EN
BANC
EDGAR
R. DEL CASTILLO,
Petitioner,
G. R. No. 112513
August 21, 1997
-versus-
CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION,PROFESSIONAL REGULATION
COMMISSIONand/or ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER MARIANO
A. MENDIETA of the Professional
Regulation
Commission,
Respondents.
R
E SO L U T I O N
KAPUNAN, J.:
This is a
Motion for Clarificatory Relief filed
by petitioner in G. R. No. 112513 entitled Edgar R. Del Castillo vs.
Civil
Service Commission, et al.[1]
seeking a clarification of the decision of this Court in said case and
praying for an award of backwages and other benefits accruing to
petitioner
as a result of his illegal dismissal.
The facts of this
case are as follows:
On August 1,
1990, petitioner, an employee of
the Professional Regulation Commission [PRC], was placed under
preventive
suspension by the PRC for "grave misconduct" and "conduct prejudicial
to
the best interest of the service." After due investigation, petitioner
was found guilty of grave misconduct and was dismissed from the service
with forfeiture of all benefits.cralaw:red
Petitioner
appealed the PRC's decision to the
Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) which exonerated him of said
charge.cralaw:red
On appeal by the
PRC, however, the Civil Service
Commission [CSC] found petitioner guilty of grave misconduct, and
imposed
upon him the penalty of dismissal. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration
was denied.[2]
Petitioner, thus,
filed in this Court a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court alleging that the
CSC
committed grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the PRC's appeal,
among
other grounds.cralaw:red
This Court
granted said petition in an En Banc
Decision promulgated on February 14, 1995. The dispositive
part of
said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, all premises considered,
Resolution
No. 92-1249 dated September 8, 1992 and Resolution No. 93-4502 dated
October
12, 1993 of the respondent Civil Service Commission are hereby REVERSED
and the decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board is REINSTATED.
However, it may
be noted that the decision of the
MSPB referred to above merely ordered the reinstatement of petitioner
to
his former position and was silent on the award of back salaries. Thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing
premises,
the PRC Resolution dated September 19, 1990 is hereby set aside there
being
no substantial evidence adduced to support the conviction or finding of
guilt. Thus, respondent-appellant Edgar R. del Castillo is exonerated
of
the charge of grave misconduct levelled (sic) against him. The
Professional
Regulations Commission is thus directed to reinstate him to his former
position effective immediately.[4]
Nevertheless,
petitioner, through counsel, wrote
to PRC Chairman Hermogenes Pobre requesting not only reinstatement but
payment of back salaries as well. Petitioner was eventually reinstated
on July 17, 1995. However, his claim for backwages was in effect denied
by Chairman Pobre in a Letter[5]
to petitioner dated November 28, 1995. Attached to said letter was a
Correspondence[6]
addressed to Chairman Pobre and signed by a certain Julieta de la Torre
of the Department of Bureau and Management. The pertinent portion of
said
correspondence reads:
We regret to inform you of the inability
of
this
Department to give favorable consideration on the above request since
there
is no valid legal basis for the payment of back salaries and other
benefits
of Mr. Del Castillo. The Supreme Court decision is silent on the
payment
of such claim, hence, we cannot read into the Supreme Court decision
something
not stated therein unless the decision in question is subsequently
clarified
on this point by the Supreme Court or by any other competent authority
like the Department of Justice, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG)
or the Legal Office of the Office of the President.
Hence, this
"Motion for Clarificatory Relief."
In our Resolution
dated March 26, 1996, we required
the respondents to comment on petitioner's motion. Accordingly, the CSC
filed its Comment on October 29, 1996, stating thus:
The sole issue in this motion is whether
or not
Edgar del Castillo, who is exonerated in the administrative case and
later
ordered reinstated, is entitled to backwages and other monetary
benefits
from the time of his preventive suspension on August 1, 1990 up to the
time of his actual reinstatement on July 17, 1995.
In so many
cases, this Honorable Court had the occasion
to rule as follows:
It is already settled in this
jurisdiction that
a government official or employee is entitled to backwages not only if
he is exonerated in the administrative case but also when the
suspension
is unjustified. [Miranda vs. COA, 200 SCRA 657 citing Abellena vs. City
of Baguio, 19 SCRA 600 citing Reyes vs. Hernandez, 71 Phil. 297;
Villamor vs. Lacson, G.R. No. L-15945, November 28, 1964].
Such right [to backwages] is afforded
only to
those who have been illegally dismissed and were thus ordered
reinstated
or to those otherwise acquitted of the charge against them. [notes in
emphasis
ours] Isabelo TSabello vs. DECS, 180 SCRA 623.[7]
From the
foregoing, it appears that the CSC does
not pose any objection to petitioner's motion. Indeed, the Commission
"submits
to the sound discretion of the Honorable Court the resolution of the
instant
motion."[8]
The Solicitor General, for his part, recommends that petitioner's
prayer
for payment of backwages be granted.[9]
In support of said recommendation, the Solicitor General cites the
following
authorities:
This Honorable Court in the case of Tan,
Jr.
vs. Office of the President, 229 SCRA 677, stated:
Section 42 of P. D. No. 807, however,
is
really
not in point. The provision refers to preventive suspension[s] during
the
pendency of administrative investigation[s], and it does not cover
dismissed
civil servants who are ultimately exonerated and ordered reinstated to
their former or equivalent positions. The rule in the latter instance,
just as we have said starting with the case of Cristobal v. Melcher
[101
SCRA 857], is that when [']a government official or employee in the
classified
civil service had been illegally dismissed, and his reinstatement had
later
been ordered, for all legal [purposes he is considered as not having
left
his office, so that he is entitled to all the rights and privileges
that
accrue to him by virtue of the office that he held.'] Such award of
backwages,
however, has since been limited to a maximum period of five (5) years
(San
[Luis] vs. CA, 174 SCRA 258).
Likewise, in Gabriel vs. Domingo, 189
SCRA
672,
this Honorable Court ruled that an employee who is reinstated after
having
been illegally dismissed is entitled to back salaries for the period of
his illegal dismissal.[10]
We are in full
accord with the Solicitor General's
recommendation.
As we recently
held in De Guzman v. Civil Service
Commission:[11]
When an official or employee was
illegally
dismissed
and his reinstatement has later been ordered, for all legal purposes he
is considered as not having left his office. Therefore, he is entitled
to all the rights and privileges that accrue to him by virtue of the
office
he held (Tañada v. Legaspi, 13 SCRA 566 [1965]).
Back salaries may be ordered paid to said
officer
or employee (City Mayor of Zamboanga v. Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA 785
[1990]).
Having been
exonerated of the charges against him,
petitioner should clearly be awarded back salaries, the silence of the
MSPB's decision notwithstanding. In Cristobal vs. Melchor,[12]
Justice Claudio Teehankee, speaking for this Court, said:
As likewise reaffirmed by the Court in
Perez
vs. Evite, "under Section 45 of Rule 39, Rules of Court a judgment is
not
confined to what appears upon the face of the decision, but also those
necessarily included therein or necessary thereto." The late Chief
Justice
Fred Ruiz Castro stressed for the Court in Padua vs. Robles, that
"[T]he
sufficiency and efficacy of a judgment must be tested by its substance
rather than its form. In construing a judgment, its legal effects
including
such effects that necessarily follow because of legal implications,
rather
than the language used, govern. Also, its meaning, operation, and
consequences
must be ascertained like any other written instrument. Thus, a judgment
rests on the intention of the court as gathered from every part
thereof,
including the situation to which it applies and the attendant
circumstances.[13]
WHEREFORE,
petitioner's motion for clarificatory
relief is GRANTED. It is hereby ordered that petitioner be paid back
salaries
and other benefits due him at the rate prescribed for the position he
held
as a civil servant from the time of his preventive suspension on August
1, 1990 until his actual reinstatement on July 17, 1995, without
deduction.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Narvasa, C.J.,
Padilla, Davide, Romero,
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr.,
Panganiban
and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Regalado, J., is on leave.cralaw:red
_________________________________
Endnotes
[1]
241 SCRA 317 [1995].
[2]
Ibid.
[3]
Id., at 323.
[4]
Id., at 320.
[5]
Rollo, p. 5.
[6]
Id., at 215.
[7]
Comment of Civil Service Commission, pp. 4-5; Emphasis in the original.
[8]
Id., at 5.
[9]
Comment of Solicitor General, p. 7.
[10]
Id., at 6-7; emphasis in the original; emphasis supplied.
[11]
231 SCRA 169 [1994]. Should be Tañada.
[12]
101 SCRA 857 [1980].
[13]
Id., at 863-864. |