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PROGRESS HOMES and ERMELO ALMEDA, Petitioners, G. R. No. 106212
March 7, 1997
-versus-
NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
ROMERO, J.:
Petitioners
seek to set aside the Decision of
the National Labor Relations Commission [NLRC] which affirmed the
decision
of the Labor Arbiter, the dispositive portion of which states:
All other claims are denied for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. Petitioner
Progress Homes Subdivision [Progress Homes],
is a housing project undertaken by the Ermelo M. Almeda Foundation,
Inc.,
a non-stock organization duly registered with the Securities and
Exchange
Commission [SEC]. When it engaged in constructing low-cost housing
units
for low-income employees, it named its project "Progress Homes
Subdivision"
in Camarines Sur. The other petitioner, Ermelo Almeda, is the President
and General Manager of Progress Homes and the owner of the land where
the
Progress Homes Subdivision is located.
Private respondents allegedly were among the workers employed by petitioners in their construction and development of the subdivision from 1986 to 1988. They were paid varying salaries. Forty of these workers, including private respondents, filed before the NLRC Arbitration Branch a petition for reinstatement, salary adjustment, ECOLA, overtime pay and 13th month pay. Petitioners amicably settled the case with thirty-three of the laborers, leaving private respondents as the only claimants. Private respondents alleged that they worked as laborers and carpenters for 8.5 hours a day at a salary below the minimum wage and that when they demanded payment of the benefits due them, they were summarily dismissed and barred from entering the workplace. Petitioners denied that private respondents were regular employees claiming that they were only project employees and that there was no employer-employee relationship between them. On December 27, 1991, the Labor Arbiter in Legazpi City forthwith issued a decision in favor of private respondents. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter's decision. Hence, this petition. Petitioners maintain that there never existed an employer-employee relationship between them and private respondents and that due process was denied them in proceedings before the Labor Arbiter and in the NLRC. Moreover, they point out that private respondents could not say who hired them, nor could they produce pay slips to prove that they were on petitioners' payroll. Petitioners present the affidavit of their foreman stating that he never hired the workers, as evidence of the alleged non-hiring of private respondents. We find merit in this petition. The Labor Arbiter, in finding that an employer-employee relationship existed between the parties, said:
The evidence on record fails to convince the Court that private respondents were indeed employed by petitioners. The Labor Arbiter does not give credence to the affidavit of petitioners' foreman that he did not hire private respondents. Said affidavit cannot just be perfunctorily dismissed as "self-serving," absent any showing that he was lying when he made the statements therein. The question that obtrudes itself at this stage is: who did hire them? Private respondents have not presented any evidence that petitioners were their immediate employers. It does not make sense to require petitioners to produce contracts when they categorically deny having entered into any contract of employment with private respondents. To determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the courts have generally sought the answer to these guidelines:
(2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power to control the employee's conduct.[1] Under
the
so-called "right of control" test, the
person for whom the services are performed reserves a right to control,
not only the end to be achieved, but the means to be used in reaching
such
an end. In addition, this Court has also considered the existing
economic
conditions prevailing between the parties, such as the inclusion of the
employee in the payroll.[2]
It was speculative and conjectural on the part of the NLRC to declare petitioners' argument as "mere alibi." The employment contract presented by petitioners, while admittedly defective, did not refer to any of the private respondents. No evidence was presented to show that petitioners engaged the services of private respondents. As regards the matter of evidence, it is clear that the Labor Arbiter relied solely on the bare allegations of the parties in their position papers in rendering his now assailed decision. Rule V, Sections 4 and 5(b) of The New Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission states:
In Greenhills Airconditioning and Services Inc. v. NLRC,[3] whose issues are similar to instant case, we stated that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the labor arbiter when he submitted the case for decision solely on the basis of the position papers: It is of note that certain important issues are raised by the position papers filed before the labor arbiter among which are:
2. If he was a regular employee, whether he voluntarily resigned as alleged by petitioners or was dismissed; 3. If he was dismissed, whether there were valid grounds for his dismissal. The
nature of
the above issues shows that there was
indeed grave abuse of discretion on the part of the labor arbiter in
issuing
the order dated 18 September 1992 submitting the case for decision,
without
any hearing.
Article 221 of the Labor Code states in part:
In rendering his now assailed decision, the labor arbiter relied solely on the bare allegations of the parties in their position papers. There is nothing in the labor arbiter's decision to show how he arrived at the conclusion that it was respondent Abellano's allegations that deserved belief. The prudent and logical action which the labor arbiter should have taken was to set the case for hearing particularly on the abovementioned three [3] issues to avoid any impression of denial of due process to either or both of the parties. While it is true that the employer has the burden of proving the presence of valid grounds for dismissal of a worker, the abovestated issues in this case require a hearing and reception of evidence before the issue of the validity of Abellano's dismissal can be resolved. The respondent NLRC in sustaining and affirming the decision of the labor arbiter which was arrived at without hearing on the vital issues involved, itself committed grave abuse of discretion. The same issues are raised in the instant case and the Labor Arbiter should have set the case for further presentation of evidence considering the dearth of evidence supporting private respondents' claims. Furthermore, the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion when it affirmed the Labor Arbiter's decision holding petitioner Almeda jointly and severally liable with Progress Homes. The Court has held that corporate directors and officers are solidarily liable with the corporation for the termination of employment of employees only if the termination is done with malice or in bad faith.[4] The Labor Arbiter's decision failed to disclose why Almeda was made personally liable. There appears no evidence on record that he acted maliciously or in bad faith in terminating the services of private respondents.[5] Petitioner Almeda, therefore, should not have been made personally answerable for the payment of private respondents' salaries. WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is hereby set aside. The complaint of private respondents against herein petitioner is hereby remanded to the Labor Arbiter of Naga City for hearing, reception of evidence and decision. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Regalado, Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur. ______________________________
[1] Zanotte Shoes v. NLRC, 241 SCRA 261 [1995]; Wiluga v. NLRC, 225 SCRA 537 [1993]. [2] Sevilla v. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 171 [1988]; Visayan Stevedore Trans. Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 19 SCRA 426 [1967]. [3] 245 SCRA 390 [1995]. [4] MAM Realty Development Corp. v. NLRC, 244 SCRA 803 [1995]. [5] Sunio v. NLRC, 127 SCRA 390 [1984]; General Bank and Trust Co. v. CA, 135 SCRA 569 [1985]. |
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