EN
BANC
ALFREDO
B.
ENOJAS,
JR.,
Petitioner,
G.
R.
No. 129938
December
12, 1997
-versus-
THE
HONORABLE
COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS
and JOSE R.
RODRIGUEZ,
Respondents.
D
E C I S I O N
REGALADO, J.:
The present petition
for certiorari seeks the reversal of the resolution[1]
issued by respondent Commission on Elections [COMELEC] in SPR Nos. 9-97
and 18-97 which sets aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Palawan, Branch 50, in Special Election Case No. 891 by disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the
Commission
resolves to GRANT, as it hereby GRANTS, the petitions. The respondent
court's
order dated February 19, 1997, denying petitioner's presentation of
evidence,
the order dated March 10, 1997, denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration,
the Decision dated April 21, 1997, the order dated June 17, 1997,
directing
the issuance of a writ of execution, and the writ of execution issued
pursuant
thereto are SET ASIDE.
We order the Regional
Trial Court of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, Branch 50, to proceed
immediately with the trial of Election Case No. 891.
In the meantime,
respondent
Alfredo Enojas, Jr. shall vacate the position of mayor of Roxas,
Palawan,
and the petitioner shall assume said position to restore the parties to
the status quo ante.
This resolution is
immediately executory.
Let the records be
remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings.
The records show that these
facts are not substantially disputed.
1. Petitioner Alfredo
B. Enojas, Jr. and respondent Jose R. Rodriguez were the mayoralty
candidates
for the Municipality of Roxas, Palawan in the May, 1995 elections.
Respondent
Rodriguez reportedly won by forty-eight (48) votes over petitioner
Enojas
and was proclaimed by the Municipal Board of Canvassers for Roxas,
Palawan
as its duly elected mayor.cralaw:red
2. Petitioner Enojas,
Jr. then filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court of
Palawan,
docketed as Special Election Case No. 891, seeking the revision
of
ballots in one hundred two (102) precincts in the municipality.
However,
after the revision of the ballots in thirty-nine (39) precincts,
petitioner
Enojas, Jr., with prior approval of the trial court, withdrew the
remaining
unrevised precincts from the revision proceedings.cralaw:red
3. After petitioner
Enojas, Jr. had filed his Formal Offer of Exhibits and rested his case,
respondent Rodriguez filed, with leave of court, a Motion to Dismiss[2]
alleging, inter alia, that the court had no jurisdiction on the
ground that the protest had not passed through the Katarungang
Pambarangay
and the correct docket fees had not been paid; that based on the
allegations
in the protest and the exhibits formally offered, protestant had no
cause
of action against the protestee because the protest should have been
filed
against the person or persons liable for the alleged errors in the
counting
of votes, that protestant should be deemed to have waived his right to
file the present protest by reason of his failure to file a protest
with
the Board of Election Inspectors and/or Municipal Board of Canvassers,
that the filing of the election protest was premature and should be
dismissed
for forum shopping since there was a pending pre-proclamation protest
filed
with the Municipal Board of Canvassers and the COMELEC, and that the
allegations
in the complaint are ambiguous for failure to make out clearly whether
it is an election contest or a judicial recount.cralaw:red
4. On December 19, 1995,
the trial court granted the motion of respondent Rodriguez on the
ground
of lack of jurisdiction for non-payment of the correct docket fees, and
dismissed Special Election Case No. 891.cralaw:red
5. From said order of
dismissal, petitioner Enojas, Jr. went to respondent COMELEC on a
petition
for certiorari, prohibition and disqualification which was docketed as
SPR No. 1-96. On June 11, 1996, respondent COMELEC issued a resolution
reversing the Order of December 19, 1995 and remanding the case to the
trial court for further proceedings. The lower court thereafter set the
case for reception of the evidence of respondent Rodriguez.cralaw:red
6. On October 11, 1996,
however, petitioner Enojas, Jr. filed an Opposition to the presentation
of evidence by respondent Rodriguez on the ground that the latter is
deemed
to have waived his right to present evidence by reason of the COMELEC's
denial of his motion to dismiss which was previously granted by the
court a quo.
7. On February 19, 1997,
the trial court issued an Order declaring that respondent Rodriguez was
deemed to have waived his right to present evidence, and accordingly
considered
the case submitted for decision.cralaw:red
8. His motion for reconsideration
of the Order of February 19, 1997 having been denied for lack of merit,
respondent Rodriguez filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
before
the COMELEC in SPR No. 9-97 questioning the February 19, 1997 and March
10, 1997 orders of the trial court denying his right to present
evidence.cralaw:red
9. In the meantime,
the trial court rendered a decision dated April 28, 1997, declaring
petitioner
Enojas, Jr. as the winner in the 1995 elections for the position of
mayor
of Roxas, Palawan. On even date, petitioner Enojas, Jr. filed a motion
for execution pending appeal.cralaw:red
10. As a consequence
of the foregoing, the COMELEC issued on April 29, 1997 a temporary
restraining
order (TRO) in SPR No. 9-97 against Presiding Judge Nelia Yap-Fernandez
of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan, Branch 50.cralaw:red
11. On June 17, 1997,
a writ of execution pending appeal was issued by the trial court, upon
motion of protestant and after the expiration of the 20-day TRO issued
by the COMELEC. Accordingly, after posting a bond of P400,000.00,
petitioner
Enojas, Jr. assumed office as municipal mayor of Roxas, Palawan.
12. Respondent Rodriguez
consequently filed another petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus
with the COMELEC, docketed as SPR No. 18-97, questioning the propriety
of the Order of June 17, 1997 which authorized the issuance of a writ
of
execution pending appeal.
In reversing the trial
court and ordering the reception of evidence for respondent
Rodriguez,
respondent COMELEC held as follows:
[R]espondent Enojas
objected to petitioner's presentation of evidence contending that by
filing
a motion to dismiss or demurrers to evidence, petitioner was deemed to
have waived his right to present evidence. Respondent judge upheld such
contention in the questioned orders dated February 19, 1996 and March
10,
1996.
Such ruling is not
only erroneous but constitutes a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. What petitioner filed was not a
demurrer
to evidence but a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Demurrer
to evidence questions the sufficiency of evidence. Thus, as enunciated
by the Supreme Court in the case of Siayngco vs. C[o]stibolo, 27 SCRA
272:
This rule is now
embodied
in the Revised Rules of Court, section 1, Rule 35, captioned Judgment
and
Demurrer to Evidence, which will take effect on January 1, 1964. It is,
therefore, evident that the respondent court, in the case at bar, after
denying the motion to dismiss, for insufficiency of evidence, [demurrer
to evidence], should have permitted the petitioner-defendant to present
his own evidence.
The motion to dismiss on
the ground of jurisdiction can be easily differentiated from a motion
to
dismiss on demurrer to evidence in that, in the latter case, the movant
admits the truth or factual allegations in the complaint and moves for
the dismissal of the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.
The
legal effect and consequence of a demurrer to evidence is that in the
event
that the motion to dismiss on demurrer to evidence is granted and the
order
of dismissal is reversed on appeal, the movant loses his right to
present
evidence in his behalf.
However, in a motion
to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the movant does not
lose
his right to present evidence.cralaw:red
The case of Calabig
vs. Villanueva, 135 SCRA 300 and Demetrio vs. Lopez, 50 Phil 45, cited
by private respondent are inapplicable to the instant case as the
motions
filed therein were demurrers to evidence.[3]
The main issue in this
case, therefore, involves the determination of whether the motion to
dismiss
filed by respondent Rodriguez should be considered as a demurrer to
evidence
by reason of which he is deemed to have waived his right to present
evidence.cralaw:red
We rule in the affirmative.cralaw:red
The present controversy
does not involve a novel issue. As early as the case of Demetrio vs.
Lopez,[4]
wherein after the protestant had introduced his evidence, the
protestee,
before presenting his own, filed a motion to dismiss the protest upon
the
ground that the evidence presented by the protestant did not show that
he had obtained a greater number of votes than the protestee, and
reserving
the right to present his evidence if his motion was decided adversely,
this Court held that:
In regard to the
first
assignment of error, the practice followed in the courts of these
Islands
is to permit the defendant to present a motion for dismissal in
ordinary
cases after the plaintiff has rested, reserving the right to present
his
evidence if the ruling on his motion is adverse to him either in the
first
instance or on appeal. In an election protest proceeding, however,
which
is a summary one, and in which the periods are short and fatal, and
trials
rapid and preferential as the peremptory nature of the litigation so
requires,
the motion for dismissal at that stage of the proceeding must be
considered
as a demurrer to the evidence presented by the protestant, with implied
waiver by the protestee to present his evidence, whatever may be the
ruling,
whether adverse or favorable, either in the first instance or on
appeal,
the court of origin or appellate court having the power to
definitely
decide the protest. If, in the prosecution of election protests the
ordinary
practice were to be followed in regard to the presentation of motions
for
dismissal or of demurrer to the evidence, in the majority of cases, if
not always, the law would be frustrated and the will of the electorate
defeated, to the great detriment of the underlying principles of
representative
government, because, in case of revocation of a ruling sustaining the
motion
of dismissal or the demurrer on appeal, the case would have to be
remanded
to the court below for the continuation of the trial and the
introduction
of evidence by the protestee, thus causing the proceeding to continue
during
the term of the office in question, with the possible result that the
defeated,
and not the elected, candidate would be discharging the office.
In election protests, therefore,
the protestee should not be permitted to present a motion for dismissal
or a demurrer to the evidence of the protestant, unless he waives the
introduction
of his own evidence in case the ruling on his motion or demurrer is
adverse
to him, in which case the court that tries the case must definitely
decide
it.
In the present case,
the motion for dismissal filed by the protestee has the effect of a
demurrer
to the evidence presented by the protestant, he having thereby
impliedly
waived the introduction of his evidence, for which reason the trial
court
did not commit an error in sustaining said motion and definitely
deciding
the case without requiring the protestee to present his evidence. [Emphasis
supplied]
The aforequoted ruling
was reiterated in the later case of Jardiel vs. Commission on
Elections,
et al.[5]
wherein the motion to dismiss filed by the protestee, after the
protestant
had submitted a written offer of evidence, was considered as a demurrer
to the evidence presented. In the succeeding case of Calabig vs.
Villanueva,
etc., et al.,[6]
the foregoing pronouncement was quoted with approval and applied as a
doctrinal
rule.cralaw:red
The instant petition
is substantially on all fours with the three cited cases, and no
compelling
reason exists to warrant an exception thereto. The fact that the motion
to dismiss filed by respondent Rodriguez was initially granted by the
trial
court, but subsequently reversed on appeal by the COMELEC on the basis
of the jurisdictional grounds raised therein, does not warrant a ruling
to the contrary. The reason is that the motion to dismiss filed in this
case did not only raise a couple of defective jurisdictional issues but
likewise challenged and demurred to the sufficiency of the evidence
adduced
therein by petitioner Enojas, through these allegations:
2. This protest is
without any cause of action. It appears from the face of the protest
and
even in the exhibits formally offered, admitting in arguendo that the
same
is admitted by the Court, that the herein protest has no cause of
action.
The allegation in the protest clearly shows that protestant has no
cause
of action against the protestee. Again, granting in arguendo, that the
herein protestant actually garnered more votes than herein protestee,
the
protest should be filed against the person or persons liable against
such
error or errors.[7][Emphasis ours]
and thereafter prayed that
"the herein protest be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, lack of
cause
of action,[8]
nonpayment of correct filing fee, for being premature as the
pre-proclamation
protest is not yet terminated, and the protest is ambig[u]ous whether
it
is for election contest or judicial recount."[9]
Hence, We agree that respondent Rodriguez had waived his right to
present
evidence.
It was respondent COMELEC
which erred in applying the ruling in Siayngco, et al. vs. Costibolo,
et
al.[10]
because that case involved an action for annulment of judgment.
Moreover,
we reject the view of respondent COMELEC that the doctrine in Demetrio
vs. Lopez, ante, is inapplicable to the case at bar. The fact
is
that while what was filed in that case was a motion to dismiss, it was
correctly treated therein by the Court as a demurrer to evidence, hence
it is precisely in point under the position we have taken in this case.cralaw:red
It likewise bears stressing
that a demurrer to evidence under Rule 33 is in the nature of a motion
to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence and is presented
after the plaintiff rests its case. It thus differs from a motion to
dismiss
under Rule 16 which is grounded on preliminary objections and is
presented
at the outset of the case, that is, before a responsive pleading is
filed
by the movant and within the period for the filing thereof.cralaw:red
It is thus obvious that
the motion to dismiss filed by respondent Rodriguez before the trial
court
in Special Election Case No. 891 was, in point of time, actually a
demurrer
to evidence. It was filed after petitioner Enojas, Jr. had offered his
evidence and rested his case and before respondent Rodriguez was
supposed
to present his own.[11]
Although the motion contained other grounds, specifically alleged
therein
was the contention that petitioner Enojas had no cause of action. That
ground necessarily connotes that despite the evidence offered by
petitioner,
it was respondent's submission that such evidence was insufficient to
establish
his cause of action. Ineluctably, therefore, such a motion presented at
that stage of the action and on that ground cannot be anything else
other
than a demurrer to evidence.cralaw:red
It is pointless for
respondent Rodriguez to insist that the mere fact that the issue of
jurisdiction
was also raised as another ground would detract from the nature of the
pleading filed by him as being in truth a demurrer. Otherwise, it would
be very easy for a defendant or respondent to avoid the restrictions
and
consequences of Rule 33 by merely filing an omnibus motion, or a motion
containing several grounds, although his main thrust was to challenge
the
sufficiency of the evidence. That would open the door to further
proceedings in either the trial or appellate court, if not in both, for
piecemeal resolution of the different grounds and thereby delay the
final
decision in the election protest to the benefit of the dubious
occupant,
as pointed out in Demetrio and reiterated in succeeding cases
aforecited.cralaw:red
In the present case,
for reasons of its own, the trial court erroneously pounced upon the
supposed
lack of jurisdiction only, probably since this presented a more simple
and convenient ground for dismissal. That is why the COMELEC rebuffed
it
likewise and necessarily on the same ground, but that did not convert
the
demurrer into an ordinary motion to dismiss which under Rule 16, should
be filed before the movant presents his answer to the initiatory
pleading.
Note should further be taken of the fact that neither the trial court
nor
the COMELEC ruled out the propriety of private respondent's invocation
of the ground of lack of cause of action in the same pleading, hence he
actually demurred to the sufficiency of the evidence theretofore
offered
by petitioner.cralaw:red
What conjointly determine
the nature of a pleading are the allegations therein made in good
faith,
the stage of the proceeding at which it is filed, and the primary
objective
of the party filing the same. The ground chosen or the rationale
adopted
by the court in resolving the motion does not determine or change the
real
nature thereof. It is also significant that respondent Rodriguez did
obviously
rely primarily on what he believed was the lack of the requisite
quantum
of evidence to prove the election protest, so much so that he did not
even
bother to file a counter-protest. All the foregoing considerations
convince
Us that the supposed motion to dismiss is actually a demurrer, hence
the
trial court correctly held that respondent Rodriguez had waived his
right
to present evidence.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, the questioned
resolution of the Commission on Elections is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
The decision of Branch 50 of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan in
Special
Election Case No. 891, declaring petitioner Alfredo B. Enojas, Jr. as
the
duly elected mayor of the Municipality of Roxas, Palawan, is hereby
REINSTATED
and the President Judge thereof is hereby ordered to CEASE and DESIST
from
further proceeding with the hearing of the case. This decision shall be
immediately executory.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Narvasa, C.J.,
Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Francisco,
Panganiban and Martinez, JJ., concur.cralaw:red
__________________________________
Endnotes
[1]
Annex A, Petition; Rollo, 21.
[2]
Annex E-1; Rollo, 52.
[3]
Rollo, 25-26.
[4]
50 Phil. 45 [1927].
[5]
G.R. No. 58575, September 21, 1983, 124 SCRA 650.
[6]
G.R. No. 56598, March 15, 1985, 135 SCRA 300.
[7]
Annex E-1, Petition, Rollo, 52.
[8]
The ground for dismissal based on the fact that the pleading asserting
the claims states no cause of action is different from the ground that
the case of the claimant should be dismissed for lack of cause of
action.
The first is raised in a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 before a
responsive
pleading is filed and can be determined only from the allegations in
the
initiatory pleading and not from evidentiary or other matters aliunde.
The second is raised in a demurrer to evidence under Rule 33 after the
plaintiff has rested his case and can be resolved only on the basis of
the evidence he has presented in support of his claim.
[9]
Id., ibid.; Rollo, 54.
[10]
G.R. No. L-22506, February 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 272.
[11]
Rollo, 13, 44. |