Republic of the
PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND
DIVISION
NIACONSULT,
INC., JOSE
DEL ROSARIO,
WILFREDO S. TIANGCO and CESAR DE GUZMAN,
Petitioners,
G. R. No. 108278
January 2, 1997
-versus-
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
and JESUS C. OCAMPO,
Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:cralaw:red
This is a
Petition for
Certiorari to
annul the
Order dated July 21, 1992, and the Resolution dated December 22, 1992,
of the National Labor Relations Commission, dismissing petitioners'
appeal
from a Decision of the Labor Arbiter on the ground that it had been
filed
beyond the reglementary period.
The facts are as
follows:
Petitioner
NIAConsult, Inc., a subsidiary of the
National Irrigation Administration [NIA], employed private respondent
Jesus
C. Ocampo as Irrigators Development Chief-B.cralaw:red
On July 4, 1990,
the Board of Directors of petitioner
NIAConsult, Inc. abolished private respondent's position effective
August
31, 1990. On August 2, 1990, private respondent Jesus Ocampo filed a
complaint
alleging illegal dismissal by petitioners.cralaw:red
A Decision was
rendered in his favor on February
15, 1991 by the Labor Arbiter who ruled that the abolition of private
respondent's
position had been done in bad faith. Accordingly, petitioners were
ordered
to reinstate private respondent and to pay him backwages and honoraria
as well as damages and attorney's fees.cralaw:red
Petitioners
appealed to the NLRC on March 11,
1991. It was alleged that counsel received the decision on March 4,
1991.
Private respondent filed an answer to the memorandum of appeal, but
later
moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that, upon verification, he
discovered
that the registry return card showed the date of receipt to be March 1,
1991, and not March 4, 1991, as alleged by petitioners in their appeal
memorandum. When private respondent went to the post office to verify
the
date of receipt of the decision, he discovered that it had actually
been
delivered to and received at the NIA Records Section earlier on
February
25, 1991. This fact was certified by Marino B. London, Postmaster I at
the NIA Post Office.cralaw:red
Atty. Musa I.
Maglayang filed an affidavit of
merit relating the circumstances of his receipt of the questioned
registered
mail and the corresponding return card as follows:
1. That I am one of the Corporate
Attorneys of
the National Irrigation Administration [NIA] and one of the counsels
for
NIACONSULT, Inc. in NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-08-G4156-90 "Jesus C. Ocampo
vs.
NIACONSULT, Inc. et al" now the subject of an appeal with the National
Labor Relations Commission, NCR, Manila;
2. That from February 24 to 28, 1991,
I was
officially
on field work at NIA's Regions IX and XII, particularly in Pagadian
City,
Dipolog City and Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte, in connection with "Pp.
vs.
William Sy" and "Heirs of Dimavivas vs. NIA, et al." among other cases,
and returned home on February 28, 1991; as per copy of time card hereto
attached as Annex "A" and made an integral part hereof;
3. That sometime in the afternoon of
March
1,
1991, I passed by the NIA Office in Quezon City to get my salary only
as
I was on official leave of absence as per copy of my time card hereto
attached
as Annex "B" and made an integral part hereof;
4. That while in the office, one of
the
personnel
of the NIA Records Division presented several mail matters addressed to
me and I received some, but because I was in a hurry and at the same
time
on leave of absence I told the Records personnel that I will receive
the
rest on Monday, March 4, 1991, when I will officially report for work;.
5. That on March 4, 1991, I reported
for
office
work at Quezon City and on the same date I received a registered mail
which
is the decision of the Labor Arbiter in NLRC-NCR Case No.
00-08-G4156-90
entitled "Jesus C. Ocampo vs. NIACONSULT, Inc. et. al," proof of which
receipt of Decision is my initial with date "3/4/91" at the tail of my
name on the front portion of the envelope containing the decision, a
copy
hereto attached as Annex "C" and likewise made a part hereof.[1]
On the basis of
these facts, the NLRC dismissed on
July 2, 1992 petitioners' appeal on the ground that it was filed out of
time. The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was
denied.
Hence, this petition. Petitioners contend that their appeal, which they
filed on March 11, 1991, was timely because, as shown by the registry
return
card, their counsel received the mail containing the decision on March
1, 1991 so that their appeal was perfected on the tenth day of the
appeal
period. In addition, petitioners assail the decision of the Labor
Arbiter,
claiming that the damages awarded to private respondent were excessive;
that the dismissal of private respondent was legal; and that the Labor
Arbiter had no power to order the officers of the corporation to pay
damages
to private respondent as there was no privity of contract between them
and private respondent.
The petition is
without merit.cralaw:red
As the NLRC
observed, the official address given
by petitioners' former counsel, Atty. Musa I. Maglayang, was c/o NIA
Bldg.,
EDSA Quezon City. To consider the date of receipt of the decision of
the
Labor Arbiter to be February 25, 1991, when the decision was delivered
at this address, is not to violate the rule [Rule 13, Section 2] that
when
a party is represented by counsel, service of process must be made on
counsel
and not on the party. Petitioners insist, however, that the date
of receipt should be considered on March 1, 1991, because a different
system
of delivery is followed at the NIA. Petitioners explain that under this
system, registered mail matter addressed to NIA employees and officers
is delivered directly to the NIA Records Section where a personnel
would
receive the registry return cards without signing them. The mail matter
is delivered personally to the addressees who would then sign the
registry
return cards. The registry return cards would afterwards be sent back
to
the post office.cralaw:red
Petitioners point
out that this is different from
the usual practice of the post office of leaving registry notices at
the
address indicated, which notices the addressee then takes to the post
office
to claim his mail. Under this procedure, the registry return card is
signed
at the same time the mail is actually received. In contrast,
petitioners
claim that under the system followed at NIA, the mail is considered
received
only upon the addressee's signing of the return card, that is, upon
personal
delivery to the addressee, regardless of the actual date the mail is
delivered
to the NIA. Petitioners contend that delivery of a copy of the
decision,
in this case to the Records Section, was equivalent to the sending of
the
registry notices but not the actual delivery to a representative of the
addressee.cralaw:red
The contention is
untenable. To allow petitioners
to compute the period for appealing in the manner outlined above would
be to make the record of receipt of mail at the NIA completely
dependent
on the date the addressee signs the registry return card, even if the
mail,
as in this case, has actually been delivered to the NIA much earlier.
The
rule is that service by registered mail is complete either upon actual
receipt by the addressee or at the end of five [5] days, if he does not
claim it within five [5] days from the first notice of the postmaster.
[Rule 13, Section 8]. The purpose is to place the date of receipt
of pleadings, judgments and processes beyond the power of the party
being
served to determine at his pleasure. This purpose would be negated if
We
were to sanction the procedure allegedly followed by NIA.cralaw:red
Petitioners'
excuse that its counsel, Atty. Maglayang,
was out on field work on February 25, 1991 when the Decision was
received
at the NIA and that he actually received the Decision only on March 1,
1991 when he signed the registry return card, is not a good reason for
departing from the established rule. Moreover, Atty. Maglayang
was
not the only counsel of NIAConsult, Inc. Atty. Simeon S. Basuil was
also
counsel for petitioners, to whom the decision could have been delivered
if, as claimed, Atty. Maglayang was in the province at the time the
mail
arrived.cralaw:red
At all events, it
was the responsibility of petitioners
and their counsel to devise a system for the receipt of mail intended
for
them. [Enriquez v. Bautista, 79 Phil. 220 (1947); Marquez v.
Panganiban,
109 Phil. 1121 (1960)]. The finality of a decision is a jurisdictional
event which cannot be made to depend on the convenience of a party.cralaw:red
Consequently,
since the decision of the Labor
Arbiter was received by the Records Division of the petitioner NIA on
February
25, 1991, the 10-day period within which to file an appeal expired on
March
7, 1991 and since petitioners' appeal was filed only on March 11, 1991,
the appeal was late and the NLRC did not commit a grave abuse of its
discretion
in dismissing the appeal.cralaw:red
This ruling makes
it unnecessary for Us to pass
upon the other issues raised by petitioners.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, the
petition is dismissed for lack
of merit.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Regalado, Romero,
and Puno, JJ., concur.cralaw:red
_____________________________
Endnote
[1]
Rollo, p. 102. |