THIRD
DIVISION
F. F.
MAÑACOP CONSTRUCTION CO., INC.,
Petitioner,
G. R. No. 122196
January 15, 1997
-versus-
COURT
OF APPEALS and THE MANILA
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY,
Respondents.
D
E C I S I O N
FRANCISCO, J.:
The undisputed
facts are as follows:
Sometime in September, 1995, petitioner
started
with the construction of a perimeter fence along the MIA road from Asia
Overseas, Inc. up to Airscope Development Corporation for and in
consideration
of the quoted price of P307,440.00. Because of the urgency of building
the said fence which was to prevent would be squatters from entering
the
area, petitioner proceeded with the fence construction even if the
Notice
to Proceed was not yet signed by the general manager[1]
of private respondent[2]
but already initialed by its Assistant Project Manager.[3]
After the February, 1986 revolution, however, the new general manager[4]
of private respondent stopped the construction of the said fence. By
that
time, 95% was finished which was worth P282,068.00 as computed by
petitioner.
Petitioner made repeated demands for the payment of what it has
completed
but private respondent ignored said demands. After two years of making
demands for payment which, as aforesaid, were simply ignored by private
respondent, petitioner decided to bring the matter to court and thus
incurred
attorney's fees in the process.
In court, the issues were limited to
whether
or not petitioner had done works for the private respondent and whether
or not the same was authorized.In order
to
prove that petitioner rendered services to private respondent,
petitioner
presented Engr. Angelito Gonzales who testified that indeed fence was
constructed
for private respondent in accordance with plans therefor [Exh. "C"] and
pictures had been taken of the fence [Exhs. "N" to "N-3"] and the
certification
of the supplier as to the materials used by petitioner in constructing
the fence and the price thereof.
Private respondent presented no evidence
whatever (sic) despite the chances[5]
given to it by the trial court, one of which evidence would have
consisted
of a testimony from the COA[6]
on what should be the expenses involved in the construction of said
fence.
After the repeated failure of private
respondent
to present its evidence, the trial court rendered a decision wherein it
is found that for the services rendered by the petitioner it should be
paid P238,501.48 based upon a quantum meruit since there is an absence
of a written contract between the parties. Said amount is the latest
evaluation
of the work done which evaluation was made by private respondent
itself.
Likewise, the trial court ordered private respondent to pay petitioner
attorney's fees since there is reason to believe that private
respondent
acted in bad faith in refusing to comply with the repeated demands of
petitioner
for payment for two long years.
On appeal to the respondent court, the
private
respondent assigned the error that the trial court should have referred
the computation of what should be paid to petitioner to the COA
pursuant
to what was done in the case of Eslao v. Commission on Audit, 195 SCRA
730. The petitioner refuted this assigned error by pointing out that it
is not one of the issues raised before the trial court.
In its decision dated September 8, 1995,
the
Court of Appeals agreed that petitioner rendered services to private
respondent
for which it should be paid but set aside the entire decision of the
trial
court directing the latter to refer the computation of what should be
paid
to petitioner to the COA as done in the case of Eslao v. Commission on
Audit.
A motion for reconsideration of the
aforesaid
decision proved futile.[7]
Petitioner
comes to this Court via petition
for review under Rule 45 arguing that the Court of Appeals (CA) erred
in
taking cognizance of the issue of referring the matter to the COA to
determine
the amount due to petitioner by relying on Eslao v. COA and Royal Trust
Co. vs. COA[8],
which issue was raised for the first time on appeal. The Court gave due
course to the petition and required the parties to submit their
respective
memoranda. Petitioner complied while private respondent adopted its
comment
as memorandum.
Well-recognized
jurisprudence precludes raising
an issue only for the first time on appeal,[9]
as it would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play and justice to
allow private respondent to raise a question not ventilated before the
court a guo.[10]
There is no dispute that the issue of whether the matter should be
referred
to the COA was not raised in the lower court. Thus, technically,
respondent
court should not have taken cognizance of the same. However,
considering
that the issue of reference is a matter closely related to the
determination
of the question on how much is exactly due to petitioner, the court may
consider the former issue for a just and complete resolution of the
case.[11]
Besides, the present case involves the disposition of public funds and
calls for the performance of a constitutional duty of the COA which
should
not be defeated by mere technicalities of procedure.cralaw:red
Proceeding to the
merits, it is not disputed that
petitioner is entitled to payment for the construction it made, which
arose
from a quasi-contractual relation created between the former and
private
respondent. But should petitioner be paid based on quantum meruit?
The issue was
answered in the affirmative in the
case of Eslao. We find no reason to depart from such ruling due to the
following reasons: First, the instant quasi-contract is neither
fraudulent
nor mala in se. Second, the project was already covered by a specific
appropriation.[12]
Third, as in private contracts, the facts show that an implied
obligation
to pay would be imposed upon the government. Fourth, the property or
benefit
is not ultra vires, i.e. they can be the proper subject of an
express
contract and are within the contractual powers of the public body.
Fifth,
the case falls within the exemption from the mandatory procedure of
public
bidding which is dispensed with on the ground of public necessity,[13]
or when time is of the essence,[14]
and considering that the subject project was contiguous to an on going
project[15]
performed by petitioner and there is no proof of any unsatisfactory
performance
or negative slippage.[16]
Sixth, the contractor substantially complied [95% complete] in good
faith
with its obligation and no intentional departure from the
specifications
were alleged. Seventh, petitioner's claim is clearly supported by
equity.
Private respondent is reaping benefits from the scallop fence and wire
placed by petitioner. Eighth, there is no proof of any collusion among
the parties involved. Finally, the payment is limited to the actual
cost
chargeable against funds authorized and certified for the purpose. All
these circumstances, taken together, negate fraud and collusion.[17]
Citing the cases
of Eslao and Royal Trust, the
Solicitor General, on behalf of private respondent, argues that the
matter
should be referred to the COA. Such argument is without merit. Quantum
meruit allows recovery of the reasonable value regardless of any
agreement
as to value. It entitles the party to "as much as he, reasonably
deserves,"[18]
as distinguished from quantum valebant or to "as much as what is
reasonably
worth."
Unliquidated
claims present a justiciable question
ripe for judicial determination which is beyond the powers of the COA
to
adjudicate.[19]
Recovery based on quantum meruit is in the nature of such claim because
its settlement requires the application of judgment and discretion and
cannot be adjusted by simple arithmetical processes. In the cases of
Eslao
and Royal Trust, the Court found it necessary to refer to the COA the
task
of determining the total compensation due to the claimants considering
that the matter on the exact amount was not at issue[20]
and the determination thereof involves a review of the factual findings
and evidence in support thereof. On the other hand, the lower court in
this case, had already made a factual finding on the amount reasonably
due to petitioner and scrutinized the evidence to sustain the claim.
Besides,
there is nothing in the cited cases which would imply that only the COA
can determine the specific amount due to a contractor guided by the
equitable
principle of quantum meruit. As our courts are both courts of law and
equity,
they are not powerless to determine a factual matter in accordance with
both standards.cralaw:red
With respect to
the award of attorney's fees,
the same is premised on the uncontroverted factual finding of the lower
court, as affirmed by respondent appellate court, that private
respondent
acted in bad faith in refusing payment to petitioner. Such factual
findings
are not only accorded great weight, but finality as well, since they
are
supported by substantial evidence.[21]
No reason appears in this case that would justify departure from the
above
doctrine.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, the
decision of the Court of Appeals
is SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court dated May 4,
1992 is REINSTATED.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Narvasa, C.J.,
Davide, Jr., Melo and Panganiban,
JJ., concur.cralaw:red
____________________________
Endnotes
[1]
Luis Tabuena, [Rollo, p. 70].
[2]
Renamed as the Ninoy Aquino International Airport [NAIA], (Rollo , p.
8).
[3]
Elpidio L. Mendoza, [Rollo, p. 70].
[4]
Luis Tabuena was replaced by Romeo Santos who was in turn replaced by
Reli
German, [Rollo, p. 9].
[5]
The RTC gave private respondent at least (4) opportunities to present
their
evidence but the latter still failed to avail of such opportunities for
undisclosed reasons.
[6]
Commission on Audit.
[7]
Rollo, pp. 127-129.
[8]
G.R. No. 84202, November 23, 1988 (Resolution of the Court en banc,
cited
in Eslao vs. COA, 195 SCRA 730 [1991]).
[9]Manila Bay Club vs. CA,
[resolution]
249 SCRA 303 (1995); Republic vs. NLRC, 314 Phil. 507 [1995].
[10]
See Lopez Realty, Inc. vs. Fontecha, 247 SCRA 183 [1995]; Manila Bay
Club
vs. CA, [Decision] 315 Phil. 805 (1995); C. Alcantara & Sons, Inc.
vs. NLRC, 229 SCRA 109 [1994]; Ravelo vs. CA, 207 SCRA 254 (1992);
Anchuelo
vs. IAC, 147 SCRA 434 [1987].
[11]
Garrido v. CA, 236 SCRA 450 [1994].
[12]
An amount of P313,325.28 was appropriated for the reinforcement of the
fence. [Rollo, p. 45].
[13]Section 9, B. P. 132 [Public Works Appropriations Act] provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
"Negotiated contracts
Pursuant to the general policy of undertaking projects by contract
after
public bidding, no project covered by appropriations in this act shall
be prosecuted by negotiated contract except: xxx; (b) in case of urgent
necessity or emergency or danger to life and property; xxx Provided,
that
no negative slippage exceeding ten per centum (10%) is incurred by the
contractor in any of his on-going projects: Provided, further, That the
additional work is within his contracting capabilities." [Emphasis
supplied].
[14]Section 4, P.D. 1594 as amended provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
"Bidding. Construction
projects shall generally be undertaken by contract after competitive
public
bidding. Projects may be undertaken by administration or force account
or by negotiated contract only in exceptional cases where time is of
the
essence, or where there is lack of qualified bidders or contractors, or
where there is a conclusive evidence that greater economy and
efficiency
would be achieve through this arrangement, and in accordance with
provisions
of laws and acts on the matter, subject to the approval of the Minister
of Public Works, Transportation and Communications, the Minister of
Public
Highways, or the Minister of Energy, as the case may be, if the project
cost is less than P1 million, and the President of the Philippines,
upon
recommendation of the Minister, if the project cost is P1 million or
more."
[15]
Petitioner was under contract with private respondent and was actually
fencing the MIAA Engineering compound at the time the latter asked the
former to perform the project subject of this case. [Rollo, p. 44].
[16]
IB 10.4.2, Implementing Rules and Regulations of P. D. 1594, as amended
provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
"1. Negotiated contract may
be entered into only where any of the following conditions exist and
the
implementing office/agency/corporation is not capable of undertaking
the
project by administration:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
"xxx
xxx
xxx
"c. Where the subject project
is adjacent or contiguous to an ongoing project and it could be
economically
prosecuted by the same contractor, in which case, direct negotiation
may
be undertaken with the said contractor at the same unit prices and
contract
conditions, less mobilization cost, provided that he has no negative
slippage
and has demonstrated a satisfactory performance. [Emphasis ours].
"xxx
xxx xxx"
[17]
Rivera v. Municipality of Malolos, 102 Phil. 285, 291 [1957].
[18]
Caughlan v. International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, 78
A.L.R.
2d 313; Jackson v. City of Gastonia, 100 S.E. 2d 241, 243; Lockard v.
City
of Salem, 43 S.E. 2d 239 244, 130 W. Va. 287; Mead v. Ringling, 64 N.
W.
2d 222, 225; American-Hawaiian Engineering and Construction Co. v.
Butler,
165 Cal. App. 497 cited in 17 Am Jur 26 Contracts, Sec. 583.
[19]
See Phil. Operations, Inc. v. Auditor-General, 94 Phil. 868 [1954].
[20]
The issue in the cited cases is whether the contractors were entitled
to
any payment.
[21]
See Far East Bank v. CA, G.R. No. 123569, April 1, 1996; Acevedo
Optical
v. CA, 250 SCRA 409 [1995]; Salvador v. CA, supra.; Alforte v. Santos,
313 Phil. 384 [1995]; Chua v. CA, 312 Phil. 857 [1995]; Tay v. CA, 312
Phil. 1128 [1995]; Meneses v. CA, 246 SCRA 162. |