SECOND
DIVISION
VICTORIA
MEDINA, VIRGINIA VINUYA,
ANSELMO YABOT and SALVACION MENDOZA,
Petitioners,
G. R. No. 113235
July 24, 1997
-versus-
CITY
SHERIFF, MANILA and SPOUSES JUSTINO V.
JIMENEZ
and AURORA RUEDA JIMENEZ,
Respondents.
R
E S O L U T I O N
ROMERO, J.:
The sole issue
in the instant petition for certiorari
is whether or not the Court of Appeals, in denying petitioners'
application
for a writ of preliminary injunction, committed grave abuse of
discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The facts which gave rise to this
petition
are stated below:
Private
respondent spouses Justino and Aurora
Jimenez filed an unlawful detainer suit against petitioners on April 8,
1991 docketed as Civil Case No. 92-135259-CV. The Jimenezes, as lessors
and as owners of a parcel of land in Tondo, Manila, sought to evict
petitioners-lessees
therefrom.[1]
On January 2, 1992, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila rendered its
decision in favor of plaintiff-lessors below and herein respondents
with
the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
against
the defendants and in favor of the plaintiffs, ordering the defendants
to vacate the premises being occupied by them under TCT No. 194409 of
plaintiffs,
including all persons claiming rights and title under them. Defendants
are also ordered, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiffs the
amount
of P15,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, as well as
the costs of this suit.[2]
Unknown to
petitioners, the spouses Jimenez had earlier
sold the subject property to Ernesto and Rose Concepcion for
P450,000.00
on October 14, 1990. After the above-mentioned ejectment case was
initiated
against petitioners, private respondents Jimenez commenced a complaint
in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8 for annulment of the
deed
of sale they had executed in favor of the spouses Concepcion.[3]
On March 12, 1992, the court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit
and ordered the plaintiffs Jimenez to pay liquidated damages and
litigation
expenses, as well as attorney's fees amounting to P50,000.00 and
P30,000.00,
respectively.[4]
Respondent appellate court dismissed the appeal filed by the Jimenezes
due to the late filing of the appellant's brief.[5]
Petitioners
allege that they were not aware of
the conveyance to the Concepcions and the legal battle between the
latter
and the Jimenez spouses until after private respondents Jimenez moved
for
the issuance of a writ of execution in the ejectment case. Petitioners
filed their opposition to said motion on the ground of the supervening
event of private respondents' loss of ownership over the property. The
Metropolitan Trial Court, through Judge Reinato G. Quilala, granted the
motion for execution and issued the assailed writ on April 27, 1993.[6]
Petitioners
resorted to filing a case for "Damages
with Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order" before
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 22.[7]
After the lower court denied petitioner's application for the issuance
of the writ of preliminary injunction,[8]
they proceeded to file a petition for prohibition and certiorari with
preliminary
injunction and/or restraining order in the Court of Appeals, docketed
as
CA-G. R. SP No. 31337.[9]
On December 15, 1993, respondent court rendered the questioned
Resolution
denying petitioners' motion for issuance of preliminary injunction,
which
reads:
Acting on the petitioners' Motion for
Issuance
of Preliminary Injunction dated December 7, 1993 after having gone over
the petition and comment thereto with their respective annexes, We find
no factual and legal basis to warrant issuance of a preliminary
injunction.
WHEREFORE, the petitioners' motion is
DENIED
and the main case is now deemed submitted for decision.[10]
Consequently, a
Sheriff's Notice to Demolish and
Vacate was issued on January 10, 1994.[11]
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari.
In a Resolution
of this Court dated February 2,
1994, private respondents herein were required to comment on the
petition.
On July 11, 1994, after noting that the aforesaid Resolution was
unclaimed
by private respondents, we required counsel for petitioners to inform
the
Court of private respondents' address, under pain of dismissal of the
petition.cralaw:red
On March 15,
1995, the Court required counsel
for petitioners to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt
with for failure to comply with the July 11, 1994 Resolution. Atty.
Floriano
Par, counsel for petitioners, filed his Compliance on May 2, 1995
stating
that the address of the Jimenezes is 1393 Sta. Maria St. Tondo, Manila,
which is the same address in the Deed of Sale dated October 14, 1990
and
in the complaint for ejectment in Civil Case No. 92-135259 filed in
1991.[12]
On June 21, 1995, the Court reiterated its earlier directive requiring
comment from private respondents and its Resolution was sent to the
same
address.cralaw:red
On August 21,
1995, the Court required counsel
for petitioners once again to furnish the address of private
respondents.
On September 13, 1995, Atty. Floriano Par complied and stated that the
true and present address of the spouses Jimenez continues to be at 1393
Sta. Maria Street, Tondo, Manila. Said address is that declared in a
complaint
for ejectment filed by the spouses Jimenez against the Heirs of Rita de
Jesus, et al. [Civil Case No. 146572-CV] filed on January 27, 1995 and
which is still pending.[13]
On October 2, 1995, the Court noted Atty. Par's Compliance and directed
petitioners to serve a copy of the petition directly on private
respondents.[14]
On January 2,
1996, counsel for petitioners filed
his Compliance stating that he personally delivered a copy of the
petition
to respondents at their residence and the same was received by
Jackerson
Jimenez, son of Justino and Aurora Jimenez, on December 28, 1995.
All this hassle regarding service on private respondents, the repeated
manifestations of counsel for petitioners that private respondents had
not changed residences and the continued silence of private respondents
reveal the latter's utter lack of interest in the petition before Us.
Thus,
the instant petition will have to be resolved without the benefit of
their
comment as the Court's patience, after granting them several chances to
file their comment over a two-year period, has reached its limit.cralaw:red
For the petition
to be granted, it must be shown
that the respondent appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction and not mere errors of judgment, for
certiorari is not a remedy for errors of judgment, which are
correctible
by appeal.[15]
The instant petition should be dismissed, there being no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of respondent court in denying petitioners'
application
for preliminary injunction.cralaw:red
To be entitled to
the injunctive writ, they must
show that there exists a right to be protected which is directly
threatened
by an act sought to be enjoined.[16]
Furthermore, there must be a showing that the invasion of the right is
material and substantial and that there is an urgent and paramount
necessity
for the writ to prevent serious damage.[17]
Complainant's right must be clear and unmistakable. In the absence of a
clear legal right, the issuance of the writ constitutes grave abuse of
discretion. Where the complainant's right or title is doubtful or
disputed,
injunction is not proper.[18]
The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of an actual
existing
right is not a ground for injunction.[19]
In the instant
case, the enforcement of the writ
of execution, which would evict them from their homes, is manifestly
prejudicial
to petitioners' interest. However, they possess no clear legal right
that
merits the protection of the courts through the writ of preliminary
injunction.
Their right to possess the property in question has been declared
inferior
or inexistent in relation to the plaintiff in the ejectment case below
after a judgment which has become final and executory.cralaw:red
Petitioner'
ground for the issuance of the writ
of prohibition and/or certiorari before the Court of Appeals is the
presence
of a supervening event that renders execution unjust or inequitable.
Said
issue remains unresolved in the main case still pending and does not
confirm
the existence of a clear right in favor of petitioners. At best, they
can
obtain the suspension of the enforcement of the writ of execution or
other
similar relief on equitable grounds.[20]
WHEREFORE, the
instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Costs against petitioner.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Regalado, Puno
and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Torres, Jr., J., is on leave.cralaw:red
___________________________________
Endnotes
[1]
The property was originally covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No.
194409 in the name of the spouses Jimenez.
[2]
Penned by Judge Reinato G. Quilala, Rollo, pp. 32-35.
[3]
"Spouses Justino V. Jimenez and Aurora D. Rueda Jimenez v. Spouses
Ernesto
Concepcion and Rose Concepcion," Civil Case No. 91-56807, Regional
Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 8.
[4]
Penned by Judge Arsenio M. Gonong, Rollo, pp. 48-61.
[5]
Per Resolution dated January 27, 1993 in CA-G. R. CV No. 37681 dated
January
27, 1993, penned by Justice Serafin V.C. Guingona with the concurrence
of Justices Segundino G. Chua and Ricardo P. Galvez, Rollo, pp. 62-64.
[6]
Issued by Judge Reinato G. Quilala, Rollo, p. 65.
[7]
Civil Case No. 93-65848, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 22.
[8]
Per Judge Marino M. Dela Cruz, Jr., Rollo, p. 75.
[9]
"Victoria Medina, et al. v. Hon. Marino M. Dela Cruz and Spouses
Justino
and Aurora Jimenez."
[10]
Per Justice Alfredo Marigomen with the concurrence of Justices Ma.
Alicia
Austria-Martinez and Lourdes K. Tayao-Jaguros, Rollo, pp. 89-90.
[11]
Rollo, p. 91.
[12]
Rollo, p. 101.
[13]
Rollo, p. 120.
[14]
Rollo, p. 137.
[15]
Lipana v. Development Bank of Rizal, 154 SCRA 257 [September 24, 1987]
citing Vecino v. Geronimo, 59 O.G. 579. Rule 65, Sections 1 and 2.
[16]
Searth Commodities Corporation v. CA, 207 SCRA 628 [March 31, 1992];
Saulog
v. CA, G.R. No. 119769, September 18, 1996.
[17]
Syndicated Media Access Corporation v. CA, 219 SCRA 797 [March 11,
1993].
[18]
Arcega v. CA, G. R. No. 122206, July 7, 1997 citing Vinzons-Chato v.
Natividad,
244 SCRA 787 and China Banking Corporation v. CA, G. R. No. 121158,
December
5, 1996.
[19]
Ibid. citing Ulang v. CA, 224 SCRA 642.
[20]
When a judgment or order becomes final and executory, the trial court's
ministerial duty is to issue a writ of execution to enforce this
judgment.
A writ of execution may, however, be refused on equitable grounds such
as when there is a change in situation of the parties that would make
execution
inequitable. Likewise, where supervening events occurring subsequent to
the judgment bring about a material change in the situation of the
parties
which makes the execution inequitable or where there is no compelling
urgency
for the execution because it is not justified by the prevailing
circumstances,
a stay or preclusion of execution may be properly sought. These are
cases
of special and exceptional nature where execution may be suspended in
the
higher interest of justice. Baclayon v. CA, 182 SCRA 761 [February 26,
1990]; Rodriguez v. Project 6 Market Service Cooperative, 247 SCRA 528
[August 23, 1995] citing Luna v. CA, 137 SCRA 7; Heirs of Gumimpin v.
CA,
120 SCRA 687; Albar v. Carandang, 6 SCRA 211. Hualam Construction
Development
Corporation v. CA, 214 SCRA 612 [October 16, 1992] citing Laurel v.
Abalos,
163 SCRA 237; Laurel v. Abalos, 30 SCRA 281 [October 31, 1969];
Concurring
opinion of Chief Justice, then Associate Justice Andres R. Narvasa in
Baclayon
v. CA, 182 SCRA 761 [February 26, 1990]; and Ngo Bun Tiong v. Sayo, 163
SCRA 237 [June 30, 1988]; Lipana v. Development Bank of Rizal, 154 SCRA
257 [September 24, 1987] citing Vecino v. Geronimo, 59 O. G. 579. |