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FILFLEX
INDUSTRIAL
& MANUFACTURING CORPORATION
G.
R.
No. 115395
February
12, 1998
-versus-
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS [NAFLU] AND SALUD GALING, Respondents. PANGANIBAN,
J :
Is an employee entitled
to back wages during the pendency of her appeal before the NLRC, even
if
the assailed Labor Arbiter's Decision did not order her reinstatement?
May the NLRC decree back wages where the employee's dismissal was legal?
The Court answers these questions in the negative in granting this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the October 29, 1993 Resolution[1] of the National Labor Relations Commission[2] [NLRC] which disposed as follows:[3]
However, respondents [petitioners herein] are ordered to pay complainant [private respondent herein] her salaries from the date of the filing of the instant appeal on April 10, 1992 up to the date of the promulgation of this Resolution pursuant to Art. 223 of the Labor Code, as amended." Petitioners also challenge the NLRC's Resolution dated February 7, 1994 which denied their subsequent motion for reconsideration, for lack of merit. The Labor Arbiter's Decision, which the NLRC set aside, in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-02-01060-91 dated March 10, 1992 disposed as follows:[4]
"Considering, however, the physical condition of the complainant that was the real cause of her absences and tardiness, it would be to their mutual advantage and most importantly to the physical and health welfare of complainant that she is separated from the service with separation benefits equivalent to 1/2 month basic salary for every year of service, a fraction of six (6) months equivalent to one year in the amount of P22,815.00. "The charge of unfair labor practice is hereby denied for lack of legal basis. "Individual respondent Celia Buenconsejo is hereby absolved of any liability for she acted only in her official capacity. Other claims are denied for lack of merit."
Declaring "the dismissal of complainant improper and unjust," the Labor Arbiter awarded her "limited backwages and other benefits" plus separation pay equivalent to one half month for every year of service. The Labor Arbiter did not order her reinstatement holding that her separation from employment would be to the parties' "mutual benefit and most importantly to the physical and health welfare of complainant." On appeal, Respondent NLRC ruled that the dismissal of private respondent was justified. It held, however, that Article 223 of the Labor Code required the reinstatement of private respondent during the pendency of her appeal. Thus, it awarded back wages for the said period when the appeal was pending before it, reasoning as follows:[6]
However, pursuant to Art. 223 of the Labor Code, as amended, which provides for mandatory reinstatement whether actual or on payroll, pending appeal, respondent should pay complainant her salaries from the time the appeal was filed on April 10, 1992 up to the date of the promulgation of this Resolution." Dissatisfied, petitioners lodged this recourse before this Court. In the Resolution[7] dated June 29, 1994, this Court issued a temporary restraining order thus:[8]
The petition is meritorious. Agreeing with the Petition, the Solicitor General clarifies that Article 223 of the Labor Code is inapplicable to the instant case because Labor Arbiter Cueto "did not order the reinstatement of private respondent." Likewise, the government lawyer agrees that the NLRC Resolution was inherently inconsistent for holding that the dismissal of complainant Galing was justified and, at the same time, ruling that she should have been reinstated during the pendency of the appeal.[14] On the other hand, the legal department of the NLRC[15] maintains that "reinstatement [pending appeal] whether actual or in payroll is mandatory under Art. 223 of the Code."[16] Private respondent adds that under paragraph one, second sentence of the Labor Arbiter's Decision, "there [was] a call for reinstatement of the complainant because of the backwages granted to her."[17] We agree with the petitioners and the Solicitor General. The relevant law is Article 223[18] of the Labor Code which reads:
In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided herein." [Emphasis supplied]. In other words, reinstatement during appeal is warranted only when the Labor Arbiter [LA] himself rules that the dismissed employee should be reinstated. In the present case, neither the dispositive portion nor the text of the labor arbiter's decision ordered the reinstatement of private respondent. Further, the back wages granted to private respondent were specifically limited to the period prior to the filing of the appeal with Respondent NLRC. In fact, the LA's decision ordered her separation from service for the parties' "mutual advantage and most importantly to the physical and health welfare of complainant." Hence, it is an error and an abuse of discretion for the NLRC to hold that the award of limited back wages, by implication, included an order for private respondent's reinstatement. An order for reinstatement must be specifically declared and cannot be presumed. Like back wages, it is a separate and distinct relief given to an illegally dismissed employee.[19] There being no specific order for reinstatement and the order being for complainant's separation, there can be no basis for the award of salaries/back wages during the pendency of appeal. In addition to the foregoing discussion, there is an equally cogent reason to sustain the petition. Before reinstatement or back wages may be granted, there must be unjust or illegal dismissal from work.[20] The Labor Arbiter ruled that private respondent's "absences and tardiness by itself are sufficient ground for the complainant's dismissal were it not for reason of sickness which we believe is excusable."[21] On appeal, however, the NLRC categorically declared that private respondent's dismissal was wholly justified because her performance was characterized by inefficiency, infractions and absenteeism.[22] Indeed, the records substantiate the following findings of the NLRC:
"In this particular, complainant's attitude toward her work is characterized by infractions and inefficiency. It is undisputed that besides her unauthorized absences from November 11, 1990 to December 18, 1990, she previously incurred various offenses. She was frequently late in reporting for work during the following period:
Second Quarter of 1984 — 45 times First Quarter of 1985 — 18 times January 1987 — 8 times February 1987 — 8 times March 1987 — 13 times April 1987 — 6 times May 1987 — 13 times June 1987 — 19 times July 1987 — 11 times August 1987 — 7 times October 1987 — 13 times November 1987 — 17 times December 1987 — 19 times January 1988 — 13 times February 1988 — 15 times March 1988 — 9 times April 1988 — 3 times May 1988 — 10 times January 1990 — 11 times March 1990 — 21 times April 1990 — 16 times May 1990 — 19 times June 1990 — 21 times
Since
the dismissal of
private respondent was deemed valid, she cannot be entitled to
reinstatement
and back wages.[23]
An award of back wages by the NLRC during the period of appeal is
totally
inconsistent with its finding of a valid dismissal.
Additionally, private respondent cannot now be granted separation pay or any other affirmative relief previously awarded to her by the Labor Arbiter but reversed by the NLRC. Since she did not appeal from the NLRC's Resolution, she is presumed to be satisfied with the adjudication therein. This is in accord with the doctrine that a party who has not appealed cannot obtain from the Appellate Court any affirmative relief other than the ones granted in the appealed decision.[24] WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The award of back wages in the assailed NLRC Resolution dated October 29, 1993 is DELETED. The temporary restraining order issued on June 29, 1994 is MADE PERMANENT. No costs. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Vitug and Quisumbing, JJ., concur. ________________________ Endnotes: [1] In NLRC NCR CA No. 003258-92; rollo, pp. 26-34. [2]
Second Division composed of Pres. Comm. Edna Bonto-Perez, ponente;
Comm.
Domingo H. Zapanta and Rogelio I. Rayala, concurring.
[3] Rollo, p. 33. [4] Rollo, p. 25. [5] Rollo, pp. 16-19; LA's decision, pp. 1-4. [6] Rollo, pp. 29-33; Resolution of October 29, 1993, pp. 4-8. [7] Issued by the First Division. [8] Rollo, pp. 156-157. [9] This case was deemed submitted for resolution on April 14, 1997 upon this Court's receipt of private respondent's memorandum. [10] Rollo, p. 8; Petition, p. 7. [11] Should be "Resolution." [12] Rollo, pp. 250-251; Petitioners' Memorandum, pp. 8-9. [13] Rollo, p. 252; Petitioners' Memorandum, p. 10. [14] Rollo, pp. 193-194; Solicitor General's Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Comment, pp. 5-6. [15] Represented by Atty. Edgardo M. Tamoria [now deceased]. [16] Rollo, p. 223; Respondent NLRC's Comment, p. 5. [17] Rollo, p. 272; Private Respondent's Memorandum, p. 6. [18] As amended by Section 12 of RA 6715. [19] Article 279 of the Labor Code; Gold City Integrated Port Service, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 245 SCRA 627, July 6, 1995. [20] Gold City Integrated Port Service, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, supra, at pp. 638-639; Torillo vs. Leogardo, 197 SCRA 471, May 27, 1991; Indophil Acrylic Mfg. Corp. vs. NLRC, 226 SCRA 723, September 27, 1993. [21] Rollo, p. 24; LA's Decision, p 9. [22] Citing Mendoza vs. NLRC, 195 SCRA 606, March 22, 1991. [23] Lausa vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 187 SCRA 299, July 9, 1990. [24] SMI Fish Industries vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 213 SCRA 444, September 2, 1992. See also Caliguia vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 264 SCRA 110, November 13, 1996; Teodoro vs. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 603, July 11, 1996; Carrion vs. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 862, August 22, 1996. |
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