RODRIGO R. DUTERTE AND BENJAMIN C. DE GUZMAN,
                                                                        Petitioners,

Chairman : Atty. Benjamin C. de Guzman, City Administrator
Members : Mr. Jorge Silvosa, Acting City Treasurer
 Atty. Victorino Advincula, City Councilor
 Mr. Alexis Almendras, City Councilor
 Atty. Onofre Francisco, City Legal Officer
 Mr. Rufino Ambrocio, Jr., Chief of Internal Control Office
 Atty. Mariano Kintanar, COA Resident Auditor.[1]

1. The award of the contract for the "Davao City Local Automation Project" to Systems Plus, Inc., for P11,656,810 was done thru negotiated contract rather than thru competitive public bidding in violation of Sections 2 and 8 of PD 526. Moreover, there was no sufficient appropriation for this particular contract in violation of Sec. 85 of PD 1445.
 
2. Advance payment of P1.7M was made to Systems Plus, Inc. covering 15% of the contract cost of P11.6M in violation of Sec. 45 of PD 477 and Sec. 88 of PD 1445.
 
3. The cost of computer hardware and accessories under contract with "Systems Plus, Inc. (SPI)" differed from the team's canvass by as much as 1200% or a total of P1.8M.
 
4. The City had no Information Systems Plan (ISP) prior to the award of the contract to SPI in direct violation of Malacañang Memo. Order No. 287 and NCC Memo. Circular 89-1 dated June 22, 1989. This omission resulted in undue disadvantage to the City Government.
 
5. To remedy the foregoing deficiencies, the team recommends that the contract with Systems Plus, Inc. be rescinded in view of the questionable validity due to insufficient funding. Further, the provisions of NCC-MC 89-1 dated June 22, 1989 regarding procurement and/or installation of computer hardware/system should be strictly adhered to.[7]

"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this case is hereby dismissed on the ground of prematurity and that it has become moot and academic with the mutual cancellation of the contract. The other claims of the parties are hereby denied. No pronouncement as to costs.
 
"SO ORDERED."[10]

"file in ten (10) days (1) their respective verified point-by-point comment under oath upon every allegation of the complaint in Civil Case No. 20,550-91 in the Regional Trial Court [RTC], Branch 12, Davao City "Dean Pilar C. Braga, et al. vs. Hon. Rodrigo Duterte," for Judicial Declaration of Nullity and Illegality of City Council of Davao Resolutions and Ordinances, and the Computer Contract executed Pursuant Thereto, for Recovery of Sum of Money, Professional Fees and Costs — with Injunctive Relief, including the Issuance of a Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction in which they filed a motion to dismiss, not an answer and (2) the respective comments, also under oath, on the Special Audit Report No. 91-05, a copy of which is attached."[11]

"That on or about November 5, 1990, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, both public officers, accused Rodrigo R. Duterte being then the City Mayor and accused Benjamin C. De Guzman being then the City Administrator of Davao City, committing the crime herein charged in relation to, while in the performance and taking advantage of their official functions, and conspiring and confederating with each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter into a negotiated contract for the purchase of computer hardware and accessories with the Systems Plus, Incorporated for and in consideration of the amount of Pesos:  Eleven Million Six Hundred Fifty-Six Thousand Eight Hundred Ten [P11,656,810.00], which contract is manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government, said accused knowing fully-well that the said acquisition cost has been overpriced by as much as twelve hundred [1200%] percent and without subjecting said acquisition to the required public bidding.
 
"Contrary to law."[13]

1. Petitioners were deprived of their right to a preliminary investigation, due process and the speedy disposition of their case;
 
2. Petitioner Duterte acted in good faith and was clothed with authority to enter into the subject contract;
 
3. There is no contract manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government since the subject contract has been duly rescinded.

It appears, however, that the accused were able to file Motions for the Reconsideration of the Resolution authorizing the filing of the Information herein with the Ombudsman in Manila. This would mean, therefore, that whatever decision which might have occurred with respect to the preliminary investigation would have been remedied by the motion for reconsideration in the sense that whatever the accused had to say in their behalf, they were able to do in that motion for reconsideration.
 
Considering the denial thereof by the Office of the Ombudsman, the Court does not believe itself empowered to authorize a reinvestigation on the ground of an inadequacy of the basic preliminary investigation nor with respect to a dispute as to the proper appreciation by the prosecution of the evidence at that time.
 
In view hereof, upon further representation by Atty. Medialdea that he represents not only Mayor Duterte but City Administrator de Guzman as well, upon his commitment, the arraignment hereof is now set for July 25, 1997 at 8:00 o'clock in the morning.[14]

THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DENYING PETITIONERS' MOTION TO QUASH AND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, CONSIDERING THAT:
 

[1] PETITIONERS WERE EFFECTIVELY DEPRIVED OF THEIR RIGHT TO A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO SEC. 4, RULE II OF ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 07 (RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN); and
 
[2] ASSUMING THAT A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION WAS PROPERLY CONDUCTED, THERE WAS AN INORDINATE DELAY IN TERMINATING THE SAME THEREBY DEPRIVING THEM OF THEIR RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF THE CASE.

THERE IS NO SUFFICIENT BASIS, IN FACT AND IN LAW, TO CHARGE PETITIONERS DUTERTE AND DE GUZMAN OF VIOLATING SEC. 3 (G) OF R.A. 3019 IN THAT:

[1] PETITIONER DUTERTE ACTED IN GOOD FAITH AND WAS CLOTHED WITH FULL LEGAL AUTHORITY FROM THE CITY COUNCIL TO ENTER INTO A CONTRACT WITH SYSTEMS PLUS, INC.;
 
[2] THERE IS NO CONTRACT MANIFESTLY AND GROSSLY DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GOVERNMENT TO SPEAK OF AS THE SAME HAS BEEN RESCINDED AND NO DAMAGE WAS SUFFERED BY THE CITY GOVERNMENT;
 
[3] ASSUMING THAT THE CONTRACT WAS NOT RESCINDED, THE SAME CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AS MANIFESTLY AND GROSSLY DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GOVERNMENT.[16]

Sec. 2. Evaluation. - Upon evaluating the complaint, the investigating officer shall recommend whether or not it may be:
 
(a) dismissed outright for want of palpable merit;
(b) referred to respondent for comment;
(c) endorsed to the proper government office or agency which has jurisdiction over the case;
(d) forwarded to the appropriate office or official for fact-finding investigation;
(e) referred for administrative adjudication; or
(f) subjected to a preliminary investigation.
 
xxx
 
Sec. 4. Procedure. - The preliminary investigation of cases falling under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and Regional Trial Courts shall be conducted in the manner prescribed in Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following provisions:
 
(a) If the complaint is not under oath or is based only on official reports, the investigating officer shall require the complainant or supporting witnesses to execute affidavits to substantiate the complaints.
 
(b) After such affidavits have been secured, the investigating officer shall issue an order, attaching thereto a copy of the affidavits and other supporting documents, directing the respondent to submit, within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, his counter-affidavits and controverting evidence with proof of service thereof on the complainant. The complainant may file reply affidavits within ten (10) days after service of the counter-affidavits.
 
(c) If the respondent does not file a counter-affidavit, the investigating officer may consider the comment filed by him, if any, as his answer to the complaint. In any event, the respondent shall have access to the evidence on record.
 
(d) No motion to dismiss shall be allowed except for lack of jurisdiction. Neither may a motion for a bill of particulars be entertained. If respondent desires any matter in the complainant's affidavit to be clarified, the particularization thereof may be done at the time of clarificatory questioning in the manner provided in paragraph [f] of this section.
 
(e) If the respondent cannot be served with the order mentioned in paragraph 6 hereof, or having been served, does not comply therewith, the complaint shall be deemed submitted for resolution on the basis of the evidence on record.
 
(f) If, after the filing of the requisite affidavits and their supporting evidences, there are facts material to the case which the investigating officer may need to be clarified on, he may conduct a clarificatory hearing during which the parties shall be afforded the opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine the witness being questioned. Where the appearance of the parties or witnesses is impracticable, the clarificatory questioning may be conducted in writing, whereby the questions desired to be asked by the investigating officer or a party shall be reduced into writing and served on the witness concerned who shall be required to answer the same in writing and under oath.
 
(g) Upon the termination of the preliminary investigation, the investigating officer shall forward the records of the case together with his resolution to the designated authorities for their appropriate action thereon.
 
No information may be filed and no complaint may be dismissed without the written authority or approval of the Ombudsman in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan or the proper Deputy Ombudsman in all other cases.

Even in investigations looking to the prosecution of a party, Rule I, Section 3 can only apply to the general criminal investigation, which in the case at bar was already conducted by the PCGG. But after the Ombudsman and his deputies have gathered evidence and their investigation has ceased to be a general exploratory one and they decide to bring the action against a party, their proceedings become adversary and Rule II Section 4[a] then applies. This means that before the respondent can be required to submit counter-affidavits and other supporting documents, the complainantt must submit his affidavit and those of his witnesses. This is true not only of prosecutions of graft cases under Rep. Act No. 3019 but also of actions for the recovery of unexplained wealth under Rep. Act No. 1379, because Section 2 of this latter law requires that before a petition is filed there must be a "previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigation in criminal cases."

Although such a preliminary investigation is not a trial and is not intended to usurp the function of the trial court, it is not a casual affair. The officer conducting the same investigates or inquires into the facts concerning the commission of the crime with the end in view of determining whether or not an information may be prepared against the accused. Indeed, a preliminary investigation is in effect a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the case. Sufficient proof of the guilt of the accused must be adduced so that when the case is tried, the trial court may not be bound as a matter of law to order an acquittal. A preliminary investigation has then been called a judicial inquiry. It is a judicial proceeding. An act becomes judicial when there is opportunity to be heard and for the production and weighing of evidence, and a decision is rendered thereof.

We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in the instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due process. Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary investigation, including substantial compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under the constitutional guarantee of "speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights [both in the 1973 and 1987 Constitution], the inordinate delay is violative of the petitioner's constitutional rights. A delay of close to three [3] years can not be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar. We are not impressed by the attempt of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay by indulging in the speculative assumption that "the delay may be due to a painstaking and grueling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation merited prosecution of a former high-ranking government official." In the first place, such a statement suggests a double standard of treatment, which must be emphatically rejected. Secondly, three out of the five charges against the petitioner were for his alleged failure to file his sworn statement of assets and liabilities required by Republic Act No. 3019, which certainly did not involve complicated legal and factual issues necessitating such "painstaking and grueling scrutiny" as would justify a delay of almost three years in terminating the preliminary investigation. The other two charges relating to alleged bribery and alleged giving of unwarranted benefits to a relative, while presenting more substantial legal and factual issues, certainly do not warrant or justify the period of three years, which it took the Tanodbayan to resolve the case.

Here, the Office of the Ombudsman, due to its failure to resolve the criminal charges against petitioner for more than six years, has transgressed on the constitutional right of petitioner to due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases against him, as well as the Ombudsman's own constitutional duty to act promptly on complaints filed before it. For all these past 6 years, petitioner has remained under a cloud, and since his retirement in September 1994, he has been deprived of the fruits of his retirement after serving the government for over 42 years all because of the inaction of respondent Ombudsman. If we wait any longer, it may be too late for petitioner to receive his retirement benefits, not to speak of clearing his name. This is a case of plain injustice which calls for the issuance of the writ prayed for.[25]

A painstaking review of the facts can not but leave the impression that political motivations played a vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutorial process in this case. Firstly, the complaint came to life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos. Secondly, departing from established procedures prescribed by law for preliminary investigation, which require the submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits by the complainant and the respondent and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential Security Command for fact-finding investigation and report.
 
We find such blatant departure from the established procedure as a dubious, but revealing attempt to involve an office directly under the President in the prosecutorial process, lending credence to the suspicion that the prosecution was politically motivated. We cannot emphasize too strongly that prosecutors should not allow, and should avoid, giving the impression that their noble office is being used or prostituted, wittingly or unwittingly, for political ends, or other purposes alien to, or subversive of, the basic and fundamental objective observing the interest of justice evenhandedly, without fear or favor to any and all litigants alike whether rich or poor, weak or strong, powerless or mighty. Only by strict adherence to the established procedure may be public's perception of the impartiality of the prosecutor be enhanced.[26]

In a number of cases, this Court has not hesitated to grant the so-called "radical relief" and to spare the accused from undergoing the rigors and expense of a full-blown trial where it is clear that he has been deprived of due process of law or other constitutionally guaranteed rights. Of course, it goes without saying that in the application of the doctrine enunciated in those cases, particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to its case.[27]