SECOND
DIVISION
JOSE
BARITUA,
Petitioner,
G. R. No. 100748
February 3, 1997
-versus-
HON.
COURT OF APPEALS [ELEVENTH DIVISION],
HON. MANUEL
D. VICTORIO, Judge, RTC, Br. 53,
Rosales -
Pangasinan, and ROY R.
DOMINGO,
represented
by his Attorney-in-Fact,CRISPIN
A. DOMINGO,
Respondents.
D
E C I S I O N
PUNO, J.:
Petitioner Jose
Baritua raises the question of
venue in the filing of a complaint for damages arising from a
quasi-delict.
The facts show that on June 26, 1989 private respondent Roy R. Domingo,
represented by his attorney-in-fact, Crispin A. Domingo, filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Resales, Pangasinan a complaint
against
petitioner Jose Baritua as owner and operator of the J.B. Bus Lines.
Private
respondent sought to recover actual and exemplary damages after a bus
owned
by petitioner rammed private respondent's car along the Maharlika
Highway,
Sto. Tomas, Batangas on January 19, 1988. In his complaint, private
respondent
alleged that:
1. He is a Filipino, of legal age,
married and
a resident of Poblacion, Resales, Pangasinan before he went to the
United
States where he now lives at 4525 Leata Lane, La Cantada LA 91011. He
is
being represented by his attorney-in-fact Crispin A. Domingo, a
Filipino,
of legal age, married and resident of No. 47 Yale St., Cubao,
Quezon
City. Defendant is also a Filipino, of legal age, married and doing
business
under the business name "J.B. Bus Lines" with business address at Tramo
Street, Pasay City where said defendant could be served summons.[1]
Petitioner
moved to dismiss the complaint for improper
venue. He alleged that since private respondent was not a resident of
the
Philippines, the complaint should be filed in the place where
petitioner,
the defendant, resides which is in Gubat, Sorsogon. The trial court
denied
the motion to dismiss after finding that private respondent was merely
temporarily out of the country and did not lose his legal residence in
Rosales, Pangasinan.[2]
The Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court.[3]
Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition.cralaw:red
Petitioner claims
that:
A.chanrobles virtual law library
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
GROSS ERROR AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE
PETITION
DESPITE PETITIONER'S OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE THAT THE VENUE OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENT'S
ACTION (CIVIL CASE NO. 915-R) WAS IMPROPERLY LAID;B.chanrobles virtual law library
INSPITE ALSO OF THE ADMITTED FACT THAT
PRIVATE RESPONDENT ROY DOMINGO HAS REMAINED AN ACTUAL RESIDENT OF 4525
LEATA LANE, LA CANTADA, LA 91011, U.S.A., AT LEAST SINCE FEBRUARY 18,
1988,
UP TO THE PRESENT.[4]
A complaint for
damages is a personal action.
In cases filed before the Regional Trial Court, the venue for personal
actions is laid down in Section 2 [b] of Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of
Court which reads as follows :
Sec. 2. Venue in Courts of First
Instance.-
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Personal actions.-
All
other
actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the
defendants
resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the
plaintiffs
resides, at the election of the plaintiff.
xxx xxx xxx[5]
The complaint
in personal actions may be filed in
the place where the defendant resides or may be found, or where the
plaintiff
resides, at the option of the plaintiff. The Rules give the plaintiff
the
option of choosing where to file his complaint. He can file it in the
place
[1] where he himself or any of them resides; or [2] where the defendant
or any of the defendants resides or may be found. The plaintiff or the
defendant must be residents of the place where the action has been
instituted
at the time the action is commenced.[6]
Section 2 [b] of
Rule 4 speaks of the place where
the defendant or the plaintiff "resides." We have held that the
residence
of a person must be his personal, actual or physical habitation or his
actual residence or abode.[7]
It does not mean fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one
has
the intention of returning. The word "resides" connotes ex vi termini
"actual
residence" as distinguished from "legal residence" or "domicile."[8]
Actual residence may in some cases be the legal residence or domicile,
but for purposes of venue, actual residence is the place of abode and
not
necessarily legal residence or domicile.[9]
Actual residence signifies personal residence, i.e., physical presence
and actual stay thereat.[10]
This physical presence, nonetheless, must be more than temporary and
must
be with continuity and consistency.[11]
The question in
this case is whether private respondent
had his actual residence in Rosales, Pangasinan or in Los, Angeles,
California
at the time the complaint was filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Resales, Pangasinan.cralaw:red
It is undisputed
that private respondent left
for the United States on April 25, 1988 before the complaint was filed
on June 26, 1989.[12]
This fact is expressly admitted in the complaint itself where private
respondent
states that he "is [sic] a resident of Poblacion Rosales,
Pangasinan
before he went to the United States where he now lives in 4525 Leata
Lane,
La Cantada, LA 91011." Furthermore, the special power of attorney in
favor
of Crispin A. Domingo was drawn and executed by private respondent on
February
18, 1988 before the Philippine Consul in Los Angeles, California.[13]
In said special power of attorney, private respondent declared that he
was a resident of Los Angeles, California.[14]
Private
respondent was not a mere transient or
occasional resident of the United States. He fixed his place of abode
in
Los Angeles, California and stayed there continuously and consistently
for over a year at the time the complaint was filed in Rosales,
Pangasinan.[15]
Contrary to the
lower courts' finding, the temporary
nature of private respondent's "working non-immigrant" visa did not
make
him a non-resident of the United States. There is no showing as to the
date his temporary employment in the United States ended.[16]
There is likewise no showing, much less any allegation, that after the
filing of the complaint, private respondent actually returned to the
Philippines
and resumed residence in Rosales, Pangasinan. In fact, petitioner's
claim
that private respondent resided in the United States continuously and
consistently
since 1988 until the present has not been refuted.[17]
We previously
held that:
We are fully convinced that private
respondent
Coloma's protestations of domicile in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, based
on his manifested intention to return there after the retirement of his
wife from government service to justify his bringing of an action for
damages
against petitioner in the CFI of Ilocos Norte, is entirely of no moment
since what is of paramount importance is where he actually resided or
where
he may be found at the time he brought the action, to comply
substantially
with the requirements of Sec. 2[b] of Rule 4, Rules of Court, on venue
of personal actions.[18]
It is
fundamental that the situs for bringing
real and personal civil actions is fixed by the rules to attain the
greatest
convenience possible to parties litigants and their witnesses by
affording
them maximum accessibility to the courts of justice.[19]
The choice of venue is given to the plaintiff but is not left to his
caprice.[20]
It cannot unduly deprive a resident defendant of the rights conferred
upon
him by the Rules of Court.[21]
When the
complaint was filed in Rosales, Pangasinan,
not one of the parties was a resident of the town. Private respondent
was
a resident of Los Angeles, California while his attorney-in-fact was a
resident of Cubao, Quezon City. Petitioner's "business address"
according
to private respondent is in Pasay City,[22]
although petitioner claims he resides in Gubat, Sorsogon.[23]
The venue in Rosales, Pangasinan was indeed improperly laid.cralaw:red
IN VIEW WHEREOF,
the petition is granted and the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 20737 is reversed
and
set aside. The complaint in Civil Case No. 915-R is dismissed for
improper
venue. No costs.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Regalado, Romero
and Torres, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Mendoza, J., took no part.cralaw:red
________________________________
Endnotes
[1]
Annex "I" to the Petition, Rollo, p. 36.
[2]
Order dated April 23, 1990, Civil Case No. 915-R, Annex "L" to the
Petition,
Rollo, pp. 44-45.
[3]
Decision dated November 29, 1990, CA-G.R. SP No. 20737; Annex "A" to
the
Petition, Rollo, pp. 18-21.
[4]
Petition; p. 2, Rollo, p. 4.
[5]
Emphasis supplied.
[6]
De la Rosa v. De Borja, 53 Phil. 990, 998 [1929]; see Hernandez v.
Rural
Bank of Lucena, 81 SCRA 75, 85 [1978]; Koh v. Court of Appeals, 70 SCRA
298, 305 [1976]; see also Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, vol. I, p.
71 [1988].
[7]
Bejer v. Court of Appeals, 169 SCRA 566, 571 [1989]; Garcia Fule v.
Court
of Appeals, 74 SCRA 189, 199 [1976].
[8]
Bejer v. Court of Appeals, supra; Dangwa Transporation Co., Inc. v.
Sarmiento,
75 SCRA 124, 129 [1977].
[9]
Hernandez v. Rural Bank of Lucena, supra, at 85.
[10]
Raymond v. Court of Appeals, 166 SCRA 50, 54 [1988]; Garcia Fule v.
Court
of Appeals, supra.
[11]
Bejer v. Court of Appeals, supra; Dangwa Trans. Co. Inc. v. Sarmiento,
supra.
[12]
Petition; pp. 10-11, Rollo, pp. 12-13; Memorandum of Petitioner, pp.
8-9,
Rollo, pp. 106-107.
[13]
Annexes "D" and "E" to the Petition, Rollo, pp. 26-27.
[14]
Annex "D" supra.
[15]
Compare with Bejer v. Court of Appeals, supra, at 569, 571, where
petitioners,
residents of Bauan, Batangas, were declared mere occasional visitors of
their children who lived in Pandacan while schooling in Manila.
[16]
Esuerte v. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 541, 545 [1991].
[17]
Petition; pp. 10-11, Rollo, pp. 12-13; Memorandum of Petitioner, pp.
8-9,
Rollo, pp. 106-107.
[18]
Koh v. Court of Appeals, 70 SCRA 298, 305 [1976].
[19]
Koh v. Court of Appeals, supra, at 304-305; Nicolas v. Reparations
Commission,
64 SCRA 110, 116 [1975].
[20]
Esuerte v. Court of Appeals, supra, at 544; Clavecilla Radio System v.
Antillon, 19 SCRA 379, 382 [1967].
[21]
Portillo v. Reyes, 3 SCRA 311, 312-313 [1961].
[22]
Complaint; Annex "I" to the Petition, p. 1, Rollo, p. 36.
[23]
Motion to Dismiss; Annex "J" to the Petition, Rollo, p. 39. |