SECOND
DIVISION
WILFREDO
R. CAMUA,
Petitioner,
G. R. No. 116473
September 12, 1997
-versus-
NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
and HERBERT S. DEE JR./HOOVEN PHILS.
INC.,
Respondents.
D
E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
This is a
Petition for
Certiorari to
set aside
the Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC-NCR
Case
No. 00-01-00441-90, reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter which
found
that petitioner had been illegally dismissed by private respondents.
The
facts are as follows:
Private
respondent Hooven Phil. Inc. is engaged
in the manufacture of aluminum sections. Petitioner was first hired by
it as a casual employee on November 18, 1986. On October 8, 1987, he
was
made a permanent employee, working as an anodizing aide. He was later
transferred
to the Quality Inspection Division and made a quality assurance
inspector.cralaw:red
During the term
of petitioner as quality assurance
inspector, respondent company received during the period of April to
October
1989, complaints from customers concerning the quality of products
delivered
by the company. On the basis of these complaints the company found
petitioner
to be grossly negligent and, possibly, even guilty of fraud.cralaw:red
Accordingly, on
October 26, 1989, Edgardo S. Crisostomo
recommended petitioner's dismissal on the ground of loss of trust and
confidence.
The recommendation was approved on October 27, 1989 by respondent
Herbert
S. Dee, Jr., but implementation of the order was put off because the
company
allegedly wanted to catch petitioner in flagrante delicto. However, the
respondent company was frustrated in its attempt because petitioner
allegedly
learned about the plan. On November 30, 1989, petitioner was finally
dismissed.cralaw:red
On January 23,
1990, petitioner filed this case
for illegal dismissal and nonpayment of 13th month pay against private
respondents. Respondent company paid petitioner Camua's 13th month pay
on February 28, 1990, leaving as the sole issue petitioner's dismissal.cralaw:red
In a decision
dated January 21, 1994, Labor Arbiter
Melquiades Sol D. Del Rosario found petitioner to have been illegally
dismissed.
On appeal, however, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter's decision.
Hence,
this petition for certiorari.cralaw:red
First. Petitioner
contends that he was dismissed
without due process of law. The law requires that before an employee
may
be dismissed two notices must be given to him by the employer, to wit:
[1] notice apprising the employee of the particular acts or omission
for
which his dismissal is sought, and [2] notice informing the employee of
the decision to dismiss him and the ground or grounds therefor.[1]
In the case at bar, both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC found that no
written
notice of the charges had been given to petitioner by the respondent
company.
With respect to the second notice required, private respondents claim
that,
on November 30, 1989, petitioner was informed of his dismissal by means
of a written memorandum but petitioner refused to receive the notice.
Private
respondents could have sent such notice, however, by registered mail in
order to have evidence of such notice to petitioner, but they did not
do
so.cralaw:red
There is thus no
evidence to show that respondent
company gave petitioner the required two notices before he was
dismissed.
Accordingly, in accordance with the well-settled rule,[2]
private respondents should pay petitioner P1,000 as indemnity for
violation
of his right to due process.cralaw:red
Second. Private
respondents contend that petitioner
was guilty of gross negligence and possibly of fraud against the
company.
Therefore, they claim that petitioner was dismissed for just cause. In
their reply filed in the NLRC they said Camua was an "incompetent
employee
and worse, may even be dishonest" and that Camua's incompetence was
probably
a "mere facade to hide his felonious acts."[3]
But the NLRC
found petitioner guilty not of gross
negligence but for dishonesty for having allegedly certified aluminum
sections
to be defective when the fact is that they were not products of the
company.
This is erroneous because the only evidence that respondent company had
to support its allegation that petitioner was colluding with some
customers
to defraud the respondent Company were in the latter's own word
"unconfirmed
reports."[4]
Private respondents said they were planning to catch the petitioner and
his accomplices in flagrante delicto[5]
but did not succeed because petitioner learned about the plan and so
was
able to take the necessary precaution. It is just as possible, however,
that private respondents were not able to catch petitioner in flagrante
delicto precisely because he was not involved in any wrongdoing.cralaw:red
The NLRC said in
its decision:
The scheme, as presented by the
respondents in
that, the aluminum products of the respondent corporation like those of
its competitors do not bear any trade mark or seal that would clearly
identify
them from other aluminum products; that the products delivered to the
customers
are quality products as certified by the complainant; that upon
delivery,
the customers will in turn reject the product but would actually return
other substandard products. Hence, there is no way of determining with
certainty the identity and other sources of these rejected products.
Otherwise,
if the product was indeed inspected and certified to as quality product
before delivery by the complainant, then, We see no plausible reason
for
the complainant to declare it as substandard upon its return after the
same was rejected by the customer.
If there was no
way of identifying the defective
products to determine if they were those of respondent company, there
can
be no basis for concluding that petitioner is guilty of certifying as
defective
products which were not those of respondent company. Indeed, even the
company
only suspected that more than gross negligence, petitioner was guilty
of
fraudulently certifying other manufacturer's products and thereby
caused
respondent company damage.
Indeed, what
private respondents presented was
evidence not of dishonesty but of gross negligence of petitioner. Thus
it presented the affidavit of its sales service manager, Lorna
Encallado,
who stated that "Mr. Camua did nothing less than approve rejectable
items
for packing as well as delivery to the detriment of Hooven's business
reputation"
and that she was giving the affidavit "for the purpose of attesting to
the gross negligence committed by Wilfredo Camua." No mention of
dishonesty,
fraudulent scheme or cheating by Camua was ever made in the affidavit.cralaw:red
Petitioner
personally inspected, certified and
authorized the delivery of certain aluminum sections to customers, some
of which were later returned by customers for being defective.
Petitioner
was sent to inspect the aluminum sections complained of and, upon his
certification
that they were defective, respondent company replaced the goods in
question.
But the goods returned were those which the company had sold. The
company
complained that because of the number of times it had to replace
defective
products on several occasions during the period April to October 1989,
its reputation suffered and it incurred losses because of additional
expenses
for transportation and handling.cralaw:red
Thus, while the
evidence does not sustain the
NLRC's finding of fraud, it does prove gross negligence on the part of
petitioner. The evidence shows that the aluminum sections found to be
defective
had not been properly inspected before delivery, considering that the
defects
were visible to the naked eyes and consisted of blisters, crooked or
twisted
sheets, corrosion, and the like. The company submitted in evidence
Aluminum
Transfer Slips [ATS], Field Inspection Reports and a document
denominated
as "Attachment A," which summarizes the aluminum sections found to be
defective
after reinspection. These records show that a total of 54 aluminum
sections
were found to be defective after field inspection.[6]
These had allegedly been previously inspected by petitioner and
certified
by him to be of good quality prior to their delivery to customers. At
least,
26 of these appear in the ATS as having been among those certified of
good
quality by petitioner on April 22, 24 and 25, August 15, 30 and October
23 and 24, 1989, but upon inspection were later found to be defective.cralaw:red
Although an
employee is validly dismissed for
cause, he may nevertheless be given separation pay as a measure of
social
justice provided the cause is not serious misconduct reflecting on his
moral character.[7]
Where the reason for the dismissal of the employee is gross negligence
in the performance of his duties resulting in loss of trust and
confidence,
financial assistance may be given to the employee.[8]
WHEREFORE, the
decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission is AFFIRMED with the modification that private
respondents
are ordered jointly and severally to pay petitioner the sum of
P1,000.00
as indemnity for violation of his right to due process and separation
pay
at the rate of one month salary for every year of service, a fraction
of
at least six months being considered as one whole year, based on his
salary
at the time of dismissal.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Regalado, Puno
and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.cralaw:red
__________________________
Endnotes
[1]
Philippine Savings Bank v. NLRC, 261 SCRA 409 [1996], citing Jones v.
NLRC,
250 SCRA 668 [1995];Pampanga II Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. NLRC, 250
SCRA 31 [1995]; Nitto Enterprises v. NLRC, 248 SCRA 654 [1995];
Kingsize
Manufacturing Corp. v. NLRC, 238 SCRA 349 [1994], Pepsi-Cola Bottling
Co.,
Inc. v. NLRC, 210 SCRA 277 [1992].
[2]
See, e.g., Tañala v. NLRC, 252 SCRA 314 [1996].
[3]
Records, p. 77.
[4]
Rollo, p. 52.
[5]
Id., p. 53.
[6]
Records, p. 72.
[7]
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. NLRC, 164 SCRA 671 [1988].
[8]
Pepsico, Inc. v. NLRC, 177 SCRA 308 [1989]. |