prayed
for in the supplemental complaint.[11]
Private respondent appealed the case with. respect to the reduction of
the amount awarded. Petitioner, likewise, appealed impugning the trial
court's order for him to pay private respondent P8,852.76, an amount
over
and above the value received from the foreclosure sale. Both appeals
were
consolidated and in CA-G. R. No. 24684, the modified order of RTC
Branch
40 was affirmed. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but to
no avail.[12]
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.cralaw:red
Petitioner
contends that. the award of repossession
expenses to private respondent as mortgagee is "contrary to the letter,
intent and spirit of Article 1484[13]
of the Civil Code."[14]
He asserts that private respondent's repossession expenses have been
amply
covered by the foreclosure of the chattel mortgage, hence he could no
longer
be held liable. The arguments are devoid of merit.cralaw:red
Petitioner's
contentions, We note, were previously
rejected by respondent court in its decision in CA-G. R No. 56718-R the
dispositive portion of which provides as follows:
WHEREFORE, the order dismissing the case
is
hereby
set aside and the case is remanded to the lower court for reception of
evidence of 'expenses properly incurred in effecting seizure of the
chattel
[and] of recoverable attorney's fees in prosecuting the action for
replevin"
as "repossession expenses" prayed for in the supplemental complaint,
without
pronouncement as to costs.[15]
Which ruling
has long acquired finality. It is clear,
therefore, that the appellate court had already settled the propriety
of
awarding repossession expenses in favor of private respondent. The
remand
of the case to RTC Branch 40 was for the sole purpose of threshing out
the correct amount of expenses and not for relitigating the accuracy of
the award. Thus, the findings of RTC Branch 40, as affirmed by the
appellate
court in CA-G. R. No. 24684, were confined to the appreciation of
evidence
relative to the repossession expenses for the query or issue passed
upon
by the respondent court in CA-G. R. No. 56718-R [propriety of the award
for repossession expenses] has become the "law of the case". This
principle
is defined as "a term applied to an established rule that when an
appellate
court passes on a question and remands the cause to the lower court for
further proceedings, the question there settled becomes the law of the
case upon subsequent appeal."[16]
Having exactly the same parties and issues, the decision in the former
appeal [CA-G. R. No. 56718-R] is now the established and controlling
rule.
Petitioner may not, therefore, be allowed in a subsequent appeal [CA-G.
R. No. 24684] and in this petition, to resuscitate and revive formerly
settled issues. Judgment of courts should attain finality at some point
in time, as in this case, otherwise, there will be no end to litigation.
At any rate, even
if we were to brush aside the
"law of the case" doctrine we find the award for repossession expenses
still proper. In Filipinas Investment and Finance Corporation v. Ridad,[17]
the Court recognized an exception to the rule stated under Art. 1484[3]
upon which petitioner relies. Thus:
Where the mortgagor plainly refuses to
deliver
the chattel subject of the mortgage upon his failure to pay two or more
installments, or if he conceals the chattel to place it beyond the
reach
of the mortgagee, what then is the mortgagee expected to do? It
logically
follows as a matter of common sense, that the necessary expenses
incurred
in the prosecution by the mortgagee of the action for replevin so that
he can regain possession of the chattel, should be borne by the
mortgagor.
Recoverable expenses would, in our view, include expenses properly
incurred
in effecting seizure of the chattel and reasonable attorney's fees in
prosecuting
the action for replevin.[18]
Anent the
denial of the award for attorney's fees,
We find the same in order. The trial court as well as respondent court
found no evidence to support the claim for attorney's fees which
factual
finding is binding on Us.[19]
We find no compelling reason, and none was presented, to set aside this
ruling.
ACCORDINGLY, the
petition is DENIED for lack of
merit, and the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto.
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Narvasa, CJ.,
Davide, Jr., Melo and Panganiban,
JJ., concur
____________________________________
Endnotes
[1]
Promulgated on August 18, 1992, penned by Justice Pedro A. Ramirez with
Justices Cesar D. Francisco and Pacita Canizares-Nye, concurring.
[Annex
"A", Petition; Rollo p. 50].
[2]
Promulgated on March 31, 1989, with Judge Felicidad Carandang-Villalon,
presiding, [RTC records, Vol. II, p. 63].
[3]RTC Records. Vol. I, Record on
Appeal, Annex "A", Promissory Note., p. 7.
[4]
Id., Annex "B", Chattel Mortgage, p. 8.
[5]
Id., Annex "C". Deed of Assignment,. p 9.
[6]
Supra 1 at 51.
[7]
RTC Records, Vol. 1, Supplemental Complaint, p. 65.
[8]
Supra, 1 at 52.
[9]
Decision promulgated on May 31, 1976, penned by Justice Ramon C.
Fernandez
with Justices Ricardo Puno and Delfin Batacan, concurring; [RTC
Records.
Vol. I, pp. 214-224].
[10]
Supra 1 at 8, Rollo p. 58.
[11]
Supra 1 at 55.
[12]
Id., Annex "B", p. 60.
[13]
Art. 1484 In a contract of sale of personal property the price of which
is payable in installments, the vendor may exercise any of the
following
remedies:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
[1] Exact fulfillment of the
obligation should the vendee fail to pay;
[2] Cancel the sale, should
the vendee's failure to pay cover two or more installments;
[3] Foreclose the chattel
mortgage
on the thing sold, if one has been constituted should the vendee's
failure
to pay cover two or more installments. In this case, he shall have no
further
action against the purchaser to recover any unpaid balance of the
price.
Any agreement to the contrary shall be void.
[14]
Petition, p. 23; Rollo, p. 41.
[15]
Supra 10 at 8.
[16]
Trinidad v. Roman Catholic Archbishop Manila, 63 PHIL. 881, 913, citing
Ballentine Law Dictionary, Rodriguez v. COMELEC and Marquez, G. R. No.
120099, July 24, 1996.
[17]
30 SCRA 564.
[18]
Id., 572-573.
[19]
Margolles vs. Court of Appeals, 230 SCRA 97, 106; Go Ong v. Court of
Appeal,
154 SCRA 270, 275. |