EN
BANC
MAYOR
OSCAR B. LAMBINO,
Complainant,
A. M. No. MTJ-94-1017
July 7, 1997
-versus-
JUDGE
AMANDO A. DE VERA,
Respondent.
D
E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
In these two
[2] administrative complaints, respondent
Judge Amado de Vera of the Municipal Trial Court, Malasiqui,
Pangasinan,
is charged with various corrupt practices prejudicial to the
administration
of justice.
The antecedent
facts, as gathered from the records,
are as follows.cralaw:red
In an anonymous
letter complaint dated June 6,
1994,[1]
sent to the Office of the Chief Justice, respondent Judge was accused
of
gross inefficiency in the performance of his duties, delay in the
resolution
of pending cases in his sala and allowing lawyers to prepare his
decisions
or resolutions. Judge de Vera denied all of these charges in his
comment
dated October 21, 1994,[2]
filed in compliance with the October 3, 1994, indorsement of Deputy
Court
Administrator Juanito A. Bernad.[3]
He asserted that the charges levelled against him were concocted by
losing
litigants who could not accept his decisions.cralaw:red
Meanwhile, a
second letter-complaint was sent
on October 17, 1994, by Mayor Oscar Lambino[4]
to Court Administrator Paño, requesting the immediate transfer
or
retirement of Judge de Vera from the service due to conduct prejudicial
to the judicial system, reiterating the allegations in the complaint of
June 6, 1994, in addition to the fact that Judge de Vera fraternizes
with
known criminals within the Municipality.cralaw:red
Under this
Court's resolution dated January 11,
1995, the complaint of Mayor Lambino was referred to Judge Victor
Llamas,
Jr., Executive Judge, RTC, San Carlos City, for investigation, report
and
recommendation. On April 1, 1995, Judge Llamas submitted his report
recommending,
inter alia, Judge de Vera's dismissal from the service.[5]
In a resolution
dated May 24, 1995, the report
embodying the recommendation of the investigating Judge was referred to
the Court Administrator. Consequently, on July 26, 1995, Deputy Court
Administrator
Reynaldo Suarez submitted his report,[6]
adopting the findings and recommendations of the investigating Judge,
which
were reiterated in his report dated September 10, 1996,[7]
to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this
Office
respectfully submits for the consideration of the Honorable Court
recommending
that respondent Judge Amado A. de Vera, MTC, Malasiqui, Pangasinan, be
DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits
and accrued leave credits, if any, and with disqualification for
re-employment
in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including
government-owned
or controlled corporations.
We now consider
whether the penalty of dismissal
is proper under these premises. A lower court judge is mandated to
render
a decision within three months from date of submission.[8]
Additionally, Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct
requires a judge to dispose of the court's business promptly and decide
cases within the period specified.
With the
foregoing pronouncements as guidelines
and after evaluating the records of this administrative case, no other
conclusion can be drawn other than the fact that respondent Judge has
been
remiss in the performance of his duties.cralaw:red
Within the period
1993-1994, there were twenty-six
criminal cases filed before Judge de Vera's sala, but none of them was
resolved, not even to determine whether there was indeed probable cause
to try the cases on the merits. In those instances where respondent
Judge
did find probable cause, the decision was not forthcoming until
approximately
five years later. Such glaringly unjustifiable delay cannot be
overlooked.
To aggravate matters, there were four civil cases submitted for
decision
in 1989, 1991, 1992 and 1993,[9]
all of which remained unresolved. Again, We cannot countenance such
undue
delay.cralaw:red
This Court has
consistently held that the failure
of a judge to decide a case within the required period is not excusable
and constitutes gross inefficiency,[10]
and non-observance of said rule is a ground for administrative sanction
against the defaulting judge.[11]
It is not uncommon for this Court, upon proper application and in
meritorious
cases, especially when difficult questions of law or complex issues are
involved, to grant judges of lower courts additional time to decide
beyond
the ninety-day period.[12]
No such application, however, was made by Judge de Vera in the case at
bar.cralaw:red
As to the charges
that Judge de Vera did not personally
prepare his decisions and fraternized with known criminals, it appears
that these are based on mere suspicion and speculation; thus, We shall
not give credence to them. Furthermore, We cannot disregard
respondent
Judge's fraudulent practice of submitting fake certifications of
service,
which certifications are essential to the fulfillment by the court of
its
duty to speedily dispose of cases, as mandated by the Constitution.[13]
In Magdamo v. Pahimulin,[14]
We held that a judge who fails to decide cases within the required
period
and continues to collect his salaries upon his certification that he
has
no pending matters to resolve, transgresses the constitutional right of
litigants to a speedy disposition of their cases.cralaw:red
Considering the
gravity of Judge de Vera's acts
and omissions which have impeded the administration of justice, as well
as his failure to honor the dignity of his position, the imposition of
the supreme penalty of dismissal is not undeserved. Judge de Vera's
transgressions
when considered altogether, are grave and betrays his failure to
measure
up to stringent judicial standards. His lack of candor, gross
inefficiency
in the performance of his duties and repeated submission of fake
certifications
of service are serious violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct which
call for his dismissal from the service.[15]
WHEREFORE, in
view of the foregoing, respondent
Judge Amado A. de Vera is DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture
of
all retirement benefits and accrued leave credits and with prejudice to
re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of government, including
government-owned and controlled corporations and upon receipt of this
decision,
he shall cease and desist from performing his judicial functions
immediately.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Narvasa, C.J.,
Padilla, Regalado, Davide,
Jr., Romero, Melo, Vitug, Mendoza, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ.,
concur.
Bellosillo, Puno, Kapunan, Hermosisima, Jr.
and
Torres, Jr., JJ., are on leave.cralaw:red
________________________________
Endnotes
[1]
Rollo, p. 6.
[2]
Ibid., p. 4.
[3]
Id., p. 5.
[4]
Id., p. 1.
[5]
Id., p. 24.
[6]
Id., pp. 67-73.
[7]
Id., pp. 76-80.
[8]Section 15, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution.
[9]
Rollo, p. 14.
[10]
In re Judge F. Madara, 104 SCRA 245 [1981]; Longboan v. Polig, 186 SCRA
557 [1990]; Sabado v. Cajigal, 219 SCRA 800 [1993].
[11]
Alfonso-Cortes v. Magalang, 227 SCRA 482 [1993].
[12]
Marcelino v. Cruz, Jr., 121 SCRA 51 [1983].
[13]
Sabitsana, Jr. v. Villamor, 202 SCRA 435 [1991].
[14]
73 SCRA 110 [1976].
[15]
Guinto v. Judge Aunario Lucero, A.M. No. MTJ-93-794, August 23, 1996;
Re
Report on the Judicial Audit and Physical Inventory of the Record cases
in RTC, Br. 43, Roxas, Mindoro Oriental, 236 SCRA 631 [1994]; Sulu
Islamic
Association of Masyod Lambayong v. Malik, 226 SCRA 193 [1993]. |
