EN BANC
SELWYN
F. LAO,
Complainant,
A.C.
No.
5916
July 1, 2003
-versus-
ATTY.
ROBERT W.
MEDEL,
Respondent.
D
E C I S I
O N
PANGANIBAN,
J.:
The deliberate failure
to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross
misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with one-year
suspension
from the practice of law. The Case and the
Facts
This Administrative
Case stems from a Complaint-Affidavit[1]
filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar
Discipline
(IBP-CBD) by Selwyn F. Lao. Atty. Robert W. Medel was charged
therein
with dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct unbecoming an attorney.cralaw:red
The material averments
of the Complaint are summarized by the IBP-CBD in this wise:
"The Complaint arose
from the [respondent’s] persistent refusal to make good on four (4)
RCBC
checks totaling [t]wenty [t]wo [t]housand (P22,000.00) [p]esos.
These
dishonored checks were issued by defendant in replacement for previous
checks issued to the complainant. Based on the exchange of
letters
between the parties, it appears that [respondent], in a letter dated
June
19, 2001, had committed to ‘forthwith effect immediate settlement of my
outstanding obligation of P22,000.00 with Engr. Lao, at the earliest
possible
time, preferably, on or before the end of June 2000.’ Again, in a
letter dated July 3, 2000, the [respondent] made a ‘request for a final
extension of only ten (10) days from June 30, 2000 (or not later than
July
10, 2000), within which to effect payment of P22,000.00 to Engr.
Lao.’
Needless to say, the initiation of this present complaint proves that
contrary
to his written promises, Atty. Medel never made good on his dishonored
checks. Neither has he paid his indebtedness."[2]chanrobles virtual law library
In his Answer[3]
dated July 30, 2001, Atty. Medel reasons that because all of his
proposals
to settle his obligation were rejected, he was unable to comply with
his
promise to pay complainant. Respondent maintains that the
Complaint
did not constitute a valid ground for disciplinary action because of
the
following:
"(a). Under Sec.
27, Rule 138 of the Rules, a member of the Bar, may be disbarred or
suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice,
or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or
by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for
any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to
practice, or for a wil[l]ful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior
court, or for corruptly or wil[l]fully appearing as an attorney for a
party
to case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting
cases
at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents
or brokers, constitutes malpractice;
"(a.1). Applying
the afore-cited legal provision to the facts obtaining in the present
case,
it is clear that the offense with which the respondent is being charged
by the complainant, is merely a violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22
(B.P.
22, for brevity), which is a special law, and is not punishable under
the
Revised Penal Code (RPC, for brevity). It is self-evident
therefore,
that the offense is not in the same category as a violation of Article
315, paragraph 2, (d), RPC, which is issuing a post-dated check or a
check
in payment of an obligation, with insufficient funds in the drawee
bank,
through false pretenses or fraudulent acts, executed prior to or
simultaneously
with the commission of the fraud, which is a crime involving moral
turpitude;
"(b). If the respondent
is to be disciplined by the Supreme Court, under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of
the
Rules, for the issuance of a worthless check, in violation of B.P. 22,
for payment of a pre-existing obligation to the complainant, then,
verily,
the said Rule 138, Sec. 27, would be a cruel and an unjust law, which
the
Honorable Supreme Court would not countenance;
"(c). A careful
examination of the specific grounds enumerated, for disbarment or
suspension
of a member of the Bar, under Sec. 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules, clearly
shows beyond a shadow of doubt that the alleged issuance of a worthless
check, in violation of B.P. 22, is NOT one of the grounds for
disciplinary
action against a member of the Bar, to warrant his disbarment or
suspension
from his office as attorney, by the Supreme Court; andchanrobles virtual law library
"(d). The issuance
of a worthless check by a member of the Bar, in violation of B.P. 22,
does
NOT constitute dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct, under Canon 1
and
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. This is
because,
the door to the law profession swings on reluctant hinges. Stated
otherwise, unless there is a clear, palpable and unmitigated immoral or
deceitful conduct, of a member of the Bar, in violation of his oath as
an attorney, by the mere issuance of a worthless check, in violation of
B.P. 22, the Supreme Court is inclined to give the said attorney, the
benefit
of the doubt."[4]
On August 22, 2001,
complainant submitted his Reply.[5]
Thereafter, IBP-CBD Commissioner Renato G. Cunanan, to whom the case
was
assigned by the IBP for investigation and report, scheduled the case
for
hearing on October 4, 2001. After several cancellations, the
parties
finally met on May 29, 2002. In that hearing, respondent
acknowledged
his obligation and committed himself to pay a total of P42,000 (P22,000
for his principal debt and P20,000 for attorney’s fees).
Complainant
agreed to give him until July 4, 2002 to settle the principal debt and
to discuss the plan of payment for attorney’s fees in the next hearing.cralaw:red
On July 4, 2002, both
parties appeared before the IBP-CBD for their scheduled hearing.
But, while waiting for the case to be called, respondent suddenly
insisted
on leaving, supposedly to attend to a family emergency. Complainant’s
counsel
objected and Commissioner Cunanan, who was still conducting a hearing
in
another case, ordered him to wait. He, however, retorted in a
loud
voice, "It’s up to you, this is only disbarment, my family is more
important."[6]
And, despite the objection and the warning, he arrogantly left.
He
made no effort to comply with his undertaking to settle his
indebtedness
before leaving.chanrobles virtual law library
Report and
Recommendation
of the IBP
In his September 19,
2002 Report,[7]
Commissioner Cunanan found respondent guilty of violating the
attorney’s
oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. The former
explained
that, contrary to the latter’s claim, violation of BP 22 was a crime
that
involved moral turpitude. Further, he observed that ‘‘[w]hile no
criminal case may have been instituted against [respondent], it is
beyond
cavil that indeed, [the latter] committed not one (1) but four counts
of
violation of BP 22."[8]
The "refusal [by respondent] to pay his indebtedness, his broken
promises,
his arrogant attitude towards complainant’s counsel and the [commission
sufficiently] warrant the imposition of sanctions against him."[9]
Thus, the investigating commissioner recommended that respondent be
suspended
from the practice of law.cralaw:red
In Resolution No. XV-2002-598,[10]
the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted the Report and Recommendation
of Commissioner Cunanan and resolved to suspend respondent from the
practice
of law for two years. The Resolution, together with the records
of
the case, was transmitted to this Court for final action, pursuant to
Rule
139-B Sec. 12(b).
The Court’s Ruling
We agree with the findings
and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors, but reduce the period
of suspension to one year.
Administrative
Liability
of Respondent
Lawyers are instruments
for the administration of justice. As vanguards of our legal system,
they
are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high
standard
of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing.[11]
In so doing, the people’s faith and confidence in the judicial system
is
ensured.cralaw:red
In the present case,
respondent has been brought to this Court for failure to pay his debts
and for issuing worthless checks as payment for his loan from
complainant.
While acknowledging the fact that he issued several worthless checks,
he
contends that such act constitutes neither a violation of the Code of
Professional
Responsibility; nor dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.cralaw:red
The defense proffered
by respondent is untenable. It is evident from the records that
he
made several promises to pay his debt promptly. However, he
reneged
on his obligation despite sufficient time afforded him. Worse, he
refused to recognize any wrongdoing and transferred the blame to
complainant,
on the contorted reasoning that the latter had refused to accept the
former’s
plan of payment. It must be pointed out that complainant had no
obligation
to accept it, considering respondent’s previous failure to comply with
earlier payment plans for the same debt.chanrobles virtual law library
Moreover, before the
IBP-CBD, respondent had voluntarily committed himself to the payment of
his debts, yet failed again to fulfill his promise. That he had
no
real intention to settle them is evident from his unremitting failed
commitments.
His cavalier attitude in incurring debts without any intention of
paying
for them puts his moral character in serious doubt.cralaw:red
Verily, lawyers must
at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, to
the courts and to their clients. As part of those duties, they
must
promptly pay their financial obligations. Their conduct must
always
reflect the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility. On these considerations, the
Court may disbar or suspend lawyers for any professional or private
misconduct
showing them to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and
good
demeanor -- or to be unworthy to continue as officers of the Court.[12]
It is equally disturbing
that respondent remorselessly issued a series of worthless checks,
unmindful
of the deleterious effects of such act to public interest and public
order.[13]
Canon 1 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility mandates all members of the bar to obey
the laws of the land and promote respect for law. Rule 1.01
of the Code specifically provides that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." In Co v.
Bernardino,[14]
the Court considered the issuance of worthless checks as a violation of
this Rule and an act constituting gross misconduct. It explained
thus:
"The general rule is
that a lawyer may not be suspended or disbarred, and the court may not
ordinarily assume jurisdiction to discipline him for misconduct in his
non-professional or private capacity (In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 5569
[1923]).
Where, however, the misconduct outside of the lawyer's professional
dealings
is so gross a character as to show him morally unfit for the office and
unworthy of the privilege which his licenses and the law confer on him,
the court may be justified in suspending or removing him from the
office
of attorney (In Re Sotto, 38 Phil. 569 [1923]).chanrobles virtual law library
"The evidence on record
clearly shows respondent's propensity to issue bad checks. This
gross
misconduct on his part, though not related to his professional duties
as
a member of the bar, puts his moral character in serious doubt.
The
Commission, however, does not find him a hopeless case in the light of
the fact that he eventually paid his obligation to the complainant,
albeit
very much delayed.cralaw:red
"While it is true that
there was no attorney-client relationship between complainant and
respondent
as the transaction between them did not require the professional legal
services of respondent, nevertheless respondent's abject conduct merits
condemnation from this Court.cralaw:red
"As early as 1923, however,
the Court laid down in In Re Vicente Pelaez [44 Phil.567 (1923)]
the principle that it can exercise its power to discipline lawyers for
causes which do not involve the relationship of an attorney and client
x x x In disciplining
the
respondent, Mr. Justice Malcolm said: x
x
x As a general rule, a court will not assume jurisdiction to discipline
one of its officers for misconduct alleged to have been committed in
his
private capacity. But this is a general rule with many
exceptions
x x x. The nature
of the office, the trust relation which exists between attorney and
client,
as well as between court and attorney, and the statutory rules
prescribing
the qualifications of attorneys, uniformly require that an attorney
shall
be a person of good moral character. If that qualification is a
condition
precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of the
law,
it would seem to be equally essential during the continuance of the
practice
and the exercise of the privilege. So it is held that an attorney
will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his
profession,
but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional
duties,
which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the
privileges
which his license and the law confer upon him x
x
x.cralaw:red
"Ten years later, in
Piatt v. Abordo where the erring lawyer was suspended for one year from
the practice of law for attempting to engage in an opium deal, Justice
Malcolm reiterated that an attorney may be removed not only for
malpractice
and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not
related
to his professional duties which show him to be an unfit and unworthy
lawyer.
The courts are not curators of the morals of the bar. At the same
time the profession is not compelled to harbor all persons whatever
their
character, who are fortunate enough to keep out of prison. As
good
character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to
practice, when the attorney's character is bad in such respects as to
show
that he is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an
attorney,
the courts retain the power to discipline him x
x x Of all classes and professions, the lawyer
is most sacredly bound to uphold the law x
x
x and to that doctrine we give our unqualified support."
We likewise take notice
of the high-handed manner in which respondent dealt with Commissioner
Cunanan
during the July 4, 2002 hearing, when the former was expected to settle
his obligation with complainant. We cannot countenance the
discourtesy
of respondent. He should be reminded that the IBP has
disciplinary
authority over him by virtue of his membership therein.[15]chanrobles virtual law library
Thus, it was imperative
for him to respect the authority of the officer assigned to investigate
his case. Assuming that he had a very important personal matter
to
attend to, he could have politely explained his predicament to the
investigating
commissioner and asked permission to leave immediately.
Unfortunately,
the former showed dismal behavior by raising his voice and leaving
without
the consent of complainant and the investigating commissioner.cralaw:red
We stress that membership
in the legal profession is a privilege.[16]
It demands a high degree of good moral character, not only as a
condition
precedent to admission, but also as a continuing requirement for the
practice
of law.[17]
In this case, respondent fell short of the exacting standards expected
of him as a guardian of law and justice.[18]
Accordingly, administrative
sanction is warranted by his gross misconduct. The IBP Board of
Governors
recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for two
years.
However, in line with Co v. Bernardino,[19]
Ducat Jr. v. Villalon Jr.[20]
and Saburnido v. Madroño[21]- which also involved gross
misconduct
of lawyers - we find the suspension of one year sufficient in this case.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, Atty. Robert
W. Medel is found guilty of gross misconduct and is hereby SUSPENDED
for
one year from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this
Decision.
He is warned that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be
dealt
with more severely.cralaw:red
Let copies of this Decision
be entered in the record of respondent and served on the IBP, as well
as
on the court administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for
their
information and guidance.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo,
Puno, Vitug, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Corona,
Carpio-Morales,
Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ.,
concur.
Quisumbing, J., on leave.
Austria-Martinez, J.,
on official leave.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Dated April 2, 2001; rollo, pp. 1-5.
[2]
Report of the IBP-CBD, p. 1; rollo, p. 77.
[3]
Rollo, pp. 37-43.chanrobles virtual law library
[4]
Answer, pp. 3-5; id., pp. 39-41.
[5]
Rollo, pp. 44-46.
[6]
Report of the IBP Investigating Commissioner, p. 2; id., p. 78.
[7]
Id., pp. 77-79. The case was deemed submitted for decision on
February
1, 2003, for failure of respondent to file an appeal of the IBP-CBD
Board
of Governors’ Resolution No. XV-2002-598.
[8]
IBP-CBD’s Report, p. 2; Rollo, p. 78.
[9]
Ibid.chanrobles virtual law library
[10]
Resolution No. XV-2002-598; Rollo, p. 76.
[11]
Maligsa v. Atty. Cabanting, 338 Phil 912, May 14, 1997.
[12]
Ibid; Co v. Bernardino, AC No. 3919, January 28, 1998; Nakpil v.
Valdes,
286 SCRA 758, March 4, 1998; Calub v. Suller, 323 SCRA 556, January 28,
2000; Cruz v. Jacinto, 328 SCRA 636, March 22, 2000.chanrobles virtual law library
[13]
People v. Tuanda, 181 SCRA 692, January 30, 1990; citing Lozano v.
Martinez,
146 SCRA 324, 338 & 340, December 18, 1996.
[14]
Supra, per Bellosillo, J.
[15]
Toledo v. Abalos, 315 SCRA 419, September 29, 1999.chanrobles virtual law library
[16]
Dumadag v. Lumaya, 334 SCRA 513, June 29, 2000; Arrieta v. Llosa, 346
Phil
932, November 28, 1997; NBI v. Reyes, 326 SCRA 109, February 21,
2000.
[17]
Nakpil v. Valdes, supra; Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos, 285 SCRA 93, January 28,
1998; Co v. Bernardino, supra; Igual v. Javier, 324 Phil 698,
March
7, 1996.
[18]
Radjaie v. Alovera, 337 SCRA 244, August 4, 2000.chanrobles virtual law library
[19]
Supra.chanrobles virtual law library
[20]
337 SCRA 622, August 14, 2000.
[21]
366 SCRA 1, September 26, 2001.
chan
robles virtual law library |