SECOND
DIVISION
PHILGREEN
TRADING CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
G. R. No. 120408
April 18, 1997
-versus-
COURT
OF APPEALS, HON. ERNA F. ALIPOSA, as
Judge,
RTC of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 150
and
UNITED
COCONUT PLANTERS BANK,
Respondents.
D
E C I S I O N
PUNO, J.:
This is a
petition to review the decision of
the Court of Appeals setting aside the orders of the Regional Trial
Court,
Branch 50, Makati City, which suspended the appeal in the case for
ejectment
[Civil Case No. 93-526] pending a determination of the issues in the
case
for specific performance [Civil Case No. 88-477].
This case
involves a parcel of land with improvements
registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 149578 located at
No.
3 Cambridge Circle, North Forbes Park, Makati City. The property was
foreclosed
by private respondent United Coconut Planters Bank in 1987. At the
public
auction sale, petitioner Philgreen Trading Construction Corporation was
the highest bidder and the lot was awarded to it for the amount of P13
million. Petitioner, through its President, Teresita Villaluz,
deposited
the amount of P1.4 million with the agreement to pay the balance of
P11.6
million within ninety [90] days. Petitioner and private respondent also
agreed that petitioner was to take possession of the property but title
shall remain with private respondent until full payment of the purchase
price. This agreement was embodied in a Contract to Sell.cralaw:red
Petitioner
thereafter took possession of the property.
Before the expiration of the ninety-day period, however, petitioner
allegedly
discovered that the lot was sequestered by the Philippine Commission on
Good Government as ill-gotten wealth of Edna Camcam and was actually
the
subject before the Sandiganbayan of Civil Case No. 00017 entitled
"Republic
of the Philippines vs. Fabian Ver, et. al." On March 28, 1988,
petitioner
instituted against private respondent before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 57, Makati City, Civil Case No. 88-477 for specific performance
and rescission of contract with damages. The complaint sought to compel
private respondent to clear the property from sequestration before full
payment of the purchase price.cralaw:red
On the other
hand, private respondent, on May
25, 1988, filed against petitioner a complaint for ejectment before the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Makati City, on the ground of failure to pay
the balance of the purchase price under their Contract to Sell. On
January
7, 1992, the Metropolitan Trial Court rendered a decision ordering
petitioner
to vacate the property, restore possession to private respondent and
pay
attorney's fees of P20,000.00. Private respondent forthwith filed a
motion
for execution of the decision pending appeal. The Metropolitan Trial
Court,
however, did not act on the motion but instead forwarded the records of
the case to the Regional Trial Court upon appeal by petitioner.cralaw:red
The appeal was
assigned to respondent Regional
Trial Court, Branch 150, Makati City and was docketed as Civil Case No.
93-526. Before Branch 150, petitioner moved to consolidate the appeal
with
Civil Case No. 88-477 then pending before Branch 57, or, in the
alternative,
to suspend proceedings in the appeal until resolution of Civil Case No.
88-477. On June 4, 1993, the trial court issued an order denying
consolidation
of the cases. The court, however, found that Civil Case No. 88-477 "is
unavoidably determinative of whether or not the cause for ejectment
should
proceed with the risk that herein defendant-movant is ousted from the
premises
while in the meantime the rights and obligations of the parties are
still
in litigation."[1]
The court thus ordered the suspension of the proceedings in Civil Case
No. 93-526 pending determination of the issues in Civil Case No. 88-477.cralaw:red
Private
respondent moved for reconsideration of
the order which the trial court denied on August 23, 1993. On November
17, 1993, private respondent filed a "Motion to Reopen Case with Motion
to Resolve Motion for Execution Pending Appeal." On February 8, 1994,
the
trial court denied the Motion declaring that the motion to reopen was a
second motion for reconsideration of the June 4, 1993 order and that
the
motion for execution pending appeal was not before it but before the
Metropolitan
Trial Court. Thus:
In its opposition, defendant contends
that
plaintiff's
motion for execution cannot be resolved at this point in time for the
reason
that an order suspending further proceedings is in effect.
This Court agrees with defendant's
stand. As
correctly
pointed out by defendant, if under this motion, plaintiff is again
seeking
the reversal of the order of suspension, then the motion is, in effect,
a second motion for reconsideration which is prohibited by the Rules.
Anent plaintiff's motion to resolve
motion
for
execution pending appeal, the record shows that plaintiff has not filed
any motion for execution pending appeal before this Court. Plaintiff is
probably referring to its motion filed before Branch 63, Metropolitan
Trial
Court of Makati, Metro Manila. Even assuming that said motion was filed
before this court, still the same could not be acted upon for the same
reason that an order suspending further proceedings in this case is in
effect.[2]
On April 26,
1994, private respondent filed with
the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari questioning the orders
of
the trial court.[3]
On May 24, 1995, the Court of Appeals granted the petition and reversed
the trial court after finding that the pendency of Civil Case No.
88-477
was not a bar to the ejectment case in Civil Case No. 93-526. Hence
this
recourse.
Petitioner
questions the timeliness of the filing
of the petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. It argues
that
in 1992, the Supreme Court promulgated three Resolutions, i.e., Philec
Workers' Union v. Hon. Romeo A. Young,[4]
Antonio V. Navarro v. National Labor Relations Commission,[5]
and The President and Vice-President of Travellers Life Assurance of
the
Philippines v. National Labor Relations Commission,[6]
where it "laid down the rule that a petition for certiorari can only be
filed within three months from receipt of the questioned order."[7]
It is urged that since private respondent's petition was filed before
the
Court of Appeals more than seven [7] months after notice of the August
23, 1993 order of the trial court, it was therefore filed out of time
and
should have been dismissed.cralaw:red
The Revised Rules
of Court do not fix a specific
time frame for the filing of a special civil action for certiorari
under
Rule 65 thereof. Existing jurisprudence merely requires that the same
be
filed within a reasonable time from receipt of the questioned judgment
or order.[8]
The period of three (3) months has been found as reasonable to file the
petition for certiorari.[9]
The three Minute
Resolutions cited by petitioner
do not categorically state that the period within which to file a
petition
for certiorari is three months. In fact, the Resolution in Philec
Workers'
Union was later cited in the cases of Caramol v. National Labor
Relations
Commission,[10]
and Paderanga v. Court of Appeals,[11]
where this Court declared that a petition for certiorari should be
filed
within a reasonable period of three months from notice of the decision
or order. The operative phrase is "reasonable period" and this has been
defined as "so much time as is necessary under the circumstances for a
reasonable, prudent and diligent man to do."[12]
"Three months" is merely used as a yardstick to determine the
reasonableness
of the period in filing the petition.[13]
There is no such declaration that three months is the period for filing
the petition beyond which period no such petition can be filed. If the
petition is filed beyond three months, then under normal circumstances,
it was filed beyond a reasonable time and should be dismissed. This,
however,
does not preclude courts from entertaining the petition if warranted by
the demands of justice and provided laches has not set in.[14]
Laches is defined
as the failure or neglect for
an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which by
exercising
due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, or to assert a
right
within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled
thereto has either abandoned it or declined to assert it.[15]
We have held that an interval of two [2] years is definitely barred by
laches[16]
and so is an interval of seven [7] months after rendition of the last
order
sought to be set aside.[17]
A petition brought after ninety-nine [99] days is also barred by laches.[18]
In the case at
bar, the petition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals assailed three (3) orders of the trial
court,
viz: (a) the order dated June 4, 1993; (b) the order dated
August
23, 1993; and (c) the order dated February 8, 1994. The February 8,
1994
order was issued to dispose of private respondent's "Motion to Reopen
Case
with Motion to Resolve Motion for Execution Pending Appeal." The trial
court denied this motion on the ground that the Motion to Reopen Case
was
a second motion for reconsideration which is prohibited by the Rules.
Petitioner
claims that since a second motion for reconsideration is prohibited
then
the period to file a petition for certiorari should be counted from
receipt
of the order denying the first motion for reconsideration, which was
the
order of August 23, 1993. Private respondent received a copy of the
August
23, 1993 order on August 31, 1993 and filed its petition with the Court
of Appeals on April 26, 1994 seven [7] months and 26 days
thereafter
which it is contended is an unreasonably long period of time.[19]
The rule that a
second motion for reconsideration
is prohibited by the Rules applies to final judgments and orders, not
interlocutory
orders.[20]
This is clear from the Interim or Transitional Rules Relative to the
Implementation
of B. P. 129. Section 4 of the Interim Rules provides that "[n]o party
shall be allowed a second motion for reconsideration of a final order
or
judgment." A second motion for reconsideration attacking an
interlocutory
order can be denied on the ground that it is a "rehash" or mere
reiteration
of grounds and arguments already passed upon and resolved by the court;
it, however, cannot be rejected on the ground that a second motion for
reconsideration of an interlocutory order is forbidden by law.[21]
The order of June
4, 1993 suspending the decision
in the ejectment case is an interlocutory order. An interlocutory order
does not terminate nor finally dispose of the case, but leaves
something
to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the
merits.[22]
The trial court did not rule nor did it dismiss the appeal in the
ejectment
case but merely suspended ruling thereon until the specific performance
case shall have been decided. The order of June 4, 1993 being
interlocutory,
the trial court therefore should not have dismissed the Motion to
Reopen
Case on the ground that it was prohibited by the Rules.[23]
Moreover, the
Motion to Reopen was not the only
pleading filed. It included a Motion to Resolve Motion for Execution
Pending
Appeal which the Metropolitan Trial Court forwarded to Branch 150 of
the
Regional Trial Court as appellate court. This was the first time
private
respondent moved for resolution of its Motion for Execution. Since the
Motion to Reopen is not a prohibited pleading, then the order denying
the
same should be the reckoning point in counting the period for filing a
petition for certiorari. The period to file a petition for certiorari
started
to run on March 1, 1994, the day private respondent received notice of
the order of February 8, 1994.[24]
The petition for certiorari was filed before the Court of Appeals on
April
26, 1994, almost two [2] months thereafter, hence, it was filed within
a reasonable period of time.cralaw:red
IN VIEW WHEREOF,
the petition is denied and the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 33926 is affirmed.
Costs against petitioner.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Regalado, Romero,
Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ.,
concur.cralaw:red
___________________________________
Endnotes
[1]
Decision of the Court of Appeals, pp. 3-4, Rollo, pp. 25-26.
[2]
Id., p. 4, Rollo, p. 26.
[3]
CA-G. R. SP No. 33926.
[4]
G. R. No. 101734, January 22, 1992.
[5]
G. R. No. 101755, January 27, 1992.
[6]
G. R. No. 93998, February 17, 1992.
[7]
Reply, p. 1, Rollo, p. 60.
[8]
Allied Leasing & Finance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA
71, 75-76 [1991]; Torres v. National Labor Relations Commission, 200
SCRA
424, 429, 430 [1991]; Reas v. Bonifacio, 190 SCRA 493, 500 [1990];
Toledo
v. Pardo, 118 SCRA 566, 571 [1982].
[9]
People v. Magallanes, 249 SCRA 212, 229 [1995]; Paderanga v. Court of
Appeals,
247 SCRA 741, 759 [1995].
[10]
225 SCRA 582, 589 [1993].
[11]
247 SCRA 741, 759 [1995].
[12]
Andaya v. National Labor Relations Commission, 188 SCRA 253, 257-258
[1990];
East Realty Investment, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 166 SCRA 256 [1988].
[13]
See De la Paz v. Panis, 245 SCRA 242, 250-251 [1995] where We declared
that "inasmuch as a period of three months is considered reasonable,
the
filing of the petition after 45 days from notice is definitely within
the
reasonable period."
[14]
See People v. Castaneda, 165 SCRA 327 [1988]; Santos v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 166 SCRA 759 [1988].
[15]
Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. v. Deputy Executive Secretary, 190
SCRA
673, 682 [1990] citing Seno v. Mangubat, 156 SCRA 113 [1987] and Tijam
v. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29 [1968] and
[16]
San Juan v. Cuento, 160 SCRA 277 [1988].
[17]
People v. Castaneda, supra, at p. 336.
[18]
Claridad v. Santos, 120 SCRA 148, 153 [1983].
[19]
Petition, pp. 2-3, Rollo, pp. 11-12.
[20]
Dizon v. Court of Appeals, 210 SCRA 107, 120-121 [1992].
[21]
Id., at 121.
[22]
Bairan v. Tan Siu Lay, 18 SCRA 1235, 1239 [1966]; People v. Hewald, 105
Phil. 1297 [1959].
[23]
See also BA Finance Corporation v. Pineda, 119 SCRA 493, 503 [1982].
[24]
Petition, pp. 2-3, Rollo, pp. 11-12. |