THIRD
DIVISION
MAYOR
OSCAR DE LOS REYES,
Petitioner,
G. R. No. 121215
November 13, 1997
-versus-
SANDIGANBAYAN,
THIRD DIVISION
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
D
E C I S I O N
ROMERO, J.:
The
significance of the minutes taken during
the session of a local legislative assembly is the determinant issue in
this present petition. Petitioner, along with two others, was charged
with
the crime of falsification of a public document, specifically
Resolution
No. 57-S-92 dated July 27, 1992 of the Municipal Council of Mariveles,
Bataan. The Complaint[1]
alleged that the resolution, appropriating the amount of P8,500.00 for
the payment of the terminal leave of two municipal employees, was
anomalous
for not having been approved by the said Council, as the minutes of the
proceedings therein made no reference to the supposed approval thereof.
It contended that its seeming passage was carried out by petitioner in
connivance with Sangguniang Bayan [SB] Member Jesse Concepcion and SB
Secretary
Antonio Zurita.
After preliminary
investigation, the deputized
prosecutor of Balanga, Bataan recommended the filing of an information[2]
for Falsification of Public Document against petitioner and Concepcion,
excluding Zurita who died during the pendency hereof. On
September
21, 1994, the information filed before the Sandiganbayan reads as
follows:
That on or about July 27, 1992 or
sometimes (sic)
prior or subsequent thereto, in Mariveles, Bataan, Philippines, and
within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, Oscar delos Reyes and Jesse
Concepcion,
both public officers, being Municipal Mayor of Mariveles, Bataan and
Member
of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mariveles, Bataan, passed and approved the
said resolution appropriating the amount of P8,500.00 for payment of
the
terminal leave of two [2] employees of the municipality, when in truth
and in fact, as both accused knew well, the same is false and incorrect
as the said resolution was not approved by the aforesaid Sangguniang
Bayan
for which both accused has the obligation to disclose the truth.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
On October 14,
1994, prior to his arraignment, petitioner
filed a Motion for Reinvestigation arguing, among other things, "that
the
Ombudsman previously dismissed a similar complaint against him
involving
the same factual setting."[4]
Likewise adduced in the motion is the joint affidavit of the other
members
of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mariveles attesting to the actual passage
and
approval of Resolution No. 57-S-92.
In a resolution
dated December 29, 1994, respondent
Sandiganbayan denied the Motion for Reinvestigation, the pertinent
portion
of which reads:
Acting on accused Mayor Oscar delos
Reyes'
Motion
for Reinvestigation and accused Jesse Concepcion's Manifestation, the
same
are hereby DENIED, being without merit and the prosecution having
vigorously
opposed the Motion. The allegations of fact and the arguments of
counsel
are best taken up in the trial on the merits. As found by the
prosecution,
a prima facie case exists.
Consequently, let the arraignment of the
above-entitled
case be set on March 03, 1995, at 8:30 A.M.[5]
After the
motion for reconsideration was denied on
May 24, 1995, petitioner filed this instant petition for certiorari. On
September 18, 1995, the Court resolved to issue the temporary
restraining
order prayed for by petitioner.
The order of
respondent Sandiganbayan must be
sustained.cralaw:red
In an effort to
exonerate himself from the charge,
petitioner argues that the deliberations undertaken and the consequent
passage of Resolution No. 57-S-92 are legislative in nature. He adds
that
as local chief executive, he has neither the official custody of nor
the
duty to prepare said resolution; hence, he could not have taken
advantage
of his official position in committing the crime of falsification as
defined
and punished under Article 171[6]
of the Revised Penal Code.cralaw:red
Petitioner would
like to impress upon this Court
that the final step in the approval of an ordinance or resolution,
where
the local chief executive affixes his signature, is purely a
ministerial
act. This view is erroneous. Article 109[b] of the Local Government
Code
outlines the veto power of the Local Chief Executive which provides:
Art. 109 [b]The local chief executive,
except
the punong barangay, shall have the power to veto any particular item
or
items of an appropriations ordinance, an ordinance or resolution
adopting
a local development plan and public investment program or an ordinance
directing the payment of money or creating liability. [Emphasis
supplied].
Contrary to
petitioner's belief, the grant of the
veto power confers authority beyond the simple mechanical act of
signing
an ordinance or resolution, as a requisite to its enforceability. Such
power accords the local chief executive the discretion to sustain a
resolution
or ordinance in the first instance or to veto it and return it with his
objections to the Sanggunian, which may proceed to reconsider the same.
The Sanggunian concerned, however, may override the veto by a
two-thirds
[2/3] vote of all its members thereby making the ordinance or
resolution
effective for all legal intents and purposes. It is clear, therefore,
that
the concurrence of a local chief executive in the enactment of an
ordinance
or resolution requires not only a flourish of the pen but the
application
of judgment after meticulous analysis and intelligence as well.
Petitioner's
other contention that the Ombudsman
should have dismissed the present case in view of a previous dismissal
of a similar complaint involving the same factual context is likewise
misplaced.
As explained by Deputy Special Prosecutor
Leonardo
P. Tamayo in his comment, the other case relied upon by petitioner has
no relation whatsoever with the one in question. Notably, the former
case
was subject of a separate complaint and preliminary investigation,
hence,
the findings and records therein could not be "made part of the case
under
consideration."[7]
It must be
stressed that the Ombudsman correctly
relied on the minutes taken during the session of the Sangguniang Bayan
held last July 27, 1992, which petitioner regards as inconclusive
evidence
of what actually transpired therein. In a long line of cases, the
Court,
in resolving conflicting assertions of the protagonists in a case, has
placed reliance on the minutes or the transcribed stenographic notes to
ascertain the truth of the proceedings therein.cralaw:red
The following
cases illustrate the importance
of the minutes:
It was held that "contrary to
petitioner's
claim,
what the minutes only show is that on August 12, 1994 the Sanggunian
took
a vote on the administrative case of respondent Mayor and not that it
then
rendered a decision as required by Section 66(a) of the Local
Government
Code."[8]
With the same factual context as in the
case
at bar, petitioners herein were "accused of having falsified or caused
the falsification of the excerpts of the minutes of the regular
sessions
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Quirino Province on August 15, 1988
and September 19, 1988."[9]
In his resolution, Secretary Drilon
declared
that there were no written notices of public hearings on the proposed
Manila
Revenue Code that were sent to interested parties as required by
Article
276(b) of the Implementing Rules of the Local Government Code; nor were
copies of the proposed ordinance published in three successive issues
of
newspaper of general circulation pursuant to Article 275(a). No minutes
were submitted to show that the obligatory public hearings had been
held.[10]
It appears from the minutes of the board
meeting
of February 28, 1958 that the names of the members present as well
those
who were absent have been recorded, and that all those present took
active
part in the debates and deliberations. At the end of the session, when
the presiding officer asked the members if there were any objections to
the approval of the proposed budget, only one councilor raised an
objection.
The minutes therefore, could readily show who of the members present in
the deliberations voted pro and who voted con.[11]
The certification of the election
registrar
relied
upon by the petitioner is correct as far as it goes. Only 80 votes
appear
to have voted according to the precinct book in the sense that only 80
voters affixed their signatures thereon after voting. But this does not
necessarily mean that no other voters cast their ballots in the
questioned
precinct: there were 279 in all, according to the minutes of voting,
although
only 80 of them signed the precinct book.[12]
As found by the trial court, the said
minutes
of the meeting of the Sangguniang Bayan do not mention the execution of
any deed to perfect the agreement. An engineer was appointed to survey
the old abandoned road, but this act does not in any manner convey
title
over the abandoned road to the Pansacola spouses nor extinguishes their
ownership over the land traversed by the new provincial highway.[13]
In the case at bar, the minutes of the
session
reveal that petitioner attended the session of the Sangguniang Bayan on
July 27, 1992. It is evident, therefore, that petitioner approved the
subject
resolution knowing fully well that "the subject matter treated therein
was neither taken up and discussed nor passed upon by the Sangguniang
Bayan
during the legislative session."[14]
Thus, the Court
accords full recognition to the minutes
as the official repository of what actually transpires in every
proceeding.
It has happened that the minutes may be corrected to reflect the true
account
of a proceeding, thus giving the Court more reason to accord them great
weight for such subsequent corrections, if any, are made precisely to
preserve
the accuracy of the records. In light of the conflicting claims of the
parties in the case at bar, the Court, without resorting to the
minutes,
will encounter difficulty in resolving the dispute at hand.
With regard to
the joint affidavit of some members
of the Sangguniang Bayan attesting to the actual passage and approval
of
Resolution No. 57-S-92, the Court finds the same to have been belatedly
submitted as a last-minute attempt to bolster petitioner's position,
and,
therefore, could not in any way aid the latter's cause. Indeed, the
arguments
raised by petitioner's counsel are best taken up in the trial on the
merits.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, in
view of the foregoing, the instant
petition is DISMISSED. The assailed resolutions of the Sandiganbayan
dated
December 29, 1994, and May 24, 1995, are hereby AFFIRMED. The temporary
restraining order issued by this Court on September 18, 1995, is hereby
LIFTED.cralaw:red
The Sandiganbayan
is DIRECTED to set Criminal
Case No. 21073 for arraignment and trial.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Melo, Francisco
and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., is on leave.cralaw:red
__________________________________
Endnotes
[1]
Filed by Sangguniang Bayan Members Jose Villapando, Sr. and Angel
Peliglorio,
Jr.
[2]
Concurred in by Ombudsman Investigator Samuel R. Recto and Special
Prosecution
Officer Cornelio L. Somido.
[3]
Rollo, pp. 51-52.
[4]
Ibid., p. 52.
[5]
Id., p. 53.
[6]
Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or
ecclesiastic
minister. The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed
5,000
pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary
who,
taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by
committing any of the following acts:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. Counterfeiting or imitating
any handwriting, signature or rubric;
2. Causing it to appear that
persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in
fact so participate;
3. Attributing to persons who
have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those
in
fact made by them;
4. Making untruthful
statements
in a narration of facts;
5. Altering true dates;
6. Making any alteration or
intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning;
7. Issuing in an authenticated
from a document purporting to be a copy of an original document when no
such original exists, or including in such a copy of a statement
contrary
to, or different from, that of the genuine original; or
8. Intercalating any
instrument
or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry, or
official
book.
The same penalty shall be
imposed
upon any ecclesiastical minister who shall commit any of the offenses
enumerated
in the preceding paragraphs of this article, with respect to any record
or document of such character that its falsification may affect the
civil
status of persons.
[7]
Rollo, p. 57.
[8]
Malinao v. Reyes, 255 SCRA 616 [1996].
[9]
Pimentel v. Garchitorena, 208 SCRA 122 [1992].
[10]
Drilon, v. Lin, 235 SCRA 135 [1994].
[11]
Subido v. City of Manila, et al., 108 Phil. 462 [1960].
[12]
Dizon v. Tizon, 22 SCRA 1317 [1968].
[13]
Velarma v. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 406 [1996].
[14]
Rollo, p. 58. |