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JOSE
BARITUA,
G. R. No. 100748
February 3, 1997
-versus-
HON.
COURT OF APPEALS [ELEVENTH DIVISION],
PUNO, J.:
Petitioner Jose
Baritua raises the question of
venue in the filing of a complaint for damages arising from a
quasi-delict.
The facts show that on June 26, 1989 private respondent Roy R. Domingo,
represented by his attorney-in-fact, Crispin A. Domingo, filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Resales, Pangasinan a complaint
against
petitioner Jose Baritua as owner and operator of the J.B. Bus Lines.
Private
respondent sought to recover actual and exemplary damages after a bus
owned
by petitioner rammed private respondent's car along the Maharlika
Highway,
Sto. Tomas, Batangas on January 19, 1988. In his complaint, private
respondent
alleged that:
Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint for improper venue. He alleged that since private respondent was not a resident of the Philippines, the complaint should be filed in the place where petitioner, the defendant, resides which is in Gubat, Sorsogon. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss after finding that private respondent was merely temporarily out of the country and did not lose his legal residence in Rosales, Pangasinan.[2] The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.[3] Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition. Petitioner claims
that:
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS ERROR AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PETITION DESPITE PETITIONER'S OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE THAT THE VENUE OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S ACTION (CIVIL CASE NO. 915-R) WAS IMPROPERLY LAID; INSPITE ALSO OF THE ADMITTED FACT THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT ROY DOMINGO HAS REMAINED AN ACTUAL RESIDENT OF 4525 LEATA LANE, LA CANTADA, LA 91011, U.S.A., AT LEAST SINCE FEBRUARY 18, 1988, UP TO THE PRESENT.[4] A complaint for damages is a personal action. In cases filed before the Regional Trial Court, the venue for personal actions is laid down in Section 2 [b] of Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court which reads as follows :
xxx xxx xxx (b) Personal actions.- All other actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff. xxx xxx xxx[5] The complaint
in personal actions may be filed in
the place where the defendant resides or may be found, or where the
plaintiff
resides, at the option of the plaintiff. The Rules give the plaintiff
the
option of choosing where to file his complaint. He can file it in the
place
[1] where he himself or any of them resides; or [2] where the defendant
or any of the defendants resides or may be found. The plaintiff or the
defendant must be residents of the place where the action has been
instituted
at the time the action is commenced.[6]
Section 2 [b] of Rule 4 speaks of the place where the defendant or the plaintiff "resides." We have held that the residence of a person must be his personal, actual or physical habitation or his actual residence or abode.[7] It does not mean fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning. The word "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence" or "domicile."[8] Actual residence may in some cases be the legal residence or domicile, but for purposes of venue, actual residence is the place of abode and not necessarily legal residence or domicile.[9] Actual residence signifies personal residence, i.e., physical presence and actual stay thereat.[10] This physical presence, nonetheless, must be more than temporary and must be with continuity and consistency.[11] The question in this case is whether private respondent had his actual residence in Rosales, Pangasinan or in Los, Angeles, California at the time the complaint was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Resales, Pangasinan. It is undisputed that private respondent left for the United States on April 25, 1988 before the complaint was filed on June 26, 1989.[12] This fact is expressly admitted in the complaint itself where private respondent states that he "is [sic] a resident of Poblacion Rosales, Pangasinan before he went to the United States where he now lives in 4525 Leata Lane, La Cantada, LA 91011." Furthermore, the special power of attorney in favor of Crispin A. Domingo was drawn and executed by private respondent on February 18, 1988 before the Philippine Consul in Los Angeles, California.[13] In said special power of attorney, private respondent declared that he was a resident of Los Angeles, California.[14] Private respondent was not a mere transient or occasional resident of the United States. He fixed his place of abode in Los Angeles, California and stayed there continuously and consistently for over a year at the time the complaint was filed in Rosales, Pangasinan.[15] Contrary to the lower courts' finding, the temporary nature of private respondent's "working non-immigrant" visa did not make him a non-resident of the United States. There is no showing as to the date his temporary employment in the United States ended.[16] There is likewise no showing, much less any allegation, that after the filing of the complaint, private respondent actually returned to the Philippines and resumed residence in Rosales, Pangasinan. In fact, petitioner's claim that private respondent resided in the United States continuously and consistently since 1988 until the present has not been refuted.[17] We previously held that:
It is fundamental that the situs for bringing real and personal civil actions is fixed by the rules to attain the greatest convenience possible to parties litigants and their witnesses by affording them maximum accessibility to the courts of justice.[19] The choice of venue is given to the plaintiff but is not left to his caprice.[20] It cannot unduly deprive a resident defendant of the rights conferred upon him by the Rules of Court.[21] When the complaint was filed in Rosales, Pangasinan, not one of the parties was a resident of the town. Private respondent was a resident of Los Angeles, California while his attorney-in-fact was a resident of Cubao, Quezon City. Petitioner's "business address" according to private respondent is in Pasay City,[22] although petitioner claims he resides in Gubat, Sorsogon.[23] The venue in Rosales, Pangasinan was indeed improperly laid. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 20737 is reversed and set aside. The complaint in Civil Case No. 915-R is dismissed for improper venue. No costs. SO ORDERED. Regalado, Romero
and Torres, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
________________________________
[1] Annex "I" to the Petition, Rollo, p. 36. [2] Order dated April 23, 1990, Civil Case No. 915-R, Annex "L" to the Petition, Rollo, pp. 44-45. [3] Decision dated November 29, 1990, CA-G.R. SP No. 20737; Annex "A" to the Petition, Rollo, pp. 18-21. [4] Petition; p. 2, Rollo, p. 4. [5] Emphasis supplied. [6] De la Rosa v. De Borja, 53 Phil. 990, 998 [1929]; see Hernandez v. Rural Bank of Lucena, 81 SCRA 75, 85 [1978]; Koh v. Court of Appeals, 70 SCRA 298, 305 [1976]; see also Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, vol. I, p. 71 [1988]. [7] Bejer v. Court of Appeals, 169 SCRA 566, 571 [1989]; Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, 74 SCRA 189, 199 [1976]. [8] Bejer v. Court of Appeals, supra; Dangwa Transporation Co., Inc. v. Sarmiento, 75 SCRA 124, 129 [1977]. [9] Hernandez v. Rural Bank of Lucena, supra, at 85. [10] Raymond v. Court of Appeals, 166 SCRA 50, 54 [1988]; Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, supra. [11] Bejer v. Court of Appeals, supra; Dangwa Trans. Co. Inc. v. Sarmiento, supra. [12] Petition; pp. 10-11, Rollo, pp. 12-13; Memorandum of Petitioner, pp. 8-9, Rollo, pp. 106-107. [13] Annexes "D" and "E" to the Petition, Rollo, pp. 26-27. [14] Annex "D" supra. [15] Compare with Bejer v. Court of Appeals, supra, at 569, 571, where petitioners, residents of Bauan, Batangas, were declared mere occasional visitors of their children who lived in Pandacan while schooling in Manila. [16] Esuerte v. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 541, 545 [1991]. [17] Petition; pp. 10-11, Rollo, pp. 12-13; Memorandum of Petitioner, pp. 8-9, Rollo, pp. 106-107. [18] Koh v. Court of Appeals, 70 SCRA 298, 305 [1976]. [19] Koh v. Court of Appeals, supra, at 304-305; Nicolas v. Reparations Commission, 64 SCRA 110, 116 [1975]. [20] Esuerte v. Court of Appeals, supra, at 544; Clavecilla Radio System v. Antillon, 19 SCRA 379, 382 [1967]. [21] Portillo v. Reyes, 3 SCRA 311, 312-313 [1961]. [22] Complaint; Annex "I" to the Petition, p. 1, Rollo, p. 36. [23] Motion to Dismiss; Annex "J" to the Petition, Rollo, p. 39. |
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