SECOND
DIVISION
EUGENIO
TENEBRO,
Petitioner,
G. R. No. 107193
July 7, 1997
-versus-
THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
and DAVAO FARMS CORPORATION,
Respondents.
D
E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a
petition for review of the decision
of the Court of Appeals,[1]
affirming an order of the Regional Trial Court of Davao denying
petitioner
relief from judgment.
It appears that
on August 15, 1985, private respondent
Davao Farms Corporation brought an action in the trial court for
collection
of P117,840.46 allegedly owed by petitioner for purchases of broiler
chicks
and egg trays. In due time, petitioner filed his answer claiming that
his
unpaid balance was only P48,843.68. He executed a special power of
attorney
in favor of his counsel, Atty. Angel Fernandez, giving the latter
authority
to represent him and act on his behalf in the case.cralaw:red
On June 16, 1986,
the pre-trial was terminated
and the case was scheduled for hearing on July 30, 1986. Fernandez
claimed,
however, that after the pretrial he had lost contact with petitioner.
His
letter informing petitioner of the date and time of hearing had
allegedly
been returned unclaimed. The subpoena issued to petitioner at his given
address was also returned undelivered.cralaw:red
Atty. Fernandez
himself did not appear at the
hearing scheduled on October 5, 1987 despite due notice to him, for
which
reason he was ordered by the court to show cause why he should not be
declared
in default. On October 10, 1987, Atty. Fernandez filed a
"Manifestation"
in which he claimed that his failure to appear at the hearing was due
to
the fact that his communications to petitioner had been returned
undelivered
and that petitioner could not be reached by long distance telephone.cralaw:red
The case was
again scheduled for trial on January
11, 1988. But again petitioner and his counsel did not come. The
hearings
were reset several more times, but, as both petitioner and his counsel
were absent, the trial court, on June 2, 1988, allowed private
respondent,
as plaintiff, to present its evidence ex parte.cralaw:red
On July 4, 1988,
the trial court rendered judgment
ordering petitioner to pay private respondent the amount of P103,690.46
for the unpaid purchases, plus interest at 14% per annum from January
25,
1985, attorney's fees and costs.cralaw:red
A copy of this
decision was served on Atty. Fernandez
on July 8, 1988. As the decision became final and executory, private
respondent,
on July 29, 1988, moved for execution of the decision. A writ of
execution
was issued on August 1, 1988.cralaw:red
On October 27,
1988, petitioner filed, through
a new counsel, a petition for relief from judgment with a prayer to
quash
the writ of execution, but his petition was denied on May 9, 1989. The
trial court rejected petitioner's claim that he had been deprived of
due
process. It held that petitioner had not informed the court of his new
address or inquired from it regarding the status of the case. The trial
court also found petitioner's claim that he had a balance of only
P48,843.68
to be without merit, there being no basis presented to show this, his
theory
being instead that the broiler chicks delivered to him had redhibitory
defects.cralaw:red
Petitioner
appealed but the Court of Appeals dismissed
the appeal and affirmed the order of the trial court. Hence, this
petition
for review.cralaw:red
First.
Petitioner contends that his failure
to appear at the hearing of the case was a ground for considering him
to
have waived the right to crossexamine private respondent's witnesses,
but
not his right to present evidence. For this reason, he contends that a
separate hearing for the reception of his evidence as defendant should
have been held by the trial court and that the trial court erred in
relying
on the information of his counsel that he could not be located.cralaw:red
The contention
has no merit. As the Court of Appeals
correctly held:
The theory of appellant that he was
deprived
of his day in court deserves scant consideration. As can be gleaned
from
the records, after he executed a special power of attorney in favor of
Atty. Fernandez, he did practically nothing to protect his interest in
the litigation. For almost three years since to commencement of the
suit,
he failed to communicate with his counsel to inquire about the status
of
the case if indeed he believed he has a meritorious defense. Now, after
his long slumber, he had the temerity to declare that he was denied his
day in court. One who was given full opportunity to present his
evidence
and who failed to do so cannot complain that he was denied due process
when the court rendered its decision on the basis of the evidence given
ex-parte. [Ganaden vs. Ramos, 99 SCRA 613]. In his
last-ditch
effort
to obtain the relief demanded, he alleged that he was not notified of
the
decision by his counsel. Assuming, gratis argumenti, that he
was
not notified, the failure of counsel to notify him of the adverse
judgment
does not constitute excusable negligence. A party cannot avoid
liability
ordered in the decision appealed from on the ground that because of
"the
caused action and/or omissions of his former counsels, he was placed in
a position no better than those in default" considering that he was
given
every opportunity in the lower court to present his evidence. Except
for
their intermittent requests for postponements and change of counsels,
he
never appeared in court any more, until the case was finally
terminated.
Furthermore, the mistakes and negligence of counsel are binding upon
his
client [Isaac vs. Mendoza, 89 Phil. 279; Vivero vs. Santos, 98 Phil.
500;
Ocampo vs. Hon. Caluag, et al., 19 SCRA 717; Javellana vs. Hon.
Leuterio,
et al., 20 SCRA 717].
Contrary to his
contention, petitioner waived not
only the right to cross-examine private respondent's witnesses but also
his right to present evidence as a necessary consequence of his
repeated
failure, nay, refusal, to appear at the hearings of his case.
As
already stated, petitioner could not be found at his given address and
utterly neglected to let the court and his counsel know of his
whereabouts.
After receiving a copy of the decision,
even
petitioner's counsel, Atty. Fernandez, did not move for the
reconsideration
of the decision or appeal but, instead, allowed the decision to become
final and executory. Needless to say, petitioner is bound by his
counsel's
decisions regarding the conduct of the case, especially considering
that
petitioner does not complain against the manner his counsel handled the
case.
Nor can
petitioner lay the blame on the trial
court for his failure to present his evidence. Petitioner was served
notice
of all the hearings through his counsel of record. In addition, he was
served summons by the court itself. But from July 30, 1986, when the
first
hearing was scheduled, to July 4, 1988, when the decision was rendered,
petitioner never showed up in court, forcing it to reschedule the
hearings
several times. Neither did petitioner inform his counsel or the court
of
his new address or inquire from them about the status of his case. The
trial court was, therefore, fully justified in terminating the trial
and
considering the case submitted for decision.cralaw:red
Second. Petitioner
contends that
the trial court erred in considering the merits of the case, because
the
only issue raised by his petition for relief from judgment was whether
he had been deprived of due process. This contention is likewise
without
merit. A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy which
is allowed only in exceptional cases because, as a rule, a final
judgment
should not he disturbed where a party could have appealed or availed
himself
of another remedy. [1 Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium 250 (1988)].
Accordingly,
a court may validly consider the equities of a case in order to
determine
whether there is a compelling reason for setting aside the decision.
That
is why Rule 38, Section 3 provides that a petition for relief from
judgment
must be accompanied by an affidavit of merit containing the facts
constituting
the petitioner's good and substantial cause of action or defense.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, the
decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Regalado and
Romero, JJ., concur.
Puno and Torres, Jr., JJ., are on
leave.cralaw:red
_____________________________
Endnote
[1]
Per Justice Manuel C. Herrera [ponente and chairman], and concurred in
by Justices Nicolas P. Lapeña, Jr. and Maria Alicia M. Austria,
members. |