KILOSBAYAN,
INC.,
FERNANDO A. SANTIAGO,
QUINTIN S. DOROMAL,
EMILIO C. CAPULONG, JR.chanrobles virtual law library
and RAFAEL G.
FERNANDO,
Petitioners,
G.
R.
No. 128054
October
16, 1997
-versus-
COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS,
SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ,
FRANKLIN DRILON,
CESAR SARINO, LEONORA V. DE JESUS,
TIBURCIO RELUCIO,
RONALDO V. PUNO, BENITO R. CATINDIG,
MANUEL CALUPITAN
III, VICENTE CARLOS, FRANCISCO CANCIO,
JIMMY DURANTE and
MELVYN MENDOZA,
Respondents.
D
E C I S I
O N
HERMOSISIMA,
JR., J.:
Special Provision No.
1 of the Countrywide Development Fund [CDF] under Republic Act No.
7180,
otherwise known as the "General Appropriations Act [GAA] of 1992"
allocates a specific amount of government funds for infrastructure and
other priority projects and activities. In order to be valid, the use
and
release of said amount would have to proceed upon strict compliance
with
the following mandatory requirements: [1] approval by the President of
the Philippines; [2] release of the amount directly to the appropriate
implementing agency; and [3] list of projects and activities.
In a letter, dated March
17, 1992, respondent Cesar Sarino, the then Secretary of Interior and
Local
Government, requested for authority to negotiate, enter into a sign
Memoranda
of Agreements with accredited Non-Governmental Organization [NGOs] in
order
to utilize them to implement the projects of the CDF provided for under
R. A. No. 7180. Thereafter, in an undated letter[1],
respondent Franklin Drilon, the then Executive Secretary, granted the
above-mentioned
request of Secretary Sarino. Such an authority was extended to all the
Regional Directors of the Department of Interior and Local Government
[DILG].cralaw:red
Pursuant to the above-described
authority granted him as the then Regional Director of the DILG-NCR,
respondent
Tiburcio Relucio, on April 24, 1992, entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement[2]
with an accredited NGO known as the "Philippine Youth Health and Sports
Development Foundation, Inc." [PYHSDFI].cralaw:red
The PYHSDFI was registered
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on October 25, 1985
as
a non-stock, non-profit foundation with principal address at AFMC
Building,
Amorsolo Street, Makati City.[3]
Its incorporators were private respondents Benito Catindig, President;
Manuel Calupitan, Vice-President; Francisco Cancio, Treasurer; Melvin
Mendoza,
Secretary, and Ronaldo Puno, Chairman.[4]
The PYHSDFI was organized
to promote among the youth, consciousness and greater involvement and
participation
in sports and cultural development activities through training camps
and
demonstration seminars conducted by qualified experts in the field.[5]
Not long after its incorporation,
that is, in 1987, the PHYSDFI suspended its operations because of lack
of fund donations and the migration to the United States of many of its
members.[6]
The foundation became active again in October, 1991.[7]
In order to be eligible
for financial assistance, the PYHSDFI, on December 12, 1991, applied
with
the DILG for accreditation as NGO in accordance with the guidelines
prescribed
in Memorandum Circular No. 90-07, dated January 31, 1990.[8]
On March 23, 1992, the
PYHSDFI approved Board Resolution No. 7, Series of 1992, requesting for
allocation from the government's CDF in order to implement its various
sports, health, and cultural activities in specific areas in Metro
Manila.[9]
Hence, the Memorandum of Agreement dated April 24, 1992 was entered
into
by PYHSDFI President Catindig and DILG-NCR Regional Director Relucio.
In
compliance with accreditation requirements of the DILG, the PYHSDFI, on
April 27, 1992, filed with the SEC a new set of By-laws.[10]
Under the said Memorandum
of Agreement, it was the express responsibility of the DILG to effect
the
release and transfer to PYHSDFI of the amount of Seventy Million Pesos
[P70,000.000.00][11]
from the aggregate allocation of the CDF for the complete
implementation
of the foundation's sports, health and cultural work program.cralaw:red
Respondent Salvador
Enriquez, as Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM),
signed on April 22, 1992 and released on April 30, 1992, Advice of
Allotment
[AA] No. BC-8494-92-215 dated April 22, 1992, allocating the amount of
Seventy Million Pesos from the CDF under object 200-10 to cover
financial
assistance for sports, health and cultural programs and other related
activities
in the various barangays in the National CapitalRegion.[12]
The release of the Seventy
Million Pesos was made in several checks:[13]
Date
PNB Check
No.
Amount
May 5,
1992
138051
P23,000,000.00
May 5,
1992
138052
P23,000,000.00
May 6,
1992
138060
P24,000.000.00
During the hearing of the
Senate Committee on Finance on November 22, 1993, DILG Budget Officer
Rafael
Barata confirmed the above allotment as part of the amount of Three
Hundred
Thirty Million Pesos (P330,000,00000) that was released by the DBM from
the 1992 CDF. The exact amount released to DILG-NCR was P70,099,393.00
while the amounts released to the other regions are as follows:
Region
I P 14,942,834.00
Region
II 108,000.00
Region
III 19,115,000.00
Region
IV 74,131,150.00
Region
V 25,047,991.00
Region
VI 5,545,000.00
Region
VII 20,159,500.00
Region
VIII 23,006,600.00
Region
IX 19,900,900.00
Region
X 25,356,012.00
Region
XII 9,549,000.00
CAR
10,300,000.00
The total amount disbursed
under the CDF was P330,470,688.00.
On December 14, 1993,
public respondent Commission on Elections [Comelec] received from
petitioner
Kilosbayan a letter informing the former of "two serious violations of
election laws"[14],
thus:
1. The
documented
admission of Secretary of Budget Salvador Enriquez, in the October 5,
1993
hearing of the Commission on Appointments, that the amount of P70
million
was released by his Department, shortly before the elections of May 11,
1992, in favor of a private entity, the so-called "Philippine Youth,
Health
and Sports Development Foundation," headed by Mr. Ronaldo Puno, who had
been repeatedly identified by columnist Teodoro Benigno as a key member
of the Sulu Hotel Operation [SHO], which had reportedly engaged in
dirty
election tricks and practices in said elections
2. The illegal
diversion
of P330 million by Malacanang from the Countryside Development Fund to
the Department of Interior and Local Government which disbursed this
huge
amount shortly before the May 11, 1992 elections, as revealed by DILG
Budget
Officer Barata, in a hearing of the Senate Finance Committee, chaired
by
Sen. Vicente Sotto III held last November 22, 1993.[15]
and "request[ing] that
these offenses and malpractices be investigated promptly, thoroughly,
impartially,
without fear or favor, so that public confidence in the integrity and
purity
of the electoral process may be immediately restored for the sake of
our
newly-regained democracy."[16]
On December 14, 1993,
then Comelec Chairman Christian Monsod called a meeting of the Comelec
En Banc which resolved to refer petitioner Kilosbayan's
letter-complaint
to the Law Department for comment and/or recommendation.[17]
Said letter-complaint was docketed as E. O. Case No. 93-193.
The evidence proffered
by Kilosbayan in support of its letter-complaint consisted of the
published
writings of Teodoro Benigno[18]
in his column in the Philippine Star newspaper imputing to the
so-called
Sulo Hotel Operation [SHO] headed by PYHSDFI's chairman, Ronaldo Puno,
the commission of illegal election activities during the May 11, 1992
elections,
including the obtention of government funds for electioneering
purposes;
the transcripts of record of the testimony of Secretary Enriquez before
the Commission on Appointments during a hearing on October 5, 1993 and
of the testimony of DILG Budget Officer Rafael Barata before the Senate
Finance Committee during a hearing on November 22, 1993; and an
Affidavit
executed by Norberto Gonzales, a congressional candidate in the May 11,
1992 elections, who alleged therein that at the Makati Headquarters of
the Lakas-NUCD, in February, 1992, he overheard respondents Franklin
Drilon
and Leonora de Jesus discussing party plans to use the funds of various
government offices to finance the party's election campaign and that
ten
(10) days or so before May 11, 1992, he obtained his election
propaganda
materials, following instructions from the party's National
Headquarters,
from the Sulo Hotel in Quezon City.cralaw:red
In a Memorandum dated
March 28, 1994, Comelec Commissioner Regalado Maambong informed
Chairman
Christian Monsod that petitioner Kilosbayan "[has already] presented
their
affidavits and supporting documents and [that] it is now time for the
respondents
to be subpoenaed and for them to present their counter-affidavits and
supporting
documents, if any, relative to the complaint of the Kilosbayan for
illegal
disbursement of public funds in the May 11, 1992 synchronized elections.[19]
On March 29, 1994, the
Comelec en banc, during its regular meeting, directed Atty.
Jose
P. Balbuena, Director of Law Department, to issue the proper subpoenas
and subpoena duces tecum in connection with the hearing of the
Kilosbayan
letter-complaint; to proceed in accordance with the Comelec Rules and
Procedure
relative to the investigation of cases involving election offenses; and
to submit a complete report within ten (10) days from the termination
of
the investigation.[20]
Director Balbuena issued
a subpoena dated April 17, 1994[21]
addressed to respondents Salvador Enriquez, Ronaldo Puno, Francisco
Cancio,
Vicente Carlos, Jimmy Durante, Melvin Mendoza and "Other John Does"
requiring
them to appear at the Office of the Director on April 28, 1994 and to
submit
their respective counter-affidavits and other supporting documents, if
any, in connection with petitioner Kilosbayan's letter-complaint
against
them.cralaw:red
On May 10, 1994, respondents
Melvin Mendoza and Salvador Enriquez filed their respective
counter-affidavits[22]
specifically denying all the accusatory allegations in petitioner
Kilosbayan's
letter-complaint.cralaw:red
On May 25, 1994, respondent
Vicente Carlos submitted his counter-affidavit.[23] For his part, respondent
Francisco
Cancio filed a Manifestation[24]
dated May 24, 1994 that he cannot submit his counter-affidavit due to
lack
of material time. Thereafter, petitioner Kilosbayan manifested that it
will file a consolidated reply to the Counter-Affidavits of respondents
Mendoza, Enriquez and Carlos. In order to give petitioner Kilosbayan
sufficient
time to prepare its consolidated reply, the hearing was set on June 6,
1994.cralaw:red
When June 6, 1994 came,
however, petitioner Kilosbayan filed, not a consolidated reply, but a
pleading
denominated as "Interrogatories"[25]
dated May 20, 1994. Said pleading contained a list of questions
sought
to be propounded to respondents Enriquez, Carlos and Mendoza in an
attempt
to elicit from them confirmation regarding the questioned CDF
allotment,
specifically the cash allocation received by PYHSDFI, and the
consumption
thereof by PYHSDFI chairman Ronaldo Puno's SHO for its reported illegal
election campaign activities during the May 11, 1992 elections.cralaw:red
Amidst opposition forged
by respondents Enriquez and Mendoza, the Comelec Law Department,
through
Director Balbuena, scheduled the clarificatory questioning on July 9,
1994.[26]
Through a Motion for
Reconsideration
dated July 5, 1994, respondent Enriquez persisted to question the
legality
of the scheduled clarificatory questioning on the ground that the same
is in violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination.
Said motion, however, was denied by the Comelec Law Department through
Director Balbuena.cralaw:red
Thus, respondents Enriquez
and Mendoza filed separate Petitions for Certiorari[27]
before the Comelec en banc assailing the afore-mentioned orders
of Director Balbuena. The Comelec en banc treated said
petitions
as motions for reconsideration or petitions for review, of the orders
of
Director Balbuena giving due course to petitioner Kilosbayan's
Interrogatories
and scheduling the same for hearing. Ultimately, it ruled in favor of
respondents
Enriquez and Mendoza and held that the questions sought by petitioner
Kilosbayan
to be propounded by Director Balbuena to said respondents, are being
raised
in a preliminary investigation during which any person being accused of
an offense, has the right to remain silent, among others.[28]
On February 9, 1995,
the Comelec En Banc, during its regular meeting, promulgated Minute
Resolution
No. 95-0713 approving, with modification, the recommendations of the
Law
Department, as follows:
[1] To dismiss the
complaint against Secretary Salvador Enriquez, Jr. for insufficiency of
evidence to establish a probable cause;
[2] To hold in
abeyance
the case against Ronaldo Puno, Vicente Carlos, Melvin Mendoza,
Francisco
Cancio and Jimmy Durante, and to direct the Commission on Audit [COA]
to
conduct further rigid and extensive investigation on the alleged
irregularities
or anomalies stated in its report dated November 15, 1993 and to submit
its report on such investigation including pertinent papers thereof,
which
shall be included in the re-evaluation of the existing documents
pertaining
to the PYHSDFI before the case of the above respondents be re-submitted
to this Commission for resolution;
[3] To order the Law
Department to summon Atty. Tiburcio A. Relucio, former Regional
NCR-DILG
Director to shed light on the Kilosbayan complaint or the P70 million
which
were allotted by his office to the PYHSDFI shortly before the May 11,
1992
synchronized national and local elections;
[4] To direct the Law
Department to send a letter to former DILG Secretary Cesar Sarino to
explain
allotments and sub-allotments per evaluation report of the Law
Department;
(and)
[5] To direct the
Kilosbayan
to identify, under oath, the John Does in their complaint.[29]
Dismissing the case against
respondent Enriquez, whose evidence of strict compliance with the
requirements
of R. A. No. 7180 prior to the release of the Seventy Million Pesos to
PYHSDFI, was significantly left unrebutted by petitioner Kilosbayan,
the
Comelec en banc reserved the disposition of the case against
Ronaldo
Puno and other PYHSDFI officers until after submission by the COA of a
more detailed report of the nature and extent of the anomalous
practices
of the PYHSDFI in the utilization of the CDF money allocated thereto.
Easily
understandable is the need for further investigation by the COA
considering
that nothing on the Special Audit Report on PYHSDFI's CDF allocation
imputed
the use thereof for electioneering activities.
In response, however,
to the letter of the Comelec Law Department dated August 20, 1995
requesting
the COA to conduct a more rigid and extensive investigation, COA
Chairman
Celso Gangan wrote Director Balbuena on September 12, 1995 that "the
facts
stated in our report dated November 15, 1993 are already complete; that
the report does not make mention of irregularities or anomalies, rather
deficiencies like lack of supporting documents to fully substantiate
the
disbursements although the distribution of funds by the Foundation is
supported
by a list."[30]
On the same day, August
20, 1995, a letter was also sent to respondent Cesar Sarino, former
DILG
Secretary, requesting him to submit a verified explanation regarding
the
sub-allotments issued by his office on several dates in February and
March,
1992, as well as some various sub-allotments issued by respondent
Leonora
de Jesus, then Undersecretary of the DILG. In the meantime, in a
letter dated August 18, 1995, Director Balbuena asked petitioner
Kilosbayan
to "identify, under oath, the John Does in their complaint". Responding
through a letter[31],
petitioner Kilosbayan, through its Acting President, Cirilo Rigos, gave
the following names:
Cesar Sarino
Victor Sumulong
Leonora de Jesus
Dionisio de la Serna
Jose Almonte
Gabriel Claudio
Franklin Drilon
The above-named respondents
were duly subpoenaed. Thereafter, they filed their respective Comments
and/or Answers.
On November 13, 1995,
respondent Cesar Sarino submitted his Sworn Explanation/Comment
remonstrating
that the questioned sub-allocations were approved after a strict
compliance
with the proscribed time frame under the law which was March 27, 1992
until
May 2, 1992 and the prohibition against public work expenditures.cralaw:red
Respondent Gabriel Claudio
filed his Comment/Answer on December 12, 1995 contending that he had
not
yet joined government at any time before the May 11, 1992 elections.cralaw:red
Respondent Franklin
Drilon filed his Comment on January 29, 1996 denouncing as hearsay the
sole evidence against him consisting of Teodoro Benigno's newspaper
articles
implicating him in the SHO.
Dionisio de la Serna,
Victor Sumulong and Jose Almonte, who were additionally named as
respondents
by petitioner Kilosbayan, denied any knowledge or participation in the
election offenses subject of the letter-complaint and objected thereto
for failure to state, with particularity, the acts that they had
supposedly
committed in violation of the Omnibus Election Code. Likewise, they
pointed
out that Teodoro Benigno's newspaper articles constituted hearsay
evidence
bereft of any probative value.cralaw:red
Insofar as respondent,
then DILG-NCR Regional Director, Tiburcio Relucio was concerned, the
Law
Department was unable to subpoena him because he was abroad. No
rebuttal
evidence was tendered by petitioner Kilosbayan to dispute the
counter-allegations
of herein respondents. Notably, too, petitioner Kilosbayan did not
offer
any additional evidence, in place of Teddy Benigno's published
newspaper
articles implicating PYHSDFI's Ronaldo Puno and the SHO's
electioneering
activities during the 1992 elections, in order to show even some
semblance
of a connection between the PYHSDFI's CDF allotment and the SHO's
electioneering
activities.cralaw:red
On April 3, 1996, the
Comelec Law Department issued the following findings and
recommendations:
SYNOPSIS OF CASE
[1] TITLE:
KILOSBAYAN VS.
SECRETARY
SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, JR., ET AL.chanrobles virtual law library [2] DOCKET NUMBER
[3] LAW ALLEGEDLY
VIOLATED:
Section 261 (o),
(v) and (w) of the Omnibus Election Code. [Use of public funds, money
deposited
in trust for an election campaign; Prohibition against release,
disbursement
or expenditure of public funds for any and all kinds of public works;
and
Prohibition against construction of public works, delivery of materials
for public works and issuance of treasury warrants and similar devices].chanrobles virtual law library [4] FINDINGS:
The Law
Department
finds that there is insufficient ground to engender a well-founded
belief
that respondents Ronaldo Puno, Secretary Vicente Carlos, Melvin
Mendoza,
Francisco Cancio, Jimmy Durante, Hon. Cesar N. Sarino, Leonora V. de
Jesus,
Jose Almonte, Dionisio de la Serna, Victor Sumulong, Franklin Drilon
and
Gabriel [Gabby] Claudio have committed the acts being complained of and
are probably guilty thereof and should be held for further proceedings
[trial] considering that the allegations in the complaint are plain
conjectures,
speculations and based on hearsay evidence. The other set of evidence
which
was obtained through coercive processes of the Commission did not show
that the acts are reflected therein come within the proscription of
Section
261 (o), (v) and (w) of the Omnibus Election Code.chanrobles virtual law library [5] RECOMMENDATION:
To dismiss the
complaint
of Kilosbayan against all the respondents.chanrobles virtual law library
The details of the investigation
and a complete discussion of the evidence submitted by the contending
parties
are laid out in the 16-page Study[33]
attached to the aforecited Synopsis of the Case. Essentially, the Law
Department
evaluated the evidence in this wise:
The provisions of
the Omnibus Election Code that may have been possibly violated by the
respondents
in the KILOSBAYAN complaint, are as follows:
Sec. 261.
Prohibited
Acts the following shall be guilty of an election offense.chanrobles virtual law library
(o) Use of
public
funds, money deposited in trust, equipment, facilities owned or
controlled
by the government for an election campaign. Any person who uses
under
any guise whatsoever, directly or indirectly, (1)) public funds or
money
deposited with, or held in trust by; public financing institutions or
by
government offices, banks, or agencies; for any election campaign or
for
any partisan political activity.chanrobles virtual law library
(v) Prohibition
against release, disbursement or expenditure of public funds. Any
public official or employee including barangay officials and those of
government-owned
or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, who, during
forty-five
days before a regular election and thirty days before special election,
releases, disburses or expends any public funds for:
(1) Any and
all
kinds of public works, except the Following:
(w) Prohibition
against construction of public works, delivery of materials for public
works and issuance of treasury warrants and similar devices.
during
the period of forty-five days preceding a regular election and thirty
days
before a special election, any person who (a) undertakes the
construction
of any public works, except for projects or works exempted in the
preceding
paragraph; or (b) issues, uses or avails of treasury warrants or any
device
undertaking future delivery of money, goods or other things of value
chargeable
against public funds.chanrobles virtual law library
The Commission on Audit,
thru its Chairman, pointed out in its letter dated September 12, 1995,
that the facts stated in their report dated November 15, 1993 are
already
complete and that the report does not make mention of irregularities or
anomalies, rather deficiencies like lack of supporting documents to
fully
substantiate the disbursements, such that although the distribution of
funds by the Foundation is supported by a list, this does not show the
acknowledgment by the supposed recipients.
Although the report
of the COA dated November 15, 1993 mentioned that upon the start of the
audit, it was disclosed that PYHSDFI did not keep book of accounts,
wherein
to record its transactions, which constitute[s] a basic requirement in
the accounting for funds and "all it had to evidence its disbursements
are vouchers, many of which are not supported by receipts or other
documents",
it does not show that the public funds released to it by the DILG was
used
for any election campaign or for any partisan political activity. The
report
says:
2) The inadequate
financial
reports, book of accounts and other supporting documents rendered
verification
of total disbursements of P70M difficult.
This consist of the following:
[a] Meals/snacks
P14,465,000
[b] Prof.
fees/allowances
travel expenses P17,881,500
[c] Rental
site/facilities
P3,441,480
[d] Purchases of
supplies
and materials P34,221,020
P70,000,000
This particular part of
the report of the COA also clearly showed that the public funds in the
hands of the PYHSDFI were not used for any and all kinds of public
works.
Further it says:
[3] In
most of the transactions undertaken, cash payments [were] used in
paying
their obligations, since it would have been significantly expensive in
overhead cost to maintain a pool of administrative staff and besides no
allocation of such expenses [was] programmed. Moreover, most of [the]
expenses
were in the category of payrolls which [had] to be paid in cash.
[L]ikewise
suppliers asked for cash-on-delivery (COD) basis since the prices given
were the lowest obtainable commercial rates.
This showed that not all
obligations of the PYHSDFI were paid in cash, in other words, the other
obligations were paid in other forms which may be checks or any other
device
undertaking future delivery of money. However, no single piece of
evidence
was presented by Kilosbayan to prove its complaint to determine whether
they [checks] have been issued within the prohibited period.In the light of the
foregoing,
the Law Department reiterates its former findings in its Study for
Agenda
dated February 8, 1995 that "in the case of respondents Ronaldo Puno,
Secretary
Vicente Carlos, Melvin Mendoza, Francisco Cancio and Jimmy Durante,
based
on the existing documents appearing on the records, no probable cause
exists
against them for violation of the election law". It is well-settled
that
the complainant must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on
the
weakness of the evidence of the respondent[s].
In the case of Hon.
Cesar N. Sarino, he alleged that his approvals of the sub-allocations
reflect
a strict compliance with the law and do not violate Section 261 [v] of
the Omnibus Election Code as their approval (was) not within the
proscribed
time frame as designated by the Commission on Elections, and Advice of
Sub-Allotment No. DILG-92-2-128 covers a type of expenditure which is
not
a public works expenditure, hence, not violative of said provision of
law.cralaw:red
xxx xxx
xxx
xxx [A]n incisive, careful,
meticulous and rigid review and re-evaluation of the above-listed
sub-allotments
revealed, that the nine (9) sub-allotments approved by former DILG
Secretary
Cesar Sarino which appeared to be for construction of public works are
actually nine (9) pages of five (5) sub-allotments and the one (1)
sub-allotment
issued by Undersecretary Leonora V. de Jesus which appeared to be for
construction
of public works is actually:
(b) Sub-allotment No.
Date of Approval Panel No.cralaw:red
[1] 92-1-90 March 19,
1992
To be liable for violation
of Section 261 (v), supra, four (4) essential elements must concur and
they are:
(1) A public official
or employee releases, disburses, or expends any public funds;
(2) The release,
disbursement
or expenditure of such public funds must be within forty-five days
before
regular election (March 27, 1992 until May 11, 1992, Section 1, Comelec
Resolution No. 2332, Jan. 02, 1992);
(3) The release,
disbursement
or expenditure of said public funds is for any and all kinds of public
works; and
(4) The release,
disbursement
or expenditure of the public funds should not clover any of the
exceptions
of Section 261 (v).
Except for Sub-Allotment
No. 92-1-94 and Sub-Allotment No. 92-2-128 approved on March 27, 1992
and
April 22, 1992, respectively, by former DILG Secretary Cesar Sarino,
not
one of the sub-allotments listed above does fall within the proscribed
period. Sub-allotment No. 92-1-98 was approved to cover the
improvement/rehabilitation
of Cabucgayan Waterworks System of Cabucgayan, Leyte. This falls within
the exception (maintenance of existing and/or completed public works
projects)
of the proscription being merely a rehabilitation of an existing public
works project. Sub-Allotment No. 92-2-128 was not for any and all kinds
of public works. It was approved to cover the purchase of reference and
instructional materials for distribution to all local executives of the
2nd District of Surigao del Norte in support of the Educational
Upliftment
Program of the DILG, hence, it could not also fall within the
proscription.
The sub-allotment approved by Undersecretary Leonora V. de Jesus, which
appeared to be for the construction of public works, having been
approved
on March 19, 1992 does not fall within the proscriptive period, hence,
it could not also fall within the proscription.
xxx xxx
xxx
Prescinding from the
foregoing documents appearing on [the] records, there exists no
sufficient
ground to engender a well-founded belief that former DILG Secretary
Cesar
Sarino and Undersecretary Leonora V. de Jesus have violated Section 261
(v) of the Omnibus Election Code. The
Law Department must stress here that the allegations appearing in the
columns
of Teodoro Benigno in the Philippine Star on several dates imputing
dirty
"election tricks and practices" [as worded by Kilosbayan] against
respondents
Jose Almonte, Dionisio de la Serna, Victor Sumulong, Franklin Drilon
and
Gabriel [Gabby] Claudio cannot be admitted as gospel truth because they
are purely speculative and conjectural. Suffice it to say, that, they
are
mere hearsay evidence. Well-settled is the rule that Newspaper
clippings
are hearsay and of no evidentiary value. [People vs. Jovito Aguel, et
al.,
97 SCRA 795].cralaw:red
Moreover, former Executive
Secretary, now, Senator, Franklin Drilon's undated letter, where he
approved
the request for authority dated March 17, 1992 of then former DILG
Secretary
Cesar N. Sarino to negotiate, enter into and sign Memoranda of
Agreements
with and to utilize the accredited Non-Governmental Organizations
[NGOs],
in accordance with the directive of then former President Corazon
Aquino
dated March 13, 1992, regarding the implementation of projects under
the
Countrywide Development Fund [CDF] provided under R. A. 7180, does not
refer to any release, disbursement, or expenditure of public funds for
construction of public works.cralaw:red
Consequently, there
also exists no sufficient evidence to engender a well-grounded belief
that
respondents Jose Almonte, Dionisio de La Serna, Victor Sumulong,
Franklin
Drilon and Gabriel [Gabby] Claudio have violated Section 261 (o) and
(v)
of the Omnibus Election Code.cralaw:red
It would not be amiss
to state here in passing that well-enshrined is the rule that the
complainant
must submit evidence to prove his case. Iin the instant case,
complainant
KILOSBAYAN did not submit evidence to prove its case. It postulates the
theory that since it is the constitutional power of the Commission to
enforce
and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of
elections,
it is incumbent to use its constitutional power to secure the needed
evidence.
This position of the KILOSBAYAN is patently erroneous as it is not only
its legal obligation but also its moral duty to submit its evidence to
prove its complaint.[34]
Adopting the foregoing
findings and conclusions of the Law Department, the Comelec en banc
promulgated Minute Resolution No. 96-1037 dismissing the charges
against
the following: respondents Ronaldo Puno, Vicente Carlos, Melvin
Mendoza,
Francisco Cancio and Jimmy Durante for violation of Section 261 (o),
(v)
and (w) of the Omnibus Election Code; respondents Cesar Sarino and
Leonora
de Jesus for violation of Section 261 (v) of the Omnibus Election Code;
and respondent Franklin Drilon and others also charged in petitioner's
complaint, namely, Jose Almonte, Dionisio de la Serna, Victor Sumulong
and Gabriel Claudio, for violation of Section 261 (o) and (v) of the
Omnibus
Election Code, all on the ground of insufficiency of evidence to
establish
probable cause.cralaw:red
Petitioner Kilosbayan,
however, brushed off responsibility for adducing evidence of herein
respondents'
culpability, and adamantly demanded that the Comelec perform its
constitutional
duty of prosecution election offenses upon any, even meager,
information
of alleged commission of election offenses. Its
complaint having been dismissed in the aforementioned Resolutions dated
February 9, 1995 and April 11, 1996, respectively, petitioner filed a
Motion
for Reconsideration dated May 16, 1997 and a Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration
dated June 7, 1996 seeking the nullification of the said Resolution and
praying for the filing of the corresponding criminal complaints and/or
informations against herein respondents.cralaw:red
Reiterating the dismissal
of E. O. Case No. 93-193, however, the Comelec denied the motions in
the
Resolution dated October 30, 1996.[35]
The Comelec Resolution
dated January 20, 1997 contained the detailed basis for the final
dismissal
of E.O. Case No. 93-193. Discussing point by point the arguments raised
by petitioner in its Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion
for Reconsideration, the Comelec en banc unanimously held,
thus:
Movant complains:
The Law Department
makes
it appear that the KILOSBAYAN has greater responsibility in the
enforcement
of election laws than the COMELEC to make it its moral and legal duty
to
spend its time and private funds to gather evidence from public offices
to convince the COMELEC that there is sufficient evidence to establish
the guilt of the respondents.
xxx
xxx
xxx
It may do well to
remember
that the Constitution charged the COMELEC with the responsibility to.
xxx
xxx
xxx
(6) where
appropriate,
prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or
omissions
constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices. [Emphasis
theirs]
The Commission has
no
quarrel with complainant that indeed the Constitution tasked this Body
with the prosecution of election offenses. But the constitutional
provision
made it clear that the prosecution should be made only where it is
appropriate.
It is appropriate when it is established in a preliminary investigation
that probable cause exist to justify the filing of the necessary
information
against the accused.
Lest the
complainant
forgets, it initiated the complaint. Thus, on it rests the burden of
supporting
its charges with affidavits and/any evidence, for it is upon the
evidence
thus adduced, that the investigating officer shall determine whether or
not there is sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial. This
is
so provided under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Nonetheless,
even
with Complainant's failure to submit evidence substantial enough to
justify
findings of probable cause, the Commission, through its Law Department
undertook an investigation of the case. The Law Department summoned the
parties, took testimonies of witnesses, secured documents, and
conducted
hearings. The result of the preliminary investigation was certainly on
the basis of the evidences adduced by complainant and the facts
gathered
by the Department on its own initiative.
xxx
xxx
xxx
No other evidence
except
Mr. Benigno's articles were submitted [by petitioner] to prove the
existence
of the so-called Sulo Hotel Operations. "Newspaper clippings are
hearsay
and of no evidentiary value." [People v. Aquel, et al97 SCRA 795]
xxx
[Further] xxx [petitioner] wants the Commission to derive from [the
Commission
on Audit] report the conclusion that because there were discrepancies,
to wit: 1. No books of accounts (were) maintained by the NGO [i.e.,
PHYSDFI]; and 2. Cash payments were made regardless of amount, then the
allocation to PHYSDFI were made for electioneering purposes. Indeed,
there
could have been, as alleged by Complainant, irregularities in the
allocation,
but it must be shown by the quantum of evidence required to establish
probable
cause that such irregularities constituted election offense. This,
Complainant's
evidences failed to show.
xxx
xxx
xxx
It was established
that
the PHYSDFI received from DILG-NCR an allocation of P70 Complainant
"the
nature" of the allocation and the amount of the expenditures' made by
PHYSDFI
"within a short period of time, i.e., immediately before the
elections
and in the light of the fact that it stopped all its operations shortly
after the elections' established beyond reasonable doubt that the
foundation
was engaged in partisan political activity. Complainant further averred
that the "flight of the heads of the foundation [Puno and Catindig] and
Regional Director Tiburcio A. Relucio who went into hiding after the
series
of exposes by columnist Teodoro Benigno constitutes an implied
admission
of guilt.
It is the Law
Department's
findings and so is Ours, that the nature and amount of expenditure
within
a short period of time are not sufficient to meet the quantum proof
required
to establish that said contributions were made for partisan political
activity.
It must be emphasized that the burden is on Kilosbayan to prove its
allegations.
He who alleges must prove his allegation. Unfortunately for
complainant,
it was not able to produce evidence showing that the contribution was
used
for partisan political activity.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Complainant posits
the
view that respondents are liable because the sports and medical kits
were
unlawful election propaganda, having been purchased and distributed a
few
days before election and then stopped after the election. At most, this
is speculative and presumptive. In the absence of proof amply showing
that
the purchase and distribution of gadgets and kits were made to
advertise
or to further the chances of victory of a candidate or candidates, the
Commission cannot justify the conclusion that probable cause exists to
charge respondents
xxx
xxx
xxx
While it was
established
by documents thus presented that there was a release of public funds by
DILG/DILG-NCR, within the prohibited period, the same could not be
considered
as a violation because one, the expenditure was not for public works;
and
two, the Department of Interior and Local Government can not be
considered
as an office of other ministries [departments] performing functions
similar
to the Ministry of Social Services and Development or the Ministry of
Human
Settlements.
Kilosbayan's
complaints
were heard. They were investigated. Complainant was given opportunity
to
argue its case and prove its charges. It presented arguments but not
evidences.
Its thesis is more on speculations, conjectures and suspicions. It
expects
the Commission to find as circumstantial evidence the chain of
circumstances
which [it] presented, forgetting that:
The rule on
circumstantial
evidence necessarily requires that each circumstance must be positively
established with the requisite quantum of evidence, in the same manner
that the catena that binds them together and conduces to a conclusion
of
guilt must survive the test of reason and satisfy the required
evidentiary
weight. [People vs. Adofina, 239 SCRA 67]. Unfortunately,
Complainant
failed to substantiate with sufficient evidence the circumstances on
which
it based the liability of respondents for offenses charged by way of
its
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.[36]
Its Motion for Reconsideration
and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration having been finally denied
by the Comelec En Banc, petitioner Kilosbayan has come before us
ascribing
grave abuse of discretion to public respondent Comelec for: [1]
refusing
and/or neglecting to gather more evidence of respondents' culpability,
pursuant to its constitutional duty to prosecute election offenses,
through
oral arguments upon petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration and
Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration as well as from respondents Ronaldo Puno and
Tiburcio Relucio who, petitioner claims, have not gone abroad but are
actually
in the country; and [2] for issuing a blanket exoneration of all
respondent
despite the prima facie evidence already in the hands of the
Comelec.
The Comelec did not
commit any act constituting grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
petitioner
Kilosbayan's letter-complaint against herein respondents, the former
having
failed to prove its case against the latter. As such, this petition
must
be dismissed.cralaw:red
Section 2 [7] of Article
IX-C of the 1987 Constitution provides that the Comelec shall exercise
the power to "investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of
violations
of elections laws, including act or omissions constituting election
frauds,
offenses, and malpractices". Discerning the rationale for this grant of
prosecutorial powers to the Comelec, we already had occasion to rule,
thus:
The grant to the COMELEC
of the power, among others, to enforce and administer all laws relative
to the conduct of election and the concomitant authority to investigate
and prosecute election offenses is not without compelling reason. The
evident
constitutional intendment in bestowing this power to the COMELEC is to
insure the free, orderly and honest conduct of elections, failure of
which
would result in the frustration of the true will of the people and make
a mere idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified
citizen
to vote.[37]
This constitutional
grant of prosecutorial power in the Comelec finds statutory expression
under Section 265 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the
Omnibus
Election Code, to wit:
"Sec. 265. Prosecution.
The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have
the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all
election
offenses punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same. The
Commission
may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the
government:
Provided, however, That in the event that the Commission fails to act
on
any complaint within four months from his filing, the complainant may
file
the complaint with the office of the fiscal or with the Ministry of
Justice
for proper investigation and prosecution, if warranted."
Insofar as the prosecution
of election offenses is concerned, therefore, the Comelec is the
"public
prosecutor with the exclusive authority to conduct the preliminary
investigation
and the prosecution of election offenses punishable under the [Omnibus
Election] Code before the competent court."[38]
This constitutional and statutory mandate for the Comelec to
investigate
and prosecute cases of violation of election laws translates, in
effect,
to the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigations in cases
involving
election offenses for the twin purpose of filing an information in
court
and helping the Judge determine, in the course of preliminary inquiry,
whether or not a warrant of arrest should be issued.[39]
For the effective investigation
and prosecution of cases of election offenses and in the exercise by
the
Comelec of its quasi-legislative power under Section 6, Article IX of
the
1987 Constitution, the Comelec Rules of Procedure were promulgated,
providing,
among others, the guidelines pertinent to election offenses. They are
as
follows:
Rule 34 Prosecution
of Election Offenses.-
Sec. 1. Authority
of the Commission to Prosecute Election Offenses.- The
Commission
shall have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of
all election offenses punishable under the election laws and to
prosecute
the same, except as may otherwise be provided by law.
Sec. 2. Continuing
Delegation of Authority to Other Prosecution Arms of the Government.-
The Chief State Prosecutor, all Provincial and City Fiscals, and/or
their
respective assistants are hereby given continuing authority, as
deputies
of the Commission, to conduct preliminary investigation of complaints
involving
election offenses under the election laws which may be filed directly
with
them, or which may be indorsed to them by the commission or its duly
authorized
representatives and to prosecute the same. Such authority may be
revoked
or withdrawn any time by the Commission whenever in its judgment such
revocation
or withdrawal is necessary to protect the integrity of the Commission,
promote the common good, or when it believes that successful
prosecution
of the case can be done by the Commission.
Sec. 3. Initiation
of Complaint.- Initiation of complaint for election offenses
may be done motu proprio by the Commission, or upon written complaint
by
any citizen of the Philippines, candidate, registered political party,
coalition of political parties or organizations under the party-list
system
or any accredited citizen arms of the Commission.
Sec. 4. Form
of Complaint
and Where to File. - (a) When not initiated motu propio by the
Commission,
the complaint must be verified and supported by affidavits and/or any
other
evidence. Motu proprio complaints may be signed by the
Chairman
of the Commission, or the Director of the Law Department upon direction
of the chairman, and need not be verified.
(b) The complaint
shall
be filed with the Law Department of the Commission; or with the offices
of the Election Registrars.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Sec. 5. Referral
for Preliminary Investigation.- If the complaint is initiated
motu proprio by the Commission, or is filed with the Commission by any
aggrieved party, it shall be referred to the Law Department for
investigation.
Upon direction of the Chairman of the Commission, the preliminary
investigation
may be delegated to any lawyer of said Department, or to any of the
Regional
Election Directors or Provincial Election Supervisors, or any lawyer of
the Commission.
Sec. 6. Conduct
of
Preliminary Investigation.- (a) If on the basis of the
complaint,
affidavits and the supporting evidence, the investigating officer finds
no ground to continue with the inquiry, he shall recommend the
dismissal
of the complaint and shall follow the procedure prescribed in Section 8
(c) of this Rule. Otherwise, he shall issue a subpoena to the
respondent,
attaching thereto a copy of the complaint, affidavits and other
supporting
documents giving said respondent ten (10) days from receipt within
which
to submit counter-affidavits and other supporting documents. The
respondent
shall have the right to examine all other evidence submitted by the
complainant.
(b) Such
counter-affidavits
and other supporting evidence submitted by the respondent shall be
furnished
by him to the complainant.
(c) If the
respondent
cannot he subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does not submit
counter-affidavits
within the ten-dry period, the investigating officer shall base his
resolution
on the evidence presented by the complainant.
(d) If the
investigating
officer believes that there are matters to be clarified, he may set a
hearing
to propound clarification questions to the parties or their witnesses,
during which the parties shall be afforded an opportunity to be present
but without the right to examine or cross-examine. If the parties so
desire,
they may submit questions to the investigating officer which the latter
may propound to the parties or witnesses concerned.
(e) Thereafter,
the
investigation shall be deemed concluded, and the investigating officer
shall resolve the case within ten (10) days therefrom. Upon the
evidence
thus adduced, the investigating officer shall determine whether or not
there is sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial.
Sec. 7. Presumption
of Existence of Probable Cause.- A complaint initiated motu
proprio by the Commission is presumed to be based on sufficient
probable
cause and the investigating officer must forthwith issue the subpoena
mentioned
in the immediately preceding section.
Sec. 8. Duty
of Investigating
Officer.- The preliminary investigation must be terminated
within
twenty (20) days after receipt of the counter-affidavits and other
evidence
of the respondents, and resolution thereof shall be made within five
(5)
days thereafter.
(a) If the
investigating
officer finds no cause to hold the respondent for trial, he shall
recommend
dismissal of the complaint.
(b) If the
investigating
officer finds cause to hold the respondent for trial, he shall prepare
the resolution, and the corresponding information wherein he shall
certify
under oath that he has examined the complainant and his witnesses, that
there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed
and
that the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence
submitted
against him and that he was given an opportunity to submit
controverting
evidence.
(c) In either
case,
the investigating officer shall, within five (5) days from the
rendition
of his recommendation, forward the records of the case to:
1) The Director
of
the Law Department of the Commission in cases investigated by any of
the
Commission lawyers or field personnel; and
2) The Stale
Prosecutor,
Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal, as the case may be, pursuant to the
continuing
authority provided for in Section 2 of this Rule.
Sec. 9. Duty of
the Law Department, State Prosecutor, Provincial or City Fiscal Upon
Receipt
of Records.- (a) Within ten (10) days from receipt of the
records
stated in paragraph (c) of the immediately preceding section, the State
Prosecutor, Provincial or City Fiscal shall take appropriate action
thereon,
immediately informing the parties of said action.
(b) In cases
investigated
by the lawyers or the field personnel of the Commission, the Director
of
the Law Department shall review and evaluate the recommendation of said
legal officer, prepare a report and make a recommendation to the
Commission
affirming, modifying or reversing the same which shall be included in
the
agenda of the succeeding meeting en banc of the Commission. If
the
Commission approves the filing of an information in court against the
respondent/s,
the Director of the Law Department shall prepare and sign the
information
for immediate filing with the appropriate court.
(c) In all other
cases,
if the recommendation to dismiss or the resolution to file the case in
court is approved by State Prosecutor, Provincial or City Fiscal, they
shall likewise approve the Information prepared and immediately cause
its
filing with the proper court.
(d) If the
recommendation
to dismiss is reversed on the ground that a probable cause exists, the
State Prosecutor, or the Provincial or City Fiscal, may, by himself
prepare
and file the corresponding information against the respondent or direct
any of his assistants to do so without conducting another preliminary
investigation.
xxx
xxx
xxx(Emphasis ours).
The Comelec, whenever any
election offense charge is filed before it, must have first, before
dismissing
the same or filing the corresponding information, conducted the
preliminary
investigation proper of the case. At this initial stage of criminal
prosecution,
is the determination of probable cause, i.e., whether or not
there
is reason to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged
and, therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense,
rigors
and embarrasment of trial[40]
or as the Comelec Rules of Procedure phrase it, whether or not "there
is
reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed."[41]
The determination of
probable cause in any criminal prosecution, is made indispensable by
the
Bill of Rights which enshrines every citizen's right to due process,
the
presumption that he is presumed innocent, and the inadmissibility
against
him of any damaging evidence obtained in violation of his right against
self-incrimination. As Justice Reynato S. Puno has pointed out,
probable
cause is neither an "opaque concept in our jurisdiction"[42]
or a "high level legal abstraction to be the subject of warring
thoughts"[43]
It constitutes those "facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed"[44]
by the person sought to be judicially indicted. In determining probable
cause, however, the public prosecutor must have been apprised by the
complainant
of his evidence in support of his accusatory allegations. In other
words,
determining probable cause is an intellectual activity premised on the
prior physical presentation or submission of documentary or testimonial
proofs either confirming, negating or qualifying the allegations in the
complaint.cralaw:red
It follows, therefore,
that in the instant case, petitioner Kilosbayan must have necessarily
tendered
evidence, independent of and in support of the allegations in its
letter-complaint,
of such quality as to engender belief in an ordinarily prudent and
cautious
man that the offense charged therein has been committed by herein
respondents.
Indeed probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing
evidence
of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable
doubt
and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt[45],
but it certainly demands more than "bare suspicion"[46]
and can never be "left to presupposition, conjecture, or even
convincing
logic."[47]
The efforts of petitioner Kilosbayan, thus, in order to successfully
lead
to the judicial indictment of respondents, should have gone beyond a
largely
declamatory condemnation of respondents and diligently focused on its
two-fold
obligation of not only substantiating its charges against respondents
but
also proffering before the Comelec substantial evidence of respondents'
utilization, through conspiratorial, cooperative and/or interrelated
acts,
of Seventy Million Pesos from the CDF for electioneering activities in
violation of the pertinent provisions on election offenses as
enumerated
in the Omnibus Election Code.cralaw:red
In the dispensation
of this obligation, however, petitioner Kilosbayan utterly failed. The
encompassing narration of the pertinent facts and circumstances of this
case in the early part of this ponencia indubitably shows the
complacency,
at the least, and the gross and deliberate negligence, at the most, of
petitioner Kilosbayan in presenting sufficient evidence in support of
its
letter-complaint. To
salvage its position, however, petitioner Kilosbayan denies the
existence,
under the 1987 Constitution, of any obligation on its part to present
any
evidence of its accusations against respondents in its
letter-complaint.
Petitioner Kilosbayan asserts that it is the obligation of the Comelec
to search for the evidence needed to judicially indict respondents
because
it is the agency empowered to investigate and prosecute cases involving
election offenses; that E. O. Case No. 93-193 should, at any rate, be
deemed
one filed by the Comelec motu proprio, thus needing no evidence since
probable
cause is such a case is presumed, petitioner Kilosbayan having only
"requested"
for an investigation and the Comelec having proceeded to in fact hold
the
investigation, as "requested" by petitioner Kilosbayan; and that the
Comelec
should already be grateful to petitioner Kilosbayan for the latter's
private
efforts at exposing respondents' illegal election activities.cralaw:red
Kilosbayan's position
is not tenable.cralaw:red
Indeed, Kilosbayan truly
deserves commendation for its continued vigilance against any and all
forms
of government corruption that cost this country not only the funds
gravely
needed to afford each Filipino a decent and honorable life, but also
the
moral resolve to unite with each other and resist and eradicate the
growing
culture of greed, abuse of power and blatant disregard for basic human
dignity and social responsibility. But it must guard against arrogance
in trumpeting its causes, if not recklessness in its advocacy.cralaw:red
The claim of petitioner
Kilosbayan that it is merely the "informant" and not the private
complainant
with the burden to prove probable cause, borders on the ridiculous.
Kilosbayan
filed before the Comelec a letter-complaint dated December 14, 1993 in
support of which documentary evidences like copies of Teodoro Benigno's
newspaper articles on the SHO's use of PYHSDFI-obtained CDF, of
respondent
Enriquez's testimony before the Commission on Appointments, of DILG
Budget
Officer Barata's testimony before the Senate Finance Committee, and of
Norberto Gonzales' affidavit, were likewise submitted by petitioner.
The
letter-complaint not being verified, it is not disputed that petitioner
Kilosbayan subsequently caused its verification; when later asked to
give
the names of the other John Does in its letter-complaint, petitioner
Kilosbayan
obliged with a list, under oath, of additional respondents. Petitioner
Kilosbayan initiated the complaint against herein respondents, hence
the
docketing thereof as E.O. Case No. 93-193; it filed numerous pleadings
before the Comelec as a private complainant in E. O. Case No. 93-193;
it
proceeded in the case in accordance with the Comelec Rules of Procedure
pertinent to the prosecution of cases of election offenses. After all,
the Kilosbayan should have presented evidence and not proceeded and
relied
on mere conjecture and hearsay evidence.cralaw:red
The contention of petitioner
Kilosbayan that it is the Comelec that is duty-bound to search
for
evidence to prove its letter-complaint is downright erroneous.
The
task of the Comelec as investigator and prosecutor, acting upon any
election
offense complaint, is not the physical searching and gathering of proof
in support of a complaint for an alleged commission of an election
offense.
A complainant, who in effect accuses another person of having committed
an act constituting an election offense, has the burden, as it is his
responsibility,
to follow through his accusation and prove his complainant. If the
complainant
fails to proffer the necessary evidence to show probable cause,
notwithstanding
the lack of denial or any evidence in controversion, of the accusation,
the complaint must be dismissed, since any person accused of a crime is
presumed innocent and does not at all have to make a response or
reaction
to the charges against him.cralaw:red
The Comelec, in acting
upon an election offense complaint in the course of preliminary
investigation,
initially facilitates the confrontation process between the complainant
and the respondents by requiring the submission of and interfacing,
their
respective evidences. Ultimately, the Comelec passes upon the
contending
parties' respective submission and proofs and weighs the fact and
circumstances
established therefrom. Contrary to the asseveration of petitioner
Kilosbayan,
the preliminary investigation is not an occasion for the Comelec to, as
a duty, spoonfeed the complainant with evidence needed to prove its
case.cralaw:red
Finally, we cannot avoid
to point out that no novel legal theory can distract even an ordinary
layman
from the plain dearth of evidence of respondents' culpability on the
record.
There is no proof of the electioneering activities alleged by
petitioner
Kilosbayan to have been perpetrated by PYHSDFI during the May 11, 1992
elections. Petitioner claims that PYHSDFI distributed medical kits and
sports equipment to several youth groups in certain Metro Manila
barangays
for purposes of influencing their vote during the May 11, 1992
elections.
Petitioner, however, vaguely states the places where, the dates when,
the
particular candidate for whose cause, and the general description of
the
people for whose consumption, the distribution of election propaganda
materials
was undertaken. In fact, there is no proof that the medical kits and
sports
equipment were election propaganda materials. This is not surprising
for
there is the barest evidence that this distribution had any taken place
at all.cralaw:red
There is no proof
that PYHSDFI used its cash allocations as an accredited
non-governmental
organization in order to undertake electioneering activities.
Petitioner
likewise did not present proof that said distribution of medical kits
and
sports equipment was for purposes of influencing the votes of certain
groups
of people during the May 11, 1992 elections. Brushing aside these fatal
evidentiary lapses, petitioner insists that PYHSDFI is guilty of using
public funds for electioneering purposes simply because it received its
CDF allocation within a time frame suspiciously so near the May 11,
1992
elections. This CDF allocation, however, has been convincingly shown to
be a legal disbursement of public funds. Significantly, PYHSDFI neither
presented rebuttal evidence or even attempted to argue against the
presumption
of regular performance of official duty on the part of respondents like
Franklin Drilon, Cesar Sarino, and Salvador Enriquez who were then
acting
in their official capacity as heads of their respective departments.cralaw:red
It may even be conceded
that petitioner tells a credible story, it being too much of a
coincidence
for there to be, on the one hand, rumors of electioneering activities
on
the part of PYHSDFI and on the other, genuine cash allotments showing
disbursement
of public funds to the latter so coincidentally close to the May, 1992
elections. However, no matter how believable a story may be, no matter
how possible it could really have been that PYHSDFI was a financial
conduit
for criminal elements working for the interests of a particular
candidate
in the 1992 elections, criminal charges cannot ever be sanctioned by
possibilities
or coffee shop rumors.cralaw:red
In other words, said
cash allocations appear to be evidence of perhaps, a thousand
hypothetical,
though, possible scenarios. But, they are evidence of only one fact:
that
a certain amount of public money was made available to PYHSDFI as it is
rightfully entitled thereto as an accredited non-governmental
organization
at around the same time that the synchronized elections of 1992 were to
be held. But this one fact is certainly no justification to indict
herein
respondent for the election offenses imputed to them.cralaw:red
Lastly, there is no
proof that respondents conspired to have PYSDFI accredited as a
non-government
organization in order to avail itself of public funds to spend for
electioneering
purposes. In order for there to be reasonable ground to believed that a
conspiracy exists among [1] the government officials who set up the
mechanism
for accrediting NGOs to implement the projects under the CDF and to
qualify
the latter to receive CDF allocations; [2] the incorporators and
officers
of the PYHSDFI; and (3) the SHO implicated by Teodoro Benigno in his
newspaper
articles in alleged electioneering activities during the May 11, 1992
elections,
there must be a semblance of evidence linking them to each other. There
is none, however, except for the hearsay evidence consisting of the
aforementioned
newspaper articles. Suffice it to say that although only a low quantum
and quality of evidence is needed to support a finding of probable cause[48],
the same cannot be justified upon hearsay evidence that is never given
any evidentiary or probative value in this jurisdiction.cralaw:red
Incidentally, we note
that although made party respondents in this case, Benito Catindig and
Manuel Calupitan III were not officially made respondents in E. O. Case
No. 93-193 and accordingly not served with subpoena at any time during
the pendency of said before the Comelec. There is no ground, therefore,
to implead Benito Catindig and Manuel Calupitan III in the instant case.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF
THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED, without any
pronouncement
as to costs.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Narvasa, C.J.,
Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Davide, Jr., J.,
concurs in the result.
Romero, Puno and
Panganiban,
JJ., took no part.
Regalado and Francisco,
JJ., are on leave.cralaw:red
______________________________
Endnotes
[1]
Reproduced in the Comment of Respondent Franklin Drilon dated April 11,
1997,p. 3.
[2]
Dated April 24, 1992; signed by Benito R. Catindig, President of
PYHSDFI,
and Tiburcio A. Relucio, Regional Director, DILG-NCR; acknowledged
before
Atty. Nestor Beltran, Notary Public; Rollo, pp. 139-142.
[3]
Special Audit Report dated November 15, 1993, p. 4; Rollo, p. 170.
[4]
Ibid.
[5]
Special Audit Report dated November 15, 1993, p. 4; Rollo, p. 170.
[6]
Id., p. 11; Rollo, p. 177.
[7]
Id., p. 3; Rollo, p. 169.
[8]
Id., p. 3; Rollo, p. 169.
[9]
Id., p. 5; Rollo, p. 171.
[10]
Id., p. 12; Rollo, p. 178.
[11]
Memorandum of Agreement dated April 24, 1992, p. 2; Rollo, p. 140.
[12]
Alleged on p. 5 of the Counter-Affidavit of respondent Salvador
Enriquez
dated May 10, 1994, presented before the Comelec.
[13]
Special Audit Report dated November 15, 1993, p. 10; Rollo, p. 176.
[14]
Letter dated December 14, 1993 p. 1; Rollo, p. 131.
[15]
Ibid.
[16]
Letter, supra, p. 2. Rollo, p. 132.
[17]
Minutes of the Meeting of the Comelec En Banc on December 14, 1993,
Rollo,
p. 133; Minute Resolution No. 94-0286 dated January 27, 1994.
[18]
In a letter dated June 25, 1996 addressed to Jovito Salonga, President
of Kilosbayan, Teodoro Benigno stated: "I know you and Kilosbayan
are engaged in a non-partisan crusade for clean and free
elections.
I would like to help your crusade by telling the truth on matters which
are within my personal knowledge, particularly in connection with my
own
fight against the appointment of Mr. Ronnie Puno as head of Broadcast
City.
I may add that in my judgment, President Corazon C. Aquino had nothing
to do with the Sulo Hotel Operation [SHO], which I exposed in my
columns
in the Philippine Star."; Rollo, p. 164.
[19]
Excerpt from the Minutes of the Regular Meeting of the Comelec En Banc
on March 29, 1994; Rollo, p. 134.
[20]
Ibid.
[21]
Annex "1" of the Comment of respondents Puno, Catindig, Cancio,
Mendoza,
Calupitan and Durante dated February 20, 1995.
[22]
Annexes "2" and "3", supra.
[23]
Annex "A" of the Comment of respondent Vicente Carlos dated April 15,
1997.
[24]
Annex "3" of the Comment of respondents Puno, Catindig, Cancio,
Mendoza,
Calupitan and Durante dated February 20, 1995.
[25]
Annex "4'', supra.
[26]
Order dated June 30, 1994, Annex "7" of the Comment of respondents
Puno,
Catindig, Cancio, Mendoza, Calupitan and Durante dated February 20,
1995.
[27]
Annexes "9" and "10", supra.
[28]
Unanimous Resolution of the Commission En Banc penned by Commissioner
Maambong,
dated October 18, 1994, Annex "14" of the Comment of respondents Puno,
Catindig, Cancio, Mendoza, Calupitan and Durante dated February 20,
1995.
[29]
Excerpt from the Minutes of the Regular En Banc Meeting of the Comelec
held on February 9, 1995; Rollo, pp. 91 and 94.
[30]
Letter dated September 12, 1995, Rollo, p. 145.
[31]
Rollo, pp. 143-144.
[32]
Synopsis of the Case prepared and submitted by Reny C. Ables of the
Comelec
Law Department; Rollo, p. 97.
[33]
Dated April 3, 1996; Rollo, pp. 98-115.
[34]
"In Re: E.O. Case No. 93-193" [Study] dated April 3, 1996, pp. 8-16;
Rollo,
pp. 105-118.
[35]
Excerpt from the Minutes of the Regular En Banc Meeting of the Comelec;
Rollo, p. 114.
[36]
Comelec Resolution dated January 20, 1997, pp. 2-14; Rollo, pp. 117-129.
[37]
Corpus v. Tanodbayan, 149 SCRA 281, 283 [1987]; De Jesus v. People, 120
SCRA 760, 765-766 [1983].
[38]
People v. Delgado, 189 SCRA 715, 721 [1990].
[39]
People v. Inting, 187 SCRA 788, 794 [1990].
[40]
People v. Inting, 187 SCRA 788, 793 [1990].
[41]Section 8 (b), Rule 34, Comelec Rules of Procedure.
[42]
Webb v. De Leon, 247 SCRA 652, 668 [1995].
[43]
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Reynato S. Puno in Roberts, Jr. v. Court
of Appeals, 254 SCRA 307, 353 [1996].
[44]
Webb v. De Leon, supra.
[45]
Id., at 676.
[46]
Ibid. (Cf: Brinegar v. United States, 338 US 160 [149])
[47]
Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 254 SCRA 307, 341 [1996].
[48]
Webb v. De Leon, 247 SCRA 653, 676 [195]. |