SECOND
DIVISION
PACIFIC
MARITIME SERVICES, INC.,
MALAYAN INSURANCE CORPORATION
and CROWN SHIPMANAGEMENT, INC.,
Petitioners,
G. R. No. 111002
July 21, 1997
-versus-
NICANOR
RANAY and GERARDO RANAY
and
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
Respondents.
D
E C I S I O N
ROMERO, J.:
That a man's
job is a property right within the
ambit of Constitutional protection has been long recognized and
accepted
in law; hence, we are circumspect and vigilant whenever a worker comes
to this Court complaining of illegal dismissal. In each such case, we
require
the employer to prove by substantial evidence the facts constituting
the
ground for dismissal,[1]
and that termination has been affected with strict observance of both
procedural
and substantive due process. It is by these standards that the Court
has
judged the instant petition.
Petitioner
Pacific Maritime Services, Inc. [Pacific,
for brevity], is a duly licensed manning agency while its
co-petitioners,
Malayan Insurance Corporation and Crown Ship Management, Inc., are the
former's bonding company and principal, respectively. On February 1,
1989,
Pacific engaged the services of private respondents Nicanor Ranay and
Gerardo
Ranay as laundrymen. Their employment contracts, both dated February 1,
1989, and duly approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency
(POEA),
provided for the following uniform compensation package: [1] basic
monthly
salary of US$300.00; [2] additional fixed overtime pay in the amount of
US$150.00; and [3] leave pay equivalent to six days' wages. These
contracts
were supposed to be effective for ten months from the date of hiring.cralaw:red
On February 14,
1989, private respondents boarded
the vessel "M/V Star Princess," where they were assigned to
work
and which immediately left the Philippines. After working for only
three
months and thirteen days, however, private respondents were ordered to
disembark. They were subsequently repatriated to the Philippines on May
27, 1989. Because of their dismissal, private respondents filed on
August
14, 1989, a complaint against petitioners before the POEA, challenging
the legality of their dismissal on the ground that the same was
effected
without prior notice and without just cause. Consequently, they prayed
for recovery of all unpaid salaries, overtime pay and leave pay which
had
accrued and could have accrued were it not for the pretermination of
their
contracts.cralaw:red
Pacific opposed
the complaint, contending that
the dismissal of private respondent was validly made. It argued that
private
respondents' employment was terminated due to serious misconduct,
insubordination,
non-observance of proper hours of work and damage to the laundry of the
vessel's crew and passengers. To support these allegations, petitioners
presented a telefax transmission,[2]
its lone evidence, purportedly executed and signed by a certain Armando
Villegas. Said document made an account of the incidents which
allegedly
prompted Pacific to terminate private respondents' services, among
which
were: [1] the assault on the person of Armando Villegas himself by
Gerardo
Ranay coupled with the latter's utterance of the words "Putang-ina
mo!"
in the presence of at least four other crew members; [2]
Gerardo
Ranay's
failure to report for work for three consecutive days; [3] Nicanor
Ranay's
tardiness in going to his working area and having a drinking spree with
his brother Gerardo; and [4] failure of private respondents to adjust
to
their working environment. The records, however, do not reveal that
petitioners
ever presented any corroborative or additional evidence to buttress
this
allegation other than photocopies of two Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation
checks both for P1,919.85 and both dated October 3, 1989, allegedly
paid
to private respondents by Pacific, and computations of private
respondents'
wages, overtime pay and leave pay.[3]
On the basis of
the parties' submission, then
POEA Administrator Jose N. Sarmiento rendered a Decision[4]
dated November 6, 1990, which ruled that private respondents' dismissal
was illegal for failure of petitioners to prove the legality thereof
and
to afford them due process. He refused to give credence to the report
made
by Armando Villegas which was prepared long after the events referred
to
therein had taken place. Accordingly, he ordered petitioners to pay
private
respondents each in the amount of US$2,925.00 corresponding to their
salaries
for the unexpired 6 and 1/2-month portion of their employment
contracts;
P15,566.85 each for their unpaid salaries, overtime pay and leave pay;
and plane fare for the return trip to the Philippines. Furthermore, he
found merit in private respondents' claim that they were not paid their
salaries, overtime and vacation leave pay up to May 29, 1989, since the
vouchers failed to show that the checks intended to cover the amounts
for
the private respondents were duly acknowledged and received by them. He
pointed out that the columns for "Received by" and "Date" were all in
blank
and that, at any rate, the amount of P1,919.85 covered by each check
was
insufficient to pay for what would be rightfully due to private
respondents.cralaw:red
Aggrieved,
petitioners appealed to the NLRC. On
April 19, 1993, the Commission dismissed said appeal and affirmed the
decision
of the POEA.[5]
Hence, this petition.cralaw:red
As stated at the
outset, the merit of this petition
depends on petitioner's strict compliance with the requirements of both
procedural and substantive due process, as well as their observance of
the principle that it is the employer who bears the burden of
establishing
by substantial evidence the facts supporting a valid dismissal. Upon
careful
and meticulous scrutiny of the records, however, the Court finds that
the
petition falls short of these standards. We are, therefore, constrained
to deny it and uphold the decision of the POEA and the NLRC.cralaw:red
The Court
concedes that assault, invectives, obscene
insult or offensive words against a superior and imbibing intoxicating
drinks during work may constitute serious misconduct which would
justify
the dismissal of an employee found guilty thereof. We likewise agree
that
gross neglect of duties as shown by tardiness and absenteeism, as well
as willful disobedience and insubordination, equally deserve the same
penalty.
These grounds are in fact well-supported by jurisprudence.[6]
These are not, however, the real and crucial issues. Before even
determining
whether the acts complained of constitute serious misconduct,
insubordination,
tardiness or absenteeism, it is necessary to determine if, in the first
place, the petitioners sufficiently established these acts by
substantial
evidence. On this point, the Court rules that petitioners failed to do
so.cralaw:red
Petitioners'
reliance on the telefax transmission
signed by Armando Villegas is woefully inadequate in meeting the
required
quantum of proof which is substantial evidence. For one thing, the same
is uncorroborated. Although substantial evidence is not a function of
quantity
but rather of quality, the peculiar environmental circumstances of the
instant case demand that something more should have been proffered.
According
to the account of Villegas, it appears that the incidents he was
referring
to transpired with the knowledge of some crew members. The alleged
assault
by Gerardo Ranay on Villegas, for instance, was supposedly witnessed by
at least four other crew members. Surprisingly, none of them was called
upon to testify, either in person or through sworn statements. Worse,
Villegas
himself who omitted some vital details in his report, such as the time
and date of the incidents referred to, was not even presented as
witness
so that private respondents and the POEA hearing officer could have
been
given an opportunity to cross-examine and propound clarificatory
questions
regarding matters averred by him in the telefax transmission.[7]
Moreover, although signed, the same was not under oath and, therefore,
of dubious veracity and reliability although admissible.[8]
Likewise, the motive is suspect and the account of the incidents
dangerously
susceptible to bias since it came from a person with whom private
respondents
were at odds. All told, petitioners failed to make up for the weakness
of the evidence upon which they confidently anchored the merits of
their
case.cralaw:red
Likewise, the
belated submission of the report
by Villegas, long after the incidents referred to had taken place and
after
the complaint had been lodged by private respondents, weighs heavily
against
its credibility. Petitioners did not show any convincing reason why
said
report was only accomplished on September 22, 1989. They merely argued
that as in criminal cases, the witness is usually reluctant to report
an
incident. At any rate, with present technology, a ship out at sea is
not
so isolated that its captain cannot instantly communicate with its
office.
It would appear that the report, filed several months later, is but an
afterthought.cralaw:red
Aside from
petitioners' failure to establish the
facts constituting the grounds for dismissing private respondents, the
Court also takes into account against petitioners their glaring
omission
to afford private respondents procedural due process, the indispensable
elements of which are notice and hearing. We observe that the records
are
devoid of ally proof indicating that the required notices were sent to
respondents and a reasonable opportunity accorded them to be heard. The
POEA and the NLRC similarly failed to find any, leading to the
inescapable
conclusion that the dismissal of private respondents was even tainted
with
procedural infirmity.cralaw:red
The Court,
however, notwithstanding the employer's
breach of procedural due process, is disinclined to award damages in
line
with recent jurisprudence.[9]
As regards petitioners' contention that both the POEA and the NLRC
overlooked
the alleged payments they made to private respondents, we rule that the
same deserves little consideration. The mere presentation of
photocopies
of two (2) RCBC checks[10]
and two vouchers[11]
containing the computation of private respondents' remuneration does
not
conclusively establish payment. In this regard, We call attention to
our
latest ruling in Jimenez v. National Labor Relations Commission,[12]
thus:
As a general rule, one who pleads payment
has
the burden of proving it. Even where the plaintiff must allege
non-payment,
the general rule is that the burden rests on the defendant to prove
payment,
rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-payment. The debtor has the
burden
of showing with legal certainty that the obligation has been discharged
by payment.
When the existence of` a debt is fully
established
by the evidence contained in the record, the burden of proving that it
has been extinguished by payment devolves upon the debtor who offers
such
a defense to the claim of the creditor.
The positive testimony of a creditor may
be
sufficient
of itself to show non-payment, even when met by indefinite testimony of
the debtor. Similarly, the testimony of the debtor may also be
sufficient
to show payment, but, where his testimony is contradicted by the other
party or by a disinterested witness, the issue may be determined
against
the debtor since he has the burden of proofThe testimony of the
debtor
creating merely an inference of payment will not be regarded as
conclusive
on that issue. [Emphasis supplied, citations omitted].
The existence
of the checks and the supporting vouchers
simply establishes the fact that petitioners admit their monetary
liability
to private respondents and their intention to pay the latter's unpaid
salaries,
overtime pay and leave pay. To reiterate, these documents, standing
alone,
do not evidence payment. There is no certainty that these were ever
delivered
to, much less encashed by, private respondents. Absent any evidence to
that effect, petitioners are deemed to have failed to discharge their
burden
of proving their affirmative allegation of prior payment in the amount
of P1,919.85 each to private respondents in spite of the latter's mere
denial of said payment.
WHEREFORE, the
instant petition is hereby DISMISSED
for lack of merit. The April 19, 1993, decision
of respondent National Labor Relations
Commission
is hereby AFFIRMED.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Regalado and
Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Puno and Torres, Jr., JJ., are on
leave.cralaw:red
_______________________________
Endnotes
[1]
Molave Tours Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 250
SCRA
325 [1995].
[2]
Rollo, pp. 34-36.
[3]
Ibid., pp. 68-71.
[4]
Id., pp. 28-33.
[5]
Id., pp. 18-26.
[6]
Dela Cruz v. National Labor Relations Commission, 177 SCRA 626 [1989];
Asian Design and Manufacturing Corporation v. Hon. Deputy Minister of
Labor,
142 SCRA 79 [1986]; Haverlon Shipping Ltd. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 135 SCRA 685 [1985]; Reta v. National Labor Relations
Commission,
232 SCRA 613 [1994]; Zenco Sales, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission,
234 SCRA 689 [1994].
[7]
Sections 5 and 6, Rule III, Book VII of the POEA Rules and Regulations
provide in part:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Sec. 5. Clarifying Questions.-
In cases where the Hearing Officer finds that there are complicated
factual
issues involved that cannot be resolved through position paper or
memorandum,
he may direct the parties and their witnesses to appear before him to
answer
clarifying questions. [Emphasis supplied].
Sec. 6. Nature of Proceedings.
xxx
xxx
xxx
The Hearing Officer may avail
himself of all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of the case,
including
ocular inspection, where appropriate, and examination of informed
persons.
[Emphasis supplied].
[8]
Com Savings Bank v. National Labor Relations Commission, 257 SCRA 307
[1996].
[9]
MGG Marine Services, Inc. and/or Doroteo C. Garlan and Cesar Rotilo v.
National Labor Relations Commission and Elizabeth A. Molina, G. R. No.
114313, July 29, 1996.
[10]
Check Nos. 952587 and 952586.
[11]
Voucher Nos. 9283 and 9282.
[12]
256 SCRA 84 [1996]. |