ManilaEN
BANC
PEOPLE
OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
G.
R.
No. 117818
April
18, 1997
-versus-
ROMAN
DERILO,
ISIDRO
BALDIMO y QUILLO,alias "Sido",
LUCAS
DOÑOS, ALEJANDRO COFUENTES,and JOHN DOE,
Accused-Appellants.
D
E C I S I
O N
REGALADO,
J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Roman Derilo, Isidoro Baldimo
y Quillo, Lucas Doños, Alejandro Cofuentes and one
John
Doe
were charged with the so-called crime of murder committed by a band
before
the First Branch of the former Court of First Instance of Borongan,
Eastern
Samar.[1]
The information filed therefor alleges:
"That on January 1,
1982 at about 6:00 o'clock P.M. at sitio Palaspas, Taft, Eastern Samar,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named
accused with treachery and evident premeditation, with intent to kill,
with the use of firearm and bolos, confederating and mutually helping
one
another did then and there shot (sic) and stabbed (sic) one Perpetua
Adalim
thus inflicting injuries which caused her death.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."[2]
Of the five accused, only
accused-appellant Isidoro Q. Baldimo was apprehended and brought within
the trial court's jurisdiction. At his arraignment on March 18, 1985,
and
after the information was translated in the Waray dialect with which he
is well versed, appellant pleaded not guilty.[3]
Trial on the merits was conducted thereafter. However, by the
time
the People had formally finished presenting its evidence on August 6,
1986,
appellant, through his counsel de parte, manifested to the court a quo
that he wanted to withdraw his earlier plea of not guilty and
substitute
the same with one of guilty. Consequently, a re-arraignment was ordered
by the lower court and, this time, appellant entered a plea of guilty
to
the charge of murder.[4]
A series of questions
was then propounded by the trial court to test appellant's
voluntariness
and comprehension of the consequences in making his new plea of guilty.
Satisfied with the answers of appellant, the trial court convicted him
of the crime of murder defined and punished under Article 248 of the
Revised
Penal Code.[5]
A detailed account of
the killing was furnished by prosecution eyewitness Cresencio Lupido.[6]
According to him, Perpetua C. Adalim went to his house at Sitio
Palaspas,
Barangay Polangi in Taft, Eastern Samar in the early evening of January
1, 1982 to look for farmlands willing and desiring to work in her
ricefields.
Lupido was an agricultural tenant of Perpetua and lived on one of the
properties
owned by the latter. Upon her arrival, Perpetua instructed Lupido's
wife
to get food from her house in the poblacion as she had decided to spend
the night at Sitio Palaspas.cralaw:red
While Perpetua was waiting
and standing in the yard of the house, five armed men arrived and
confronted
Perpetua. Lupido recognized two of the men as Roman Derilo and
appellant
Isidoro Baldimo, as these two frequently passed by his house at Sitio
Palaspas.
He did not know the other three men but he claimed that he could
identity
them if brought before him. Roman Derilo talked momentarily with
Perpetua. Then, without any warning, Derilo shot Perpetua three times
with
the pistol he was carrying. After she fell to the ground, appellant,
who
was standing at the right side of Derilo, approached Perpetua and
stabbed
her several times with a knife that looked like either a Batangas knife
or a bolo know locally as "depang." A third member of the
group,
with a short and stout physique, followed suit in stabbing Perpetua.
After
the repeated stabbings, the gang walked around the yard for some time
and
left, walking in the direction of the mountains. All of them carried
long
firearms.cralaw:red
As soon as the group
had left the scene of the crime, Lupido hurriedly went to Perpetua's
house
in the poblacion of Taft where he informed the family of the deceased
about
the incident.[7]
I.chanrobles virtual law library
Appellant does not deny
his participation in the commission of the crime. Rather, in his brief
pitifully consisting of two pages, he merely asks for the modification
of the death penalty imposed by the lower court to life imprisonment.[8]
Although appellant is aware that he has made his plea of guilty after
the
prosecution had presented its evidence, thus foreclosing the
application
of paragraph 7, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code,[9]
he contends that his untimely acknowledgment of culpability may still
be
treated by analogy as a mitigating circumstance under paragraph 10 of
the
same article, invoking therefor the aforesaid case of Coronel.[10]
Unfortunately, that
decision relied upon by appellant is inapplicable to his case. The
death
penalty in People vs. Coronel, et al.[11]
was modified to "life imprisonment" not in consideration of paragraph
10,
Article 13 of the code but because the number of votes of then required
to affirm a sentence of death imposed by a lower court[12]
was not secured by this Court in its automatic review of the judgment.
Apparently, the required number for concurrence was not obtained
because
some members of the Court treated the belated confession of the accused
therein as an indication on his part to reform, and they felt that he
should
only suffer the same penalty imposed on some of his co-conspirators.cralaw:red
The late plea of guilty
entered by herein appellant cannot be considered mitigating because the
plea made is not "of a similar nature and analogous" to the plea of
guilty
contemplated in paragraph 7 of Article 13. A plea of guilty is
considered
mitigating on the rationale that an accused spontaneously and willingly
admits his guilt at the first opportunity as an act of repentance. An
accused
should not be allowed to speculate on the outcome of the proceedings by
pleading not guilty on arraignment, only to later substitute the same
with
a plea of guilty after discovering that the People has a strong case
against
him. Withal, all is not lost for appellant.cralaw:red
The killing of the victim,
Perpetua C. Adalim, was found by the lower court to have been qualified
to murder by treachery. Although not alleged in the information, the
circumstances
of superior strength hand cuadrilla were taken note of by the court a
quo based on the evidence presented by the prosecution, but the
same
were correctly regarded by said court as absorbed in alevosia. However,
it found that the generic aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation
likewise attended the commission of the crime. Hence, with no
mitigating
circumstance to offset this aggravating circumstance, the trial court
sentenced
appellant to suffer the supreme penalty of death and to indemnify and
pay
damages to the heirs of the victim.cralaw:red
It will be observed
from a reading of the lower court's decision[13]
that its judgment was obviously based not only on the evidence
presented
by the prosecution but also on appellant's belated admission of guilt,
together with some inconclusive pronouncements of this Court on
conspiracy.
The former apparently proved the circumstances of treachery, superior
strength
and cuadrilla, while the latter supposedly supplied the ground for the
finding of evident premeditation.cralaw:red
We agree with the finding
of the court below that appellant participated in the treacherous
killing
of Perpetua C. Adalim. Appellant's presence in the locus criminis and
his
identification were positively supplied by the prosecution's
eyewitness.
The unwavering and unequivocal testimony of Lupido, corroborated by
that
of Dr. Eduardo S. Evardone who conducted the postmortem examination on
the corpse of the victim[14]
and submitted his corresponding autopsy report,[15]
indubitably show the deliberate employment by the accused of a reliable
and unfailing means to ensure the killing without giving the victim an
opportunity to defend herself.cralaw:red
However, we cannot give
the same stamp of approval to the finding on premeditacion conocida
declared
by the trial court. The disturbing conclusions of said court thereon
need
to be clarified to obviate misconceptions that may affect the stability
of our present rules on evidence and criminal procedure. Said the lower
court on this aspect:
The aggravating circumstance
of evident premeditation is likewise present in the commission of the
offense
of murder as the existence of the conspiracy among the accused Baldimo
and his co-accused having been duly proven also beyond peradventure of
doubt, presupposes evident premeditation (People vs.
Belen,
L-13895, Sept. 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 39)which the said accused
himself
supplied the evidence on this score by virtue of his plea of guilty,
which
circumstance is not the least disproven by the evidence on record.
Thus,
its appreciation as an aggravating circumstance in this case.cralaw:red
A plea of guilty constitute(s)
an admission of all material facts alleged in the information,
including
the aggravating circumstances alleged, although the offense charged be
capital. (People vs. Boyles, L-15308, May 29, 1964, 11
SCRA
88; People vs. Mongado, L-24877, June 30, 1969, 28 SCRA 642; People vs.
Tilos, L-27151, Nov. 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 734).cralaw:red
A plea of guilty is
mitigating and at the same time it constitutes an admission of all the
material facts alleged in the information, including the aggravating
circumstances,
and it matters not that the offense is capital. Because of the
aforesaid
legal effect of Pineda's plea of guilty, it was not incumbent upon the
trial court to receive his evidence, much less require his presence in
court. (People vs. Jose, 37 SCRA 450; People vs.
Estebia,
40 SCRA 90).[16]
The trial court should
not have concluded that evident premeditation attended the commission
of
the crime of murder on the bases of its findings regarding the
admission
of guilt by appellant and the existence of conspiracy with his
co-accused.
As earlier stated, appellant entered his plea of guilty after the
prosecution
had presented its evidence. Thereafter, no further evidence whatsoever
was adduced by it to prove the supposed evident premeditation. The
records
and the transcripts of stenographic notes are barren of any proof
tending
to show any prior reflection on, followed after some time by
persistence
in, the criminal resolution of the five accused.cralaw:red
It is elementary law
that to establish evident premeditation, there must be proof of (1) the
time when the offender determined to commit the crime, (2) an act
manifestly
indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination, and (3) a
sufficient
lapse of time between the determination and execution to allow him to
reflect
upon the consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to
overcome
the resolution of his will had he desired to hearken to its warnings.[17]
The essence of premeditation
is that the execution of the criminal act was preceded by cool thought
and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent
during
a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.[18]
When it is not shown as to how and when the plan to kill was hatched or
what time had elapsed before it was carried out, evident premeditation
cannot be considered. Evident premeditation must be based on external
acts
and must be evident, not merely suspected, indicating deliberate
planning.
Otherwise stated, there must be a demonstration by outward acts of a
criminal
intent that is notorious and manifest.[19]
As there is no proof,
direct or circumstantial, offered by the prosecution to show when
appellant
and his co-accused meditated and reflected upon their decision to kill
the victim and the intervening time that elapsed before this plan was
carried
out, the circumstance of evident premeditation cannot be presumed
against
appellant. As early as 1905, we laid down the rule that the
circumstances
specifying an offense or aggravating the penalty thereof must be proved
as conclusively as the act itself, mere suppositions or presumptions
being
insufficient to establish their presence. No matter how truthful these
suppositions or presumptions may seem, they must not and cannot produce
the effect of aggravating the liability of the accused.[20]
It is an ancient but
revered doctrine that qualifying and aggravating circumstance before
being
taken into consideration for the purpose of increasing the degree of
the
penalty to be imposed must be proved with equal certainty and clearness
as that which establishes the commission of the act charged as the
criminal
offense.[21]
It is not only the central fact of a killing that must be shown beyond
reasonable doubt; every qualifying or aggravating circumstance alleged
to have been present and to have attended such killing, must similarly
be shown by the same degree of proof.[22]
II.chanrobles virtual law library
The foregoing doctrines
consequently point to the need of reconciling them with the old rule
that
a plea of guilty admits not only the crime but also its attendant
circumstances
which is relied upon and invoked by the lower court in this case to
justify
its conclusion of evident premeditation to aggravate the liability of
appellant.cralaw:red
Over the years and through
numerous cases, this Court has adopted an exception to the erstwhile
rule
enunciating that there is no need to prove the presence of aggravating
circumstances alleged in an information or complaint when the accused
pleads
guilty to the charge. Our rulings regarding this principle were
expressed
more or less in this wise:
Having pleaded guilty
to the information, these aggravating circumstances were deemed fully
established,
for the plea of guilty to the information covers both the crime as well
as its attendant circumstances qualifying and/or aggravating the crime.[23]
We are not, however,
concerned here merely with the doctrine itself but more specifically
with
the consequences thereof. Thus, in People vs. Rapirap,[24]
it was formerly explained that the subject doctrine has the following
effects:
"A plea of guilty
does
not merely join the issues of the complaint or information, but amounts
to an admission of guilt and of the material facts alleged in the
complaint
or information and in this sense takes the place of the trial itself.
Such
plea removes the necessity of presenting further evidence and for all
intents
and purposes the case is deemed tried on its merits and submitted for
decision.
It leaves the court with no alternative but to impose the penalty
prescribed
by law."
Then, in People vs. Lambino,[25]
we prevented the accused in criminal actions from contradicting the
outcome
of his admission, with our holding that by the plea of guilty, the
accused
admits all the facts alleged in the information and, by that plea, he
is
precluded from showing that he has not committed them. People vs.
Yamson, et al.[26]
thereafter expanded the application of the doctrine to both capital and
non-capital cases:
"A plea of guilty is
an admission of all the material facts alleged in the complaint or
information.
A plea of guilty when formally entered in arraignment is sufficient to
sustain a conviction for any offense charged in the information,
without
the necessity of requiring additional evidence, since by so pleading,
the
defendant himself has supplied the necessary proof. It matters not even
if the offense is capital for the admission (plea of guilty) covers
both
the crime as well as its attendant circumstances."
Finally, People vs. Apduhan,
Jr.[27]
cited by some of the cases relied upon by the lower court, declared
that:
"While an unqualified
plea of guilty is mitigating, it, at the same time, constitutes an
admission
of all material facts alleged in the information, including the
aggravating
circumstance therein recited, xxx The prosecution does not need
to
prove the three aggravating circumstances (all alleged in the second
amended
information) since the accused, by his plea of guilty, has supplied the
requisite proof."
With the foregoing presentation,
the trial court must have believed that it had acted correctly in
presuming
the existence of evident premeditation based on appellant's plea of
guilty
without any proof being presented to establish such aggravating
circumstance.
However, the developmental growth of our procedural rules did not stop
there. With the advent of the revised Rules on Criminal Procedure on
January
1, 1985, a new rule, specifically mandating the course that trial
courts
should follow in capital cases where the accused pleads guilty, was
introduced
into our remedial law with this provision:
"Sec. 3. Plea of
guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence When the
accused
pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching
inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences
of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the
precise
degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his
behalf."[28]
We expounded on this in
People vs. Camay[29]
with this explanation:
"Under the new
formulation,
three (3) things are enjoined of the trial court after a plea of guilty
to a capital offense has been entered by the accused: [1] The court
must
conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension
of the consequences of his plea; [2] The court must require the
prosecution
to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise
degree
of his culpability; and [3] The court must ask the accused if he
desires
to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires.
"The amended rule
is
a capsulization of the provisions of the old rule and pertinent
jurisprudence.
We had several occasions to issue the caveat that even if the trial
court
is satisfied that the plea of guilty was entered with full knowledge of
its meaning and consequences, the Court must still require the
introduction
of evidence for the purpose of establishing the guilt and degree of
culpability
of the defendant. This is the proper norm to be followed not only to
satisfy
the trial judge but also to aid the Court in determining whether or not
the accused really and truly comprehended the meaning, full
significance
and consequences of his plea.
"The presentation
of
evidence is required in order to preclude any room for reasonable doubt
in the mind of the trial court, or the Supreme Court on review, as to
the
possibility that there might have been some misunderstanding on the
part
of the accused as to the nature of the charge to which he pleaded
guilty,
and to ascertain the circumstances attendant to the commission of the
crime
which justify or require the exercise of a greater or lesser degree of
severity in the imposition of the prescribed penalty."[30]
To emphasize its importance
this Court held in People vs. Dayot[31]
that the rule in Section 3, Rule 116 is mandatory, and issued the
warning
that any judge who fails to observe its command commits a grave abuse
of
discretion. This Court has come a long way in adopting a
mandatory
rule with regard to the presentation of evidence in capital cases where
the accused pleads guilty to the criminal charge. From granting trial
courts
in the earlier Rules of Court[32]
sufficient discretion in requiring evidence whenever guilt is admitted
by the accused, the Court has now made it mandatory on the part of the
lower courts to compel the presentation of evidence and make sure that
the accused fully comprehends the nature and consequences of his plea
of
guilty. III.chanrobles virtual law library
There is another reason
why we have to reject the aforesaid conclusion reached by the lower
court
in this case. Under settled jurisprudence, the consequences of
aggravating
circumstances alleged in the information must be explained to the
accused
when he pleads guilty to a crime imputed against him.
A reading of the
questions
directed at appellant during his re-arraignment reveals a shortcoming
on
the part of the trial court to fully explain to appellant the
consequences
of his plea.[33]
"COURT:
"All right, please
come
forward, Mr. Baldimo. Your lawyer, Atty. Camilo Libanan manifested to
the
court that you intimated to him your desire to withdraw your plea of
not
guilty when arraigned in this case and to substitute the same with a
plea
of not guilty after the prosecution has already presented evidence and
in fact closed its evidence this morning. What have you to say about
the
manifestation of your lawyer, Atty. Libanan?
"ACCUSED: Yes,
your
honor.
"COURT:
"All right,
re-arraign
the accused. Did you understand the information charging you with the
crime
of murder along with some other persons?
"A Yes, your honor.
"Q All right, what
will
your plea be?
"ACCUSED:
"Guilty.
"COURT:
"When you withdraw
your
plea of not guilty to the information when arraigned the first time and
substitute the same with a plea of guilty this morning, did you do so
of
your free and voluntary will?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Were you not
forced,
threatened, coerced or intimidated to change your plea of not guilty
and
substitute the same with a plea of guilty?
"A I was not.
"Q Were you not
under
influence by any person or persons who exercises legal authority over
you
which may have been the consideration why you are now pleading guilty
to
the offense charged?
"A None.
"Q Do you realize
the
consequences of a plea, of your plea of guilty?
"A Yes, your honor.
"Q You are
therefore
aware that by your plea of guilty you will be penalized by the court
and
ordered to indemnify your victim as well as other accessory penalties
provided
for by law?
"A Yes, your honor.
"Q And this
notwithstanding
your realization of what a plea of guilty entail, will you still insist
on your plea of guilty to the information charging you with the crime
of
murder committed by a band?
"A Yes, your honor.
"Q Was it your
realization
that you actually committed the crime charged and the prodding of your
conscience that you now enter the plea of guilty?
"A Yes, your honor.
"Q Are you now
repentant?
"A I am not
repentant.
"Q You are not
repentant
for what you have done?
"A Yes, sir, I am
repentant.
"Q In other words,
you
regret having committed the acts, having committed the crime charged?
"A Yes, your honor.
"COURT:
"All right,
promulgation
is set on August 18. All right, September 1. "
A plea of guilty is improvidently
accepted where no effort was even made to explain to the accused that a
plea of guilty to an information for a capital offense, attended by an
aggravating circumstance, may result in the imposition of the death
penalty.[34]
We cannot declare with reasonable certainty that when appellant pleaded
guilty to the crime charged in the information he knew that he was at
the
same time admitting the presence and serious effects of the aggravating
circumstances alleged therein. We are more inclined to believe, as a
matter
of judicial experience, that when he admitted his role in the killing
of
the deceased, he only intended to limit such admission to the crime
charged
and not to the aggravating circumstances.
The trial judge did
not himself try to inform or advise appellant regarding the
consequences
of pleading guilty to having killed the victim with both circumstances
of evident premeditation and treachery. More particularly, the trial
judge
did not himself try to convey to appellant, in ordinary language that
appellant
would be assumed to understand, the meaning of evident premeditation
and
treachery as circumstances that would qualify the killing to murder and
to aggravate the penalty as to call for the maximum penalty of death.[35]
We quote from the old
but instructive and still authoritative case of U.S. vs. Jamad.[36]
If the accused does
not clearly and fully understand the nature of the offense charged, if
he is not advised as to the meaning and effect of the technical
language
so often used in formal complaints and informations in qualifying the
acts
constituting the offense, or if he does not clearly understand the
consequences
by way of a heavy and even a capital penalty flowing from his admission
of his guilt of the crime in the precise technical manner and form in
which
it is charged, his plea of guilty should not be held to be sufficient
to
sustain a conviction.cralaw:red
Our experience has taught
us that it not infrequently happens that, upon arraignment, accused
persons
plead "guilty" to the commission of the gravest offenses,
qualified
by marked aggravating circumstances, when in truth and in fact they
intend
merely to admit that they committed the act or acts charged in the
complaint,
and have no thought of admitting the technical charges of aggravating
circumstances.
It not infrequently happens that after a formal plea of "guilty"
it develops under the probe of the trial judge, or in the course of the
statement of the accused made at the time of the entry of his plea, or
upon the witness stand, that the accused, while admitting the
commission
of the acts charged in the information, believes or pretends to believe
that these acts were committed under such circumstances as to exempt
him
in whole or in part from criminal liability. Clearly, a formal plea of
guilty entered under such circumstances is not sufficient to sustain a
conviction of the aggravated crime charged in the information.cralaw:red
In People vs. Alamada, [37]
this Court found the trial court to have failed in observing that
quantum
of care which it had prescribed for the valid admission of a plea of
guilty
by an accused, especially in capital cases, when it did not explain to
the accused the nature of the charges against him, particularly the
allegations
regarding conspiracy, treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of
superior
strength, which are terms so technical that the layman, especially an
unschooled
one like the accused in the said case, cannot possibly understand
without
proper elucidation.cralaw:red
It is neither just nor
reasonable to assume that an uneducated person understands the
allegation
that "the aggravating circumstances of treachery and premeditation were
present in the commission of the crime," inasmuch as "treachery" and
"premeditation"
are highly technical terms the juridical meaning of which is beyond the
understanding not of the illiterates alone but even of those who, being
educated, are not lawyers.[38]
If many members of the Bar are unable to call to mind the technical
requisites
of "treachery" and "evident premeditation" as qualifying and
aggravating
circumstances, there is no reason for supposing that the accused, who
is
a farmer by occupation, understood such elements and requisites after a
few minutes of whispered advice from a counsel de oficio in open court.[39]
Another reason why we
cannot agree with the lower court's posture on this issue is the
consistent
holding in several cases that a plea of guilty to an information
alleging
aggravating circumstances will not be considered an admission of such
circumstances
if the evidence presented by the prosecution fails to establish
them.
Even the case of People vs. Boyles[40]
cited by the trial court disallowed the appreciation of the aggravating
circumstance of nighttime when the Supreme Court found out that other
than
the time of the commission of the crime, nothing else suggested the
circumstance
of nocturnidad as understood in criminal law, to wit:
"Not one of the
prosecution
evidence, oral or documentary, makes the slightest indication that the
protection of the night's darkness was deliberately availed of by the
appellants.
In view of this deficiency in the case for the Government, we are
constrained
to disallow the said circumstance even as, technically, it may have
been
accepted by them when they pleaded guilty on arraignment."
On the same ratiocination,
although herein appellant pleaded guilty to the charge as alleged in
the
information, evident premeditation may not be taken against him since
the
evidence presented by the People does not adequately disclose the
existence
of the same.[41]
Where the aggravating circumstances listed in the information were not
supported by the evidence adduced, a plea of guilty to a capital
offense
cannot constitute an admission of the aggravating circumstances set
forth
in the information.[42]
The above rulings drew
from People vs. Corachea[43]
which, in turn, reiterated the dictum in People vs. Galapia[44]
that even under the old rule on judicial confession of guilt, to be
appreciated
the aggravating circumstances must further be duly proved.cralaw:red
The rule is that a judicial
confession of guilt admits all the material facts alleged in the
information
including the aggravating circumstances listed therein. But, where such
circumstances are disproven by the evidence, it should be disallowed in
the judgment. Thus, in People vs. Gungab (64 Phil. 779), the Court
ruled
"that when an accused, who lacks instruction, pleads guilty to the
crime
of parricide described in the information as having been committed with
the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation
and
his testimony given under oath before the trial court, upon his
petition
fails to show the existence of such aggravating circumstances, his plea
of guilty shall be understood as being limited to the admission of
having
committed the crime of parricide, not having done so with treachery and
evident premeditation."
In view of the present
requirement of Section 3, Rule 116 for the presentation of evidence but
with due explanation to appellant of the significance of the
aggravating
circumstances alleged in an information, and considering the
insufficiency
of the People's evidence showing evident premeditation in this case, we
cannot consider appellant's plea of guilty as an admission of the
existence
of that aggravating circumstance.cralaw:red
As the pertinent principle
lays down a rule of procedure, the plea of guilty of an accused cannot
stand in place of the evidence that must be presented and is called for
by said Section 3 of Rule 116. Trial courts should no longer assume
that
a plea of guilty includes an admission of the attending circumstances
alleged
in the information as they are now required to demand that the
prosecution
should prove the exact liability of the accused. The requirements of
Section
3 would become idle and fruitless if we were to allow conclusions of
criminal
liability and aggravating circumstances on the dubious strength of a
presumptive
rule.cralaw:red
While it may be argued
that appellant entered an improvident plea of guilty when re-arraigned,
we find no need, however, to remand the case to the lower court for
further
reception of evidence. As a rule, this Court has set aside convictions
based on pleas of guilty in capital offenses because of improvidence
thereof
and when such plea is the sole basis of the condemnatory judgment.
However,
where the trial court receives evidence to determine precisely whether
or not the accused has erred in admitting his guilt, the manner in
which
the plea of guilty is made (improvidently or not) loses legal
significance,
for the simple reason that the conviction is based on the evidence
proving
the commission by the accused of the offense charged[45]
Thus, even without considering
the plea of guilty of appellant, he may still be convicted if there is
adequate evidence on record on which to predicate his conviction.[46]
As already observed, the prosecution had already rested when appellant
decided to change his plea. The prosecution then had all the
opportunity
to verify the material allegations in the information. Despite such
opportunity,
it only successfully established treachery but failed to present any
evidence
tending to prove evident premeditation.cralaw:red
We also doubt the applicability
to the case at bar of People vs. Belen,[47]
cited by the lower court, to the effect that conspiracy presupposes
evident
premeditation. A reading of People vs. Timbang, et al.[48]
upon which Belen is based, does not state, either categorically or
impliedly,
that evident premeditation exists where conspiracy is proven.cralaw:red
There is no doubt that
conspiracy was shown in the instant case from the concerted actions of
the accused. The existence of this mode in the commission of a felony
can
be inferred from the sudden shooting of the victim by Derilo and the
successive
stabbing of her person by appellant and his unidentified companion.cralaw:red
However, to claim that
evident premeditation can be inferred from conspiracy violates the
fundamental
principle that aggravating circumstances should also be proved beyond
reasonable
doubt as the crime alleged to have been committed. While the court
below
did not equate conspiracy with evident premeditation, the latter cannot
be deduced from the former as the elements of conspiracy and evident
premeditation
are completely different.cralaw:red
There is conspiracy
when two or more persons come to an agreement, the agreement concerned
the commission of a felony, and the execution of the felony is decided
upon. However, unlike evident premeditation, where a sufficient period
of time must elapse to afford full opportunity for meditation and
reflection
and for the perpetrator to deliberate on the consequences on his
intended
deed, conspiracy arises on the very instant the plotters agree,
expressly
or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith decide to pursue it.
Once
this assent is established, each and everyone of the conspirators is
made
criminally liable for the crime committed by anyone of them.[49]
To establish conspiracy,
it is not essential that there be proof as to the previous agreement
and
decision to commit the crime, it being sufficient that the malefactors
shall have acted in concert pursuant to the same objective.[50]
To end any doubt on this matter, we quote our ruling in People vs.
Rizal:[51]
There is no proof, aside
from conspiracy, that the accused and his companions had sufficient
time
to plan the killing, reflect on it and after reflection decided to
commit
the evil deed. Under ordinary circumstances where conspiracy is present
with proof of attendant deliberation and selection of the method, times
and means of executing the crime, the existence of evident
premeditation
is taken for granted. But when conspiracy is merely inferred from the
acts
of the accused and his companions in the perpetration of the crime and
there is no showing that characterizes evident premeditation, such
aggravating
circumstance cannot be taken for granted but must be proved like any
other
of its kind. (Emphasis supplied).cralaw:red
It can thus be said
that evident premeditation can only be deduced from conspiracy if in
the
course of directly proving conspiracy, the elements of evident
premeditation
were likewise presented and proven. But then, in such a case, evident
premeditation
would not merely be presumed but actually established. Hence, it
follows
that there is really a need for the presentation of evidence indicating
the existence of premeditacion conocida, which was not done in this
case.
IV.chanrobles virtual law library
We could stop at this
juncture, with the vital points against the death penalty having been
made,
but there are certain facets of this case which necessitate
elucidation.
Indeed, the peculiar antecedents and chronological milieu of the
instant
case confront us now with what appear to be the problematical
application
of two penal laws.cralaw:red
At the time of the commission
of the crime on January 1, 1982 and the conviction of the accused on
October
12, 1986, the substantive law in force dealing with the crime of murder
was Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code which took effect way back on
January 1, 1932. Said provision provided that any person guilty of
murder
shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death.cralaw:red
Then on February 2,
1987, a new Constitution came into force after its ratification on that
date by the people. The 1987 Constitution, regarded by some as
progressive
since it contains new provisions not covered by our earlier two
Constitutions,
proscribed in Section 19, Article III (Bill of Rights) thereof the
imposition
of the death penalty, as follows:
"Sec. 19. (1)
Excessive
fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
inflicted. Neither shall the death penalty be imposed, unless, for
compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for
it.
Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion
perpetua. (Emphasis supplied).
"xxx
xxx
xxx "
Responding to the alarming
increase of horrible crimes being committed in the country, Congress
passed
a law imposing the death penalty on certain heinous offenses and
further
amending for that purpose the Revised Penal Code and other special
penal
laws. Said law was officially enacted as Republic Act No. 7659 and took
effect on December 31, 1993. This is now the governing penal law at the
time of this review of the case at bar.
Although the elements
and circumstances which qualify a killing to murder were maintained,
Republic
Act No. 7659 amended Article 248 of the Code by imposing a heavier
penalty
for murder than that originally prescribed, the new penalty provided in
Section 6 of said amendatory statute being reclusion perpetua to
death.cralaw:red
Being a penal law, such
provision of Republic Act No. 7659 may not be applied to the crime of
murder
committed in 1982 by appellant, based on the principle of prospectivity
of penal laws. Further, the presumption is that laws operate
prospectively,
unless the contrary clearly appears or is clearly, plainly and
unequivocally
expressed or necessarily implied.[52]
In every case of doubt, the doubt will be resolved against the
retroactive
operation of laws.[53]
Nor can the prospective application of Republic Act No. 7659 be doubted
just because of the constitutional provision leaving to Congress the
matter
of the death penalty in cases of heinous crimes, since Congress did not
otherwise provide.cralaw:red
The interpellations
in the Constitutional Commission tasked to draw up the present
Constitution
is enlightening in our determination of the non-retroactivity of said
law,
thus:
"MR. BENGZON. And
then,
supposing Congress passes a law imposing the death penalty on those
very
same crimes committed by those that were convicted of the death penalty
which penalty has been commuted to reclusion perpetua, will they go
back?
"MR. MONSOD. No.
"MR. BENGZON. Not
anymore?
"MR. MONSOD. Any
new
law passed by the National Assembly would be prospective in character.[54]
One of the universally
accepted characteristics of a penal law is prospectivity. This general
principle of criminal law is embodied in Article 21 of the Revised
Penal
Code which provides that "no felony shall be punishable by any penalty
not prescribed by law prior to its commission," and was applied by the
Supreme Court in two early cases to mean that no act or omission shall
be held to be a crime, nor its author punished, except by virtue of a
law
in force at the time the act was committed.[55]
Besides, to give retroactive
effect to the pertinent provision of Republic Act No. 7659 would be
violative
of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.[56]
Among others, an ex post facto law has been defined as one which
changes
the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed
to
the crime when it was committed.[57]
It is settled that a
penal law may have retroactive effect only when it is favorable to the
accused.[58]
Obviously, with a penalty more onerous than that provided by the
Revised
Penal Code for murder, the pertinent amendment thereof by Republic Act
No. 7659 cannot fall within the exception to the general rule on
prospectivity
of penal laws.cralaw:red
Lastly, observance of
juridical uniformity in the decisions of this Court requires that we
refrain
from applying Republic Act No. 7659 to the case at bar. The present
case
is not the first and only instance where the Court has had to review a
sentence for death after this amendatory law came into force. To give
retroactive
effect to said law in this case will disturb the numerous decisions of
the Court imposing reclusion perpetua on the accused who
committed
capital offenses prior to the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution and
were convicted after its effectivity but before that of Republic Act
No.
7659, even though the penalty imposable would have been death.cralaw:red
Having eliminated the
possibility of applying the death penalty under Republic Act No. 7659
in
the present case, we now examine the applicability of Article 248 of
the
Revised Penal Code, prior to its aforesaid amendment. On May 20, 1987,
this Court issued Circular No. 9 regarding the imposition of the death
penalty, under the circumstances therein defined. In the said circular,
all courts were enjoined to impose only the penalty of reclusion
perpetua,
even in those cases wherein our penal laws provide for the imposition
of
the death penalty, until Congress shall have provided by law for the
definition
of the heinous crimes contemplated in the 1987 Constitution.cralaw:red
Prior thereto, in an
en banc resolution dated April 30, 1987 issued in Administrative Matter
No. 87-5-3173-0, the Court took cognizance of the Cabinet Meeting held
on April 8, 1987 wherein, among others, the President agreed to issue a
statement officially commuting to life imprisonment the death sentence
theretofore imposed on some convicts, in accordance with the letter and
spirit of the 1987 Constitution. However, a verification with the
Executive
Department, through the Department of Justice, reveals that the
projected
presidential commutation never materialized.cralaw:red
It will further be noted
that said circular referred only to those cases then "under automatic
review
by the Court," and the aforestated resolution quoted therein likewise
contemplated
"pending cases before the Court," that is, as of May 20, 1987. Those
issuances
could not therefore apply to the present case since, as hereinafter
explained,
the case at bar was brought on appeal to this Court only on July 20,
1994.cralaw:red
Be that as it may, however,
whether or not evident premeditation was present in this case and
regardless
of the inapplicability thereto of the aforementioned circular and
resolution,
the Court is reasonably convinced that it cannot validly impose the
capital
punishment on appellant. The words of the Constitution are clear: Any
death
penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
Appellant,
it will be recalled, was sentenced in 1986 to suffer the death penalty
as then provided under the Revised Penal Code. With the ratification of
the Constitution in 1987, that sentence should have been reduced to
reclusion
perpetua under such constitutional fiat.cralaw:red
The fact that this Court
will have the opportunity to review appellant's case only now does not
detract from the force of such directive of the Constitution. Neither
will
the fact that Circular No. 9 was not yet issued when appellant was
tried
and convicted prevent the application to him of that Constitutional
provision.
It is not the action of the courts which, under the circumstances,
convert
his sentence of death to reclusion perpetua. Such reduction is
directed
and effected by the explicit words of the fundamental charter; the
courts
merely apply this express and self-executing provision of the
Constitution
when they impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua rather than the
imposable
penalty of death in appropriate cases.cralaw:red
Again, the following
proceedings in the Constitutional Commission yield light on the
foregoing
proposition:
"MR. DE CASTRO. The
proponent's amendment is a comma (,) after "inflicted" on line 29 to be
followed by the clause "UNLESS FOR COMPELLING REASONS INVOLVING HEINOUS
CRIMES THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY PROVIDES FOR THE DEATH PENALTY." In this
proposed
amendment, there will still be a need for the National Assembly to pass
a law providing for the death penalty. Is this correct?
"MR. MONSOD. Yes.
"MR. DE CASTRO.
What
happens to those awaiting execution, having already the death penalty
on
their heads, but there is no law yet passed by the National Assembly?
"MR. MONSOD. Then
the
next sentence will apply: "Death penalty already imposed shall be
commuted
to reclusion perpetua."[59]
It can be readily seen
that the reduction of the penalty is not and was not made dependent on
a law, decree, condition, or period before the aforementioned Section
19
can be applied by the courts. It cannot be inferred, either from the
wordings
of the subject provision or from the intention of the framers of the
Constitution,
that a death sentence should be brought to the Supreme Court for review
within a certain time frame in order that it can be reduced to
reclusion
perpetua. The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is
to
give effect to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the
people adopting it. The intention to which force is to be given is that
which is embodied and expressed in the constitutional provisions
themselves.[60]
Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat. A law should
be interpreted with a view to upholding rather than destroying it.
The fact that no proclamation
or grant of commutation was officially issued by the President will not
prevent the implementation and operation of Section 19 to appellant. To
argue otherwise would be subordinating the command of the Constitution
to the will of the President. The framers of the Constitution never
intended
that the non-imposition or non-execution of the death sentence under
those
constitutional provisions would be dependent on the act or omission of
the Chief Executive.cralaw:red
Resort to the deliberations
of the Constitutional Commission will justify this conclusion:
"MR. REGALADO. May
I ask Commissioner Monsod about this second sentence. "Death penalty
already
imposed shall be commuted to reclusion perpetua." When we
say
commuted to reclusion perpetua, I think we refer to the power of the
President
to effect commutations because only the President can commute sentences
already final and imposed by the courts. Is that correct?
"MR. MONSOD. Madam
President,
I am not the proponent of that sentence. Perhaps the Committee should
answer
that.
"MR. REGALADO.
That
was the answer of the Gentleman in response to the inquiry of
Commissioner
Bengzon.
"MR. MONSOD. My
answer
is reflective of what the Committee had answered before. And since that
has not been changed, I suppose the answer would be the same. But if
the
Committee would like to answer it in more detail, perhaps it should be
the one to answer that.
"FR. BERNAS. The
intention
of the provision here is, upon ratification of this Constitution, the
death
penalty already imposed is automatically without need for any
action
by the President commuted.
"MR. REGALADO.
Yes,
because the wording here is: "Death penalty already imposed shall be
commuted
to reclusion perpetua." The power of commutation is a presidential
prerogative.
"FR. BERNAS. Or we
can
say "ARE HEREBY commuted," if that is clearer. But that is the
intention.
"MR. REGALADO.
Does
the Commission mean "are hereby reduced"?
"FR. BERNAS.
Commuted
to the death penalty.
"MR. REGALADO. It
"shall
be REDUCED to reclusion perpetua"?
"FR. BERNAS. To
reclusion
perpetua, yes.
"MR. REGALADO.
Maybe
the Commissioner should eliminate the word "commute" because we are
invading
the presidential prerogative.
"THE PRESIDENT. Is
the
Gentleman proposing an amendment to the amendment? "[61]
Although Commissioner Regalado
was not able to formally propose an amendment because of an intervening
question by another commissioner, his observation was correspondingly
accepted
by the Commission as shown by the use of the word "reduced" in the
present
provision of the Constitution, instead of "commute" as originally
proposed.
The fact is that he did not have to propose an amendment as
Commissioner
Bernas, who was representing the committee concerned, had already taken
note thereof and acceded thereto.
Thus, in his work on
the 1987 Constitution, Commissioner Bernas had this to say on the
matter:
xxx "But since
'commutation'
is technically an executive prerogative, the Commission, in order to
make
the effect automatic without having to wait for presidential action,
deliberately
avoided the use of the word 'commuted' and, on the suggestion of
Commissioner
Regalado, used instead 'reduced'. Thus the provision reads: 'Any death
penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.' The
phrase
'shall be reduced' is not a description of some future act but a
command
that is immediately effective. (Nevertheless, President Aquino issued
an
Executive Order, perhaps ad cautelam, commuting death sentences already
imposed.)"[62]
From the foregoing, it
is apparent that no presidential action is necessary in order that any
accused sentenced to the death penalty under the same circumstances as
herein appellant may avail of the benefit of Section 19. The accused,
ipso
jure, is entitled to a reduction of his sentence. As the Constitution
is
not primarily a lawyer's document, its language should be understood in
the sense that it may have in common use. Its words should be given
their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.[63]
While "to commute" necessitates presidential initiative, "to reduce"
does
not.
Therefore, with or without
an official executive issuance on commutation, the death penalty
prescribed
in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and imposed on appellant by
the
lower court in 1986 cannot be carried out even though the case was
brought
to the Supreme Court only in 1994 after Republic Act No. 7659 had taken
effect. Nor can this law be deemed to have revived the death penalty in
the case of appellant, for reasons stated earlier. By February 2, 1987,
that penalty had already been automatically reduced to reclusion
perpetua,
not by the grace of the President or of the courts, but by the mandate
of the fundamental law of the land.cralaw:red
Before we end, we note
the extremely protracted delay in bringing appellant's conviction to
the
attention of this Court. Although the judgment of the lower court was
promulgated
on October 12, 1986, the records of this case were elevated to this
Court
only on July 20, 1994.[64]
Even by this date, the records were not yet complete as some of the
transcripts
of stenographic notes taken during the trial were not included in the
records
forwarded to this Court.cralaw:red
We can only blame the
court of origin for this improbable and unexplained delay of almost
eight
years. It is the express and specific duty of the clerk thereof to
transmit
to this Court, within the periods allowed therefor, the complete
records
of the case where the death penalty is imposed for automatic review.
Paragraph
5, Section L (Appeal), Chapter VI (Duties in Criminal Cases) of the
Manual
for Clerks of Court, which is a verbatim reproduction of Section 10,
Rule
122 of the Rules of Court, provides:
"5. Transmission
of Records in Case of Death Penalty. In all cases where the
death
penalty is imposed by the trial court, the records shall be forwarded
to
the Supreme Court for automatic review and judgment, within twenty (20)
days but not earlier than fifteen (15) days after promulgation of the
judgment
or notice of denial of any motion for new trial or reconsideration. The
transcript shall also be forwarded within ten (10) days after the
filing
thereof by the stenographic reporter."
The Office of the Court
Administrator is accordingly directed to investigate this matter and
submit
the corresponding evaluation, report and recommendation to this Court
within
ninety (90) days from notice hereof.
All clerks of court
are hereby ordered to scrupulously comply with their duty and
responsibility
of seasonably transmitting to this Court the complete records of cases
where the death penalty was imposed, especially now that the trial
courts
have imposed the death penalty in many cases involving heinous crimes.cralaw:red
With respect to the
case at bar, in justice to appellant this appellate proceeding shall be
treated as an automatic review because there is no showing in the
records
that he was advised that the death penalty imposed upon him has been
reduced
to reclusion perpetua pursuant to the pertinent provisions of the 1987
Constitution; and that his case is no longer subject to automatic
review,
as provided and required in Circular No. 9 of this Court, hence a
notice
of appeal should have been filed.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, for failure
of the prosecution to prove the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation
and by virtue of the command of the 1987 Constitution, the judgment of
the court a quo is accordingly MODIFIED. Accused-appellant
Isidoro
Q. Baldimo is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua
and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P50,000.00 in
consonance with our current case law and policy on death indemnity.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Narvasa, C.J.,
Padilla, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza,
Francisco, Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Hermosisima, Jr., J.,
is on leave.cralaw:red
__________________________________
Endnotes
[1]
Presided over by Executive Judge Sixto T. Balanquit, Jr. who penned the
decision under review.
[2]
Original Record, 2.
[3]
Ibid., 15.
[4]
TSN, August 6, 1986, 51-56.
[5]
Original Record, 116; Decision, 10.
[6]
His surname is spelled "Lopido" in the transcripts.
[7]
TSN, September 23, 1985, 14-33.
[8]
Brief for Appellant, 2; Rollo, 56-57. Appellant is erroneously using
the
term of life imprisonment instead of the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
This error arose from this Court's imposition of "life imprisonment" as
the penalty for robbery with homicide in People vs. Coronel, et al.
[G.R.
No. L-19091, June 30, 1966, (17 SCRA 509) cited by appellant].
[9]
Art. 13. Mitigating circumstances. The following are mitigating
circumstances:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
"7
That the offender xxx had voluntarily confessed his guilt before the
court
prior to the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution."
[10]Rollo,
56-57; Appellant's Brief, 1-2.
[11]
Supra, Fn. 8.
[12]Section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 (R.A. No. 296), as
amended,
provided that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
xxx
xxx xxx
"Whenever
the judgment of the lower court imposes the death penalty, the case
shall
be determined by eight Justices of the Court. When eight Justices fail
to reach a decision as to the propriety of the imposition of the death
penalty, the penalty lower in degree shall be imposed." (R.A. No. 5440).
[13]
Dated August 26, 1986, but judgment was promulgated on October 14, 1986.
[14]
TSN, July 19, 1985, 7-13.
[15]
Exhibit B, Exhibits for the Prosecution, 2.
[16]
Decision, 9-10; Original Record, 115-116.
[17]
People vs. Gravino, G.R. Nos. L-31327-29, May 16, 1983, 122 SCRA 123.
[18]
People vs. Ariola, G.R. No. L-38457, October 29, 1980, 100 SCRA 523.
[19]
People vs. Narit, G.R. No. 77087, May 23, 1991, 197 SCRA 334.
[20]
U.S. vs. Perdon, 4 Phil. 141 [1905].
[21]
U.S. vs. Ulat, 7 Phil. 559 [1907]; U.S. vs. Navarro, 7 Phil. 713 [1907].
[22]
People vs. De Guia, G.R. No. 59876, August 31, 1989, 177 SCRA 112.
[23]
People vs. Yu, G.R. No. L-13780, January 28, 1961, 1 SCRA 199; People
vs.
Arpa, G.R. No. L-26789, April 25, 1969, 27 SCRA 1037; People vs.
Alicia,
G.R. No. L-38176, January 22, 1980, 95 SCRA 227.
[24]
102 Phil. 863 [1958].
[25]
103 Phil. 504 [1958].
[26]
109 Phil. 793 [1960].
[27]
G.R. No. L-19491, August 30, 1968, 24 SCRA 798.
[28]Sec. 3, Rule 116, Rules of Court.
[29]
G.R. No. 91306, July 29, 1987, 152 SCRA 401.
[30]
People vs. De Luna, G.R. No. 77969, June 22, 1989, 174 SCRA 204.
[31]
G.R. No. 88281, July 20, 1990, 187 SCRA 637.
[32]Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1940 Rules of Court and Section 5, Rule 118
of the 1964 Rules of Court similarly provide that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
"Sec.
5. Plea of guilty; determination of punishment. Where the
defendant
pleads guilty to a complaint or information, if the court accepts the
plea
and has discretion as to the punishment for the offense, it may hear
witnesses
to determine what punishment shall be imposed."
[33]
TSN, August 6, 1986, 54-56.
[34]
People vs. Espiña, G.R. No. L-33028, June 25, 1973, 57 SCRA 317.
[35]
See People vs. De Guia, G.R. No. 59876, August 31, 1989, 177 SCRA 112
[36]
37 Phil. 305 [1917].
[37]
G.R. Nos. L-34594-95, July 13, 1973, 52 SCRA 103.
[38]
People vs. Gungab, 64 Phil. 779 [1937].
[39]
People vs. De Guia, supra, Fn. 35.
[40]
G.R. No. L-15308, May 29, 1964, 11 SCRA 88.
[41]
People vs. Gravino, G.R. Nos. L-31327-29, May 16, 1983, 122 SCRA 123;
People
vs. Logarto, G.R. No. 65833, May 6, 1991, 196 SCRA 611.
[42]
People vs. Comendador, G.R. No. 38000, September 19, 1980, 100 SCRA 155.
[43]
G.R. No. L-30101, July 16, 1979, 91 SCRA 422
[44]
G.R. Nos. L-39303-05, August 1, 1978, 84 SCRA 526.
[45]
People vs. Nismal, G.R. No. 51257, June 25, 1982, 114 SCRA 487.
[46]
See People vs. Petalcorin, G.R. No. 65376, December 29, 1989, 180 SCRA
685.
[47]
G.R. No. L-13895, September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 39.
[48]
74 Phil. 295 [1943].
[49]
People vs. Monroy, et al., 104 Phil. 759 [1958].
[50]
People vs. Sazon, G.R. No. 89684, September 18, 1990, 189 SCRA 713.
[51]
G.R. Nos. L-43487-89, February 26, 1981, 103 SCRA 282.
[52]
People vs. Zeta, 98 Phil. 143 [1955].
[53]
Cebu Portland Cement vs. CIR, G.R. No. L-20563, October 29, 1968, 25
SCRA
789 [1968].
[54]
I Record of the Constitutional Commission 748.
[55]
U.S. vs. Macasaet, 11 Phil. 447 [1908]; People vs. Moran, 44 Phil. 387
[1923].
[56]Sec. 22, Art. III, 1987 Constitution.
[57]
Bernas, J.G., The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, A
Commentary,
Vol. I, 1st ed., 488.
[58]
Art. 22, Revised Penal Code; Escalante vs. Santos, 56 Phil. 483 [1932].
[59]
I Record of the Constitutional Commission 747.
[60]
Gold Creek Mining Corp. vs. Rodriguez, 66 Phil. 259 [1938].
[61]
1 Record of the Constitutional Commission 748.
[62]
Bernas, op cit;, 444, Fr. Bernas, however, did not cite the specific
Executive
Order he was referring to, and We are not aware of any.
[63]
J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Land Tenure Administration, G.R. No.
21064,
February 18 1970, 31 SCRA 413 [1970].
[64]
Rollo, 23. The postmark on the envelope containing the records
forwarded
to this Court is dated July 20, 1994. This is because the records were
prepared for transmittal only on July 18, 1994 as indicated on page 2
of
the Rollo when these should have been done as early as 1986.
|