FIRST
DIVISION
ROSARIO
R. TUASON,
Petitioner,
G. R. No. 124553
February 10, 1997
-versus-
HON.
COURT OF APPEALS
and EMILIO R. TUASON,
Respondents.
D
E C I S I O N
VITUG, J.:
Petitioner
Rosario Tuason, mother of private
respondent Emilio R. Tuason, filed on 21 November 1991, with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a petition, docketed Case No.
Q-91-10677,
for the confinement and treatment of Emilio at the Medical City General
Hospital on account of his being a drug dependent. The trial court,
acting
on the petition, directed the confinement of Emilio at the hospital.
About
three months later, or on 11 February 1992, Rosario initiated, in SP
Proc.
M- 3051, guardianship proceedings over the person and estate of her
son.
Corresponding letters of guardianship were forthwith issued in favor of
petitioner.
On 06 June 1994,
on motion of private respondent
Emilio who claimed to have been freed from drug dependence, the trial
court
dismissed Case No. Q-91-10677. Emilio then filed, on 28 October 1990, a
Manifestation and Motion in SP Proc. No. M-3051 asking for the
termination
of his guardianship or, in the alternative, for the appointment of Mrs.
Milagros Balatbat, in lieu of petitioner, as guardian. The motion was
denied
by the trial court which, later, also rejected a reconsideration
thereof.cralaw:red
Private
respondent went up to the Court of Appeals
on a petition for certiorari The petition was followed by an exchange
of
pleadings. In his reply to petitioner's comment, private respondent
zeroed
in on the nullity of the court's ruling in SP Proc. Case No. M-3051 for
alleged lack of jurisdiction. He averred that the guardianship
proceedings
were null and void, asseverating that the Sheriffs Return, dated 14
February
1991, indicated that copies of the petition and the order setting the
case
for hearing on 20 February 1992 had been served not on private
respondent
personally but on the Director of Medical City General Hospital.
Private
respondent disclaimed having been aware of the petition. In a decision,
dated 22 November 1995, the appellate court found the petition
meritorious
and declared the appealed judgment null and void.cralaw:red
We find merit in
the instant petition.cralaw:red
There is
sufficient basis to establish that the
trial court has validly acquired jurisdiction over the person of
private
respondent Emilio Tuason. The records show that private respondent did
voluntarily submit himself to the court's jurisdiction. Several
pleadings
have been filed by him that, in fact, accounted for a number of
interlocutory
orders issued by the trial court; viz:
(1) Order dated 14 March 1994, ruling on
Emilio
R. Tuason's "Motion to Remove Guardianship" [Certified True Copy,
Rollo,
p. 38];
(2) Order dated 28 November 1994
ruling on
Emilio
R. Tuason's Urgent Omnibus Motion [Certified True Copy, Rollo, on.
39-41];
(3) Order dated 21 December 1994
ruling on
Emilio
R. Tuason's Urgent Motion for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining
Order
and/or Injunction [Certified True Copy, Rollo, p. 42];
(4) Order dated 26 December 1994,
resetting
the
case for presentation of evidence anent Emilio R. Tuason's application
for injunction [Certified True Copy, Rollo, p. 43];
(5) Order dated 15 March 1995, denying
Emilio
R. Tuason's Motion for Reconsideration [Certified True Copy, Rollo, p.
44]; and
(6) Order dated 25 July 1996, setting
the
hearing
for Emilio R. Tuason's motion for a restraining order or preliminary
injunction
and granting him twenty (20) days temporary restraining order
[Certified
True Copy, Rollo, p. 45].
In not a single
instance, in the foregoing incidents,
did private respondent appear to have seriously objected to the
jurisdiction
of the court.
Voluntary
appearance could cure a defect in the
service of summons. In La Naval Drug Corporation vs. Court of Appeals[1]
this Court has ruled:
The lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant may be waived either expressly or impliedly. When a defendant
voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have submitted himself to the
jurisdiction
of the court. If he so wishes not to waive this defense, he must do so
seasonably by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction
of
the court; otherwise, he shall be deemed to have submitted himself to
that
jurisdiction. The decisions promulgated heretofore by this Court would
likewise seemingly apply estoppel to bar the defendant from pursuing
that
defense by alleging in his answer any other issue for dismissing the
action.cralaw:red
A citation of a
few of our decisions might be
apropos.cralaw:red
In Wang
Laboratories, Inc. vs. Mendoza [156 SCRA
44], this Court has ruled that if the defendant, besides setting up in
a motion to dismiss his objection to the jurisdiction of the court,
alleges
at the same time any other ground for dismissing the action, he is
deemed
to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. In the
process,
it has equated the matter to a situation where, such as in Immaculata
vs.
Judge Navarro, et al. [146 SCRA 5], the defendant invokes an
affirmative
relief against his opponent.cralaw:red
When the
appearance is by motion for the purpose
of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, it must
be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction
of
the court. If his motion is for any other purpose than to object to the
jurisdiction of the court over his person, he thereby submits himself
to
the jurisdiction of the court. A special appearance by motion made for
the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the
person
will be held to be a general appearance, if the party in said motion
should,
for example, ask for a dismissal of the action upon the further ground
that the court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter. [Syllabus,
Flores vs. Zurbito, supra, at page 751. That rule was followed in
Ocampo
vs. Mina and Arejola, 41 Phil. 308].[2]
The case of
Yangco vs. CFI of Manila,[3]
cited by the appellate court, is not really in point. The petitioner
therein,
Yangco, did not seek any affirmative relief, instantly taking, instead,
an exception from the trial court's jurisdiction over his person. In
the
case at bench, Rule 15, Section 23 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 23. What is equivalent to service.
The defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent
to service.
is clearly
applicable.
WHEREFORE, the
petition is GRANTED, and the questioned
decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. All orders
made and entered by the trial court are REINSTATED, and the case is
REMANDED
thereto for further proceedings. No costs.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Padilla,
Bellosillo, Kapunan and Hermosisima,
Jr., JJ., concur.cralaw:red
_____________________________
Endnotes
[1]
236 SCRA 78.
[2]
At pp. 86-87.
[3]
29 Phil. 183. |