ManilaEN
BANC
PRISCILLA
CASTILLO VDA. DE MIJARES,
Complainant,
A. C. No. 4431
June 19, 1997
-versus-
JUSTICE
ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ [Retired],
Respondent.
D
E C I S I O N
REGALADO, J.:
Doubly
distressing as the subject of administrative
recourse to this Court is the present case where the cause celebre
is a star-crossed marriage and the unlikely protagonists are an
incumbent
and a retired member of the Judiciary.
In a sworn
complaint for disbarment filed with
this Court on June 6, 1995, complainant Judge Priscilla Castillo Vda.
de
Mijares charged respondent Onofre A. Villaluz, a retired Justice of the
Court of Appeals, with gross immorality and grave misconduct.[1]
After an Answer[2]
and a Reply[3]
were respectively filed by respondent and complainant, the Court, in
its
Resolution dated February 27, 1996, resolved to refer the
administrative
case to Associate Justice Fidel P. Purisima of the Court of Appeals for
investigation, report and recommendation. On March 4, 1997,
Justice
Purisima submitted his Report to this Court, with the following
recommendation:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing
and
without prejudice to the outcome of the aforesaid Criminal Case No.
142481
for Bigamy, it is respectfully recommended that the respondent, former
Justice Onofre A. Villaluz, be found guilty of gross misconduct, within
the contemplation of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court on removal
or suspension of attorneys, and therefor[e], he be suspended from the
practice
of law for a period of two [2] years, commencing from the finality of
the
Decision in this case, with a warning that a repetition of the same or
any other misconduct will be dealt with more severely.
On the basis of
the evidence adduced by the parties,
Justice Purisima summarized the antecedent facts in his aforestated
Report
and which We feel should be reproduced hereunder so that his
disposition
of this case may be duly appreciated:
Complainant is the Presiding Judge of
Branch
108 of the Regional Trial Court, Pasay City; while respondent, former
Justice
Onofre A. Villaluz, is a consultant at the Presidential Anti-Crime
Commission
[PACC] headed by Vice-President Joseph E. Estrada.
Widowed by the death of her first
husband,
Primitivo
Mijares, complainant commenced Special Proceeding No. 90-54650 and
therein
obtained a decree declaring the said Primitivo Mijares presumptively
dead,
after an absence of sixteen [16] years.
Complainant narrated that on January 7,
1994,
she got married to respondent in a civil wedding before Judge Myrna Lim
Verano, then Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Carmona,
Cavite and now Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong
City.
Their marriage was the culmination of a long engagement. They met
sometime
in 1977, when respondent, as Presiding Judge of the Criminal Circuit
Court
in Pasig, Metro Manila, was trying a murder case involving the death of
a son of Judge Mijares. Since then, respondent became a close family
friend
of complainant [T.S.N., p. 14; April 10, 1996]. After the wedding, they
received their guests at a German restaurant in Makati. With the
reception
over, the newlyweds resumed their usual work and activities. At 6:00
o'clock
in the afternoon of the same day, respondent fetched complainant from
her
house in Project 8, Quezon City, and reached the condominium unit of
respondent
two hours later at which time, she answered the phone. At the other end
of the line was a woman offending her with insulting remarks.
Consternated,
complainant confronted respondent on the identity of such caller but
respondent
simply remarked "it would have been just a call at the wrong
number."
What followed was a heated exchange of harsh words, one word led to
another,
to a point when respondent called complainant a "nagger", saying
"Ayaw ko nang ganyan! Ang gusto ko sa babae, yong sumusunod
sa
bawa't
gusto ko. Get that marriage contract and have it burned." Such
unbearable
utterances of respondent left complainant no choice but to leave in
haste
the place of their would-be honeymoon. Since then, the complainant and
respondent have been living separately because as complainant
rationalized,
contrary to her expectation, respondent never got in touch with her and
did not even bother to apologize for what happened [T.S.N., p. 13,
April
10, 1996].
Several months after that fateful
encounter of
January 7, 1994, in a Bible Study session, the complainant learned from
Manila RTC Judge Ramon Makasiar, a member of the Bible Group, that he
[Judge
Makasiar] solemnized the marriage between former Justice Onofre A.
Villaluz
and a certain Lydia Geraldez. Infuriated and impelled by the
disheartening
news, complainant lost no time in gathering evidence against respondent
such that, on June 6, 1995, she filed the instant Complaint for
Disbarment
against him [Exh. "A"].
On August 7, 1995, when she discovered
another
incriminatory document against respondent, the complainant executed
against
respondent her "Supplemental Complaint Affidavit for Falsification"
[Exhs.
"D" and "D-1"]. Exhibit "C", marriage contract of respondent and Lydia
Geraldez dated May 10, 1994, was offered by complainant to prove that
respondent
immorally and bigamously entered into a marriage, and to show that the
respondent distorted the truth by stating his civil status as SINGLE,
when
he married Lydia Geraldez. This, the respondent did, to lead an immoral
and indiscreet life. He resorted to falsification to distort the truth,
complainant lamented. Also presented for complainant were: Marriage
Contract
between her and respondent [Exh. "B"]; Order declaring her first
husband,
Primitivo Mijares, presumptively dead [Exh. "E"]; and Affidavit of
Judge
Myrna Lim Verano, who solemnized the marriage between her [complainant]
and respondent [Exhs. "F" and "F-1"].
Respondent gave a different version.
According
to him, what he inked with the complainant on January 7, 1994 was
merely
but a "sham marriage". He explained that he agreed as, in fact, he
voluntarily
signed the Marriage Contract marked Exh. "B", in an effort to help
Judge
Mijares in the administrative case for immorality filed against her by
her Legal Researcher, Atty. Joseph Gregorio Naval, Jr., sometime in
1993.
Respondent theorized that when his marriage with complainant took place
before Judge Myrna Lim Verano, his marriage with Librada Peña,
his
first wife, was subsisting because the Decision declaring the annulment
of such marriage had not yet become final and executory, for the reason
that said Decision was not yet published as required by the Rules, the
service of summons upon Librada Peña having been made by
publication,
and subject Decision was not yet published. To this effect was the
Certification
by Mrs. Nelia B. Rosario, Acting Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 37 of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila [Exh. "4"].
After a
thorough review of the records, the Court
finds itself in full accord with the findings and recommendation of
Justice
Purisima. Herein respondent is undeniably guilty of deceit and grossly
immoral conduct. He has made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred
institution
demanding respect and dignity.[4]
He himself asserts that at the time of his marriage to herein
complainant,
the decision of the court annulling his marriage to his first wife,
Librada
Peña, had not yet attained finality. Worse, four months after
his
marriage to petitioner, respondent married another woman, Lydia
Geraldez,
in Cavite, after making a false statement in his application for
marriage
license that his previous marriage had been annulled.
Respondent's
subterfuge that his marriage to petitioner
was just a "sham" marriage will not justify his actuations. Even if the
said marriage was just a caper of levity in bad taste, a defense which
amazes and befuddles but does not convince, it does not speak well of
respondent's
sense of social propriety and moral values. This is aggravated by the
fact
that he is not a layman nor even just an ordinary lawyer, but a former
Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court and, thereafter, a Justice of the
Court
of Appeals who cannot but have been fully aware of the consequences of
a marriage celebrated with all the necessary legal requisites.[5]
On this score, We
rely once again on the perceptive
findings and discussion of Investigating Justice Purisima which We
quote
with approval:
That on January 7, 1994, respondent
knowingly
and voluntarily entered into and signed a Marriage Contract with
complainant
before Judge Myrna Lim Verano, then Presiding Judge of the Municipal
Circuit
Trial Court of Carmona, Cavite, competent under the law to solemnize a
civil marriage, is beyond cavil. As stated under oath by respondent
himself,
he could not be forced to do anything not of his liking [T.S.N., April
2, 1996, p. 15a].
That what complainant and respondent
contracted
was a valid marriage is borne out by law and the evidence. To be sure,
all the essential and formal requisites of a valid marriage under
Articles
2 and 3 of the Family Code, i.e., legal capacity of the
contracting
parties, who must be a male and a female; consent freely given in the
presence
of the solemnizing officer; authority of the solemnizing officer; a
valid
marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of Title
I on marriage, Family Code; and a marriage ceremony with the appearance
of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer, and their
personal
declaration that they take each other as husband and wife, in the
presence
of not less than two witnesses of legal age, were satisfied and
complied
with.
The theory of
respondent that what was solemnized
with complainant was nothing but a "sham" marriage is too incredible to
deserve serious consideration. According to respondent, he entered into
subject marriage in an effort to save the complainant from the charge
of
immorality against her. But, to repeat: regardless of the intention of
respondent in saying "I do" with complainant before a competent
authority,
all ingredients of a valid marriage were present. His consent thereto
was
freely given. Judge Myrna Lim Verano was authorized by law to solemnize
the civil marriage, and both contracting parties had the legal capacity
to contract such marriage.
Without in any
way pre-empting whatever the Regional
Trial Court of Manila will find in the criminal case of Bigamy against
herein respondent, and even assuming for the sake of argument that the
judgment in Civil Case No. 93-67048 decreeing the annulment of the
marriage
between respondent and Librada Pena had not attained complete finality
due to non-publication of said judgment in a newspaper of general
circulation;
that circumstance, alone, only made subject marriage voidable and did
not
necessarily render the marriage between complainant and respondent void.cralaw:red
Besides, as
stressed upon by complainant, respondent
stated under oath that his marriage with Librada Pena had been annulled
by a decree of annulment, when he [respondent] took Lydia Geraldez as
his
wife by third marriage, and therefore, he is precluded, by the
principle
of estoppel, from claiming that when he took herein complainant as his
wife by a second marriage, his first marriage with Librada Peña
was subsisting and unannulled.cralaw:red
But, anyway, as
it is not proper to make here
a definitive findings as to whether or not respondent can be adjudged
guilty
of Bigamy under the attendant facts and circumstances, a crucial issue
pending determination in Criminal Case No. 142481 before Branch 12 of
the
Manila Regional Trial Court, even assuming arguendo that what
respondent
contracted with complainant on January 7, 1994 was a "sham" marriage,
as
he terms it, the ineluctible conclusion is that what respondent
perpetrated
was a gross misconduct on his part as a member of the Philippine Bar
and
as former Appellate Justice, at that. Even granting that the immorality
charge against herein complainant in the administrative case instituted
against her by Atty. Joseph Gregorio Naval, Jr., is unfounded,
respondent
was not justified in resorting to a "sham" marriage to protect her
[complainant]
from said immorality charge. Being a lawyer, the respondent is surely
conversant
with the legal maxim that a wrong cannot be righted by another wrong.
If
he never had any immoral love affair with Judge Priscilla Castillo Vda.
de Mijares and, therefore, he felt duty-bound to help her in
ventilating
the whole truth and nothing but the truth, respondent could have
testified
in her favor in said administrative case, to assure all and sundry that
what Atty. Joseph Gregorio Naval, Jr. complained of in said
administrative
case was without any factual and legal basis.cralaw:red
In this only
Christian country of the Far East,
society cherishes and protects the sanctity of marriage and the family
as a social institution. Consequently, no one can make a mockery
thereof
and perform a sham marriage with impunity. To make fun of and take
lightly
the sacredness of marriage is to court the wrath of the Creator and
mankind.
Therefore, the defense of respondent that what was entered into by him
and complainant on January 7, 1994 was nothing but a "sham" marriage is
unavailing to shield or absolve him from liability for his gross
misconduct,
nay, sacrilege.cralaw:red
From the
foregoing, it is evident that respondent
dismally fails to meet the standard of moral fitness for continued
membership
in the legal profession. The nature of the office of an attorney at law
requires that he shall be a person of good moral character. This
qualification
is not only a condition precedent for admission to the practice of law;
its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the
practice
of law.[6]
Under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer
shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The
commission
of grossly immoral conduct and deceit are grounds for suspension or
disbarment
of lawyers.[7]
However,
considering that respondent is in the
declining years of his life; that his impulsive conduct during some
episodes
of the investigation reveal a degree of aberrant reactive behavior
probably
ascribable to advanced age; and the undeniable fact that he has
rendered
some years of commendable service in the Judiciary, the Court feels
that
disbarment would be too harsh a penalty in this peculiar case. Hence, a
suspension of two years, as recommended, would suffice as a punitive
but
compassionate disciplinary measure.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE,
finding herein respondent, former Justice
Onofre A. Villaluz, guilty of immoral conduct in violation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, he is hereby supsended from the
practice
of law for a period of two [2] years effective upon notice hereof, with
the specific warning that a more severe penalty shall be imposed should
he commit the same or a similar offense hereafter.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Padilla, Davide,
Jr., Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Narvasa, C.J., took no part.
Bellosillo and Francisco, JJ., are
on
leave.cralaw:red
__________________________
Endnotes
[1]
Rollo, 1-2.
[2]
Ibid., 15-16.
[3]
Ibid., 19-20.
[4]
Pangan v. Ramos, Adm. Case No. 1053, August 31, 1981, 107 SCRA 1.
[5]
See Pomperada vs. Jochico, Bar Matter No. 68, November 21, 1984, 133
SCRA
309.
[6]
People vs. Tuanda, Adm. Case No. 3360, January 30, 1990, 181 SCRA 682.
[7]Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court. |