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G.
R.
No. 119500
August
28, 1998
-versus-
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND WILFREDO MELCHOR, Respondents. PANGANIBAN,
J :
In dismissing the Petition,
this Court reiterates the following doctrines: [1] the "boundary
system"
used in taxi [and jeepney] operations presupposes an employer-employee
relation; [2] the employer must prove just [or authorized] cause and
due
process to justify dismissal of an employee; [3] strained relations
must
be demonstrated as a fact; and [4] back wages and reinstatement are
necessary
consequences of illegal dismissal.
Before Us is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction assailing the December 16, 1994 Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission[1] in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-02-01564-94 entitled "Wilfredo Melchor vs. Paguio Transport Corporation/Serafin Paguio." The dispositive portion of the challenged Decision reads:
Petitioner also impugns the February 21, 1995 NLRC Resolution[2] denying the motion for reconsideration. The June 28, 1994 Decision of the Labor Arbiter[3] which the NLRC modified as to the amount of back wages, disposed as follows:
"The respondents are further ordered to pay him his 13th month pay in the amount of P5,600.00. "Complainant's backwages up to the date of this Decision as computed by LEILANI E. CALALANG of the Commission's NLRC NCR Branch is:
P800.00 x 3 days x 4 weeks = P9,600.00 P9,600.00 x 7 mos. = P67.200.00 "The aspect of reinstatement either in the job or payroll at the option of the employers being immediately executory pursuant to Article 223 of the Labor Code, the respondents are hereby directed to so reinstate him when he reports for work by virtue of this Decision. "Other claims are hereby dismissed for lack of evidence."
"Respondents, for their part, maintained that complainant was not illegally dismissed, there being in the first place no employer-employee relationship between them. In amplification, it was argued that the element of control which was a paramount test to determine the existence of such a relationship [was] lacking. So too, it argued the element of the payment of compensation. Considering that in lieu of the latter, payment of boundary is instead made allegedly makes the relationship between them of a 'wase-agreement' [sic]. Respondents then argued that even if an employer-employee relationship were to be presumed as present, still complainant's termination arose out of a valid cause and after he refused to articulate his stand on the investigation being conducted on him. Respondents then harped on the supposed three occasions when complainant figured in a vehicular accident involving the taxi unit he was driving, viz: On August 3, which resulted in damages to the respondent in the amount of P150.00; On August 4 which again resulted in the damages to the respondent in the amount of P615.00; and again on 4 November 1993, the mishap costing the respondents this time P25,370.00 in damages. As a result of the alleged compounded damages which the respondents had to shoulder on account of the supposed reckless driving of the complainant, the former was allegedly left with no alternative but to ask complainant's explanation why he should still be allowed to drive. Complainant, despite several chances, allegedly failed to do so."[4] The NLRC held that private respondent was an illegally dismissed employee of petitioner. Upholding the existence of an employer-employee relationship, it cited Doce v. WCC,[5] in which the Supreme Court ruled that "the relationship created between the parties operating under a 'boundary system' is one of an employer and employee, and not of a lessor and a lessee."[6] The NLRC sustained the ruling of the Labor Arbiter that the private respondent was illegally dismissed for he "was not afforded the twin requirements of due process."[7] It rejected petitioner's claim that private respondent had figured in three vehicular incidents because of his reckless driving. It found that "except for petitioner's bare statements, no proof was presented to establish with particularity the circumstances being claimed. The guilt and culpability of [private respondent] which would give [petitioner] valid ground to effect his dismissal cannot be established by a mere allegation of his reckless driving."[8] Public Respondent NLRC found petitioner liable for backwages in the amount of P86,400, and not P67,200 as computed by the labor arbiter. It found, however, that this liability should be imposed on Petitioner Corporation only, and not on its president who was also impleaded by private respondent. Hence, this Petition.[9] Petitioner raises the following issues:
"[b] Whether or not public respondent acted in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to reconsider its decision and resolution complained of despite the facts prevailing to support the reconsideration."[10] In resolving the Petition, We shall address the following points: [1] employer-employee relation; [2] presence of just cause; [3] due process; [4] strained relationship; and [5] propriety of reinstatement and backwages. The petition is not meritorious. Under the "boundary system," private respondent was engaged to drive petitioner's taxi unit on a 24-hour schedule every two days. On each such trip, private respondent remitted to petitioner a "boundary" of P650. Whatever he earned in excess of that amount was considered his income. Petitioner argues that under said arrangement, he had no control over the number of hours private respondent had to work and the routes he had to take. Therefore, he concludes that the employer-employee relationship cannot be deemed to exist. Petitioner's contention is not novel. In Martinez v. National Labor Relations Commission,[11] this Court already ruled that the relationship of taxi owners and taxi drivers is the same as that between jeepney owners and jeepney drivers under the "boundary system." In both cases, the employer-employee relationship was deemed to exist, viz:
Petitioner also asserts that private respondent's involvement in three vehicular accidents within a span of several months constitutes just cause for his dismissal. It alleges that, according to the police report concerning the most recent and serious vehicular mishap, it was private respondent who was at fault and that the "city prosecutor of Quezon City recommended that an Information for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property be filed against him."[13] Petitioner, however, did not submit any proof to support these allegations. Well-settled is the rule that the employer has the burden of proving that the dismissal of an employee is for a just cause. The failure of the employer to discharge this burden means that the dismissal is not justified and that the employee is entitled to reinstatement and backwages.[14] In this case, petitioner failed to prove any just or authorized cause for his dismissal. Private respondent, therefore, must be deemed illegally dismissed.[15] Petitioner contends that he "submitted and presented material and competent documentary evidence consisting of police reports of vehicular accidents of taxicab units owned by petitioner and driven by private respondent, the repairs and expenses suffered by the petitioner as a result thereof and the resolution of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City finding private respondent at fault for the November 4, 1993 vehicular accident caused by the latter."[16] Adding that the submission of these documents only on appeal does not diminish their probative value, petitioner cites Article 221 of the Labor Code which reads:
"Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the Labor Arbiter shall exert all efforts towards [t]he amicable settlement of a labor dispute within his jurisdiction on or before the first hearing. The same rule shall apply to the Commission in the exercise of its original jurisdiction." However, a careful examination of both the original Complaint and the Petitioner's Memorandum of Appeal from the Labor Arbiter's Decision reveals that said pieces of documentary evidence were not mentioned or included therein,[17] but were submitted by petitioner only when he filed his present petition with this Court. These pieces of evidence were attached and referred to as Annexes "G", "H", "I", "J", "K" and "L" of the said petition. Such factual issues cannot be resolved in a Petition for Certiorari like the present case, because the Court's review of NLRC Decisions is limited to questions of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion. In PMI Colleges v. NLRC,[18] the Court held:
"Of the same tenor was our disquisition in Ilocos Sur Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. NLRC where we made plain that:
Equally devoid of correctness is petitioner's claim that the documents should be considered pursuant to Article 221 of the Labor Code which states that technical rules are not binding in proceedings before the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts; as earlier stated, its jurisdiction in a Petition for Certiorari, like the present case, is confined to questions of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion. The unexplained failure of petitioner to present its evidence before the labor arbiter and the NLRC cannot compel this Court to expand the scope of its review. Indeed, petitioner has not proffered a sufficient reason for this Court to do so. Petitioner's reliance on Canete v. National Labor Relations Commission[19] is misplaced. In that case, the documents were submitted to the NLRC before they were tackled by the Supreme Court. Private respondent's admission that he was involved in the November 4, 1993 accident did not give petitioner a just cause to dismiss him. Mere involvement in an accident, absent any showing of fault or recklessness on the part of an employee, is not a valid ground for dismissal. Petitioner insists that private respondent was accorded due process, because he was allowed to explain his side and to show cause why he should still be allowed to act as one of petitioner's drivers. This does not persuade. The Court has consistently held that in the dismissal of employees, the twin requirements of notice and hearing are essential elements of due process. The employer must furnish the worker two written notices: [1] one to apprise him of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and [2] the other to inform him of his employer's decision to dismiss him. As to the requirement of a hearing, the essence of due process lies simply in an opportunity to be heard, and not always and indispensably in an actual hearing.[20] In the present case, petitioner failed to present proof, other than its bare allegations, that it had complied with these requirements.[21] We reiterate: the burden of proof rests on the employer. Private respondent, in fact, was not given notice that he was being dismissed. When ordered to explain the vehicular accident that happened on November 4, 1993, he was not informed that petitioner was contemplating his dismissal and that his involvement in said vehicular accident was the cause thereof. Private respondent was merely asked to explain the vehicular accident per se, not his defense against a charge of dismissal arising from the vehicular accident. He became aware of his employer's intention to dismiss him only when he was actually told not to report for work anymore. Notwithstanding its failure to prove just cause and due process in the dismissal of private respondent, petitioner seeks to bar his reinstatement by invoking the doctrine of strained relations. It contends that as a result of private respondent's "reckless and incompetent manner of driving, compounded by the damages suffered by petitioner in terms of repairs, related expenses, and the institution of the instant case, the relationship between the parties are so strained as to preclude a harmonious working atmosphere to the prejudice of the petitioner as well as private respondent."[22] We are not persuaded. Strained relations must be demonstrated as a fact. Petitioner failed to do so. Its allegation that private respondent was incompetent and reckless in his manner of driving, which led to his involvement in three vehicular accidents, is not supported by the records. As earlier noted, no evidence was properly submitted by petitioner to prove or give credence to his assertions. Thus, Respondent NLRC ruled:
Because the claim of petitioner has no factual basis, the doctrine on strained relations cannot be applied in this case. Moreover, the filing of the Complaint for illegal dismissal does not by itself justify the invocation of this doctrine. As the Court held in Capili vs. NLRC:[24]
Fifth Issue: Because he was illegally dismissed, private respondent is entitled to reinstatement and back wages pursuant to Section 279 of the Labor Code which reads:
Interpreting this provision, the Court held in Bustamante v. NLRC[25] that illegally dismissed employees are entitled to full back wages without conditions or limitations, viz.:
The Labor Arbiter awarded backwages in the sum of P67,200 based on the following computation:
P800.00 x 3 days x 4 weeks = P9,600.00 P9,600 x 7 mos. = P67,200.00"[26] In modifying the foregoing award, the NLRC relied on this other formula:
P600.00 x 3 days x 4 weeks = P7,200.00 P7,200 x 12 months = P86,400.00."[27] Although
the NLRC adjusted
the amount of private respondent's monthly income and the period during
which backwages may be awarded, neither the petitioner nor the private
respondent questioned the new computation. Accordingly, We sustain the
award but stress that the backwages ought to be computed from the time
of the illegal dismissal to the time of reinstatement, either actual or
in the payroll, without any deduction or qualification.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed for utter lack of merit, and the assailed Decision and Resolution are hereby affirmed. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., J., Vitug and Quisumbing, JJ., concur. Bellosillo, JJ., took no part; did not participate in deliberations. ________________________ Endnotes: [1]
Third Division composed of Comm. Joaquin A. Tanodra, ponente; Presiding
Comm. Lourdes C. Javier and Comm. Ireneo B. Bernardo, concurring.
[2] Rollo, pp. 46-47. [3] Potenciano S. Canizares, Jr. [4] NLRC Decision, pp. 2-4; rollo, pp. 39-41. [5] 104 Phil. 946, December 22, 1958. [6] NLRC Decision, p. 6; rollo, p. 43. [7] Ibid., p. 5; rollo, p. 42. [8] Ibid. [9] This case was deemed submitted for resolution on January 14, 1998, when the Court noted and granted the Solicitor General's Manifestation and Motion dated November 25, 1997. [10] Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 6; rollo, p. 144. It should be noted that private respondent did not assail the NLRC Decision or any part thereof. [11] Martinez v. National Relations Commission, 272 SCRA 793, May 29, 1997, per Bellosillo, J . [12] Ibid., pp. 799-800. [13] Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 8; rollo, p. 146. [14] Mabeza v. National Labor Relations Commission, 271 SCRA 670, 680, April 18, 1997, per Kapunan J . [15] See Art. 282 and 283 of the Labor Code. [16] Memorandum for Petitioner; p. 10; rollo, p. 148. [17] NLRC Decision; p. 5; rollo, p. 42. [18] GR No. 121466, August 15, 1997, per Romero, J . [19] 250 SCRA 259, November 23, 1995. [20] Conti v. National Labor Relations Commission, 271 SCRA 114, 118, April 10, 1997. [21] NLRC Decision, p. 5; rollo, p. 42. [22] Memorandum for Petitioner; pp. 9-10; rollo, pp. 147-148. [23] NLRC Decision; p. 5; rollo, p. 42. [24] 270 SCRA 488, 495, March 26, 1997, per Bellosillo J . [25] 265 SCRA 61, November 28, 1996, per Padilla, J . See also Highway Copra Traders v. NLRC, GR No. 108889, July 30, 1998. Bustamante applies to illegal dismissals effected after March 21, 1989. In the present case, private respondent was hired on December 25, 1992 and illegally dismissed on November 28, 1993. [26] Labor arbiter's Decision, p. 4; rollo, p. 32. [27] Assailed Decision; p. 7; rollo, p. 44. |
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