THIRD
DIVISION
ARTURO
ALANO,
Petitioner,
G. R. No. 111244
December 15, 1997
-versus-
HON.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
ENRICO A.
LANZANAS,
Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, National Capital
Judicial Region, Manila,Branch 37
and ROBERTO CARLOS,
Respondents.
D
E C I S I O N
ROMERO, J.:
Petitioner
Arturo Alano has filed this petition
for review of the decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 28150 which affirmed in toto
the order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 37[2]
denying petitioner's motion for the suspension of proceeding of
Criminal
Case No. 90-84933, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Arturo
Alano"
as well as his motion for reconsideration. Criminal Case No.
90-84933
is a prosecution for the crime of estafa. The information[3]
alleges:
That on or about June 10, 1986, in the
City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully
and feloniously defraud Roberto S. Carlos in the following manner, to
wit:
the said accused, pretending to be still the owner of a parcel of land
with an area of 1,172 square meters, more or less, located at Bicutan,
Taguig, Metro Manila, covered by Tax Declaration No. 120-004-00398,
well
knowing that he had previously sold the same to the said Roberto S.
Carlos
for P30,000.00, sold the aforesaid property for the second time to one
Erlinda B. Dandoy for P87,900.00, thereby depriving the said Roberto S.
Carlos of his rightful ownership/possession of the said parcel of land,
to the damage and prejudice of the said Roberto S. Carlos in the
aforesaid
amount of P30,000.00, Philippine currency.
Petitioner
moved for the suspension of the criminal
case on the ground that there was a prejudicial question pending
resolution
in another case being tried in the Regional Trial Court, National
Capital
Region, Pasig, Branch 68. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 55103
and
entitled "Roberto Carlos and Trinidad M. Carlos v. Arturo Alano, et.
al.,"
concerns the nullity of the sale and recovery of possession and
damages.
In the aforementioned Civil Case, private respondent filed a complaint
against the petitioner seeking the annulment of the second sale of said
parcel of land made by the petitioner to a certain Erlinda Dandoy on
the
premise that the said land was previously sold to them. In his answer,
petitioner contends that he never sold the property to the private
respondents
and that his signature appearing in the deed of absolute sale in favor
of the latter was a forgery, hence, the alleged sale was fictitious and
inexistent. At this juncture, it is worth mentioning that the civil
case
was filed on March 1, 1985, five years before June 19, 1990 when the
criminal
case for estafa was instituted.
On October 3,
1991, the trial court denied the
petitioner's motion as well as a subsequent motion for reconsideration.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
before
the Court of Appeals seeking the nullification of the assailed order.cralaw:red
On July 26, 1993,[4]
the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit, the
decretal
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding no merit to the
petition,
the same is hereby DISMISSED, with cost against petitioner.
Hence, this
petition.
The only issue in
this petition is whether the
pendency of Civil Case No. 55103, is a prejudicial question justifying
the suspension of the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90-84933 filed
against
the petitioner.
Petitioner alleges that his signature
appearing
in the first deed of absolute sale in favor of private respondent was a
forgery, such that there was no second sale covering the said parcel of
land. Otherwise stated, if the Court in the said Civil Case rules that
the first sale to herein private respondent was null and void, due to
the
forgery of petitioner's signature in the first deed of sale, it follows
that the criminal case for estafa would not prosper.cralaw:red
While at first
blush, there seems to be merit
in petitioner's claim, we are compelled to affirm the Court of Appeal's
findings. The doctrine of prejudicial question comes into play in a
situation
where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there
exists
in the former an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the
criminal
action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil
action
is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused
in the criminal action[5].
In other words, if both civil and criminal cases have similar issues or
the issue in one is intimately related to the issues raised in the
other,
then a prejudicial question would likely exists, provided the other
element
or characteristic is satisfied.[6]
On the basis of
the foregoing and a perusal of
the facts obtaining in the case at bar, the disposition of the issue
raised
need not unduly detain us. We have already ruled that a criminal action
for estafa [for alleged double sale of property] is a prejudicial
question
to a civil action for nullity of the alleged deed of sale and the
defense
of the alleged vendor is the forgery of his signature in the deed.[7]
Notwithstanding
the apparent prejudicial question
involved, the Court of Appeals still affirmed the Order of the trial
court
denying petitioner's motion for the suspension of the proceeding on the
ground that petitioner, in the stipulation of facts, had already
admitted
during the pre-trial order dated October 5, 1990 of the criminal case
the
validity of his signature in the first deed of sale between him and the
private respondent, as well as his subsequent acknowledgment of his
signature
in twenty-three [23] cash vouchers evidencing the payments made by the
private respondent.[8]
Moreover, it was also noted by the Court of Appeals that petitioner
even
wrote to the private respondent offering to refund whatever sum the
latter
had paid.[9]
In this regard,
the pre-trial provision on criminal
procedure found in Rule 118 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 2. Pre-trial conference; subject xxx
The
pre-trial conference shall consider the following:
[a] Plea bargaining
[b] Stipulation of facts
From the
foregoing, there is no question that a stipulation
of facts by the parties in a criminal case is recognized as
declarations
constituting judicial admissions, hence, binding upon the parties[10]
and by virtue of which the prosecution dispensed with the introduction
of additional evidence and the defense waived the right to contest or
dispute
the veracity of the statement contained in the exhibit.[11]
Accordingly, the
stipulation of facts stated in
the pre-trial order amounts to an admission by the petitioner resulting
in the waiver of his right to present evidence on his behalf. While it
is true that the right to present evidence is guaranteed under the
Constitution,[12]
this right may be waived expressly or impliedly.[13]
Since the
suspension of the criminal case due
to a prejudicial question is only a procedural matter, the same is
subject
to a waiver by virtue of the prior acts of the accused. After all, the
doctrine of waiver is made solely for the benefit and protection of the
individual in his private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and
relinquished
without infringing on any public right and without detriment to the
community
at large.[14] Accordingly,
petitioner's
admission in the stipulation of facts during the pre-trial of the
criminal
amounts to a waiver of his defense of forgery in the civil case. Hence,
we have no reason to nullify such waiver, it being not contrary to law,
public order, public policy, morals or good customs, or prejudicial to
a third person with a right recognized by law.[15]
Furthermore, it must be emphasized that the pre-trial order was signed
by the petitioner himself. As such, the rule that no proof need be
offered
as to any facts admitted at a pre-trial hearing applies.[16]
WHEREFORE, in
view of the foregoing, the appealed
decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 26, 1993 is AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Narvasa, C.J.,
Melo, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.cralaw:red
________________________________
Endnotes
[1]
Penned by Justice Regina G. Ordoñez-Benitez and concurred in by
Justice Manuel C. Herrera and Bernardo P. Pardo.
[2]
Per Judge Angelina Gutierrez.
[3]
Rollo, p. 30.
[4]
Id., pp. 96-101.
[5]
Flordelis v. Castillo, 58 SCRA 301 [1974]; Donato v. Luna, 160 SCRA 441
[1988].
[6]
Benitez v. Concepcion, Jr., 2 SCRA 178 [1961].
[7]
Ras v. Rasul, 100 SCRA 125 [1980].
[8]
Pre-trial Order, Rollo, pp. 134-140.
[9]
Decision, Rollo, p. 101.
[10]
People v. Hernandez, 260 SCRA 25 [1996].
[11]
People v. Bocar, 27 SCRA 512 [1969].
[12]Sec. 14, Art. 3, 1987 Constitution.
[13]
People v. Dichose, 96 SCRA 957 [1980].
[14]
People v. Donato, 198 SCRA 130 [1991].
[15]
Article 6, Civil Code.
[16]
Afable, et al., v. Ruiz, et al., 56 O.G. 3767; Permanent Concrete
Products,
Inc. v. Teodoro, 26 SCRA 339 [1969]; Munasque v. Court of Appeals, 139
SCRA 533 [1985]. |