EN
BANC
PATRICIA
FIGUEROA,
Complainant,
SBC Case No. 519
July 31, 1997
-versus-
SIMEON
BARRANCO, JR.,
Respondent.
R
E S O L U T I O N
ROMERO, J.:
In a complaint
made way back in 1971, Patricia
Figueroa petitioned that respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr. be denied
admission
to the legal profession. Respondent had passed the 1970 bar
examinations
on the fourth attempt, after unsuccessful attempts in 1966, 1967 and
1968.
Before be could take his oath, however, complainant filed the instant
petition
averring that respondent and she had been sweethearts, that a child out
of wedlock was born to them and that respondent did not fulfill his
repeated
promises to marry her.
The facts were
manifested in hearings held before
Investigator Victor F. Sevilla in June and July, 1971. Respondent and
complainant
were townmates in Janiuay, Iloilo. Since 1953, when they were both in
their
teens, they were steadies. Respondent even acted as escort to
complainant
when she reigned as Queen at the 1953 town fiesta. Complainant first
acceded
to sexual congress with respondent sometime in 1960. Their intimacy
yielded
a son, Rafael Barranco, born on December 11, 1964.[1]
It was after the child was born, complainant alleged, that respondent
first
promised he would marry her after he passes the bar examinations. Their
relationship continued and respondent allegedly made more than twenty
or
thirty promises of marriage. He gave only P10.00 for the child on the
latter's
birthdays. Her trust in him and their relationship ended in 1971, when
she learned that respondent married another woman. Hence, this petition.cralaw:red
Upon
complainant's motion, the Court authorized
the taking of testimonies of witnesses by deposition in 1972. On
February
18, 1974, respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss the
case
citing complainant's failure to comment on the motion of Judge Cuello
seeking
to be relieved from the duty to take aforesaid testimonies by
deposition.
Complainant filed her comment required and that she remains interested
in the resolution of the present case. On June 18, 1974, the Court
denied
respondent's motion to dismiss.cralaw:red
On October 2,
1980, the Court once again denied
a motion to dismiss on the ground of abandonment filed by respondent on
September 17, 1979.[2]
Respondent's third motion to dismiss was noted in the Court's
Resolution
dated September 15, 1982.[3]
In 1988, respondent repeated his request, citing his election as a
member
of the Sangguniang Bayan of Janiuay, Iloilo from 1980-1986, his active
participation in civic organizations and good standing in the community
as well as the length of time this case has been pending as reasons to
allow him to take his oath as a lawyer.[4]
On September 29,
1988, the Court resolved to dismiss
the complaint for failure of complainant to prosecute the case for an
unreasonable
period of time and to allow Simeon Barranco, Jr. to take the lawyer's
oath
upon payment of the required fees.[5]
Respondent's
hopes were again dashed on November
17, 1988 when the Court, in response to complainant's opposition,
resolved
to cancel his scheduled oath-taking. On June 1, 1993, the Court
referred
the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation,
report and recommendation.cralaw:red
The IBP's report
dated May 17, 1997 recommended
the dismissal of the case and that respondent be allowed to take the
lawyer's
oath.cralaw:red
We agree.cralaw:red
Respondent was
prevented from taking the lawyer's
oath in 1971 because of the charge of gross immorality made by
complainant.
To recapitulate, respondent bore an illegitimate child with his
sweetheart,
Patricia Figueroa, who also claims that he did not fulfill his promise
to marry her after he passes the bar examinations.cralaw:red
We find that
these facts do not constitute gross
immorality warranting the permanent exclusion of respondent from the
legal
profession. His engaging in premarital sexual relations with
complainant
and promises to marry suggests a doubtful moral character on his part
but
the same does not constitute grossly immoral conduct. The Court has
held
that to justify suspension or disbarment, the act complained of must
not
only be immoral, but grossly immoral. "A grossly immoral act is one
that
is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled
or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree."[6]
It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act which shows a moral
indifference
to the opinion of respectable members of the community.[7]
We find the
ruling in Arciga v. Maniwang[9]
quite relevant because mere intimacy between a man and a woman, both of
whom possess no impediment to marry, voluntarily carried on and devoid
of any deceit on the part of respondent, is neither so corrupt nor so
unprincipled
as to warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction against him, even
if as a result of such relationship a child was born out of wedlock.[10]
Respondent and
complainant were sweethearts whose
sexual relations were evidently consensual. We do not find
complainant's
assertions that she had been forced into sexual intercourse, credible.
She continued to see and be respondent's girlfriend even after she had
given birth to a son in 1964 and until 1971. All those years of
amicable
and intimate relations refute her allegations that she was forced to
have
sexual congress with him. Complainant was then an adult who voluntarily
and actively pursued their relationship and was not an innocent young
girl
who could be easily led astray. Unfortunately, respondent chose to
marry
and settle permanently with another woman. We cannot castigate a man
for
seeking out the partner of his dreams, for marriage is a sacred and
perpetual
bond which should be entered into because of love, not for any other
reason.cralaw:red
We cannot help
viewing the instant complaint as
an act of revenge of a woman scorned, bitter and unforgiving to the
end.
It is also intended to make respondent suffer severely and it seems,
perpetually,
sacrificing the profession he worked very hard to be admitted into.
Even
assuming that his past indiscretions are ignoble, the twenty-six years
that respondent has been prevented from being a lawyer constitute
sufficient
punishment therefor. During this time there appears to be no other
indiscretion
attributed to him. Respondent, who is now sixty-two years of age,
should
thus be allowed, albeit belatedly, to take the lawyer's oath.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, the
instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr. is ALLOWED to take his oath as a lawyer
upon payment of the proper fees.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Padilla,
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo,
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ.,
concur.cralaw:red
Narvasa, C.J.,
Hermosisima, Jr. and Torres
Jr., JJ., are on leave.cralaw:red
__________________________
Endnotes
[1]
Respondent filed a Manifestation on December 4, 1995 informing the
Court
of Rafael Barranco's death at age 28 years caused by cardio-respiratory
arrest and pancreatitis, Rollo, Volume II, page 23.
[2]
Rollo, p. 238.
[3]
Rollo, p. 244.
[4]
Appearance with Motion to Dismiss and to Allow Respondent to Take his
Oath
and Sign Roll of Attorneys, September 2, 1988, Rollo, p. 247.
[5]
Rollo, p. 259.
[6]
Reyes v. Wong, 63 SCRA 667 [January 29, 1975].
[7]
7 C.J.S. 959 cited in De los Reyes v. Aznar, 179 SCRA 653 [November 28,
1989].
[8]
106 SCRA 591 [August 14, 1981].
[9]
Also Radaza v. Tejano, 106 SCRA 250 [July 31, 1981] and Reyes v. Wong,
supra.
[10]
Bitangcor v. Tan, 112 SCRA 113 [February 25, 1982]. |