EN
BANC
COMMISSIONER
OF INTERNAL REVENUE, ET AL.,
Petitioners,
G. R. No. 119322
February 6, 1997
-versus-
THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.,
Respondents,
DAGUPAN
COMBINED COMMODITIES, INC.,
ET AL.,
Respondents-Intervenors.
R
E S O L U T I O N
PER CURIAM:
After
deliberating on petitioners' motion to
disqualify Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan from this case, petitioners'
motion for reconsideration of the Court's (First Division) decision
dated
4 June 1996 as well as all pleadings filed by the parties subsequent
thereto,
the Court Resolved to DENY said motion to disqualify for the following
reasons:
In response to the motion for his
inhibition,
Justice Kapunan has formally submitted his Resolution, which was
included
in the Court's Agenda of 21 January 1997 for deliberation. He explained
that there are no grounds whatsoever to warrant his inhibition. He
bewailed
that the motion to disqualify him dated 26 April 1996 was so belatedly
filed, just after the First Division voted 3 to 2 on 24 April 1996 to
dismiss
the petition filed by petitioners, when the petition had been pending
before
the First Division since 29 March 1995, or for more than a year, thus,
the effect of the motion for disqualification was to nullify a valid
vote.[1]
Justice
Kapunan's Resolution is quoted in full:
R E S O L U T I O N
This refers to the motion of office of
the
Solicitor
General for my inhibition from the above-entitled case citing my
alleged
close association with Atty. Estelito Mendoza, counsel for private
respondents,
who was supposedly instrumental in my appointment to the Court of
Appeals,
and that Atty. Mendoza and I or our wives, together with former Court
of
Appeals Justice Racela, established Cafe Faura located at Padre Faura
Stret,
Manila where "Justice Kapunan and Atty. Mendoza are often seen meeting
and socializing."
It is adverted in the motion for
inhibition
that
"the magistrates who will render judgment are men of good reason, and
proven
adherence to the rule of law" and that "it is not enough for this Court
just to do right, but it is also necessary that it gives the appearance
that it will always do right," considering that this Court
"is now in the apex of public esteem and
regard
because of its transcendental decisions in cases imbued with national
interest,
such as the cases involving the sale of Petron-Aramco shares, the LRT
III,
the Lotto, the Jai-Alai, the EVAT, and several others. These cases show
that this Honorable Court is above personalities and non-legal
considerations
in formulating decision."
For the foregoing reasons, the Office of
the
Solicitor General would want me to inhibit from the case.
Let me state the following in answer to
the
Solicitor
General's allegations:
1. G. R. No. 119322 was assigned in
March
1995
to the First division of which I am a member. From that time up to
April
24, 1996, when the Division deliberated on the case and voted on
whether
or not to grant or dismiss the petition several pleadings had been
filed
and interlocutory orders issued in connection therewith. Yet, it was
only
on April 26, 1996, or days after three members of the Division [the
majority]
voted to grant the petition when the Solicitor General raised the
matter
of my inhibition. Strangely, for a period of almost a year before our
voting
on the petition, the Solicitor General did not find my alleged "close
association
with Atty. Estelito Mendoza" sufficient to inhibit me from the case.
Neither
did a thought cross his mind to move for my disqualification in the
EVAT
cases and certain PCGG cases involving Eduardo Cojuangco wherein Atty.
Mendoza was counsel for the parties opposing the stand of the
Government
and in which I voted in favor of the Government. Had I voted in a
different
way in G. R. No. 119322 would the Solicitor General have sought
my
inhibition?
2. The motion to inhibit me from the
case
coming
after a vote had been taken on the petition was in effect intended to
nullify
a valid vote already made. The rule is that a petition to disqualify a
judge must be filed before rendition of judgment by the judge. The
rationale
for this rule is that a litigant cannot be permitted to speculate upon
the action of the court and to raise an opposition after a decision
unfavorable
to him had been rendered.
3. It may be pertinent to state that
when the
member of the First Division to whom the case was assigned for study
and
report submitted his draft opinion sometime in March, 1996, the other
four
[4] members of the Division, realizing the delicate nature of the case
because of allegations of massive tax evasion and in view of the
voluminous
records, proposed that the case be elevated to the Court En Banc,
or, at least set for oral argument. However, the ponente who was, and
still
is, the Chairman of the Division was not amenable to the idea, saying
that
the issues involved are simple, so the case need not be referred to the
Court En Banc. The four [4] other members did not press their
proposal
in deference to the wishes of their Chairman. It was only right after
the
closed-door voting on April 24, 1996 the results of which could
not
have been known except by the members of the First Division before the
decision was promulgated on June 4, 1996 when, surprisingly, the
Solicitor General sought my inhibition and moved for the elevation of
the
case to the Court En Banc. And it was only last December 1996
that
the OSG belatedly moved to set the case for oral argument. It is not
fair
to change the rules at the middle of the game. But it is worse when
rules
are changed when the game is over. What I am saying is that, on my
part,
I have always comported myself with utmost circumspection and
impartiality
in my actuations. I have no personal interests whatsoever in the case.
4. It is gratuitous for the Solicitor
General
to state that this Court has achieved the apex of public esteem and
high
public regard simply because of the decisions of this Court upholding
the
stand of the Office of the Solicitor General in Petron-Aramco, the LRT,
the Lotto, the Jai-Alai and EVAT, among several other cases [There, I
voted
consistently in favor of the OSG]. The implication of the Solicitor
General's
stance is most disturbing. He would want to convey the idea that it is
only when the Supreme Court consistently sustains his position in major
cases that it automatically merits high public esteem and regard, but
when
the Court decides against the Government, it loses its good public
image.
I certainly do not share the Solicitor General's concept of the nature
and essence of the duties of the Supreme Court as a just, fair and
impartial
legal arbiter. As mandated in Sec. 1, Art. VII of the Constitution:
[J]udicial power includes the duty of
the
courts
of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
In other words, in the discharge of its
duly
of adjudicating controversies or of determining whether or not there
has
been grave abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court considers the
Constitution,
the law and the evidence before it and what it perceives to be right
and
just. The Court does not cease to do what is right and just simply
because
its decision does not coincide with the stand of the Government. It is
the fundamental duty of the Court to accord everyone the protective
mantle
of the Constitution against abuse of power.
5. The fact that Atty. Mendoza was once
my
superior
at the Office of the Solicitor General and assuming that he recommended
me to the Court of Appeals cannot by any stretch of imagination be a
ground
for my inhibition. I would like to believe that I was appointed to the
Court of Appeals and afterwards to the Supreme Court because I deserved
the appointment. If I was recommended by Atty. Mendoza who was
then
the Solicitor General, it was a matter of his responsibility as chief
of
office to attract competent lawyers to the Office of the Solicitor
General
and to inspire them to dedicate themselves to the public service. Atty.
Mendoza did not do it as a personal favor to me, in the same way that
every
appointment to the public office should not be considered as a personal
favor to the appointee, because a public office is a public trust and
the
public official should discharge his duties for the public good.
Moreover,
if the Solicitor General's argument is followed to its logical
conclusion,
then all the members of this Court who have been appointed by the
President
should inhibit themselves in the cases where the Government is a party.
6. On the other hand, the record will
reveal
that in several cases decided by this Court, I voted against the
clients
of Atty. Mendoza, like the EVAT cases, certain PCGG cases involving
Eduardo
Cojuangco and more recently, the question of whether Governor Rodriguez
of Quezon Province be allowed to sit as governor. I can say with all
sincerity
that during the almost thirty-nine [39] years that I have been in
Government
Service, as tax lawyer, Solicitor, Assistant Solicitor General, Acting
Commissioner of Land Registration, Associate Justice of the Court of
Appeals
and now as Associate Justice of this Court, I have never allowed any
personal
consideration to influence my official actuations.
7. I deny that Atty. Mendoza and I are
"often
seen meeting and socializing." I rarely see him and in fact I am not
fond
of socializing. Cafe Faura at the Padre Faura Street, Manila, which is
no longer existing, was a small restaurant managed by my wife and Mrs.
Consuelo Racela. It did not produce any profit but was being maintained
for sometime primarily to provide livelihood to its few employees.
Atty.
Estelito Mendoza and his wife did not own a single share of stock in
Cafe
Faura; neither were they involved in its management or operation.
There is no ground at all for my
inhibition
in
this case. Moreover, I do not entertain the slightest doubt on my
capacity
to perform my duties and functions as member of this Court with utmost
impartiality, fairness and fidelity.
WHEREFORE, I resolve to deny the motion
for my
inhibition.
On the motion
to disqualify Justice Kapunan from
participating in this case, the Court took note of the old doctrine
that
when a Justice of the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court is
challenged,
"the magistrate sits with the court and the question is decided by it
as
a body."[2]
It will be observed, however, that the basis of the challenge there was
that the Justice had previously acted as the fiscal in an earlier
proceeding
in the case, a ground for compulsory inhibition, and that the matter
was
dealt with under Article 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure the
provisions
of which differ from those under the first paragraph of Rule 137 of the
Rules of Court.
Again, in Araneta
vs. Dinglasan,[3]
the motion to disqualify Mr. Justice Padilla from acting therein was
also
founded upon a mandatory ground for inhibition, in that as Secretary of
Justice, he had advised the President on the question of emergency
powers.
In denying the motion to disqualify Justice Padilla, the Court ruled,
citing
a previous case,[4]
that "a litigant cannot be permitted to speculate upon the action of
the
court and raise an objection of this sort after decision has been
rendered."
It appearing inter alia that the motion to disqualify was presented
after
Justice Padilla had given his opinion on the merits of the cases
involved,
the Court voted to deny the motion for disqualification.cralaw:red
In the present
case, the so-called grounds relied
upon for the disqualification of Justice Kapunan, i.e., his
having
served under Atty. Estelito Mendoza when the latter was the Solicitor
General,
and their having had business relations in connection with the
operation
of a small restaurant, even if true, could not constitute compulsory
grounds
for Justice Kapunan's recusation. It is for him alone, therefore, to
determine
his qualification.cralaw:red
Furthermore, the
present motion for inhibition
was filed after the case at bar had already been decided by the First
Division
of this Court and Justice Kapunan had duly participated and cast his
vote
therein sans any objection from any source. The motion consequently
falls
squarely within the prohibition in the aforecited cases of Araneta and
Abella.cralaw:red
At all events,
and although it was not necessary
for the Court En Banc to resolve the motion, all the Members thereof
concurred
in the denial of said motion to disqualify Justice Kapunan. The
Court
further Resolved to DENY the motion for reconsideration of the decision
dated 4 June 1996, the basic issues raised therein having already been
passed upon in said decision and there being no substantial arguments
to
support said motion.cralaw:red
However, in order
to avoid undue delay in the
disposition of Civil Case No. Q-94-18790 and the preliminary
investigation
of the complaints against private respondents, the Court Resolved to:
1. REMAND Civil case No. Q-94-18790 to
the
Regional
Trial Court, Branch 88, Quezon City;
2. SET ASIDE the orders of the panel of
prosecutors
declaring private respondents' "Motion to Dismiss, Alternatively,
Motion
to suspend" as private respondents' counter-affidavits, and denying
their
motions to require petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue to
submit
documents and to inhibit the members of the panel of prosecutors;
3. DIRECT the Secretary of Justice to
designate
as early as possible, a new panel of prosecutors to investigate the
complaints
against private respondents;
4. ORDER the new panel of prosecutors
designated
by the Secretary of Justice to grant private respondents' motion for
the
submission by petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue to private
respondents,
thru their counsel of record, of the documents supporting the
complaints,
and to give private respondents reasonable time to examine the
documents
and to submit their counter-affidavits;
5. ORDER the preliminary investigation to
proceed
with all reasonable dispatch; and
6. DIRECT respondent Judge Tirso Velasco
to
dismiss
Civil Case No. Q-94-18790 on the ground that it has become moot in
light
of the foregoing dispositions.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J.,
Padilla, Regalado, Davide,
Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Francisco,
Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.cralaw:red
______________________________
Endnotes
[1]
In the wake of the OSG's motion, anonymous poison-pen letters
were
widely distributed and picked up by some radio commentators and a few
newspaper
writers, viciously attacking the honor and integrity of the Justices
who
voted to deny the petition, prompting the Court en banc to issue a
public
statement on 4 June 1996 which is quoted in part:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
"The Court is constrained to
issue this statement with regard to what may be described as a 'poison
letter,' which reportedly is being widely distributed to the public.
The
letter's author, while attempting to hide his identity in cowardly
fashion
behind an obviously deceitful pseudonym, is unable to hide his
dastardly
intention: which apparently is to influence said Members of the Court
to
vote against Lucio Tan and his co-parties, or so thoroughly discredit
them
as to rob whatever views they may subsequently express about the case
of
any moral cogency. This seems evident in the context of the
circumstances
in which the poison pen letter made its appearance.
"xxx
xxx
xxx
"Be that as it may, the three
[3] Members of the Court's First Division thus villified have in
separate
written statements addressed to the entire membership of the Court,
denounced
the 'poison pen letter' as extremely vicious, scurrilous, false and
malicious,
libelous, unfair, baseless, mere matters of guessword, the product of a
malevolent mind. A Member of the First Division, Mr. Justice Jose Vitug
also belied the letter's contents by orally asserting before the Court
En Bane that contrary to said letter's allegation, he had never been
approached
by any of the three Justices, or any one else, to vote for any party.
The
Chairman of the First Division categorically denied as being utterly
without
basis in fact the report in a newspaper that he was "fuming mad" at a
member
of his Division for 'lack of delicadeza' in connection with the case.
Andall
the Members of the Division denied that there was ever any 'see-sawing'
in votes or opinions in said case.
"The Court condemns the
'poison
pen letter' in the strongest possible terms, and excoriates its
cowardly
and devious author and disseminator.
"The Court declares its
support
of and continuing confidence in these three [3] Members, and the Chief
Justice, who is also libeled in the 'poison pen letter.' The Court is
confident
that the records not only of their public service but also of their
private
lives can stand the closest and most critical scrutiny, and will by any
rational norm be acknowledged as models of superior achievement, honor
and rectitude."
[2]
Jurado & Co. v. Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corp., 1 Phil. 395.
[3]
84 Phil. 368, at pp. 431-432.
[4]Government of the Philippine
Islands
v. Heirs of Abella, 49 Phil. 374. |