ManilaTHIRD
DIVISION
BAYANI
SUBIDO,
JR.
and RENE PARINA,
Petitioners,
G.R.
No.
122641
January
20, 1997
-versus-
HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN
and
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
D
E C I S I
O N
DAVIDE,
JR., J.:
In this petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the petitioners seek to
set aside, on ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, the following acts of the respondent Sandiganbayan in
Criminal
Case No. 22825: (a) the Resolution[1]
of 25 October 1995 which denied the petitioners' Motion to Quash of 28
August 1995 and Supplementary Motion to Quash of 7 October 1995; (b)
the
Order[2]
of 10 November 1995 which denied the petitioners' motion for
reconsideration;
and (c) the Orders[3]
of 10 November 1995 which entered a plea of not guilty for the
petitioners
and set pre-trial on 12 January 1996.
In Criminal Case No.
22825, the petitioners were charged with Arbitrary Detention, defined
and
penalized by Article 124 of the Revised Penal Code [RPC] under an
information
dated 17 July 1995 [but filed on 28 July 1995], the accusatory portion
of which reads as follows:
"That on or about
June
25, 1992, or sometime subsequent thereto, in Mandaluyong, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named
accused, Bayani Subido, Jr., being then a Commissioner of the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation (BID) and accused Rene Parina, being then a
BID Special Agent, while in the performance of their official
functions,
and conspiring and confederating with each other, did then and there
wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously cause the issuance and implementation of a
warrant
of arrest dated June 25, 1992 against James J. Maksimuk, said accused
knowing
fully well that the BID Decision dated June 6, 1991, requiring
Maksimuk's
deportation has not as yet become final and executory considering the
pendency
of a Motion for Reconsideration, resulting in the detention of the
latter
for a period of forty-three (43) days and, thus, causing him undue
injury.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."[4]
The arraignment was originally
set for 28 August 1995.[5]
On 28 August 1995, however,
the petitioners filed a Motion to Quash,[6]
contending that in view of the effectivity of R. A. No. 7975[7]
on 6 May 1995, amending Section 4 of P. D. No. 1606,[8]
the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over both the offense charged and
the persons of the accused. They argued that: (1) Arbitrary Detention
did
not fall within Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the RPC, but within
Section 1, Chapter 1, Title II [Crimes Against the Fundamental Laws of
the State], hence, not covered by R. A. No. 7975 and, therefore, the
case
should have been filed with the Regional Trial Court [RTC] of Manila;
(2)
R. A. No. 7975 should be given prospective application and at the time
the case was filed, petitioner Subido was already a private person
since
he was separated from the service on 28 February 1995; while petitioner
Parina did not hold a position corresponding to salary grade "27"; and
(3) penal laws must be strictly construed against the State.cralaw:red
In compliance with the
order of the Sandiganbayan, the prosecution filed its Opposition to the
Motion to Quash[9]
on 28 September 1995. It contended that it was clear from Section 4(b)
of R. A. No. 7975 that the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over both the
offense charged and the persons of the accused considering that "the
basis
of its jurisdiction xxx is the position of the accused in the
government
service when the offense charged was committed and not the nature of
the
offense charged, provided the said offense committed by the accused was
in the exercise of his duties and in relation to his office." The fact
then that accused Subido was already a private individual was of no
moment.cralaw:red
In a Supplement to the
Motion to Quash[10]
filed on 9 October 1995, the petitioners further asserted that: (1) the
allegations in the information were vague; (2) under Section 1, Rule
VIII
of Memorandum Order (MO) No. 04-92 (Rules of Procedure to Govern
Deportation
Proceedings), the grant or denial of bail to an alien in a deportation
proceeding was discretionary upon the Commissioner, hence could not be
subject to a charge of arbitrary detention; (3) petitioner Subido was
separated
from the service before the effectivity of R. A. No. 7975, hence
retroactive
application thereof would be prejudicial to him; and (4) at the time
the
information was filed, petitioner Parina was not occupying a position
corresponding
to salary grade "27" or higher, as prescribed by R. A. No. 6758.[11]
In its Rejoinder[12]filed on 20 October 1995,
the
prosecution
maintained that with Section 4 of MO No. 04-92, Salazar v. Achacoso,[13]
and Gatchalian v.CID,[14]
the only instance when an alien facing deportation proceedings could be
arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest was when the Commissioner
issued
the warrant to carry out a final order of deportation, which was absent
in this case due to the pendency of the motion for reconsideration
timely
filed. It further reiterated that the basis of the Sandiganbayan's
jurisdiction
over the case was the position of the accused when the crime was
committed,
not when the information was filed; in any event, petitioner Subido's
position
as a Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration was classified even
higher
than grade "27" under the Compensation and Classification Act of 1989.cralaw:red
In its Resolution[15]
of 25 October 1995, the Sandiganbayan denied the petitioners' Motion to
Quash and the Supplement thereto, ruling:
1. [T]he jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan remains not only over the specific offenses
enumerated
in Sec. 4 of P. D. 1606 as Amended by R. A. 7975 but over offenses
committed
in relation to their office, regardless of the penalty provided that
the
salary of the accused is at Grade 27 under [R. A. 6758] or that he is
occupying
any of the position described in Sec. 4(a)e of the law, which includes
the position of Deputy Commissioner.
2. (A)t this time
the
position of the prosecution in response to this Court's misgivings
stated
in its Order of August 28, 1995, appears to be that aliens may not be
arrested
except upon execution of a deportation order, a matter which can be
taken
up at further proceedings after the arraignment of the accused.
It likewise set arraignment
on 10 November 1995. To abort arraignment, the petitioners filed on 9
November
1995 a motion for reconsideration[16]
and submitted that under the vast power of the Commissioner of the
Department
of Immigration, he could authorize the arrest and detention of an alien
even though a deportation order had not yet become final, in light of
the
preventive, not penal, nature of a deportation order.[17]
On 10 November 1995,
the Sandiganbayan issued an Order[18]
denying the petitioners' motion for reconsideration, and a second Order[19]
entering a plea of not guilty in favor of the petitioners since they
objected
to arraignment, setting pre-trial on 12 January 1996, and making of
record
that arraignment was conducted with the reservation of the petitioners
to seek redress with this Court from the denial of their motion for
reconsideration.cralaw:red
Hence, this special
civil action, where the parties, in the main, reiterate the arguments
they
raised before the Sandiganbayan. In due time, we resolved to give clue
course to the petition and required the parties to file their
respective
memoranda, which they subsequently complied with.cralaw:red
The petition must be
dismissed.cralaw:red
Sections 2 and 7 of
R. A. No. 7975 pertinently provide as follows:
"Sec. 2. Section 4
of [P.D. No. 1606] is hereby further amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 4. Jurisdiction.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
a. Violations of
Republic
Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title
VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal
accused
are officials occupying the following positions in the government,
whether
in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission
of the offense:
"(1) Officials of
the
executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher,
otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and
Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically
including:
xxx
xxx
xxx
"(5) All other
national
and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the
Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989.
"b. Other offenses
or
felonies committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection
(a) of this section in relation to their office.
"c. Civil and
criminal
cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1,
2, 14 and 14-A."
In cases where none
of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to
salary
grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in said Republic Act No. 6758, or
PNP
officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their
equivalent,
exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper Regional
Trial
Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal
Circuit
Trial Court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective
jurisdiction
as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
Sec. 7. Upon the
effectivity
of this Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not begun in the
Sandiganbayan
shall be referred to the proper courts.
R. A. No. 7975 took effect
on 16 May 1995,[20]
or one year, ten months and twenty-one days after the alleged
commission
of the crime charged in Criminal Case No. 22825 before the
Sandiganbayan.
The provisions of Section 4 of P. D. No. 1606, as amended by E. O. No.
184, but prior to their further amendment by R. A. No. 7975, are then
the
applicable provisions, Section 4 of P. D. No. 1606 then pertinently
provided
as follows:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
(a) Exclusive
appellate
jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(1) violations of
Republic
Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
practices
Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code;
(2) other offenses
or
felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to
their
office, including those employed in government-owned or controlled
corporations,
whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty
prescribed
by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6)
years, or a fine of P6,000.00: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses or
felonies
mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty prescribed by law does
not
exceed prision correccional or imprisonment of six (6) years or a fine
of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court,
Metropolitan
Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
In Aguinaldo v. Domagas,[21]
and subsequently in Sanchez v.Demetriou,[22]
Natividad v. Felix,[23]
and Republic v. Asuncion,[24]
we ruled that for the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive original
jurisdiction
over offenses or felonies committed by public officers or employees
under
the aforementioned Section 4(a)(2), it was not enough that the penalty
prescribed therefor was higher than prision correccional or
imprisonment
for six years, or a fine of P6,000.00; it was likewise necessary that
the
offenses or felonies were committed in relation to their office.[25]
The information in Criminal
Case No. 22825 before the Sandiganbayan charged the petitioners with
the
crime of arbitrary detention which was committed "while in the
performance
of their official functions," or, evidently, in relation to their
office.
As the detention allegedly lasted for a period of 43 days, the
prescribed
penalty is prision mayor,[26]
with a duration of six years and one day to twelve years. Indisputably,
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the offense charged in Criminal
Case No. 22825.cralaw:red
The petitioners, however,
urge us to apply Section 4 of P. D. No. 1606, as amended by R. A. No.
7975,
the law in force at the time of the filing of the information in
Criminal
Case No. 22825. They submit that under the new law, the Sandiganbayan
has
no jurisdiction over the offense charged and their persons because at
the
time of the filing of the information, petitioner Subido was already a
private individual, while the classification of petitioner Parina's
position
was lower than grade "27."
We are not persuaded.
The petitioners overlook the fact that for purposes of Section 4 of P.
D. No. 1606, as amended, the reckoning point is the time of the
commission
of the crime. This is plain from the last clause of the opening
sentence
of paragraph (a), Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as further amended by
R.A.
No. 7975.cralaw:red
Petitioner Subido never
denied the respondents' claim that as "commissioner of Immigration and
Deportation [now Bureau of Immigration] at the time of the commission
of
the crime [he was] classified as having a position even higher than
grade
27."[27]
Both parties are, however, agreed that at such time petitioner Parina
was
holding a position with a classification much lower than salary grade
"27."
There can, therefore, be no doubt that the Sandiganbayan had
jurisdiction
over the crime allegedly committed by Subido.cralaw:red
That petitioner Parina
held a position with a salary grade of less than "27" at the time of
the
commission of the alleged arbitrary detention is of no moment. He is
prosecuted
as a co-conspirator of petitioner Subido, a principal accused, who held
a position higher than grade "27." The following provision of Section 4
of P. D. No. 1606, as amended by R. A. No. 7975, then applies:
In cases where none
of the principal accused are occupying the positions corresponding to
salary
grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758.exclusive jurisdiction therefor shall be vested in the proper
Regional
Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and
Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective
jurisdiction
as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.cralaw:red
Finally, the petitioners'
invocation of the prohibition against the retroactivity of penal laws
is
misplaced. Simply put, R. A. No. 7975 is not a penal law. Penal laws or
statutes are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts
and establish penalties for their violation;[28]
or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for
their
punishment.[29]
R. A. No. 7975, in further amending P. D. No. 1606 as regards the
Sandiganbayan's
jurisdiction, mode of appeal, and other procedural matters, is clearly
a procedural law, i.e., one which prescribes rules and forms of
procedure of enforcing rights or obtaining redress for their invasion,
or those which refer to rules of procedure by which courts applying
laws
of all kinds can properly administer justice.[30]
Moreover, the petitioners even suggest that it is likewise a curative
or
remedial statute: one which cures defects and adds to the means of
enforcing
existing obligations.[31]
As noted by the petitioners, previous to the enactment of R. A. No.
7975:
As before, no matter
what kind of offense, so long as it is alleged that the crime is
committed
in relation to the office of the public official, the Sandiganbayan had
jurisdiction to try and hear the case, such that in many cases accused
persons even from the far away parts of the country, Mindanao, Visayas
and the northern parts of Luzon had to come personally to Manila to
attend
and appear for cases filed against them, considering that the
Sandiganbayan
has its office/court in Manila.cralaw:red
The said R. A. No. 7975
changed this lamentable situation. For no as so provided in the said
law,
there ha[s] been a modification that benefits [the] accused in the
sense
that now where none of the principal accused are occupying positions
corresponding
to salary grade "27" or higher as prescribed by Republic Act No. 6758
exclusive
jurisdiction there shall be vested now in the proper Regional Trial and
Metropolitan Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case
may be.[32]
All told, as a procedural
and curative statute, R. A. No. 7975 may validly be given retroactive
effect,
there being no impairment of contractual or vested rights.[33]
WHEREFORE, the instant
petition is dismissed, and the questioned resolution and orders of the
respondent Sandiganbayan are affirmed. Costs against the
petitioners.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Narvasa, C.J.,
Melo, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
____________________________
Endnotes
[1]
Original Record (OR), vol. 1, 69; Rollo, 16. Per Garchitorena, P.J.,
Balajadia
and Chico-Nazario, JJ.
[2]
Id., 86; Id., 17.
[3]
Id., 87-88; Id., 18-19.
[4]
OR, vol. 1, 1-2, Rollo, 20-21.
[5]
OR, vol. 1, 32.
[6]
Id., 35-37; Rollo, 22-24.
[7]
Entitled "An Act of Strengthen the Functional and Structural
Organization
of the Sandiganbayan, Amending for that Purpose Presidential Decree No.
1606, as Amended."
[8]
Entitled "Revising Presidential Decree No. 1486 Creating a Special
Court
to be Known as 'Sandiganbayan' and for Other Purposes."
[9]
OR, vol. 1, 57-58; Rollo, 25-26.
[10]
Id., 61-64; Id., 27-30.
[11]
Compensation and Classification Act of 1989.
[12]
OR, vol. 1, 65-68; Rollo, 31-34.
[13]
182 SCRA 155 [1990].
[14]
197 SCRA 853 [1991].
[15]
Supra note 1.
[16]
OR, vol. 1, 77-82; Rollo, 35-40.
[17]
Citing Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, U.S. v. De los Santos, 33 Phil. 397,
[1916]; Kessler v. Stracker, 307 U.S. 22, Murdock v. Clark, 53 F 2d. 15.
[18]
Supra note 2.
[19]
Supra note 3.
[20]Section 8 thereof provides that the Act "shall effect fifteen (15) days
following its publication in the Official Gazette or in two national
newspaper
of general circulation." It was published in the 21 April 1995 issues
of
MALAYA and The PHILIPPINE JOURNAL, and in the 17 July 1995 issue of the
Official Gazette.
[21]
G.R. No. 98452, En Banc Resolution, 26 September 1991.
[22]
227 SCRA 627 [1993].
[23]
229 SCRA 680 [1994].
[24]
231 SCRA 211 [1994].
[25]
See People v. Magallanes, 249 SCRA 212, 220-221 [1995].
[26]
Article 124(3), Revised Penal Code.
[27]
Rejoinder to the Comment/Opposition to the Motion to Quash, Rollo, 31;
Comment to the instant petition, Id., 31.
[28]
Lorenzo v. Posadas, 64 Phil. 353, 367, [1937].
[29]
Hernandez v. Albano, 19 SCRA 95, 102 [1967], note 13, citing 82 C.J.S.,
922.
[30]
Ruben E. Agpalo, Statutory Construction 268, (2d. 1990) [hereinafter
AGPALO].
[31]
See Agpalo, at 270-271.
[32]
Petitioners' Memorandum, 6; Rollo, 115 et. seq.
[33]
See Agpalo, at 268-272 |