Republic of the
PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND
DIVISION
ALBERTO
S. SILVA, EDILBERTO VIRAY, ANGELES
BARON,CEFERINO ROMERO, JAIME ACEVEDO,
RODOLFO JUAN,ANDREW DE LA ISLA, BAYANI
PILAR,
ULDARICO
GARCIA,ANANIAS HERMOCILLA, WALLY LEONES,
PABLO ALULOD,RODOLFO MARIANO, HERNANI ABOROT,
CARLITO
CHOSAS,VALERIANO MAUBAN, RENAN HALILI, MANOLITO
CUSTODIO,NONILON DAWAL, RICARDO ESCUETA,
SEVERINO
ROSETE,ERNESTO LITADA, ERNESTO BARENG,
BONIFACIO
URBANO,VICENTE SANTOS, MARIO CREDO,
BERNABE GERONIMO,ERNESTO BANAY, PASTOR VELUZ,
RICARDO CUEVAS,FELOMENO BALLON,
ORLANDO MENDOZA, ANICETO
ARBAN,GERONIMO ESPLANA, VICENTE CHAVEZ,
STEVE VELECINAand RICARDO B. VENTURA,
Petitioners, |
G.R. No. 110226
June 19, 1997
-versus-
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
and
PHILTREAD
(FIRESTONE) TIRE
AND RUBBER
CORPORATION,
Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
ROMERO, J.:
Petitioners,
all former employees of private respondent
Philtread [Firestone] Tire and Rubber Corporation [Philtread,
for
brevity], impute grave abuse of discretion on the National Labor
Relations
Commission [NLRC][1]
for issuing two resolutions dated April 7, 1993, and November 18, 1992,
which reconsidered a resolution it rendered on April 15, 1992. They
allege
that its resolution of April 15, 1992 became final and executory when
Philtread
failed to seasonably file a motion for reconsideration within the
ten-day
reglementary period required by Article 223 of the Labor Code.
The record
unfolds the following facts:
Sometime in
1985,
petitioners, then rank-and-file
employees and members of Philtread Workers Union [PWU], volunteered
for,
and availed of, the retrenchment program instituted by Philtread with
the
understanding that they would have priority in re-employment in the
event
that the company recovers from its financial crisis, in accordance with
Section 4, Article III of the Collective Bargaining Agreement concluded
on July 5, 1983.[2]
In November
1986,
Philtread, apparently having
recovered from its financial reverses, expanded its operations and
hired
new personnel. Upon discovery of this development, petitioners filed
their
respective applications for employment with Philtread, which however,
merely
agreed to consider them for future vacancies. Subsequent demands for
re-employment
made by petitioners were ignored. Even the request of the incumbent
union
for Philtread to stop hiring new personnel until petitioners were first
hired failed to elicit any favorable response.cralaw:red
Thus, on
December
5, 1988, petitioners lodged
a complaint[3]
with the National Capital Region Arbitration Branch of the NLRC for
unfair
labor practice [ULP], damages and attorney's fees against Philtread.
Both parties submitted their respective
position
papers. On its part, Philtread moved for the dismissal of the complaint
based on two grounds, namely: [1] that the NLRC lacked
jurisdiction,
there being no employer-employee relationship between it and
petitioners
and that the basic issue involved was the interpretation of a contract,
the CBA, which was cognizable by the regular courts; and [2] that
petitioners
had no locus standi, not being privy to the CBA executed
between
the union and Philtread.cralaw:red
Petitioners,
however, challenging Philtread's
motion to dismiss, stressed that the complaint was one for unfair labor
practice precipitated by the unjust and unreasonable refusal of
Philtread
to re-employ them, as mandated by the provisions of Section 4, Article
III of the 1986 and 1983 CBA's. Being one for unfair labor practice,
petitioners
concluded that the NLRC had jurisdiction over the case, pursuant to
Article
217 (a) (1) of the Labor Code.cralaw:red
On August
31,
1989, Labor Arbiter Edgardo M. Madriaga
rendered a decision dismissing the complaint but directing Philtread to
give petitioners priority in hiring, as well as those former employees
similarly situated for available positions provided they meet the
necessary
current qualifications.[4]
In dismissing the complaint, the Labor Arbiter, however, did not tackle
the jurisdictional issue posed by Philtread in its position paper.
Instead,
he dwelt solely on the question whether the petitioners were entitled
to
priority in re-employment on the basis of the CBA.cralaw:red
Petitioners
duly
appealed the decision of the
Labor Arbiter to the NLRC. Philtread opted not to interpose an appeal
despite
the Labor Arbiter's failure to rule squarely on the question of
jurisdiction.
On April 15, 1992, the NLRC issued a resolution reversing the decision
of the Labor Arbiter. It directed Philtread to re-employ petitioners
and
other employees similarly situated, regardless of age qualifications
and
other pre-employment conditions, subject only to existing vacancies and
a finding of good physical condition. This resolution was received by
Atty.
Abraham B. Borreta of the Law Firm of Borreta, Gutierrez and Leogardo
on
May 5, 1992, as shown by the bailiff's return.cralaw:red
Subsequently,
Atty. Borreta filed with the NLRC
on May 20, 1992, an ex parte manifestation explaining that he
was
returning the copy of the resolution rendered on April 15, 1992, which,
according to him, was erroneously served on him by the process server
of
the NLRC. He alleged that in the several conciliation conferences held,
it was Atty. Daniel C. Gutierrez who exclusively handled the case on
behalf
of Philtread and informed the Labor Arbiter and petitioners that the
Law
Firm of Borreta, Gutierrez and Leogardo had already been dissolved.cralaw:red
Being of
the
impression that the April 15, 1992
resolution of the NLRC had been properly served at the address of the
law
firm of Atty. Gutierrez and that no seasonable motion for
reconsideration
was ever filed by Philtread, petitioners moved for its execution.cralaw:red
On November
18,
1992, the NLRC, acting on a motion
for reconsideration filed by Atty. Gutierrez, promulgated one of its
challenged
resolutions dismissing the complaint of petitioners. It ruled that
while
petitioners had standing to sue, the complaint should have been filed
with
the voluntary arbitrator, pursuant to Article 261 of the Labor Code,
since
the primary issue was the implementation and interpretation of the CBA.cralaw:red
Dismayed by
the
NLRC's sudden change of position,
petitioners immediately moved for reconsideration. They pointed out
that
the NLRC's reliance on Article 261 of the Labor Code was patently
erroneous
because it was the amended provision which was being cited by the NLRC.
They added that the amendment of Article 261 introduced by Republic Act
No. 6715 took effect only on March 21, 1989, or after the filing of the
complaint on December 5, 1988. This being the case, petitioners argued
that the subsequent amendment cannot retroactively divest the Labor
Arbiter
of the jurisdiction already acquired in accordance with Articles 217
and
248 of the Labor Code. Petitioners further stressed that the resolution
of April 15, 1992, had already become final and executory since
Philtread's
counsel of record did not file any motion for reconsideration within
the
period of ten (10) days from receipt of the resolution on May 5, 1992.cralaw:red
The NLRC,
however, was not convinced by petitioners'
assertions. In another resolution issued on April 7, 1993, it affirmed
its earlier resolution dated November 18, 1992, ruling that even before
the amendatory law took effect, matters involving bargaining agreements
were already within the exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary
arbitrator,
as set forth in Article 262 of the Labor Code. Hence, this petition.cralaw:red
As stated
at the
outset, petitioners fault the
NLRC for issuing the assailed resolutions even when the resolution
sought
to be reconsidered had already attained finality upon Philtread's
failure
to timely move for its reconsideration. They posit that since the
bailiff's
return indicated May 5, 1992, as the date of receipt of the April 15,
1992
resolution by the Law Firm of Borreta, Gutierrez and Leogardo,
Philtread's
counsel of record, then Philtread only had ten (10) calendar days or
until
May 15, 1992, within which to file a motion for reconsideration. Since
Philtread indisputably failed to file any such motion within said
period,
petitioners deemed it highly irregular and capricious for the NLRC to
still
allow reconsideration of its April 15, 1992 resolution.cralaw:red
The
petition is
impressed with merit.cralaw:red
Time and
again,
this Court has been emphatic in
ruling that the seasonable filing of a motion for reconsideration
within
the l0-day reglementary period following the receipt by a party of any
order, resolution or decision of the NLRC, is a mandatory requirement
to
forestall the finality of such order, resolution or decision.[5]
The statutory bases for this is found in Article 223 of the Labor Code[6]
and Section 14, Rule VII of the New Rules of Procedure of the National
Labor Relations Commission.[7]
In the case
at
bar, it is uncontroverted that
Philtread's counsel filed a motion for reconsideration of the April 15,
1992 resolution only on June 5, 1992,[8]
or 31 days after receipt of said resolution.[9]
It was thus incumbent upon the NLRC to have dismissed outright
Philtread's
late motion for reconsideration. By doing exactly the opposite, its
actuation
was not only whimsical and capricious but also a demonstration of its
utter
disregard for its very own rules. Certiorari, therefore, lies.cralaw:red
To be sure,
it is
settled doctrine that the NLRC,
as an administrative and quasi-judicial body, is not bound by the rigid
application of technical rules of procedure in the conduct of its
proceedings.[10]
However, the filing of a motion for reconsideration and filing it on
time
are not mere technicalities of procedure. These are jurisdictional and
mandatory requirements which must be strictly complied with. Although
there
are exceptions to said rule, the case at bar presents no peculiar
circumstances
warranting a departure therefrom.cralaw:red
The Court
is
aware of Philtread's obvious attempt
to skirt the requirement for seasonable filing of a motion for
reconsideration
by persuading us that both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have no
jurisdiction
over petitioners' complaint. Jurisdiction, Philtread claims, lies
instead
with the voluntary arbitrator so that when the Labor Arbiter and the
NLRC
took cognizance of the case, their decisions thereon were null and void
and, therefore, incapable of attaining finality. In short, Philtread
maintains
that the ten-day reglementary period could not have started running
and,
therefore, its motion could not be considered late.cralaw:red
The
argument is
not tenable. While we agree with
the dictum that a void judgment cannot attain finality, said rule,
however,
is only relevant if the tribunal or body which takes cognizance of a
particular
subject matter indeed lacks jurisdiction over the same. In this case,
the
rule adverted to is misapplied for it is actually the Labor Arbiter and
the NLRC which possess jurisdiction over petitioners' complaint and not
the voluntary arbitrator, as erroneously contended by Philtread.cralaw:red
In this
regard,
we observe that there is a confusion
in the minds of both Philtread and the NLRC with respect to the proper
jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator. They appear to share the view
that once the question involved is an interpretation or implementation
of CBA provisions, which in this case is the re-employment clause, then
the same necessarily falls within the competence of the voluntary
arbitrator
pursuant to Article 261 of the Labor Code.cralaw:red
Respondents'
posture is too simplistic and finds
no support in law or in jurisprudence. When the issue concerns an
interpretation
or implementation of the CBA, one cannot immediately jump to the
conclusion
that jurisdiction is with the voluntary arbitrator. There is an equally
important need to inquire further if the disputants involved are the
union
and the employer; otherwise, the voluntary arbitrator cannot assume
jurisdiction.
To this effect was the ruling of the Court in Sanyo Philippines Workers
Union-PSSLU v. Canizares,[11]
where we clarified the jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator on this
manner:
In the
instant
case, however, We hold that the
Labor Arbiter and not the Grievance Machinery provided for in the CBA
has
the jurisdiction to hear and decide the complaints of the private
respondents.
While it appears that the dismissal of the private respondents was made
upon the recommendation of PSSLU pursuant to the union security clause
provided in the CBA, We are of the opinion that these facts do not come
within the phrase "grievances arising from the interpretation or
implementation
of (their) Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the
interpretation
or enforcement of company personnel policies," the jurisdiction of
which
pertains to the Grievance Machinery or thereafter, to a voluntary
arbitrator
or panel of voluntary arbitrators. Article 260 of the Labor Code on
grievance
machinery and voluntary arbitrator states that "[t]he parties to a
Collective
Bargaining Agreement shall include therein provisions that will ensure
the mutual observance of its terms and conditions. They shall establish
a machinery for the adjustment and resolution of grievances arising
from
the interpretation or implementation of their Collective Bargaining
Agreement
and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company
personnel
policies." It is further provided in said article that the parties to a
CBA shall name or designate their respective representatives to the
grievance
machinery and if the grievance is not settled in that level, it shall
automatically
be referred to voluntary arbitrators [or panel of voluntary
arbitrators]
designated in advance by the parties. It need not be mentioned that the
parties to a CBA are the union and the company. Hence, only disputes
involving
the union and the company shall be referred to the grievance machinery
or voluntary arbitrators. [Emphasis supplied]
Since the
contending parties in the instant case
are not the union and Philtread, then pursuant to the Sanyo doctrine,
it
is not the voluntary arbitrator who can take cognizance of the
complaint,
notwithstanding Philtread's claim that the real issue is the
interpretation
of the CBA provision on re-employment. The Court, however, does
not
write finis to the discussion. A more important question
arises:
If the voluntary arbitrator could not have assumed jurisdiction over
the
case, did the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC validly acquire jurisdiction
when
both of them entertained the complaint?
A brief
review of
relevant statutory provisions
is in order.cralaw:red
We note
that at
the time petitioners filed their
complaint for unfair labor practice, damages and attorney's fees on
December
5, 1988, the governing provision of the Labor Code with respect to the
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC was Article 217 which
states:
"Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor
Arbiters
and the Commission. (a) The Labor Arbiters shall have the original
and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide within thirty (30)
working
days after submission of the case by the parties for decision, the
following
cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:
"1. Unfair labor practice cases;
"2. Those that workers may file
involving
wages,
hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment;
"3. All money claims of workers,
including
those
based on non-payment or underpayment of wages, overtime compensation,
separation
pay and other benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement, except
claims for employees' compensation, social security, medicare and
maternity
benefits;
"4. Cases involving household
services; and
"5. Cases arising from any violation
of
Article
265 of this Code, including questions involving the legality of strikes
and lockouts.
"(b) The Commission shall have
exclusive
appellate
jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor Arbiters."
Articles
261
and 262, on the other hand, defined
the jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator, viz.:
"Art. 261. Grievance machinery.
Whenever a grievance arises from the interpretation or implementation
of
a collective agreement, including disciplinary actions imposed on
members
of the bargaining unit, the employer and the bargaining representative
shall meet to adjust the grievance. Where there is no collective
agreement
and in cases where the grievance procedure as provided herein does not
apply, grievances shall be subject to negotiation, conciliation or
arbitration
as provided elsewhere in this Code."
"Art. 262. Voluntary arbitration.
All grievances referred to in the immediately preceding Article which
are
not settled through the grievance procedure provided in the collective
agreement shall be referred to voluntary arbitration prescribed in said
agreement: Provided, That termination disputes shall be governed by
Article
278 of this Code, as amended, unless the parties agree to submit them
to
voluntary arbitration."
Under the
above
provisions then prevailing, one can
understand why petitioners lodged their complaint for ULP with the
Labor
Arbiter. To their mind, Philtread's refusal to re-employ them was
tantamount
to a violation of the re-employment clause in the 1983 CBA which was
also
substantially reproduced in the 1986 CBA. At the time, any
violation
of the CBA was unqualifiedly treated as ULP of the employer falling
within
the competence of the Labor Arbiter to hear and decide. Thus:
On March
21,
1989, however, Republic Act 6715,[12]
or the so-called "Herrera-Veloso Amendments," took effect, amending
several
provisions of the Labor Code, including the respective jurisdictions of
the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the voluntary arbitrator. As a result,
the present jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC is as
follows:
"Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor
Arbiters
and the Commission.- (a) Except as otherwise provided under
this
Code the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction
to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the
submission
of the case by the parties for decision without extension, even in the
absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all
workers,
whether agricultural or non-agricultural:
"1. Unfair labor practice cases;
"2. Termination disputes;
"3. If accompanied with a claim for
reinstatement,
those cases that workers may file involving wages, rates of pay, hours
of work and other terms and conditions of employment;
"4. Claims for actual, moral,
exemplary and
other
forms of damages arising from the employer-employee relations;
"5. Cases arising from any violation
of
Article
264 of this Code, including questions involving the legality of strikes
and lockouts; and
"6. Except claims for Employees
Compensation,
Social Security, Medicare and maternity benefits, all other claims,
arising
from employer-employee relations, including those of persons in
domestic
or household service, involving an amount exceeding five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for
reinstatement.
"(b) The Commission shall have
exclusive
appellate
jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor Arbiters.
"(c) Cases arising from the
interpretation
or
implementation of collective bargaining agreements and those arising
from
the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies shall
be
disposed of by the Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the grievance
machinery and voluntary arbitration as may be provided in said
agreements.
"
while
that of
the voluntary arbitrator is defined
in this wise:
"Art. 261. Jurisdiction of Voluntary
Arbitrators
or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators.- The Voluntary Arbitrator
or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction
to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the
interpretation
or implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and those
arising
from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies
referred
to in the immediately preceding article. According violations of a
Collective
Bargaining Agreement, except those which are gross in character, shall
no longer be treated as unfair labor practice and shall be resolved as
as grievances under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. For purposes
of
this article, gross violations of Collective Bargaining Agreement shall
mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic
provisions
of such agreement. xxx (Emphasis supplied)
"Art. 262. Jurisdiction over other
labor
disputes.-
The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, upon
agreement
of the parties shall also hear and decide all other labor disputes
including
unfair labor practices and bargaining deadlocks."
With the
amendments introduced by R. A. 6715, it
can be gleaned that the Labor Arbiter still retains jurisdiction over
ULP
cases. There is, however, a significant change: The unqualified
jurisdiction
conferred upon the Labor Arbiter prior to the amendment by R. A. 6715
has
been narrowed down so that "violations of a Collective Bargaining
Agreement,
except those which are gross in character, shall no longer be treated
as
unfair labor practice but as grievances under the Collective Bargaining
Agreement. It is further stated that "gross violations of Collective
Bargaining
Agreement shall mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with
the
economic provisions of such agreement." Hence, for a ULP case to be
cognizable
by the Labor Arbiter, and the NLRC to exercise its appellate
jurisdiction,
the allegations in the complaint should show prima facie the
concurrence
of two things, namely: [1] gross violation of the CBA; and [2] the
violation
pertains to the economic provisions of the CBA.
In several
instances prior to the instant case,
the Court already made its pronouncement that R. A. 6715 is in the
nature
of a curative statute. As such, we declared that it can be applied
retroactively
to pending cases. Thus, in Briad Agro Development Corporation v. Dela
Cerna,[13]
We held:
"Republic Act No. 6715, like its
predecessors,
Executive Order No. 111 and Article 217, as amended, has retroactive
application.
Thus, when this new law divested Regional Directors of the power to
hear
money claims, the divestment affected pending litigations. It also
affected
this particular case. [Note that under par 6, where the claim does not
exceed P5,000.00, regional directors have jurisdiction]. In
Garcia
v. Martinez, We categorically held that amendments relative to the
jurisdiction
of labor arbiters (under Presidential Decree No. 1367, divesting the
labor
arbiter of jurisdiction) partake of the nature of curative statutes,
thus:
'It now appears that at the time this
case
was
decided the lower court had jurisdiction over Velasco's complaint
although
at the time it was filed said court was not clothed with such
jurisdiction.
The lack of jurisdiction was cured by the issuance of the amendatory
decree
which is in the nature of a curative statute with retrospective
application
to a pending proceeding, like Civil Case No. 9657 (See 82 C.J.S.
1004).'"
Garcia
has
since been uniformly applied in subsequent
cases. Thus, in Calderon v. Court of Appeals, reiterated that PD No.
1367
[is] curative and retrospective in nature.
The
Decision of
this case, finally, acknowledged
the retrospective characteristics of Executive Order No. 111.
With the Briad ruling in place, the
implication
is that the qualified jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC
should
have been applied when the ULP complaint was still pending. This means
that petitioners should have been required to show in their complaint
the
gross nature of the CBA violation, as well as the economic provision
violated,
without which the complaint would be dismissible. Herein lies the
problem.
The Court's appreciation of petitioners' cause of action is that, while
it would make out a case for ULP, under present law, however, the same
falls short of the special requirements necessary to make it cognizable
by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. Unsubstantiated conclusions of bad
faith
and unjustified refusal to re-employ petitioners, to our mind, do not
constitute
gross violation of the CBA for purposes of lodging jurisdiction with
the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. Although evidentiary matters are not
required
[and even discouraged] to be alleged in complaint, still, sufficient
details
supporting the conclusion of bad faith and unjust refusal to re-employ
petitioners must be indicated. Furthermore, it is even doubtful if the
CBA provision on re-employment fits into the accepted notion of an
economic
provision of the CBA. Thus, given the foregoing considerations, may the
Briad doctrine be applied to the instant case and cause its dismissal
for
want of jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC?
Upon a
careful
and meticulous study of Briad,
the Court holds that the rationale behind it does not apply to the
present
case. We adopt instead the more recent case of Erectors, Inc. v.
National
Labor Relations Commission,[14]
where we refused to give retroactive application to Executive Order No.
797 which created the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
[POEA].
Under said law, POEA was vested with "original and exclusive
jurisdiction
over all cases, including money claims, involving employer-employee
relations
arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino
workers
for overseas employment,"[15]
which jurisdiction was originally conferred upon the Labor Arbiter. As
in the instant case, the Labor Arbiter's assumption of jurisdiction
therein
was likewise questioned in view of the subsequent enactment of E. O.
797.
In ruling against the retroactive application of the law, the Court
explained
its position as follows:
The rule is
that
jurisdiction over the subject
matter is determined by the law in force at the time of the
commencement
of the action. On March 31, 1982, at the time private respondent filed
his complaint against the petitioner, the prevailing laws were
Presidential
Decree No. 1691 and Presidential Decree No. 1391 which vested the
Regional
Offices of the Ministry of Labor and the Labor Arbiters with "original
and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving employer-employee
relations
including money claims arising out of any law or contracts involving
Filipino
workers for overseas employment." At the time of the filing of the
complaint,
the Labor Arbiter had clear jurisdiction over the same.cralaw:red
E. O. No.
797 did
not divest the Labor Arbiter's
authority to hear and decide the case filed by private respondent prior
to its effectivity. Laws should only be applied prospectively unless
the
legislative intent to give them retroactive effect is expressly
declared
or is necessarily implied from the language used. We fail to perceive
in
the language of E. O. No. 797 an intention to give it retroactive
effect.cralaw:red
The case of
Briad
Agro Development Corp. vs. Dela
Cerna cited by the petitioner is not applicable to the case at bar. In
Briad, the Court applied the exception rather than the general rule. In
this case, Briad Agro Development Corp. and L.M. Camus Engineering
Corp.
challenged the jurisdiction of the Regional Director of the Department
of Labor and Employment over cases involving workers' money claims,
since
Article 217 of the Labor Code, the law in force at the time of the
filing
of the complaint, vested in the Labor Arbiters exclusive jurisdiction
over
such cases. The Court dismissed the petition in its Decision dated June
29, 1989. It ruled that the enactment of E. O. No. 111, amending
Article
217 of the Labor Code, cured the Regional Director's lack of
jurisdiction
by giving the Labor Arbiter and the Regional Director concurrent
jurisdiction
over all cases involving money claims. However, on November 9, 1989,
the
Court, in a Resolution, reconsidered and set aside its June 29 Decision
and referred the case to the Labor Arbiter for proper proceedings, in
view
of the promulgation of Republic Act No. 6715 which divested the
Regional
Directors of the power to hear money claims. It bears emphasis that the
Court accorded E. O. No. 111 and R. A. 6715 a retroactive application
because
as curative statutes, they fall under the exceptions to the rule on
prospectivity
of laws.cralaw:red
E. O. No.
111,
amended Article 217 of the Labor
Code to widen the worker's access to the government for redress of
grievances
by giving the Regional Directors and Labor Arbiters concurrent
jurisdiction
over cases involving money claims. This amendment, however, created a
situation
where the jurisdiction of the Regional Directors and the Labor Arbiters
overlapped. As a remedy, R. A. 6715 further amended Article 217 by
delineating
their respective jurisdictions. Under R. A. 6715, the Regional Director
has exclusive original jurisdiction over cases involving money claims
provided:
(1) the claim is presented by an employer or person employed in
domestic
or household service, or househelper under the Code; (2) the claimant,
no longer being employed, does not seek reinstatement; and (3) the
aggregate
money claim of the employee or househelper does not exceed P5,000.00.
All
other cases within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Labor
Arbiter. E. O. No. 111 and R. A. 6715 are therefore curative statutes.
A curative statute is enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to
validate
legal proceedings, instruments or acts of public authorities which
would
otherwise be void for want of conformity with certain existing legal
requirements.cralaw:red
The law at
bar,
E. O. No. 797, is not a curative
statute. We do not find any reason why the Court should not apply
the above ruling to the case at bar, notwithstanding the fact that a
different
law is involved. Actually, this is not the first time that the Court
refused
to apply R. A. 6715 retroactively.[16]
Our previous decisions on whether to give it retroactive application or
not depended to a great extent on what amended provisions were under
consideration,
as well as the factual circumstances to which they were made to apply.
In Briad, the underlying reason for applying R. A. 6715
retroactively
was the fact that prior to its amendment, Article 217 of the Labor
Code,
as amended by then Executive Order No. 111, created a scenario where
the
Labor Arbiters and the Regional Directors of the Department of Labor
and
Employment [DOLE] had overlapping jurisdiction over money claims. This
situation was viewed as a defect in the law so that when R. A. No. 6715
was passed and delineated the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and
Regional
Directors, the Court deemed it a rectification of such defect; hence,
the
conclusion that it was curative in nature and, therefore, must be
applied
retroactively.cralaw:red
The same
thing
cannot be said of the case at bar.
Like in Erectors, the instant case presents no defect in the law
requiring
a remedy insofar as the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the
Voluntary
Arbitrator is concerned. There is here no overlapping of jurisdiction
to
speak of because matters involving interpretation and implementation of
CBA provisions, as well as interpretation and enforcement of company
personnel
policies, have always been determined by the voluntary arbitrator even
prior to R. A. 6715. Similarly, all ULP cases were exclusively within
the
jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. What R. A. 6715 merely did was to
re-apportion
the jurisdiction over ULP cases by conferring exclusive jurisdiction
over
such ULP cases that do not involve gross violation of a CBA's economic
provision upon the voluntary arbitrator. We do not see anything in the
act of re-apportioning jurisdiction curative of any defect in the law
as
it stood prior to the enactment of R. A. 6715. The Court view it
as merely a matter of change in policy of the lawmakers, especially
since
the 1987 Constitution adheres to the preferential use of voluntary
modes
of dispute settlement.[17]
This, instead of the inherent defect in the law, must be the rationale
that prompted the amendment. Hence, we uphold the jurisdiction of the
labor
arbiter which attached to this case at the time of its filing on
December
5, 1988.cralaw:red
Finally,
the
contention that it was Atty. Gutierrez
who exclusively represented Philtread and that the Law Firm of Borreta,
Gutierrez and Leogardo had been dissolved, are lame excuses to cast
doubt
on the propriety of service to Atty. Borreta. It must be noted that the
complaint of petitioners was filed on December 5, 1988. Presumably, the
preliminary conferences adverted to by Atty. Borreta, where Atty.
Gutierrez
supposedly declared that he was exclusively representing Philtread,
transpired
at around that date. The Court, however, is surprised to discover that
the record bears a Notice of Change of Address dated March 12, 1990,
filed
by Atty. Gutierrez, indicating therein that the counsel for respondent
[Philtread] was "Borreta, Gutierrez and Leogardo" whose address could
be
found at the "3rd Floor, Commodore Condominium Arquiza corner M.
Guerrero
Streets, Ermita, Manila." If, indeed, Atty. Gutierrez declared during
the
Labor Arbiter's proceedings that he was exclusively representing
Philtread,
why then did he use the firm's name, and its new address at that, in
the
aforementioned notice to the NLRC? Moreover, why did Atty. Borreta take
fifteen days to file his Manifestation and inform the NLRC of the
"improper"
service of the resolution to him? Why did he not object immediately to
the service by the bailiff? Considering that Atty. Gutierrez and Atty.
Borreta were once partners in their law firm, it behooves Atty. Borreta
to have at least advised his former partner of the receipt of the
resolution.
As a lawyer, his receipt of the adverse resolution should have alerted
him of the adverse consequences which might follow if the same were not
acted upon promptly, as what in fact happened here. As for Atty.
Gutierrez,
if the law firm of Borreta, Gutierrez, and Leogardo were really
dissolved,
it was incumbent upon him not to have used the firm's name in the first
place, or he should have withdrawn the appearance of the firm and
entered
his own appearance, in case the dissolution took place midstream. By
failing
to exercise either option, Atty. Gutierrez cannot now blame the NLRC
for
serving its resolution at the address of the firm still on record.[18]
To our mind, these excuses cannot camouflage the clever ploy of
Philtread's
counsel to earn a last chance to move for reconsideration. This Court,
it bears emphasizing, is not impressed, but looks incredulously at such
superficial moves.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE,
the
instant petition is hereby GRANTED.
The assailed resolutions of the NLRC dated November 18, 1992, and April
7, 1993, are SET ASIDE, while its resolution dated April 15, 1992, is
REINSTATED
for immediate execution.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Regalado, Puno,
Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ.,
concur.cralaw:red
___________________________________
Endnotes
[1]
First Division.
[2]
Rollo, p. 6.
[3]
Docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 12-04975-88. Rollo, p. 7.
[4]
Decision, Rollo, p. 38.
[5]
Labudahon v. National Labor Relations Commission, 251 SCRA 129 [1995];
Zapata v. National Labor Relations Commission, 175 SCRA 56
[1989];
G.A. Yupangco v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R No. 102191,
February
17, 1992; Flores v. National Labor Relations Commission, 256 SCRA 735
[1996].
[6]
Art. 223. "[T]he decision of the Commission shall be final and
executory
after ten [10] calendar days from receipt thereof by the parties."
[7]Sec. 14. Motions for Reconsideration. Motions for reconsideration
of any order, resolution or decision of the Commission shall not be
entertained
except when based on palpable or patent errors, provided that the
motion
is under oath and filed within (10) calendar days from receipt of the
order,
resolution or decision, with proof of service that a copy of the same
has
been furnished, within the reglementary period, the adverse party and
provided
further, that only one such motion from the same party shall be
entertained.
[Emphasis supplied].
[8]
Rollo, pp. 58-65.
[9]
Ibid., p. 50.
[10]
Article 221, Labor Code, as amended.
[11]
211 SCRA 361 (1992).
[12]
The New Labor Relations Law.
[13]
179 SCRA 269 [1989].
[14]
256 SCRA 629 [1996].
[15]Section 4(a), E. O. 797.
[16]
CfInciong v. NLRC, 185 SCRA 651 [1990], as regards immediate
execution
of an order to reinstate an employee; Lantion v. NLRC, 181 SCRA
513
[1990] on the issue of backwages.
[17]Section 3, Article XIII.
[18]
CfB.R. Sebastian Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA 28
[1992]. |