EN
BANC
PEDRO
C. CALUCAG,
Petitioner,
G. R. No. 123673
June 19, 1997
-versus-
COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, MANILA,THE MUNICIPAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 04,TUGUEGARAO, CAGAYAN and
CESAR CARBONEL,
Respondents.
D
E C I S I O N
ROMERO, J.:
This is a
petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Revised Rules of Court questioning the dismissal of
petitioner's
appeal before the Commission on Elections [COMELEC] on the ground of
prescription
of time for filing an appeal.
Petitioner Pedro
Calucag and private respondent
Cesar Carbonell were both candidates for Barangay Captain in Barangay
Caritan
Centro, Tuguegarao, Cagayan during the May 9, 1994 elections.
Petitioner
garnered 478 votes while private respondent obtained 477 votes or a
difference
of one vote.cralaw:red
Private
respondent filed an election protest with
the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 4 of Tuguegarao, Cagayan praying for
the judicial recount of the ballots cast and the annulment of the
proclamation
of petitioner. As agreed upon by the parties, a recount/revision of the
votes/ballots was made. As a result, private respondent obtained 491
votes
as against petitioner's 489 votes. On May 31, 1994, the MTC promulgated
a decision in open court declaring the former as the duly elected
Barangay
Captain of Caritan Centro, Tuguegarao.[1]
Petitioner appealed this ruling to the Regional Trial Court of
Tuguegarao,
Cagayan, Branch 3 which appeal was opposed by private respondent in a
Motion
to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the proper forum
being
the Commission on Elections [COMELEC].[2]
On July 18, 1994, the RTC issued an Order dismissing the appeal based
on
such ground.[3]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal
which was also seasonably denied.[4]
On appeal, the
COMELEC likewise dismissed petitioner's
case for lack of appellate jurisdiction in its order dated August 12,
1994,
which provided, inter alia:
Guided by the pronouncement of the
Supreme
Court
in the case of Flores v. COMELEC [G.R. No. 89604, April 20, 1990], We
have
disregarded the detour of the appeal to the Regional Trial Court and
considered
this appeal direct to the Commission from the Municipal Trial Court of
Tuguegarao, Cagayan, however, unlike in Flores case, this appeal was
not
perfected as it is wanting on the required payment of appeal fees on
time,
hence the appellate jurisdiction of this Commission does not attach.
ACCORDINGLY, the Commission [First
Division]
hereby DISMISSES the instant appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.[5]
[Emphasis supplied].
A motion for
reconsideration of said order was filed,
but this was also denied by the Commission en banc which found the
motion
to be devoid of merit, not because of non-payment of appeal fees on
proper
time but because the same was filed out of time.[6]
Hence, this
petition.cralaw:red
The main issue
which must be addressed herein
is whether the COMELEC has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
election
contests involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts
of limited jurisdiction.cralaw:red
It is high time
that this question be settled
definitively to obviate situations similar to the one at bar.
The court has categorically pronounced in
Flores
v. Commission on Elections that Section 9 of R. A. No. 6679, insofar as
it provides that the decision of the Municipal or Metropolitan Trial
Court
in a barangay election case should be appealed to the Regional Trial
Court,
is unconstitutional. Said pronouncement is hereby reiterated here. The
section is in direct contravention of Article IX-C, Section 2[2] of the
Constitution, providing that the COMELEC shall:
[e] xercise exclusive original
jurisdiction
over
all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of
all
elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate
jurisdiction
over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by
trial
courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay
officials
decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
Petitioner
wishes this Court to entertain his case
and rule as it did in Flores. This, however, cannot be done anymore
even
if the facts of this case were on all fours with Flores because in said
case, the petitioner, Roque Flores, was proclaimed Punong Barangay in
accordance
with Section 5 of R. A. No. 6679[7]
after having received the highest number of votes for Kagawad in the
March
28, 1989, elections. The private respondent, Nobelito Rapisora, filed
an
election protest with the MTC of Tayum, Abra which sustained his
arguments
and installed him in place of Flores as Punong Barangay. The latter
appealed
to the RTC of Abra, which affirmed in toto the challenged decision.
Thereafter,
Flores went to the COMELEC which dismissed his appeal on the ground
that
it has no power to review the decision of the RTC. Said ruling was
based
on Section 9 of R. A. No. 6679[8]
which states that decisions of RTC's in electoral contests brought to
it
on appeal from the MTC regarding questions of fact shall be final and
unappealable.
In resolving the petition for certiorari, the Court supported the
dismissal
of the appeal, not on the basis of said provision but on Constitutional
grounds. Section 9 of R. A. No. 6679 was declared unconstitutional even
if it was not squarely and properly challenged by Flores. Despite the
non-compliance
by Flores with the requisites of a judicial inquiry into a
constitutional
question,[9]
the Court felt that it was fruitless to wait for the issue to be raised
anew, perhaps in the next barangay elections, before being resolved.
Technical
obstacles were disregarded so that the defect in R. A. No. 6679 may be
brought to the attention of Congress and the same be corrected.
At the time
Flores was resolved, there was as
yet no pronouncement on the constitutionality of said Section 9 of R.
A.
No. 6679, such that the Court held that Flores had a right to rely on
its
presumed validity. He merely relied on said law when he appealed the
decision
of the MTC to the RTC. His subsequent appeal to the COMELEC was,
therefore,
considered to have been made directly from the MTC, thereby
disregarding
the detour to the RTC.cralaw:red
It follows that
after the promulgation of Flores,
the same arguments propounded therein by the petitioner may no longer
be
employed. Article 8 of the Civil Code states that "(j)udicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the constitution shall form part
of
the legal system of the Philippines." Said pronouncement of the Court,
having formed part of the law of the land, ignorance thereof can no
longer
be countenanced. Therefore, the COMELEC is the proper appellate court
clothed
with jurisdiction to hear the appeal, which appeal must be filed within
five days after promulgation of the MTC's decision.[10]
The erroneous filing of the appeal with the RTC did not toll the
running
of the prescriptive period. Petitioner filed his notice of appeal only
on August 12, 1994, or one month and twenty six days from the time he
received
a copy of the MTC's decision on June 16, 1994. The five-day period,
having
expired without the aggrieved party filing the appropriate appeal
before
the COMELEC, the statutory privilege of petitioner to appeal is deemed
waived and the appealed decision has become final and executory.cralaw:red
Petitioner's
contention that the COMELEC erred
in disallowing the case based on sheer technicalities is likewise
unmeritorious.
The COMELEC dismissed petitioner's appeal for lack of appellate
jurisdiction,
based on his failure to perfect his appeal on time. That this is not a
technicality is correctly pointed out in the questioned order citing
various
jurisprudence. Granting that petitioner paid the appeal fees on time,
he
chose the wrong forum; the payment, therefor, having been done after
the
lapse of the reglementary period to appeal. In support of his arguments
petitioner cites the case of Roleto Pahilan v. Rudy Tabalba,[11]
wherein the Court proceeded to rule on the election protest brought to
it which was dismissed in the trial court due to incomplete payment of
docket fees. The Court stated that the trial court had "no basis for
the
dismissal of petitioner's protest for the simple reason that an
election
contest is not an ordinary civil action. Consequently, the rules
governing
ordinary civil actions are not necessarily binding on special actions
like
an election contest wherein public interest will be adversely affected. The rules which apply to ordinary civil actions may not
necessarily
serve the purpose of election cases, especially if we consider the fact
that election laws are to be accorded utmost liberality in their
interpretation
and application, bearing in mind always that the will of the people
must
be upheld. Ordinary civil actions would generally involved private
interests
while all election cases are, at all times, invested with public
interest
which cannot be defeated by mere procedural and technical infirmities."
The Court, however, in Rodillas v. COMELEC[12]
categorically made a pronouncement that "the requirement of an appeal
fee
is by no means a mere technicality of law or procedure. It is an
essential
requirement without which the decision to be appealed from would become
final and executory as if no appeal was filed at all. The right to
appeal
is a mere statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner
prescribed
by, and in accordance with, the provision of the law."
WHEREFORE, in
view of the foregoing, the Order
of the Commission on Elections en banc dated February 1, 1996,
DISMISSING
the instant case for lack of appellate jurisdiction, is hereby
AFFIRMED.
Cost against petitioner.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Narvasa, C.J.,
Regalado, Melo, Puno,
Vitug, Mendoza, Hermosisima, Jr. and Torres, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Panganiban, J., concur. And may I
add,
the petition is now moot as the term of office of barangay chairman
elected
on May 9, 1994 expired on May 31, 1997.
Davide, Jr., J., took no part.
Padilla, Bellosillo, Kapunan and Francisco,
JJ.,
are on leave.cralaw:red
_______________________________
Endnotes
[1]
Annex "A," Rollo, pp. 33-39.
[2]
Annex "F," ibid, pp. 42-43.
[3]
Annex "G," id., pp. 44-45.
[4]
Annex "H," id., pp. 46-50; Annex "I," id., pp. 51-52.
[5]
Annex "O," id., pp. 71-72.
[6]
Annex "A," id., pp. 23-27.
[7]
There shall be a sangguniang barangay in every duly constituted
barangay
which shall be the legislative body and shall be composed of seven (7)
kagawads to be elected by the registered voters of the barangay. The
candidate
who obtains the highest number of votes shall be the punong barangay.
[Section
5, R. A. 6679].
[8]
A sworn petition contesting the election of a barangay official may be
filed with the proper municipal or metropolitan trial court by any
candidate
who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for a
barangay office within ten (10) days after the proclamation of the
result
of the election. The trial court shall decide the election protest
within
thirty (30) days after the filing thereof. The decision of the
municipal
or metropolitan trial court may be appealed within ten (10) days from
receipt
of a copy thereof by the aggrieved party to the regional trial court
which
shall decide the issue within thirty (30) days from receipt of the
appeal
and whose decision on questions of fact shall be final and
non-appealable.
For purposes of the barangay elections, no pre-proclamation cases shall
be allowed. [Section 9, Ibid.].
[9]
[a] There must be an actual case or controversy; [b] The question of
constitutionality
must be raised by the proper party; [c] The constitutional question
must
be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and [d] the decision of
the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of
the
case itself.
[10]
Section, 3 Rule 22, COMELEC Rules of Procedures states that: "Notice of
Appeal Within five [5] days after promulgation of the decision of
the court, the aggrieved party may file with said court a notice of
appeal,
and serve a copy thereof upon the attorney of record of the adverse
party.
[11]
230 SCRA 205 [1994].
[12]
245 SCRA 702 [1995]; citing Dorego v. Perez 22 SCRA 8 [1968], and Bello
v. Fernandez 4 SCRA 135 [1962]. |