THIRD
DIVISION
NATIONAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
and SANTIAGO N. SALVADOR,
Complainants,
A. M. No. P-96-1184
March 24, 1997
-versus-
RODOLFO
G. TULIAO, Sheriff IVof the RTC
of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20,
Respondent.
D
E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Sheriffs play
an important role in the administration
of justice. They form an integral part thereof because they are called
upon to serve court writs, execute all processes, and carry into effect
the orders of the court with due care and utmost diligence.[1]
As agents of the law, high standards are expected of them. In the
present
case, respondent sheriff failed to live up to these standards.
A complaint
against Respondent Deputy Provincial
Sheriff Rodolfo G. Tuliao of the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan,
Isabela,
Branch 20 was filed by Santiago N. Salvador before the Tuguegarao
Sub-Office
[TUGSO] of the National Bureau of Investigation ["NBI"].[2]
An investigation was conducted by Agent-in-Charge Franklin Javier and
Agent
Raul A. Ancheta. On November 24, 1994, complainant gave his statement[3]
to Agent Paul Gino Rivera. Invoking his right to remain silent,
respondent
sheriff refused to "submit himself to custodial investigation" before
Agent
Javier. Instead, he submitted a Compliance[4]
dated July 22, 1995 and an Answer[5]
dated August 4, 1995.cralaw:red
After the
investigation, Agents Javier and Ancheta
recommended, inter alia, the filing of an administrative case with the
Office of the Court Administrator.[6]
Atty. Gerarda G. Galang, Chief of the NBI Legal and Evaluation
Division,
concurred with said recommendation.[7]
On November 13, 1995, Director Mariano M. Mison of the NBI transmitted
to this Court a copy of the evaluation with the recommendation that
appropriate
action be taken against respondent.[8]
Hence, this
administrative complaint now before
Us.
The Facts
Complainant
Salvador bought a passenger jeep from
Lito G. Ignacio to be paid in monthly installments of P7,000.00 with a
down payment of P50,000.00. After remitting the down payment,
complainant
diligently paid all monthly amortizations until March 1994 when, in the
absence of Ignacio, the complainant was forced to pay to an unnamed
brother
of the seller the amounts due for the months of April and May 1994.
However,
the brother failed to remit said amount to the seller; thus, the latter
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20[9]
a suit for collection docketed as Civil Case No. 20-757, entitled
Pisces
Motor Works, represented by Lito D. Ignacio vs. Santiago Salvador.cralaw:red
Subsequently, an
order was issued by the RTC directing
respondent sheriff to attach the passenger jeep. Complainant, through
counsel,
filed a motion to discharge attachment upon filing of a counterbond for
the release of the vehicle in his favor. Due to some defects in the
aforementioned
motion, a second motion with counterbond was filed. On July 13, 1994,
the
trial court issued an order, the decretal portion of which reads, to
wit:[10]
WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing,
the
counterbond of the defendant, is hereby approved. The Sheriff is hereby
ordered to release to the defendant the attached vehicle bearing Motor
No. 6D-57-51813 with Plate No. UV BBR-127.
Respondent
refused to comply with the said order.
Instead, he released the passenger jeep to Ignacio after the latter had
executed a receipt therefor together with an undertaking that he would
produce the jeep whenever required by the court. Respondent justified
such
release by saying that the court had no storage building that would
protect
the jeep from damage or loss.[11]
Despite the
pendency of a motion for contempt[12]
filed by complainant against respondent, the case was dismissed[13]
on August 31, 1994 because jurisdiction over the case had been
transferred
to the municipal trial court as mandated by Republic Act No. 7691 which
expanded said court's jurisdiction.cralaw:red
After receipt of
respondent's Comment dated April
20, 1996, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Court
Administrator
for evaluation, report and recommendation. In a memorandum to the Chief
Justice dated August 29, 1996, Acting Court Administrator Reynaldo L.
Suarez
recommended a finding of guilt and suspension of respondent for six (6)
months without pay.[14]
Issue
The main issue in
this case is whether respondent
sheriff is administratively liable for failing to release the property
under custodia legis to the complainant in accordance with the
order
of the regional trial court.cralaw:red
Respondent
sheriff contends that his act of not
taking into his official custody the attached property was not unlawful
but was in fact reasonable because the court had no facility for its
storage.
That it could no longer be returned to complainant's possession in
accordance
with the court's order was not his fault but that of the attaching
creditor
who had violated his obligation to produce the same whenever required
by
the court. He offers "to pay a fine in the discretion of the Honorable
Court as he has not benefited any pecuniary interest (sic)."[15]
The Court's Ruling
Respondent's
contentions are without merit. We
agree with the Court Administrator that respondent should be held
administratively
liable.cralaw:red
First
Issue: Manner of Attachment
This Court finds
respondent sheriff's manner of
attachment irregular and his reason therefor totally unacceptable.cralaw:red
Rule 57 of the
Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 5. Manner of attaching property.-
The officer executing the order shall without delay attach, to await
judgment
and execution in the action, all the properties of the party against
whom
the order is issued in the province,
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 7. Attachment of real and
personal
property,
recording thereof.- Properties shall be attached by the officer
executing
the order in the following manner:
(c) Personal property capable of manual
delivery,
by taking and safely keeping it in his capacity, after issuing the
corresponding
receipt therefor;
Clearly,
respondent's act of leaving the passenger
jeep in the possession and control of the creditor did not satisfy the
foregoing requirements of the Rules; neither did it conform to
the
plainly-worded RTC order. The note in the receipt that imposed on
Ignacio
the obligation to produce the same whenever required by the court was
no
compliance either, because it did not establish that the property was
in
respondent sheriff's substantial presence and possession. Respondent
fell
short of his obligation to take and safely keep the attached property
"in
his capacity." He cannot feign ignorance of this duty as he himself
correctly
cited an early decision of this Court explaining a sheriff's duty in
attachment,
as follows:[16]
A verbal declaration of seizure or
service of
a writ of attachment is not sufficient. There must be an actual taking
of possession and placing of the attached property under the control of
the officer or someone representing him. (Hollister vs. Goodale, 8
Conn.,
332, 21 Am. Dec., 674; Jones vs. Howard, 99 Ga., 451, 59 Am. St. Rep.,
231.)
We believe that to constitute a valid
levy of
an attachment, the officer levying it must take actual possession of
the
property attached as far as practicable [under the circumstances]. He
must
put himself in [a] position to, and must assert and, in fact, enforce a
dominion over the property adverse to and exclusive of the attachment
debtor,
and such property must be in his substantial presence and possession.
[Corniff
vs. Cook, 95 Ga., 61, 51 Am. St. Rep., 55, 61]. Of course, this does
not
mean that the attaching officer may not, under an arrangement
satisfactory
to himself, put anyone in possession of the property for the purpose of
guarding it, but he can not in this way relieve himself from liability
to the parties interested in said attachment.
That Ignacio
was able to move the passenger jeep
to an unknown location is further proof that respondent sheriff had not
taken and safely kept it in his substantial presence, possession and
control.
His claim that the regional trial court did
not
have any storage facility to house said property is no justification.
He
could have deposited it in a bonded warehouse.[17]
Contrary to
respondent sheriff's contention, compelling
the attaching creditor to release the property in question was not in
order,
because the proper remedy provided by the Rules of Court was for the
party
whose property had been attached to apply for the discharge of the
attachment
by filing a counterbond.[18]
The effect of this remedy is the delivery of possession of the attached
property to the party giving the counterbond. The attaching creditor
was
not authorized to have possession of the attached property, contrary to
the insistence of respondent sheriff.cralaw:red
Second
Issue: Liability of a Sheriff
A court employee
should keep in mind that he is
an integral part of that organ of the government that is involved in
the
sacred task of administering justice. His conduct and behavior should
perforce
be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility and must at
all
times be characterized by propriety and decorum.[19]
Section 4(c) of
Republic Act No. 6713 requires
of every public official and employee justness and sincerity in the
discharge
and execution of official duties. It exacts from him at all times
respect
for the rights of others and proscribes him from dispensing or
extending
undue favors on account of his office.cralaw:red
The Court in Chan
vs. Castillo held:[20]
Every officer or
employee in the judiciary is
duty bound to obey the orders and processes of the court without the
least
delay [Pascual vs. Duncan, 216 SCRA 786 (1992)],.cralaw:red
Leaving the
attached property in the possession
of the attaching creditor makes a farce of the attachment. This is not
compliance with the issuing court's order. When a writ is placed in the
hands of a sheriff, it is his duty, in the absence of any instructions
to the contrary, to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to
execute it according to its mandate.[21]
He is supposed to execute the order of the court strictly to the letter.[22]
If he fails to comply, he is liable to the person in whose favor the
process
or writ runs.[23]
Respondent's
pretense of having acted in utmost
good faith for the preservation of the attached property is hardly
credible
because there was no reason for his having acted thus. In sum, he is
unable
to satisfactorily explain why he failed to take such movable in his
control.cralaw:red
By acceding to
the request of Ignacio, respondent
sheriff actually extended an undue favor which prejudiced the
complainant
as well as the orderly administration of justice. He exceeded his
powers
which were limited to the faithful execution of the court's orders and
service of its processes.[24]
His prerogatives did not give him any discretion to determine who among
the parties was entitled to possession of the attacked property.cralaw:red
That he exerted
efforts in going to the creditor's
residence in Tuguegarao, Cagayan to obtain possession of the attached
property
was an act of compliance with the writ of attachment. This action,
belated
as it was, did not mitigate his liability. Much less did it exculpate
him
from penalty.cralaw:red
IN VIEW OF THE
FOREGOING, respondent sheriff is
hereby found administratively liable as charged and is SUSPENDED for
six
[6] months without pay with a warning that the commission of the same
or
similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely by this
Court.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Narvasa, C.J.,
Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.cralaw:red
_________________________________
Endnotes
[1]
Wenceslao vs. Madrazo, 247 SCRA 696, 702-703, August 28, 1995.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 14-15.
[3]
Ibid., pp. 19-25.
[4]
Ibid., pp.103-110.
[5]
Ibid., pp. 117-124.
[6]
Ibid., pp. 7-13.
[7]
Ibid, pp. 2-5.
[8]
Rollo, p. 1.
[9]
Presided by Judge Henedino P. Eduarte.
[10]
Rollo, p. 83.
[11]
Receipt, rollo, p. 97.
[12]
Rollo, p. 92.
[13]
Ibid., p. 95.
[14]
Ibid., p. 192.
[15]
Comment, p. 5; Rollo, p. 186.
[16]
Walker vs. McMicking, 14 Phil 668, 673, December 23, 1909.
[17]
Sebastian vs. Valino, 224 SCRA 256, 259, July 5, 1993.
[18]Section 12, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court.
[19]
Rivera vs. Cagujas, 229 SCRA 145, 150, January 7, 1994.
[20]
238 SCRA 359, 361, November 25, 1994.
[21]
Villareal vs. Rama, 247 SCRA 493, 501, August 23, 1995; Balantes
vs. Ocampo III, 242 SCRA 327, 331, March 14, 1995.
[22]
Eduarte vs. Ramos, 238 SCRA 36, 40, November 9, 1994 and Wenceslao
vs.
Madrazo, supra, p. 704.
[23]
Elipe vs. Fabre, 241 SCRA 249, 253, February 13, 1995.
[24]
Wenceslao vs. Madrazo, supra, p. 704. |