Republic
of the
PhilippinesSUPREME
COURTBaguioFIRST
DIVISION
TEOFISTO
C. GANCHO-ON,
Petitioner,
G. R. No. 108033
April 14, 1997
-versus-
HONORABLE
SECRETARY OF LABOR
AND
EMPLOYMENT and LAKAS NGNAGKAKAISANG
MANGGAGAWA-PAFLU,
Respondents.
D
E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO, J.:
On 16 January
1992, respondent Lakas ng Nagkakaisang
Manggagawa-PAFLU filed with the Department of Labor and Employment
[DOLE],
a petition for certification election in a bid to exclusively represent
the truck drivers of Eros Repair Shop.
Petitioner
Teofisto C. Gancho-on, owner of the
shop, moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of absence
of employer-employee relationship. He contended that the members of
respondent
union who would constitute the proposed bargaining unit were not
employees
of his shop but of individual owners of the trucks used in the trucking
and hauling business managed by his wife, Herminia. In support thereof
he presented certificates of registration indicating the ownership of
four
[4] vehicles being driven by the union members. In addition, he
submitted
copy of the application to operate business filed with the Mayor's
Office
together with an application for renewal of the certificate of
registration
which described his business as an automotive repair shay.cralaw:red
Respondent union
opposed the motion and asserted
that while petitioner may be the registered owner of the shop, his wife
was the manager of the trucking and hauling business under the same
name
and style as the shop. It offered in evidence the following documents
executed
by petitioner's wife herself: [a] an affidavit dated 10 February 1992
alleging
among others that she was the manager of Eros Repair Shop which was
engaged
in the trucking and hauling of sugar cane and that the truck drivers
were
paid on commission basis;[1]
[b] a letter dated 17 February 1992 addressed to the Assistant Regional
Director of the DOLE informing the latter of the violation by one of
the
truck drivers of Eros Repair Shop of a memorandum issued to all truck
drivers;[2]
and [c] another letter dated 20 February 1992 addressed to the same
official
seeking advice concerning eleven [11] of her truck drivers who failed
to
report for work.[3]
The
Med-Arbiter Designate concluded from
the evidence thus adduced that: [a] the right to control not only the
result
of the drivers' work but also the means and method to accomplish their
task was being exercised by petitioner's wife; [b] except for
petitioner's
business permit and accreditation no other evidence was presented to
support
the allegation that Eros Repair Shop was an entity separate and
distinct
from the trucking and hauling business; and [c] most of the trucks were
owned by the Gancho-on spouses.cralaw:red
Thus, on 13 May
1992, the petition for certification
election was given due course with the following options: respondent
union,
or no union at all. A representative officer was directed to call the
parties
to a pre-election conference to thresh out the mechanics of the
election
and to conduct and supervise the same within twenty [20] days from
receipt
of the order by the parties.[4]
Petitioner
assailed the order for certification
election before respondent Secretary of Labor and Employment, still
insisting
on the absence of employer-employee relationship.cralaw:red
On 31 July 1992,
the appeal was denied. Respondent
Secretary, ordering the pre-election conference preparatory to the
certification
election be immediately conducted,[5]
declared that: [a] the affidavit of Mrs. Gancho-on in effect was an
admission
that Eros Repair Shop was engaged in trucking and hauling services; [b]
it was common knowledge in the business that trucks were leased from
various
owners; and [c] in the communications sent by Mrs. Gancho-on to the
DOLE,
she used the business name of Eros Repair Shop for her letterhead thus
creating the impression that the Eros Repair Shop was actually the
employer.
On 14 September 1992, the motion for reconsideration was denied.[6]
Petitioner raises
the same issue before Us. On
11 January 1993, the certification election nevertheless proceeded.
Respondent
union thereafter submitted to the Court an original copy of the
declaration
of the final certification election results showing that it did not
garner
a single vote because out of thirty-six [36] drivers, all of the twenty
[20] who cast their votes favored a "no union."[7]
This
notwithstanding, petitioner argues that it
is still necessary for the Court to resolve the issue of
employer-employee
relationship not only for the guidance of the bench and bar in general
but also because the matter "hangs like the sword of Damocles over his
head."
Petitioner
entirely misses the material points
which have rendered the present proceeding moot and academic. First,
subject
resolution of respondent Secretary as aforestated decreed that the
pre-election
conference preparatory to the certification election be immediately
conducted.
The certification election thereafter became a fait accompli. Second,
in
a sense salutary to petitioner, the defeat suffered by respondent Union
in its bid to be certified as the sole bargaining agent of the truck
drivers
made irrelevant the findings of both the Med-Arbiter-Designate and
respondent
Secretary that an employer-employee relationship existed. It should be
emphasized that the issue of employer-employee relationship came into
being
only because petitioner denied its existence in his motion to dismiss
the
petition for certification election. Since the certification proceeding
before the Med-Arbiter merely provided the mainspring of this petition
the defeat of respondent Union in the election has stripped this case
of
its raison d'etre.
It is a rule of
universal application, almost,
that courts of justice constituted to pass upon substantial rights will
not consider questions in which no actual interests are involved; they
decline jurisdiction of moot cases.[8]
And where the issue has become moot and academic, there is no
justiciable
controversy, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use
or value. There is no actual substantial relief to which petitioners
would
be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.[9]
WHEREFORE, the
petition is DISMISSED for being
moot and academic.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Padilla, Vitug
and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Hermosisima, Jr., J., is on leave.cralaw:red
______________________________
Endnotes
[1]
Records, p. 29.
[2]
Id., pp. 31-32.
[3]
Id., p. 30.
[4]
Issued by Med-Arbiter-Designate Ma. Wilma M. Kalaw; Records, p. 46.
[5]
Issued by Undersecretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma; Rollo, p. 22.
[6]
Rollo, p. 16.
[7]
Id., pp. 110-112.
[8]
In the Matter of the Estate of Jose Ma. Ceballos, 22 Phil. 271 (1908).
[9]
Southeast Asia Manufacturing Corporation v. The Municipal Council of
Tagbilaran,
No. L-23858, 21 November 1979, 94 SCRA 341. |